fc_judgments: 12

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_id _item_id tags date court case-number title citation url counsel timestamp coram html _commit
12 7cbc478691028742da8316d23708ba3706e97053 
[
    "Family Law \u2013 Variation of Maintenance for Child \u2013 Variation of Division of Assets"
]
 2024-01-26 Family Court Divorce No 2465 of 2021 (Summons No 966 of 2023) WSG v WSF [2024] SGFC 7 https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F30975-SSP.xml 
[
    "David Nayar (David Nayar and Associates) for the Plaintiff",
    "Michelle Elizabeth Woodworth, Yap Tong, Hitomi (Quahe Woo & Palmer LLC) for the Defendant."
]
 2024-02-01T16:00:00Z[GMT] Kenneth Yap <root><head><title>WSG v WSF</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WSG <em>v</em> WSF </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30975-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 7</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Divorce No 2465 of 2021 (Summons No 966 of 2023)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">26 January 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Kenneth Yap </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> David Nayar (David Nayar and Associates) for the Plaintiff; Michelle Elizabeth Woodworth, Yap Tong, Hitomi (Quahe Woo &amp; Palmer LLC) for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WSG — WSF </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Variation of Maintenance for Child</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Variation of Division of Assets</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">26 January 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Kenneth Yap:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1       The Plaintiff in this case (hereinafter referred to as the Mother) sought to enforce maintenance arrears against the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the Father) in MSS 659/2023. In response, the Father filed FC/SUM 996/2023 for a downward variation of child maintenance and mortgage payments under the interim judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2       Both applications were consolidated to be heard together, with the Father’s application for variation proceeding first. In his application, the Father sought a reduction of his monthly payments from $10,700.00 to $1,000.00. On 4 October 2023, I allowed the variation in part, reducing the total monthly quantum payable by the Father from $10,700.00 to $8,800.00. Parties were then given time to consider amicable resolution of the Mother’s enforcement application in MSS 659/2023. As they were unable to resolve matters, the variation decision was finalised on 17 October 2023 with costs of $2,000.00 (all-in) awarded in favour of the Mother. The Mother’s enforcement application proceeded to trial thereafter and is still ongoing at the date of this judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3       Dissatisfied with the outcome of his application, the Father filed the present appeal against the variation order on 26 October 2023. I had earlier provided the parties with brief grounds on 4 October 2023. I now set out the full grounds of my decision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Facts</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The parties</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4       The parties were married on 8 August 2011. Ten years later, the Mother filed for divorce on 21 May 2021. Parties agreed to settle, and Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was entered into by consent on 14 July 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5       There is one child of the marriage, aged 11 years and attending Primary 5 at the time of hearing (henceforth referred to as “the Child”). The Father has two other children: an 18 year old son from his first marriage (“Child B”), and a 2 year old daughter (“Child C”) born outside of wedlock in June 2021. The Mother does not have any other children.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6       As part of the divorce proceedings, the parties reached an agreement on ancillary matters. Interim Judgment was entered into by consent on 14 July 2021 and judgment was made final on 18 October 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7       Under Order 3(a) of the IJ, the parties were granted joint custody, with shared care and control of the Child. Although the IJ specifies that the Child would be under the Mother’s care from Sunday 8.00 pm to Friday 8.00 pm, and under the Father’s care from Friday 8.00 pm to Sunday 8.00, in practice, parties resided in the same household after divorce until an incident on 30 March 2022.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8       The relevant financial terms of the IJ are as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_8-p2_a"></a>(a)      <b>Order 3(c)(a):</b> The Mother retains all rights, title and interest in the Scotts Property and the Father waives all rights and claims to the same, provided that he “shall be entitled to reside at the Scotts Property for as long as he wishes until the property is sold”.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_8-p2_b"></a>(b)      <b>Order 3(c)(b):</b> For as long as Child A is attending his present primary school, the Mother shall not sell the Scotts Property without the Father’s express consent. Upon the sale of the Scotts Property, the Mother shall use the sale proceeds of the Scotts Property for the sole purpose of purchasing another property in Singapore.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_8-p2_c"></a>(c)      <b>Order 3(c)(c):</b> Once the Child completes his education at his present primary school, the Mother would be at liberty to rent out the Scotts Property. She would not need the Father’s consent to sell the Scotts Property. The Father’s obligation to pay towards the mortgage and MCST fees of the Scotts Property would cease only when the Scotts Property was rented out or sold.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_8-p2_d"></a>(d)      <b>Order 3(f)(a):</b> The Mother would retain the sum of $612,080.00 in her UOB Bank Account, of which $500,000.00 would be held on trust for the Child to be utilised towards the child’s university education and related expenses, with the balance (if any) being applied towards the purchase of a home for the Child or towards starting a business for the Child. The balance sum of $112,080.00 would be utilised from 1 March 2021 to pay: $5,000.00 being monthly maintenance for the Child until the Child completes his first university education, and $5,700.00 being the Father’s contribution towards the monthly mortgage payments for the Scotts Property and MCST fees. Upon the depletion of the balance sum of $112,080.00 (“the ringfenced sum”), the Father shall pay to the Mother on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of every month the sum of $5,000.00 in monthly maintenance for the Child, and $5,700.00 being his contribution towards the monthly mortgage payments for the Scotts Property and MCST fees, until the Scotts Property is either rented out or sold.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The events after divorce </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9       On or around January 2022, the ringfenced sum of S$112,080.00 from which the Mother drew down the monthly payment of $10,700.00 was depleted<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>. The Father thereafter made direct payments to the designated UOB joint account of both parties for three months, after which he began to partially default on his payments from May 2022<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>. Total arrears currently stand at $134,700.00 at the time of hearing. The exact sums paid by the Father during the period of default are detailed in the table below:</p> <table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="Judg-2-tblr" frame="all" pgwide="1"><colgroup><col width="32.78%"><col width="33.18%"><col width="34.04%"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Month</b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Amount Paid</b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Amount Owing</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">May 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$6,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$4,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">June 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$6,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$4,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">July 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$10,700.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$0.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">August 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,700.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,000.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">September 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">October 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">November 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">December 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">January 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$7,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">February 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$2,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$8,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">March 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,500.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,200.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">April 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">May 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">June 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">July 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">August 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">September 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$0.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$10,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">October 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$0.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$10,700.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="r" colspan="2" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">Total Arrears:</p> </td><td align="left" class="" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1"> <b><u>$134,700.00</u></b> </p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear="left"><br clear="left"> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10     Despite the divorce, the parties had initially been able to reside together at the Scotts Property, until the occurrence of an unfortunate incident on 30 March 2022. On that evening, the Mother had brought her friend, a gym instructor, to the master bedroom of the Scotts Property. The Father returned and discovered the gym instructor disrobed in the Mother’s bedroom. An altercation ensued, which ended with the Father hitting the gym instructor on the head with a wine bottle. The police were called and the Father was arrested. After the Father’s arrest, the Mother changed the lock to the Scotts Property on 4 April 2022. The Father was not able to reside at the Scotts Property thereafter.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11     Arising from the incident, the Father was charged and convicted with a criminal offence, and was sentenced to serve a short detention order. At no point after the incident did the Mother apply for a personal protection order against the Father.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12     By way of footnote, the Father had attempted to include two screenshot images showing the Mother behaving intimately with the gym instructor in his reply affidavit. The Mother filed a summons to strike out these images in SUM 2774/2023 on the basis that they were irrelevant, scandalous and oppressive. The Father’s Counsel agreed to refile the affidavit without the offending photographs and the application was allowed by consent.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The applications</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13     The Wife commenced MSS 996/2023 on 23 March 2023, seeking enforcement of the maintenance arrears. A computation of the cumulative arrears to-date (i.e. as of 10 October 2023) stands at S$120,216.13 and the quantum of the arrears is not disputed<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14     The Father filed his variation application in FC/SUM 996/2023 on 29 March 2023, praying for the following:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_14-p2_a"></a>(a)     A reduction of the monthly maintenance payable to the Child to S$1000.00;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_14-p2_b"></a>(b)     A removal of the obligation to pay monthly mortgage payments of $5,700.00; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_14-p2_c"></a>(c)     Backdating of these variations to apply from 1 May 2022 or such other date that the Court deemed fit.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15     Directions were given on 27 June 2023 for parties to file reply affidavits to the other’s application, and to file a final affidavit in response thereafter. A total of 10 affidavits were filed in relation to both applications, as well as the Mother’s application to expunge the offensive photographs from the Father’s affidavit.</p> <table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="Judg-2-tblr" frame="all" pgwide="1"><colgroup><col width="19.44%"><col width="54.56%"><col width="26%"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b><u>Marking</u></b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b><u>Document</u></b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b><u>Date</u></b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HA1</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Affidavit in support of FC/SUM 996/2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">29 March 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HVAD1</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Voluntary Affidavit in Answer to W’s Request for Discovery dated 2 May 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">31 May 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HVAI2</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Voluntary Affidavit in Answer to W’s Request for Interrogatories dated 13 June 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">7 July 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HVAD2</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Voluntary Affidavit in Answer to W’s Request for Discovery dated 13 June 2023</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">7 July 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">WA1</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">W’s Affidavit in support of MSS 659 and in reply to HA1</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">19 July 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HA2</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Affidavit in response to WA1</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">10 August 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">WA2</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">W’s Further Affidavit in response to H’s fresh allegations in HA2</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">30 August 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">WA3</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">W’s Affidavit in support of W’s application in</p> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">FC/SUM 2774/2023 (“<b>SUM 2774</b>”) to expunge from the record the images at p. 70 and p.71 of HA2</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">30 August 2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">HA3</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">H’s Affidavit in Reply in SUM 2774</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">19 September</p> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">2023</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1">WA4</p> </td><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">W’s Final Affidavit in Reply in SUM 2774</p> </td><td align="left" class="" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">29 September</p> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">2023</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear="left"><br clear="left"> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Parties’ Cases</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Father’s Submissions</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16     The Father’s application to vary his maintenance obligations was premised on two grounds. First, he claimed that there was a material change in circumstances due to an increase in expenses that had resulted in his total outgoings exceeding his income (“the First Ground”). Secondly, he sought to rely on his eviction from the Scotts Property on 30 March 2022 as a material change that justified a rescission of his obligation to pay $5,700 towards the mortgage and MCST fees (“the Second Ground”).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17     With respect to the Father’s First Ground, the gist of his arguments were as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_17-p2_a"></a>(a)     There had been an increase in his expenses of $18,465.50 arising from (i) increased mortgage financing for his Marina Way Property held in his sole name, (ii) payment of rental for an alternative residence following his eviction from the Scotts Property, (iii) a rise in property tax for the Marina Way Property, and (iv) the need to make maintenance payments for the Child following the depletion of the ring-fenced funds. These components collectively amounted to $27,507.50<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span>, and with his other monthly expenses amounting to $6,607.15, as well as personal monthly expenses of $3,050 per month, far exceeded his salary of $8,000.00 per month.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_17-p2_b"></a>(b)     There had been an increase in his expenses in relation to the Father’s children outside of the marriage. The Father attributed the increase to (i) his obligation under a Consent Order entered on 18 November 2022 with his former wife to fully pay for Child B’s university education in Australia, the costs of which amounted to $$4,446.00 each month, and (ii) an increase in Child C’s expenses by about $1,000 each month.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_17-p2_c"></a>(c)     While the Father’s income had increased from $10,400.00 at the time of the IJ to $16,097.00 at present, the Mother’s income had increased more substantially from $8,000.00 to $15,000.00 per month.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_17-p2_d"></a>(d)     There has been a depletion of the Father’s savings because of an investment-related fraud by a Maybank remisier, which resulted in a loss to the Father of USD $1,200,000.00.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18     In addition, the Father submits that the maintenance sum of $5,000.00 for the Child is not justified, and he estimates that schooling, tuition and food costs for the Child only amount to $2,044.00 per month<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19     With respect to the Second Ground, the Father submits that his eviction from the Scotts Property amounted to a radical and material change in circumstances which released him from his obligation to contribute $5,700 towards the mortgage every month. He objected to the characterisation of this sum as part of child maintenance, and emphasised that his obligation under the IJ was to pay this sum only if the Scotts Property was not rented out or sold.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Mother’s Submissions </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20     The Mother took the position that the Consent Order was crafted to safeguard the living arrangements for the Child near his present school, and that the residence of the Father at the Scotts Property was therefore irrelevant. She submits that the component of $5,700 is for the Child’s housing needs, and formed part of the Father’s agreed maintenance obligations towards the Child<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span>. They should not therefore be varied as there was no change to the needs of the Child.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21     In response to the Father’s assertion that his financial standing had changed adversely, the Mother advanced the following arguments:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_a"></a>(a)     The Father’s expenses were already far more than this alleged income at the time of the Consent Order and his lifestyle and spending habits suggest that he is not in financial difficulty. Notably, at the time of the IJ, the Father’s alleged total monthly expenses of $22,124.20 were already more than twice his income of $10,400. Further, the alleged increases in the Father’s expenditure were anticipated and/or foreseeable by the Father<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_b"></a>(b)     It was incorrect for the Father to count the sum of $10,700.00 towards the alleged increase in his expenses to support his assertion of a change in circumstances, as the Father knew he would have to pay this sum once the ring-fenced monies were depleted<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_c"></a>(c)     The increase in the mortgage payable on the Marina Way Property (from $8,642.00 at the time of the IJ to $12,133.00 at present, i.e. an increase of $3,491.00) is offset by the increase in the Father’s rental income from renting out the Marina Way Property (from $6,300.00 at the time of the IJ to $9,300.00 per month presently, i.e. an increase of $3,000.00)<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_d"></a>(d)     The Father had already been incurring rental costs at the time of the Consent Order<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span>. The Mother alleged that the Father already rented a property to live with the mother of Child C until March 2021, after which he had rented another property (“the Bideford Property”). He was thus incurring rental costs even before the incident of 30 March 2022<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_e"></a>(e)     The Father had failed to give proper account of his earnings from the sale of his company TPL<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span>, from which he earned approximately $8,000,000.00 on or around March 2020.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_f"></a>(f)     The Father’s income had increased since the time of the Consent Order, and he had other actual and/or potential sources of income besides his salary and rental income<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>. In particular, the Father owns 45% of the shareholding of TFP, which had a sum of $1,787,273.96 in its bank accounts as at June 2023. The Father also owns 51% of the shareholding of EUTSPL, a company which was incorporated on 10 August 2022 after the IJ.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_g"></a>(g)     The Mother further invited the court to draw an adverse inference against the Father for a failure to provide full and frank disclosure of his financial resources and means, particular in respect of the proceeds from the sale of TPL<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_h"></a>(h)     The Mother also submitted that the Father’s lifestyle and spending habits suggested that he was still capable of sustaining his payment obligations. In the month of November 2022 alone, the Father’s expenses on food and beverage and entertainment related items from his American Express credit card statements alone amounted to $10,546.09, which was almost equivalent to the monthly maintenance of $10,700.00. The Father was also able to take overseas to Taiwan and Thailand in short succession for leisure and golf as recently as April 2023<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_i"></a>(i)     The Father’s obligation to pay the entirety of Child B’s overseas education and associated expenses was voluntarily and irresponsibly incurred. The Father’s maintenance obligations towards Child B had previously stood at $1,250.00 per month, and he had entered into a court order by consent in FC/SUM 2651/2022 to be responsible for Child B’s overseas education. The Mother noted that this consent order was dated 18 November 2022, some 6 months after the Father had begun to default on his payments obligations in May 2022<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_j"></a>(j)     The Father’s obligation to maintain Child C was already considered under the IJ, as Child C was born on 27 June 2021 and the IJ was entered into on 14 July 2021<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_k"></a>(k)     The Father’s change in circumstances, if any, had been self-induced<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_l"></a>(l)     The Father’s move out of the Scotts Property was self-induced. By assaulting the gym instructor, he had put himself in a situation where it was no longer appropriate for him to continue residing at the Scotts Property<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_m"></a>(m)     The mortgage for the Scotts Property had increased since the time of the IJ to $8,693.40. The Mother had not sought any upwards variation, and was only asking for the Father to honour his original promise to contribute $5,700.00 towards the Child’s housing needs<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_21-p2_n"></a>(n)     The Mother rejects the Father’s assertion that the Child’s expenses are inflated. She has had to borrow money from her family to make up for the shortfall in maintenance which the Father has refused to pay<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Law</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The power to vary maintenance orders </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22     The law empowers the Court to vary maintenance orders made in the matrimonial context where there has been a material change of circumstances. In this regard, sections 118 and 119 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) provide as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>Power of court to vary orders for maintenance</b> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>118</b>.    The court may at any time vary or rescind any subsisting order for maintenance… on the application of the person in whose favour or of the person against whom the order was made … where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>Power of court to vary agreements for maintenance</b> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>119</b>.    Subject to section 116, the court may at any time and from time to time vary the terms of any agreement as to maintenance made between Father and wife … where it is satisfied that there has been any material change in the circumstances and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any such agreement.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23     Section 127 of the Women’s Charter further provides that Parts 8 and 9 of the Women’s Charter apply, with the necessary modifications, to a maintenance order for children made pursuant to divorce proceedings. This requires the Court to consider the following two provisions under Part 8 relating to spousal and child maintenance. First, section 72(1) gives the Court the power to vary or rescind any maintenance order, provides further elucidation for the test for variation as set out in s118:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>Rescission and variation of order</b> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>72.</b>—(1)    On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance under this Part and <b><em>on proof of a change in the circumstances</em></b> of that person, his wife or child, or for <b><em>other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court</em></b>, the court by which the order was made may rescind the order or may vary it as it thinks fit. <em>[Emphasis added]</em></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(2)    Without prejudice to the extent of the discretion conferred upon the court by subsection (1), the court may, in considering any application made under this section, take into consideration any change in the general cost of living which may have occurred between the date of the making of the order sought to be varied and the date of the hearing of the application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24     Next, section 73 emphasises that any variation of child maintenance must be reasonable and must be in the welfare of the child:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>Power of court to vary agreement for maintenance of child</b> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>73</b>.    The court may, at any time and from time to time, vary the terms of any agreement relating to the maintenance of a child … notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in that agreement, where it is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child to do so.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The power to vary an order relating to division of assets</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25     The power of the Court to vary an order relating to the division of assets is found in section 112(4) of the Women’s Charter:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>112.</b>—(1)    The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, to order the division between the parties of any matrimonial asset or the sale of any such asset and the division between the parties of the proceeds of the sale of any such asset in such proportions as the court thinks just and equitable …</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(4)    The court may, at any time it thinks fit, extend, vary, revoke or discharge any order made under this section, and may vary any term or condition upon or subject to which any such order has been made.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26     In <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/16670-SSP-M.xml')">[2014] 4 SLR 559</a>, it was noted by the Court of Appeal that at [24] that “the invocation of s 112(4) is justified where a court order is unworkable to begin with, or has become unworkable as a result of new circumstances which have arisen”. Such new circumstances would have to change the situation such that the implementation of the order is radically different from what was intended, at [25]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">We are of the view that where new circumstances have emerged since the order was made which so radically change the situation so that to implement the order as originally made would be to implement something which is radically different from what was originally intended, this would amount to unworkability, and the court would make, inter alia, the necessary variations to deal with such unworkability…</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27     One significant difference between the variation of an order relating to division of assets as opposed to child maintenance is that in the latter, regard should be had to the welfare of the child when considering issues in relation to maintenance. This was underscored by the Court of Appeal in <em>AUA v ATZ</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19292-SSP.xml')">[2016] 4 SLR 674</a>, at [48]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Where the court is considering the issue of division of assets, the focus is on the <em>proprietary entitlements</em> of the parties to the marriage <em>inter se</em>. No interests of third parties like children are at stake. It therefore stands to reason that any agreement which has been freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties upon legal advice should be almost determinative of the outcome and the role of the court is greatly circumscribed: it is there only to ensure that the agreement would not effect injustice. In contrast, where the court is considering the issue of maintenance for the child, the focus of the court’s inquiry is the <em>financial needs</em> of the child – a <em>third party</em> who had no say in the conclusion of the agreement but whose interests are nevertheless directly implicated. In this context, the court assumes a more prominent custodial role and the overriding objective is that the welfare of the child must be safeguarded and adequate provision must be made for his/her upkeep.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Relevant factors in considering whether a material change justifies a variation</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28     Two further observations are apposite when the Court considers whether to vary the orders relating to maintenance or division of assets.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29     The first is that the courts generally attach significant weight to an agreement relating to financial matters in a divorce. In <em>AUA v ATZ</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19150-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGCA 41</a>, Chao Hick Tin JA noted at [31] that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">It is a matter of common sense and justice that the existence of an agreement for the division of matrimonial assets in contemplation of divorce should be accorded due weight when the court decides what is a just and equitable distribution.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">His Honour went on to observe, at [32], that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">Simply put, if parties have reached an agreement on division which they have <em>freely and advisedly entered into</em>, then it is surely “just and equitable” that the terms of this agreement are adhered to. We recognise that the distributions accepted in a postnuptial agreement will not necessarily reflect what the parties would have received had they gone to court for adjudication. However, this can hardly be surprising. All settlement agreements, no less marital agreements, are a product of compromise. The distributions entered into reflect the benefits, both tangible (in terms of saved legal costs) and intangible (the psychological value of repose), of dispute avoidance. Parties often accept less than what they would otherwise properly be entitled to in order to find closure. This is entirely understandable, and it is also to be expected and respected.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30     In the context of agreements on maintenance, the court would also be circumspect in varying an order reached by consent, as parties are in the best position to appreciate their own financial circumstances, and may have made compromises or concessions that were pre-conditions to settlement. This was observed by the court in <em>UNC v UND</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22031-SSP.xml')">[2018] SGFC 62</a> (“<em>UNC</em>”) at [24(b) – (e)]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(b)    In this regard, agreements for maintenance are different from general orders for maintenance as the terms reached were those constructed by the parties themselves. The parties are in the best position to appreciate their own circumstances, and to decide what allowances or concessions to make.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(c)    Given their special position, the proposals and agreements they make carries with it a <em>greater legitimate expectation</em> that they would be fulfilled. It is for this reason why the Court of Appeal in <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0924.xml')">[2013] 1 SLR 924</a>, in the context of varying of consent orders relating to matrimonial assets, stated (at [25]) that any new circumstances must “radically change” the original intent of the order for it to be aried. This underscores the seriousness the courts place in agreements reached between parties.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(d)    In the premises, parties are, in my view, expected to ensure that they have done the necessary due diligence to ensure a reasonable level of robustness to their promises…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(e)    Accordingly, if a party had constructed the agreement such that he or she were placed in a situation where any change would affect the ability to satisfy the terms of the agreement, this Court should be more circumspect in granting the variation sough after. A party who knowingly enters into a bad or unsustainable bargain cannot subsequently seek refuge from this Court to seek absolution for their own failures. To allow this would make a mockery of parties’ legitimate interests in reaching an amicable resolution of their disputes. It would also devalue the oft-overlooked fact that their agreement has now been clothed with the stature and force of a court order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31     The second observation I would make is that foreseeable and/or self-induced changes of circumstance would not provide sufficient justification for variation. In the Law and Practice of Family Law in Singapore (Foo Siew Fong gen ed) (Sweet &amp; Maxwell Asia 2016) (“Law and Practice”), it was noted at [7.4.35] that parties cannot rely on foreseeable changes of circumstance to justify variation of an agreement:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">What constitutes material change justifying a variation of an agreement for maintenance necessitates a comparison of the present circumstances of the parties with the circumstances when they entered in the agreement. Where an <b>upcoming material change was expected to happen and known to the parties at the time of making the agreement</b>, the party agreeing to pay cannot make use of such a change in circumstances to later seek variation of the maintenance agreement. [<em>Emphasis added</em>].</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32     Where the material change is self-induced, a variation would similarly be disallowed. In the Court of Appeal decision of <em>CDV v CDW</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25101-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGCA 100</a>, Steven Chong JA noted at [88] that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">In the context of an application to vary a maintenance order, it is well established that a variation will be disallowed if the adverse change is circumstances is self-induced (see, for example, <em>UNC v UND</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22031-SSP.xml')">[2018] SGFC 62</a> at [24]; <em>VCF v VCG</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23778-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGFC 120</a> at [58]; and <em>UWY v UWZ</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23246-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGFC 60</a> at [22]). It seems to us that there is no reason why this principle should not apply in a similar manner in the context of an application to vary an order for the division of matrimonial assets. Where the order becomes unworkable due to a self-induced change in circumstances, the court should not permit a variation.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33     In a similar vein, it was pointed out in <em>UNC v UND</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22031-SSP.xml')">[2018] SGFC 62</a> (“<b><em>UNC</em></b>”) at [23] that “if a change was foreseeable or self-induced, this would not justify a variation”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34     In essence, it can be discerned that for a variation of maintenance to be granted:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_34-p2_a"></a>(a)     The Applicant cannot rely on a circumstance or fact that existed at the time the agreement was constructed between parties.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_34-p2_b"></a>(b)     If the change relied upon was foreseeable or self-induced, it would not justify a variation.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_34-p2_c"></a>(c)     The Applicant has to prove a change in the circumstances that is “material” and in the context of any variation of the maintenance of a child, it has to be reasonable and in the welfare of the child to do so.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35     Bearing in mind the parties’ positions and the relevant law, I considered the following issues in arriving at my decision:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_35-p2_a"></a>(a)     Whether the Father’s financial situation presents a material a change of circumstances that warrants a downward variation from the monthly child maintenance of $5,000.00;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_35-p2_b"></a>(b)     Whether the Father’s eviction from the Scotts Property constitutes a material of change in circumstance that justifies a downward variation of the monthly mortgage payment and MCST fee of $5,700.00; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_35-p2_c"></a>(c)     Whether any downward variation should be backdated to May 2022, which is the first date of default.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Issue 1: Whether the change in the Father’s financial position constitutes a material change in circumstances that justifies a variation of the child maintenance orders </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36     Having reviewed the evidence and submissions, I disagreed with the Father’s First Ground that the rise in his expenses justified a downward revision of his monthly payments.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37     The first observation I would make is that the Father’s net income had risen since the IJ. The Father had two sources of income, being salary from TFP, which had risen from $4,000.00 to $8,000.00 over the material period, and rental returns from his Marina Way Property. With regard to the latter, while mortgage repayments had risen amidst higher interest rates, this was mitigated by a corresponding rise in rental. From the table below, it can be seen the Father saw an increase of $3,3134.50 in his net income, from $1,358.00 at the point of the IJ to $4,492.50 at present:</p> <table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="Judg-2-tblr" frame="all" pgwide="1"><colgroup><col width="21.5756848630274%"><col width="25.0949810037992%"><col width="23.995200959808%"><col width="29.3341331733653%"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"></p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>At the time of the Consent Order</b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Current</b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="center" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Remarks</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="b" colspan="4" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Income</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Salary</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$4,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$8,000.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Rental Income </p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$6,400.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,300.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="b" colspan="4" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Expenses</b> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Mortgage, Marina Way (H’s sole property)</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$8,642.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$12,133.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Tenanted Periods: </p> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">27 March 2021 – 26 March 2023; 14 April 2023 – current</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Property Tax</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$400</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$674.50</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1"> </p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1"> <b>Net income</b> </p> </td><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,358.00</p> </td><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$4,492.50</p> </td><td align="left" class="" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Increase of $3,134.50</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear="left"><br clear="left"> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38     It is trite that a material change in expenses <em>per se</em> would not be sufficient to warrant a variation if the applicant has seen a corresponding rise in income. In the Court of Appeal case of <em>BZD v BZE</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24080-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGCA 1</a>, the father in that case had sought to reduce child maintenance on the basis that educational expenses borne by him had increased significantly following the children’s relocation to the U.K. In declining the variation, Steven Chong JA observed, at [14] and [15]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">14.    First, in examining the question of material change in circumstances, the inquiry is not simply whether there has been any material change <em>per se</em> since the Maintenance Order. The change must be sufficiently <em>material</em> such that it is no longer fair to expect the <em>status quo</em> to remain… Here, there is no dispute that the Father’s increase in income significantly outstrips the increase in the children’s educational expenses … No suggestion has been made that the Father is unable to afford the increase in the educational expense and indeed the evidence militates against it.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">15.    Second, the increase in the children’s educational expenses cannot be said to be unforeseeable… The Father must therefore have foreseen that he would have to find means of independently financing the increased educational expenses resulting from the children’s move. There is also no suggestion that the children moving to the UK to pursue their studies was an unexpected and sudden decision. Accordingly, we do not consider the increased educational expenses to constitute a material change of the circumstances under s 118 of the Women’s Charter.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39     On the present facts, the phenomenon of an interest rate hike should have been reasonably foreseeable to any property investor. It was incumbent upon the Father to have made provision for such fluctuation, before agreeing to the terms of the consent judgment. In any case, the change was not material as the rise in his income could clearly cover the increased monthly outflow occasioned by the retention of the Marina Way Property. There was therefore no change in circumstance that was sufficiently material to expect a change of the status quo. I would venture to add that, even if the Father had experienced a net loss, there was no explanation as to why he could not sell this non-performing asset in order to reduce his monthly outflow.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40     I turn next to consider the increase in maintenance obligations towards Child B and Child C. With regard to Child B, the Father’s maintenance obligations were increased from $1,250.00 per month to $4,446.00, on account of the Father agreeing to a consent judgment dated 18 November 2022 in proceedings brought by his ex-wife to render him solely responsible for cost of university education for Child B in Australia. The Mother argues that this increase is voluntary and self-induced, and was unfair because it apportioned resources to child B even though the Father had been in arrears of his payment obligations for five months at that point. To be fair to the Father, I would not consider the increased expenditure to be self-induced simply because it arose from a consent judgment. By the Father’s explanation, Child B needed to take up overseas education as he was struggling academically at junior college. Nevertheless, I noted that this change of circumstance was foreseeable and could not for that reason justify a variation. Child B was nearly 17 years of age at the point where parties entered into the IJ by consent on 14 July 2021. The need for overseas education would have been foreseeable at that point, and the Father should have provisioned for this accordingly. I would therefore not consider Child B’s university expenses to be sufficiently material to justify a variation for the purposes of s 118 of the Women’s Charter.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41     As for Child C, the Father submits that there is a monthly increase of $400 in paediatric costs and $600 in miscellaneous costs for the upkeep of the child. I note that Child C was born in June 2021, one month before the IJ was entered into. Any normal and reasonable costs in relation to the bringing up of a toddler would have been completely foreseeable at that point. The Father has not shown that the costs currently incurred by Child C are in any way unusual or unexpected. These costs likewise cannot justify a downward variation of maintenance for the Child.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42     I would add that even if expenses had risen for the Father’s other children such that there was a need for financial belt tightening, there was no reason why such austerity should be visited only on the Child of this marriage. It is incumbent upon the Father to manage and balance his obligations towards all his children equally and fairly, and not allocate sacrifices arbitrarily to any particular child.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43     The third change of circumstance the Father seeks to rely on is a depletion of his savings. It was submitted by Counsel for the Father that the Father’s expenses stood at a sum of $46,035.23, far exceeding his disclosed monthly income of $16,097.00, resulting in a monthly deficit of $29,938.23<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span>. The Father also highlights that his financial position has suffered greatly due to a loss of USD 1,200,000.00 which he suffered due to a fraud perpetrated by his Maybank remisier.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44     I disagreed with the Father’s characterisation that his savings had been depleted for several reasons.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45     First, it was clear that he had entered into the IJ on the basis that he would be drawing down on his savings rather than relying on his income to meet his payment obligations. The fact that, following the depletion of the ringfenced sum, he is now out of pocket on a monthly basis cannot <em>ipso facto</em> mean that he is facing financial difficulty. It is incumbent upon the Father to be prudent in financial planning to ensure that he retains sufficient savings to make good on the agreed payments when they materialise.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46     Indeed, as earlier cited, it is clear that a party who “knowingly enters into a bad or unsustainable bargain cannot subsequently seek refuge from (the) Court to seek absolution from their own failures”: see <em>UNC</em> at [24(e)]. Where parties have voluntarily entered into an agreement following negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that the terms entail a reasonable level of contemplation and sustainability. The Court should be wary to disturb the sanctity of such agreement, save where the change in circumstances is not reasonably foreseeable <em>and</em> fidelity to the terms presents a radical departure to the financial standing of the applicant. Hence, on the facts of <em>UNC</em>, the court held that the father who entered into a consent order to pay maintenance and relied on his savings to fund such payments could not later rely on the depletion of those savings as a material change of circumstance, at [27]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">In this regard, I was of the view that the depletion of the sale proceeds was not a material change in circumstance at the time he made the agreement to the present time. On the plaintiff’s own miscalculations, he was already dipping into the sale proceeds <em>before any change to his salary</em>. In other words, the depletion was not directly linked to the plaintiff’s reduction in salary. The depletion of the sale proceeds was not an event which the plaintiff could not have foreseen. On the contrary, the plaintiff knew or would have known that the depletion of sale proceeds was a real eventuality in the future. The fact that the plaintiff was required to dip into the sale proceeds at the outset underscored the unsustainability of his agreement under the IJ, and his financial management as a whole.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47     Second, the Father’s total asset worth is not entirely clear and it is therefore difficult to conclude that his asset base is near depletion. He was by all accounts a successful businessman and had on 3 March 2020 sold the shares in his company, TPL to Under Armour Europe B.V., for which he received approximately US$5,600.000 (equivalent to about S$8,000,000). In his reply affidavit, the Father accounted for these funds as follows<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span>:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_47-p2_a"></a>(a)     He had invested the proceeds in businesses that the Mother runs, with all proceeds debited into his Singapore UOB account;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_47-p2_b"></a>(b)     He had bought the Mother gifts over the years;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_47-p2_c"></a>(c)     Investments were made toward the end of 2020 and the restaurant business that the Mother now runs began operations in December 2020.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_47-p2_d"></a>(d)     Prior to the sale of the business, the father had transferred money to the Mother to buy a property in Shanghai, and had transferred other assets to her and made monthly payments to her.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48     These responses lack specificity, and no documentary evidence was provided to trace the whereabouts of the $8 million.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span>. At the hearing, the Father’s counsel sought leave to file a further affidavit to address this issue, but this was declined as the hearing had already proceeded in earnest and in my view, the Father should have taken the opportunity early on to respond to and clarify this averment in his reply affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49     I would add that the Mother had requested that the Court draw an adverse inference for the Father’s failure to provide full and frank disclosure in relation to the proceeds of the sale of TPL. I declined to go to such an extent, because no discovery application had been filed by the Mother following voluntary disclosure by the Father. Nevertheless, I was of the view that the Father had done himself no favours by failing to fully account how he had managed to deplete the S$8 million over a period of about two years from the receipt of the funds in March 2020 to May 2022, when he first started to default on payments. The evidential burden lies with the Father to demonstrate how such a substantial sum of money was no longer available, and the lack of a satisfactory explanation casts significant doubt on his claim that his savings had been depleted by the time of the variation application on 29 March 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50     Further, it appears that the Father has other assets that can be applied towards his payment obligations. He owns 45% of the shares in TFP and is in the board of directors of TFP<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>. He is also a director of EUTSPL, a company incorporated following the Consent Order, in which he is a 51% shareholder<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span>. There is no satisfactory explanation of why the Father considers himself to be impecunious despite his substantial shareholdings in both companies, which are going concerns. Turning to other assets, the Father could also choose to liquidate the Marina Way Property in order to improve liquidity until his business fortunes improve. He also owns other valuable assets, in the form of three motor vehicles: a Mercedes-Benz SLS AMG Coupe and Harley Davidson Roadster, which are fully paid up<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span>, and a Mercedes-Benz E200 AMG Line, which has an outstanding loan of $74,704.00.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span> There is no indication why any of these assets could not be sold to cover the increased expenses faced by the Father.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51     Third, I turn to the Father’s reliance on his loss to a fraudulent trader in the sum of USD 1.2 million as a reason for his financial difficulties<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span>. While this was an unfortunate incident, it should be remembered that an investor incurs risk for return and must perform the necessary due diligence to safeguard his investment. The Father had acted on his own volition by choosing to invest in products purportedly offered by the remisier. It would be inequitable for him to now evade his obligations under the IJ to cover his incurred losses. Further, given that there are gaps in the asset position of the Father, it is difficult to ascertain the precise impact that the fraud had on his overall financial standing.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52     Fourth, I find the Father’s spending patterns to be in conflict with his purported impecuniosity. A snapshot of his personal expenses on a single credit card in the month of November 2022 shows that he had spent $39,626.61 on food and beverage, entertainment and luxury items in the month of November 2022 alone, despite having been in arrears since May 2020. The extracted entries from his credit card is tabulated as follows<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span>:</p> <table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="Judg-2-tblr" frame="all" pgwide="1"><colgroup><col width="26.04%"><col width="55.08%"><col width="18.88%"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Date of Transaction*</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Description*</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Amount*</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">9 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">KStar Entertainment Pte Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,211.10</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">9 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Edrington Singapore Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$738.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">11 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Zouk – Capital Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,789.04</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">11 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Tin Box Group Singapore Pte Ltd</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,031.05</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">11 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Emperor Watch and Jewel Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$9,650.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">13 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Edrington Singapore Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$5,869.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">16 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">District 9 Orchard Hotel Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$3,546.87</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">18 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">The Clubroom Singapore </p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,749.24</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">19 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Emperor Watch and Jewel Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$12,040.00</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">23 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="br" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Viagogo Event Tickets Geneva</p> </td><td align="left" class="b" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$1,379.31</p> </td></tr><tr><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">30 Nov 2022</p> </td><td align="left" class="r" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="justify" class="Table-Para-1">Off White SG @ Paragon Singapore</p> </td><td align="left" class="" rowspan="1" valign="top"> <p align="right" class="Table-Para-1">$623.00</p> </td></tr></tbody></table><br clear="left"><br clear="left"> <p class="Judg-2"><a id=""></a>*As reflected in the Father’s American Express Credit Card Statement. This list of transactions is non-exhaustive.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53     Apart from the above, other personal expenses by the Father include the purchase of wine as a gift at the 1855 The Bottle Shop, Singapore on 24 January 2023, amounting to $653.00 on 24 January 2023<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span>. He had also purchased three gift watches worth $9,650.00, $12,040.00 and $7,900 on 11 November 2022, 19 November 2022 and 22 April 2023 respectively. In his reply to interrogatories, the Father confirmed that one watch was purchased on behalf of a friend from Malaysia, one watch was a gift to his ex-staff, and another was purchased for his own investment<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span>. The Father has also clarified that he had made a purchase of a limited-edition whisky for a sum of $125,000.00 as an investment on behalf of EUTSPL, by taking out a shareholder’s loan<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54     It is particularly telling that the Father had seen fit to spend large sums on luxury items, entertainment and gifts, while claiming that his savings had been depleted by increasing expenditure and his loss to fraud of USD 1.2 million. Taken in totality, I find that the Father’s spending habits and lifestyle patterns are not those of somebody who was as impecunious as he claimed to be (see in this regard, <em>TOF v TOE</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/26792-SSP.xml')">[2021] 2 SLR 976</a>, at [55]). For this reason, I do not consider there to be any material change due to depleted savings that would justify downward revision. I further did not find any reason to doubt that the continued payment of $5,000.00 in child maintenance would be to the benefit of the child’s welfare.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55     At this point, I would add a footnote to address the Father’s argument that his contributions be reduced on account of the Mother’s income having increased from $8,000.00 to $15,000.00 per month. To my mind, the Father’s level of discretionary expenditure revealed above clearly puts paid to this argument. If he can spend nearly $40,000 in one month on luxuries and entertainment, then it cannot lie in his mouth to require the Mother to shoulder a greater share of the maintenance and mortgage sums in his stead.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56     I accordingly found the Father’s First Ground that there was a shortfall between his expenses and income due to rising expenses to be insufficient to reduce his maintenance payments. The Father still possesses considerable resources, and has yet to demonstrate that his cash and assets had depleted to such an extent that it would be inequitable for him to continue his monthly payments. To succeed in this or any subsequent variation application, the Father has to show that his resources are exhausted to the point that it is inequitable to expect him to honour his obligations under the agreed terms of the IJ. He cannot, merely two years after the consent judgment, expect the Mother to share his financial burdens for the sole purpose of preserving his current asset base.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Issue 2: Whether the Father’s eviction from the Scotts Property constitutes a material change in circumstances that justifies a variation of the mortgage payments </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57     Turning to the Father’s Second Ground, I did find greater traction with his argument that his eviction from the Scotts Property on 4 April 2022 justified a reduction of the mortgage payments.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58     The Father was effectively denied his licence to stay at the premises when the Mother changed the locks to the Scotts Property on 4 April 2022. This was a breach of the terms of Order 3(c)(a) of the IJ, and I did not find it to be justified on the basis of safety considerations. While the Father’s initial reaction in the altercation was wrong, he had been convicted of a criminal charge and had paid the price for his actions. I did not see that that his singular action necessitated a complete eviction from the property. Parties were still on talking terms thereafter and could have established the necessary boundaries that were required for divorced partners to stay under the same roof for the sake of the child. For example, a clear demarcation of living areas and the installation of room locks could have ensured that proper boundaries would be observed between the parties. I also note that the Mother did not see fit to apply for a personal protection order against the Father in the aftermath of the incident.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59     It follows that I do not accept the Mother’s argument that the Father’s eviction was self-induced, i.e. that his eviction was necessitated by his behaviour on the evening of 30 March 2022. The Mother also seeks to resist the variation on the basis that the payment of $5,700 should be characterised as part of child maintenance, and as the needs of the child had not changed, there would be no justification to reduce the payment even if the Father no longer enjoyed the use of the property. However, I did not find this categorisation to be accurate. Under the IJ, the Father’s obligation to pay $5,700 towards mortgage repayments and MCST fees would terminate when the Scotts Property was rented out or sold (per Order 3(c)(c) and 3(f)(a)(iii)(b)), and it was further provided that the Mother could unilaterally sell the Scotts Property after the Child ceases to attend his present primary school (Clause 3(c)(b)). Accordingly, the obligation to pay $5,700 was not envisaged as a contribution towards the child’s maintenance. It is apparent that the preservation of the Father’s right to stay in the Scotts Property (despite a transfer of title to the Mother in the division of assets) was designed to provide continuity for the child to reside near his primary school, and to facilitate shared care and control by both parents under the same roof post-divorce for this limited period.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_60"></a>60     Instead, I was of the view that the payment of $5,700 represented the Father’s obligation to pay the imputed rental for the family nucleus to continue residing at the Scotts Property during the Child’s primary school years. That being the case, I did not agree that the Father’s eviction justified the termination of his obligation to pay in entirety. The consent judgment did not specifically provide that the Father’s right to stay was a condition precedent of his payment. Nevertheless, as the Father no longer receives the benefit of living in the Scotts Property, it is equitable for the mortgage payment obligation to be pro-rated accordingly. I therefore apportioned the mortgage payment in equal shares between the three family members, and determined that while the Father should be released from paying his share of the mortgage payment, he should continue to pay two thirds of the mortgage payment for the continued benefit of the Wife and the Child. Hence, the mortgage payment would be reduced by a third from $5,700 to $3,800, and consequentially, the term guaranteeing the Father’s entitlement to reside in the Scotts Property (under clause 3(c)(a)) would be deleted from the IJ.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_61"></a>61     For completeness, I did consider the Father’s argument that his alternative rental cost of $4,000.00 a month should be taken into consideration in the downward variation. I would simply point out that the loss of his right to reside as one of three family members in the Scotts Property did not necessitate the need to rent an entire apartment for himself. The reduction of $1,700.00 in his payment obligations would be sufficient to allow him to find shared accommodation in another equivalent property. I accordingly did not adjust the pro-ration on account of this argument.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Issue 3: Whether the variation should be backdated </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_62"></a>62     The Father had sought for any variation of the terms of the IJ to be backdated to the 30 March 2022 incident. I declined to do so for the reason that the Father was aware of but did not seek to vary the IJ until one year later on 29 March 2023. I did not see why the Father could not have filed for variation earlier, given that he had by his own account experienced financial difficulties that led to default on the payments since May 2022. Further, to retrospectively backdate the reduced sum may unduly prejudice the Mother. For this reason, I declined to backdate the variation, and directed that the reduced sum of $3,800 for the mortgage repayment should apply from the date of the application on 29 March 2023. The reduced sum would thus take effect for payments from 1 April 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_63"></a>63     With respect to costs, Counsel for the Father submitted that parties bear their own costs on the basis that the Father had succeeded in two out of the four prayers that he had sought<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_36" id="Ftn_36_1"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span>, whilst Counsel for the Mother sought costs of $2,500.00 and $1,722.00 in disbursements<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_37" id="Ftn_37_1"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span>. Counsel for the Mother noted that while the Father had succeeded in varying the mortgage payment, the Court had only granted a reduction of less than 20% of the total payment obligation, which was significantly less than the Father’s position to reduce more than 90% of the total payment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_64"></a>64     Given that the final outcome was significantly nearer to the Mother’s position, I moderated the full measure of costs and awarded $2,000.00 (all-in) in favour of the Mother.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_65"></a>65     The orders made in relation to the Father’s summons for variation in FC/SUM 996/2023 stand as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_65-p2_a"></a>(a)     The Interim Judgment dated 14<sup>th</sup> July 2021 be varied by amending the sum of “S$5,700.00” in Order 3(f)(a)(iii)(b) to “S$3,800.00”.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_65-p2_b"></a>(b)     The Defendant shall pay the amended sum of S$3,800.00 pursuant to Order 3(f)(a)(iii) from 1 April 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_65-p2_c"></a>(c)     Order 3(c)(a) be amended to delete the phrase, “PROVIDED ALWAYS that the Defendant shall be entitled to reside at the Scotts Property for as long as he so wishes until the property is sold.”</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_65-p2_d"></a>(d)     Costs of $2,000.00 (all-in) be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>HA1, [10]; confirmed at Wife’s Reply Affidavit (Affidavit in support of MSS 659/2023) dated 19 July 2023 (“WA1”), [24].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>WA1, [25].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence dated 10 October 2023; see also Correspondence to Court dated 10 October 2023 filed by Wife’s Counsel, Tab A.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>HA1, [13].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>HA1, [21]-[23].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>HA1, [37].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Father’s Written Submissions dated 2 October 2023 (“FWS”), [10]-[13].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Wife’s Affidavit in support of MSS 659/2023 filed on 19 July 2023 (“WA1”), [6]-[7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>Wife’s Written Submissions dated 2 October 2023 (“WWS”), [26], [28], [38].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>WWS, [29].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>WWS, [30].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>WWS, [31]-[32].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>WA1, [32].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>WWS, [33].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>WWS, [36]-[37].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>WWS, [35].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>WWS, [40]-[42].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>WWS, [47]-[49].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>WWS, [29(b)]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>WWS, [44] – [46].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>WWS, [51].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>WWS, [55].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>WWS, [56].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>FWS, [127].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>HA1, [9]-[10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>WA1, [11]-[12].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>WA1, [52], Tab 10, DDX-1; HA1, pages 33-37, ADWS-1.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>WA1, [52], Tab 8, DDX-1.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>See Father’s Answers to Request for Discovery dated 13 June 2023, [7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>See Father’s Answers to Request for Discovery dated 13 June 2023, [7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>Father’s Affidavit re-filed on 11 October 2023 (“HA2”) [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>Father’s Affidavit (Answers to Request for Interrogatories dated 2 May 2023) dated 31 May 2023 (“HAI1”), pages 40-42.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>HAI1, page 36.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>Father’s Affidavit (Answers to Request for Interrogatories dated 13 June 2023) dated 7 July 2023 (“HAI2”), [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup>HAI2, [51]; HAD2, [43].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_36_1" id="Ftn_36">[note: 36]</a></sup>Correspondence to Court dated 11 October 2023 filed by Father’s Counsel.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_37_1" id="Ftn_37">[note: 37]</a></sup>Correspondence to Court dated 11 October 2023 filed by Wife’s Counsel.</p></div></content></root> 1280

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