fc_judgments: 31
Data source: lawnet.sg/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources
This data as json
| _id | _item_id | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _commit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | 277ddc82bbf4a457c6fa62c7ae8d7460de256344 | [
"Family Law \u2013 Riddick undertaking",
"Family Law \u2013 Jurisdiction \u2013 Property legally owned by third party",
"Family Law \u2013 Procedure \u2013 Leave to file third ancillary affidavit"
] |
2024-05-15 | Family Court | D 1206/2020 (FC/RA 1/2024) | WWK v WWL | [2024] SGFC 25 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31499-SSP.xml | [
"Mr Wang Lian Sheng and Ms Petrina Tan Heng Kiat (Bih Li & Lee LLP) for the Plaintiff",
"Mr Randolph Khoo and Ms Brenda Kong (Drew & Napier LLC) for the Defendant"
] |
2024-05-21T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Chia Wee Kiat | <root><head><title>WWK v WWL</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WWK <em>v</em> WWL </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31499-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 25</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">D 1206/2020 (FC/RA 1/2024)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">15 May 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Chia Wee Kiat </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Mr Wang Lian Sheng and Ms Petrina Tan Heng Kiat (Bih Li & Lee LLP) for the Plaintiff; Mr Randolph Khoo and Ms Brenda Kong (Drew & Napier LLC) for the Defendant </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WWK — WWL </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Riddick undertaking</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Jurisdiction</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Property legally owned by third party</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Procedure</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Leave to file third ancillary affidavit</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">15 May 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Chia Wee Kiat:</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 The Plaintiff shall be referred to as the “Wife” and the Defendant shall be referred to as the “Husband”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 FC/RA 1/2024 (“RA 1”) is the Husband’s appeal against the decision of the learned Assistant Registrar Adriene Cheong (“the AR”) given on 16 February 2024 in respect of FC/SUM 3414/2023 (“SUM 3414”) and FC/SUM 92/2024 (“SUM 92”).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 RA 1 was filed on 26 February 2024.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 On 27 February 2024, the AR made costs orders in respect of both applications. To obviate the need for the Husband to file a further Notice of Appeal on the costs orders, parties agreed that the Husband’s appeal against the costs orders be heard under RA 1.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 On 22 April 2024, having carefully considered the submissions and the affidavits, I dismissed the Husband’s appeal with costs fixed at $5,000 (all in) to the Wife.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 As the Husband has appealed against my decision <em>vide</em> HCF/RAS 6/2024 filed on 25 April 2024, I now set out the grounds of my decision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">SUM 3414</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 In SUM 3414, the Husband applied for the following orders:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_7-p2_a"></a>a) Leave be granted to the Husband to be released from any implied undertaking not to use the documents and information as set out in Annex A for any other purposes apart from the proceedings in Divorce Action FC/D 1206/2020 (“Prayer 1”);</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_7-p2_b"></a>b) Following any order made on Prayer 1 above, the Husband may consequently be permitted to use the documents and information as set out in Annex A for the purpose of related proceedings in the General Division of the Hight Court, to determine the true beneficial ownership of [Property A]<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> (“Prayer 2”);</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_7-p2_c"></a>c) The costs of this application be in the cause in the Divorce Action FC/D 1206/2020; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_7-p2_d"></a>d) Such further and other reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Husband’s position</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 In his Supporting Affidavit filed on 2 November 2023, the Husband avers that this is an application for leave to use certain documents disclosed by the Wife in the divorce proceedings in an intended fresh civil suit to be filed in the General Division of the High Court (“Related HC Proceedings”) to determine the true beneficial ownership of Property A.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 The Husband says that pursuant to the order dated 4 August 2022 requiring the Wife to answer interrogatories in relation to Property A,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> the Wife gave her answers in an affidavit filed on 13 October 2022<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> where she stated, among other things, that her now deceased father (the “Late Mr [T]”) had allegedly purchased Property A with the assistance of a friendly loan from one [CGK]<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span>, and the loan was extended to the Late Mr T and the Wife as borrowers.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> The Wife also stated that she did not contribute towards the payment or acquisition of Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 The Husband believes that the Wife’s account of Property A having been paid for entirely by the Late Mr T is false and inaccurate.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> He believes that the Wife has attempted to hide the fact that she has all along been the true beneficial owner of Property A in an obvious effort to exclude Property A from the matrimonial pool for division.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> The Husband believes that Property A was always held by the Late Mr T on trust for the Wife from the time it was purchased.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> He alleges that the Wife contrived that the Late Mr T would create by will, a purported bequest of Property A back to her in a scheme to also avoid having to pay for Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 The Husband says that the Late Mr T never lived at Property A. It was instead the Wife who has been residing rent-free at Property A since October 2019.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> The tenancy agreements entered into between the Wife and the Late Mr T were therefore sham agreements.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 The Husband says that as a result of the parties having differing and irreconcilable positions on whether the Wife or the Late Mr T was the true beneficial owner of Property A from the time it was purchased, he intends to commence the Related HC Proceedings to determine the beneficial ownership of Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 The Husband believes that various documents and information that the Wife has disclosed in her 1<sup>st</sup> Affidavit of Assets and Means (“AOM”), 13 October Affidavit, 8 February Affidavit, and her 2<sup>nd </sup> AOM (the “Disclosed Documents and Information”) will need to be used and referred to in the Related HC Proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> The relevance of each of the Disclosed Documents and Information towards the Related HC Proceedings is set out in Annex A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 The Husband says that the Related HC Proceedings would avoid a situation where any order made by the Family Justice Court in proceedings to divide matrimonial assets (having only force between the parties to the marriage) will not bind any third party who may have an interest in the matrimonial property that is being divided and expose the divided property to future litigation and claims in separate proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> The Disclosed Documents and Information would allow the High Court to have before it very relevant evidence that would enable the High Court to properly and fairly determine whether Property A was all along beneficially owned by the Wife and hence a matrimonial asset.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 The Husband believes that the application is a necessary pre-requisite to his filing of proceedings at the High Court to determine the true beneficial ownership of Property A from the time of its purchase.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Wife’s position</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 The Wife says that SUM 3414 is unnecessary and/or premature if the Husband’s intended action in the High Court involves her.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span> If she is a party to the intended High Court civil action, there are obligations imposed on her during such court proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 The Wife vigorously objects to the Husband’s allegations that she has provided false and inaccurate account of Property A having been paid entirely by her late father.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 The Wife says that Property A was purchased in her father’s sole name. Her father was the party who had taken a friendly loan from CGK for the purchase of the property. <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span> The Wife’s father had requested the Wife to assist him with the payments for the property as he was getting on years and may not be able to attend at banks and wait long hours to purchase cashier’s orders for the purchase of the property.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 The Wife says that her father passed away on 30 August 2022. Pursuant to his Last Will and Testament dated 3 June 2021, her father had given and bequeathed Property A to her.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span> The Wife believes that in the administration of her late father’s Estate, Property A would be transferred to her pursuant to her father’s will. Given that she is a party of the divorce proceedings, any orders made in relation to Property A would bind her as a party to the action and the party who inherited the property.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The Wife says that there would be prejudice to her in the event that the court grants the orders the Husband is seeking.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> The Husband ought not to be allowed to make a frivolous claim against the Estate of her late father or the Wife based on information he had obtained from the divorce proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 The Wife says that the Husband has acted with a vendetta and has been needlessly aggressive against her throughout the proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span> As the High Court action would be an open trial proceedings, the Wife is concerned about what the Husband would be alleging in these proceedings and how he would utilise the documents provided, some of which are private and confidential in nature.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 The Wife says that the divorce was commenced in March 2020 and more than four years have passed since then. The Husband has had a change of five sets of solicitors, his present set of lawyers being the sixth set.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span> The Husband has gone to great lengths, including making intrusive and invasive requests for documents and information relating to the probate of the Wife’s late father, while there remain other options which would adequately address the Husband’s key concern, i.e. whether the value of Property A should be included in the matrimonial pool.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 The Wife says that the Husband continually insists on prolonging the proceedings and aggravating the acrimony between parties.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span> The Wife refers to an earlier appeal filed by the Husband <em>vide</em> FC/RA 1/2023 where I made the observations that the Husband had elected a procedural route that was needlessly more aggressive and acrimonious when a far less confrontational option existed that was equally capable of protecting his legal interests. The Wife also makes reference to the observations of Lai Siu Chiu J in the Husband’s further appeal <em>vide</em> HCF/RAS 4/2023 where the learned judge noted that the Husband was motivated by malice and ill will.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_36" id="Ftn_36_1"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 The Wife submits that the issue of the beneficial ownership of Property A can be property determined at the ancillary matters hearing, and there is no need for separate proceedings to be taken out for this issue.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_37" id="Ftn_37_1"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span> The matrimonial pool is sufficiently large to accommodate the distribution of matrimonial assets without needing to make an order directly affecting Property A, if it is later found to be a matrimonial asset.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_38" id="Ftn_38_1"><sup>[note: 38]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The AR’s decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 The AR noted that the orders sought by the Husband are extremely wide. The AR noted that the Husband has asked to be allowed to use the listed documents for “any other purposes apart from the divorce proceedings”, which would effectively mean that there was no limit to the manner the documents may be used.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_39" id="Ftn_39_1"><sup>[note: 39]</sup></a></span> The AR found that the Husband’s prayer is unnecessarily broad and unidentified, and it would not be reasonable for such an order to be granted.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_40" id="Ftn_40_1"><sup>[note: 40]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 The AR noted further that the Wife herself has stated that once the probate is completed, legal title with vest with her. There is hence no necessity for a separate civil suit in the High Court to determine either legal or beneficial interest of Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_41" id="Ftn_41_1"><sup>[note: 41]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 Further, the Husband has not yet commenced the related proceedings, and the specific claims have not been set out. This is the “unclear” as to the collateral purpose of the suit.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_42" id="Ftn_42_1"><sup>[note: 42]</sup></a></span> The burden of proof, as noted by the AR, lies with the Husband.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_43" id="Ftn_43_1"><sup>[note: 43]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 The AR found that the High Court proceedings are unnecessary, and this ground alone was sufficient to dismiss the Husband’s application.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_44" id="Ftn_44_1"><sup>[note: 44]</sup></a></span> The AR noted further that in the context of matrimonial cases where proceedings are held in camera, it is important to apply a strict approach to any application for waiver to avoid a situation where disclosure in private personal proceedings are used for ulterior purposes.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_45" id="Ftn_45_1"><sup>[note: 45]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Analysis</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 A judge hearing a Registrar’s Appeal exercises confirmatory jurisdiction, as opposed to appellate jurisdiction. Although I may accord appropriate weight to the AR’s decision, I am not bound by the manner in which she exercised her discretion.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 As noted in the recent decision of the High Court in <em>Third Eye Capital Corp v Pretty View Shipping SA and others</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31294-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGHC 96</a> (“<em>Third Eye</em>”), a party who discloses a document in an action under compulsion is entitled to the protection of the court against any use of the document otherwise than in that action. <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_46" id="Ftn_46_1"><sup>[note: 46]</sup></a></span> This rule, known as the “<em>Riddick</em> principle”, is derived from the case of <em>Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/English/67037-E-M.xml')">[1977] 1 QB 881</a>, where Lord Denning MR explained its rationale as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">The reason for compelling discovery of documents in this way lies in the public interest in discovering the truth so that justice may be done between the parties. … The balance comes down in the ordinary way in favour of the public interest of discovering the truth, i.e., in making full disclosure.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">On the one hand discovery has been had in the first action. It enabled that action to be disposed of. The public interest there has served its purpose. Should it go further so as to enable the memorandum of April 16, 1969, to be used for this libel action? I think not. The memorandum was obtained by compulsion. Compulsion is an invasion of a private right to keep one’s documents to oneself. The public interest in privacy and confidence demands that this compulsion should not be pressed further than the course of justice requires. The courts should, therefore, not allow the other party — or anyone else —to use the documents for any ulterior or alien purpose. Otherwise the courts themselves would be doing injustice.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 As noted in <em>Third Eye</em> (at [9]) citing the Court of Appeal (“CA”)’s decision in <em>Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and other appeals and other matters</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/26578-SSP.xml')">[2021] 2 SLR 584</a>, situations involving the <em>Riddick</em> principle may broadly be classified under three categories:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_31-p2_a"></a>a) First, it must be determined if a document is produced, or information furnished, out of compulsion. If so, it is covered by the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking. If not, the document or information may be used without the permission of the court.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_31-p2_b"></a>b) Second, if the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking applies, the question is whether the protected document or information may nonetheless be used without permission due to the nature of the related enforcement proceedings for which it is being used.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_31-p2_c"></a>c) Third, if neither of the above is satisfied, the party relying on the protected document or information to commence or sustain related proceedings must seek the court’s permission for the undertaking to be lifted.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 In the present case, the Husband accepts that he is bound by the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking. As such, the Husband filed SUM 3414 praying to be released from the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking for the purpose of being permitted to start the Related HC Proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_47" id="Ftn_47_1"><sup>[note: 47]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 The Husband clarifies that Prayer 1 of SUM 3414 is not an application to be released from the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking in order to use the Disclosed Documents and Information for a limitless number of undefined extraneous purposes.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_48" id="Ftn_48_1"><sup>[note: 48]</sup></a></span> The Husband says that Prayer 1 is simply a description of the nature of the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking that he was trying to be released from<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_49" id="Ftn_49_1"><sup>[note: 49]</sup></a></span> and is specifically limited by Prayer 2, which refers to the related proceedings in the General Division of the High Court to determine the true beneficial ownership of Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_50" id="Ftn_50_1"><sup>[note: 50]</sup></a></span> The Husband says that he has consistently made clear in his Supporting Affidavit that this is the sole purpose in filing SUM 3414.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_51" id="Ftn_51_1"><sup>[note: 51]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 Given the clarifications provided by the Husband, the central issue before me is whether permission should be granted for the undertaking to be lifted for the sole purpose of enabling the Husband to start the related proceedings in the General Division of the Hight Court to determine the true beneficial ownership of Property A.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 The law, in this regard, was helpfully summarised in <em>Third Eye</em> as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">25 In determining whether permission should be granted, the Court embarks on a balancing exercise to assess “whether the circumstances are such as to justify the lifting of the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking” (<em>Lim Suk Ling Priscilla and another v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and another and another appeal and another matter</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/25182-SSP.xml')">[2020] 2 SLR 912</a> (“<em>Amber Compounding</em>”) at [69]).</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">26 The Court of Appeal in <em>Amber Compounding</em> highlighted five (non- exhaustive) factors which may be raised in favour of lifting the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking (at [71]), of which the only relevant one here is that the EJD Information is to be used to support related foreign civil proceedings.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">27 The factors in favour of granting permission are then to be balanced against the interests sought to be protected by the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking, namely the public interest in encouraging full disclosure and the disclosing party’s privacy interests. Factors which militate against the grant of permission include (<em>Amber Compounding</em> at [72]):</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(a) injustice or prejudice to the disclosing party – however, where no irremediable prejudice is demonstrated, this factor may be accorded little weight;</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(b) improper purpose for which permission is sought – the court has a general concern to control the collateral use of disclosed documents; and</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(c) privilege against self-incrimination – which is not engaged in the present case.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">28 Ultimately, the test is whether “if, in all the circumstances of the case, the interests advanced for the extraneous use of the disclosed documents outweigh the interests that are protected by the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking” (<em>Amber Compounding</em> at [46]).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 The Husband says that SUM 3414 is necessary given that the matrimonial jurisdiction of the Family Justice Court cannot be exercised to decide the legal rights of third parties, based on the CA’s decision in <em>UDA v UDB and another</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21828-SSP.xml')">[2018] 1 SLR 1015</a> (“<em>UDA”</em>).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_52" id="Ftn_52_1"><sup>[note: 52]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 In <em>UDA</em>, the CA noted (at [51]) that there are four possible situations in which property may come before a court that is hearing an ancillary matters proceeding:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_37-p2_a"></a>a) the property is accepted as a matrimonial asset, having been acquired jointly by the spouses or solely by one of them, and the only question is how it should be divided;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_37-p2_b"></a>b) the property is in the name of one of the spouses and the issue is whether the circumstances of its acquisition render it a matrimonial asset;</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_37-p2_c"></a>c) the property is in the name of one of the spouses who claims to be holding it in trust for a third party, whilst the other spouse disputes this and contends that the property belongs beneficially to the legal owner and is therefore a matrimonial asset; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_37-p2_d"></a>d) the property is in the name of a third party but one or both spouses claims that it is a matrimonial asset because the third party is holding the whole or part of the property on trust for one or both spouses.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 The CA noted (at [56]) that the following options are available if the property is legally owned by a third party:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_a"></a>a) First, the spouse who claims the property to be a matrimonial asset may obtain legally binding confirmation from the third party that this is so and an undertaking that the third party would respect and enforce any order that the court may make relating to the beneficial interests in the property.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_b"></a>b) If this is contested, either that spouse or the other who is asserting that the property belongs beneficially to the third party would have to start a separate legal action to have the rights in the property finally determined, <em>vis-à-vis</em> the third party, in which case the s 112 proceedings would have to be stayed until the rights are determined. This would be Option 2.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_c"></a>c) The third possibility would be for the spouse to drop his or her claim that the property is a matrimonial asset and allow the s 112 proceedings to continue without it.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_d"></a>d) Alternatively, that spouse may ask the court to determine whether the asset is a matrimonial asset without involving the third party’s participation at all or making an order directly affecting the property. This is Option 1.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 With respect to Option 1, the CA provided the following guidance:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">57 <b>In respect of [56(d)] above</b>, the family justice court should only take Option 1 <b>if both spouses agree to it</b>, as this course could result in the disputed asset being treated as a matrimonial asset and adjustments being made in the division of other assets to account for its value when in separate proceedings later it may be determined that the third party was both the legal and the beneficial owner of the property and neither spouse had any interest in it at all. Thus, the result of taking <b>Option 1 may be to prejudice the spouse who has had to account to the other for the value of an item of property which turns out not to be a matrimonial asset.</b> By the time of the separate action the s 112 proceedings may have completed and no adjustments may be possible to reflect the decision made in the third party’s separate proceedings. If both spouses do not agree to Option 1 in this situation, then directions would have to be given regarding the taking of separate proceedings against the third party and Option 2 would come into play. <b>We should add that Option 1 would not be viable if the disputed asset is the main or only substantial asset available for division.</b></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">58 The other situation is where the property is in the name of one of the spouses and the third party is a “shadowy” figure in the wings whom that spouse claims has an interest in the property but no order is sought by or against the third party directly. In such a case, because no order is sought by or against the third party, it is permissible for the court to make an order exercising its powers under s 112 because the only parties directly affected by the order will be the parting spouses. This, again, is an Option 1 course. The choice of Option 1 would have the same risks for the spouses as alluded to in [57] above. Thus, for instance, <b>the spouse in whose name the property stands, having been ordered to share the value of the property with the other spouse, may later find he or she has to account to the third party for such value or to transfer the property outright to the third party</b>. <b>This is because the determination of the ownership of the disputed property in the s 112 proceedings will not bind the third party who may challenge it in separate proceedings. But that is the risk the spouse takes by not seeking an order that will bind the third party.</b> Once such an order is sought, in our view, this would be the same situation as discussed in [56(b)] above and a separate set of proceedings would have to be issued.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis in bold added]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 The Husband, through his solicitors, sought clarification from the Wife <em>vide</em> their letter dated 27 October 2023, on whether the Wife, in her personal capacity and her capacity as a Personal Representative (“PR”) of the Estate of the Late Mr T, continues to maintain her position that Property A is an inheritance and not a divisible matrimonial asset and whether the other PR, Ms [TYS], aligns herself with the Wife’s position.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_53" id="Ftn_53_1"><sup>[note: 53]</sup></a></span> In their reply dated 30 November 2023, the Wife’s solicitors indicated that they have not been instructed to act for the PRs of the Estate of the Late Mr T, but they have been instructed to act for the Wife in respect of the High Court action.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_54" id="Ftn_54_1"><sup>[note: 54]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 The Husband contends that with the passing of the Late Mr T, the Executrices of his will, the Wife and her sister, are required to first administer the Estate. The PRs of an estate as well as the Estate of the Late Mr T are each considered at law to be third parties as far as D 1206 goes. Until all debts and liabilities of the Estate have been settled, no named beneficiaries of any property bequest can legally claim to have a beneficial interest in that property.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 The Husband contends that the Executrices have steadfastly refused to disclose the progress of the probate. The Wife in her personal capacity also chose not to be helpful with disclosing the progress of the probate and avoiding the need for the Husband’s application. The Husband therefore has to start the Related HC Proceedings to determine whether the full beneficial interest to Property A has always belonged to the Wife or the Late Mr T since the current position is that there are third parties disputing that Property A is matrimonial property.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_55" id="Ftn_55_1"><sup>[note: 55]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 The Wife submits that there is no real dispute over who the beneficial interest in Property A will ultimately devolve to, and the Estate of the late Mr T is not a third party who has asserted beneficial ownership of Property A. Hence, separate proceedings in the General Division to determine the true beneficial ownership of property would be wholly unnecessary.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_56" id="Ftn_56_1"><sup>[note: 56]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 In light of the Wife’s submissions, it would be necessary to refer to <em>Ong Wui Teck (personal representative of the estate of Chew Chen Chin, deceased) v Ong Wui Swoon and another and another appeal</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23775-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGCA 61</a> where the CA summarised the principles regulating the interests of beneficiaries of an estate as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">64 In our judgment, a personal representative ceases to be an executor and administrator only after all the assets of the estate have been vested in the personal representative, and the estate has been fully administered: see G Raman, <em>Probate and Administration in Singapore and Malaysia</em> (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2018) at para 12.19. This involves, <em>inter alia</em>, getting in all the assets of the estate, paying for any funeral, testamentary and administrative expenses, and satisfying all outstanding debts against the estate. As trustee, the personal representative then becomes concerned with the problems of distribution of the administered estate among the persons entitled: see <em>Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate</em> (Alexander Learmonth <em>et al</em> gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2018) (“<em>Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks</em>”) at para 65-05. …</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">65 <b>Once an executor decides that he no longer requires the estate’s assets for the satisfaction of the liabilities of the estate, he should then “assent” to the legacy</b>. This is explained by the learned authors of <em>Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks</em> at para 76-01 (see also Arthur Dean, “When Does an Executor become a Trustee?” (1935-1938) 1 Res Judicatae 92 at p 93):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">An assent has been described as an acknowledgment by a personal representative that an asset is no longer required for the payment of the debts, funeral expenses or general pecuniary legacies.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">As has been shown all real and personal property to which a deceased person was entitled for an interest not ceasing on his death, now devolves upon his representatives. They are responsible for the satisfaction of the deceased’s debts to the extent of the whole estate, even though the testator may have directed that a portion of it should be applied to other purposes. In view of this liability they should not distribute any portion of the deceased’s estate until satisfied that such debts have been actually paid or are adequately secured, or can be paid without recourse to that portion of the estate. The personal representatives are protected against competing claims by the principle that <b>the beneficiaries’ title to the deceased’s property</b>, whether devisees, legatees or persons entitled on intestacy, <b>is not complete until some act of the representatives themselves makes it so. This act, according to the circumstances, is either an assent or a conveyance, and until it has taken place the administration continues.</b></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">66 <b>It follows that before the debts and liabilities of the estate have been fully settled, the beneficiaries to the will cannot claim to have a beneficial interest in the assets of the estate, since some of the assets may have to be used in satisfaction of the said debts and liabilities</b>. Therefore, if the beneficiaries do not have an equitable interest in the assets of the Estate, the personal representative cannot be regarded as a trustee over those assets. …</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis added]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 It is clear from the above passages that a beneficiary’s title to a deceased’s property is not complete until the executor decides that he no longer requires the estate’s assets for the satisfaction of the liabilities of the estate and assents to the legacy. Until then, the beneficiary cannot claim to have a beneficial interest in the property.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 In <em>VIK v VIL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24850-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGHCF 12</a>, the court noted (at [53]) as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">The question of whether an assent exists is a fact-sensitive one, since an assent may be informal and may also be inferred from conduct: <em>Seah Teong Kang</em> at [27]. In respect of Property 1 and Property 2, there is no evidence of any assent on the part of the Administrator, and none of the parties have sought to argue as such. It follows that both Property 1 and Property 2 are not held on trust by the Administrator, and the appropriate regime of law is that which applies to execution and administration of an estate.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 In the present case, the Wife has not provided evidence of any assent and neither has she argued as such. In the absence of such evidence, the Wife cannot claim to have a beneficial interest in Property A qua beneficiary of her father’s will. In addition, there is no evidence to show that the debts and liabilities of the Estate have been fully settled. It would not be correct, as a matter of law, to assume that the beneficial interest in Property A will ultimately devolve to her.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 In the circumstances, the facts of the present case fall within the situation described in paragraph 51(d) of <em>UDA</em>, <em>i.e.</em> the property is in the name of a third party (i.e., the Estate of Mr T) but one spouse (the Husband) claims that it is a matrimonial asset because the third party is holding the whole of the property on trust for the other spouse (the Wife).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 Since Property A is legally owned by a third party, there are two options under paragraph 56 of <em>UDA</em> that come into play: “Option 1” (<em>UDA</em> at [56(d)]) and “Option 2” (<em>UDA</em> at [56(b)]). The other two options listed in paragraph 56 are not engaged on the facts of the case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 The Wife submits that Option 1 would be the most straightforward, expeditious and cost-effective way forward for parties.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_57" id="Ftn_57_1"><sup>[note: 57]</sup></a></span> Under this option, the Family Justice Court may determine whether the asset is a matrimonial asset without involving the third party’s participation or making an order directly affecting the property. In other words, there would be no necessity for the Husband to start a separate legal action to have the rights in the property determined<em>, vis-à-vis</em> the third party, nor is there a need to stay the s 112 proceedings until the rights are determined, as would be the case if Option 2 is adopted.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 As noted in <em>UDA</em> (at [57]), the Family Justice Court should only take Option 1 if both spouses agree to it, as this course could result in the disputed asset being treated as a matrimonial asset and adjustments being made in the division of other assets to account for its value when in separate proceedings later it may be determined that the third party was both the legal and the beneficial owner of the property and neither spouse had any interest in it at all. Thus, the result of taking Option 1 may be to the prejudice of the spouse who has to account to the other for the value of an item of property which turns out not to be a matrimonial asset.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 In the present case, the Wife has opted for Option 1 even though she is the party who may be prejudiced by this course of action since she is the one who has to account for the value of Property A. In contrast, the Husband does not bear such risk. So long as both parties agree, the question whether Property A is a matrimonial asset can be appropriately determined in the ancillary matters hearing without the need for the Husband to commence separate civil action at all. Clearly then, the only obstacle to Option 1 is the Husband’s refusal to agree to it.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 The Husband has highlighted concerns that (i) any orders made by the Family Justice Court in proceedings to divide assets in the divorce proceedings will not bind third party including the PRs of the Estate who may have an interest in a matrimonial asset that is being divided, and (ii) any determination of ownership of a property, to which beneficial ownership is in dispute, in ancillary matters may face challenges by a third party affected by such a determination in separate proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_58" id="Ftn_58_1"><sup>[note: 58]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 However, it should be noted that Option 1 does not involve the court making an order directly affecting the property. The risk, if any, lies with the Wife as the spouse who has to account for the value of the disputed asset. The Wife recognises as such and is prepared to proceed on such a basis.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_59" id="Ftn_59_1"><sup>[note: 59]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55 As the Husband has a real enough choice of taking up Option 1, the AR was correct in her finding that the Related HC Proceedings are unnecessary. Further, although the Husband has clarified that he filed SUM 3414 for the sole purpose of being permitted to start the Related HC Proceedings,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_60" id="Ftn_60_1"><sup>[note: 60]</sup></a></span> the scope of the orders sought by the Husband is very wide and goes beyond that. If Prayer 1 of SUM 3414 is granted, it would have the effect of releasing the Husband of the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking from “any other purposes”. There is nothing in Prayer 2 that limits the effect of Prayer 1.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56 Given that there is no real necessity for the Husband to commence the Related HC Proceedings and taking into account the expansive nature of the orders sought by the Husband, the Wife’s apprehension that the Husband may misuse the documents and information if he is released of the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking is not without basis. This risk cannot be discounted given the conduct of the Husband as observed in FC/RA 1/2023 and HCF/RAS 4/2023. Additionally, his frequent change of solicitors deepens my concern about the propensity on his part to engage in a course of conduct that is unnecessarily acrimonious and confrontational.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57 On balance, it was clear to me that the interests that are protected by the <em>Riddick</em> undertaking outweigh the interests advanced by the Husband for the use of the Disclosed Documents and Information. Accordingly, I affirmed the AR’s decision and dismissed the appeal.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">SUM 92</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58 SUM 92 is an application by the Husband for leave to respond to certain paragraphs of the Wife’s Reply Ancillary Matters Affidavit dated 28 August 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59 The Husband’s appeal is concerned with six items identified in S/No. 1, 4, 6, 9, 10 and 12 (the “Appealed Items”) of the Table of Positions exhibited in the Husband’s Supporting Affidavit filed in SUM 92 on 8 January 2024.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_60"></a>60 The AR disallowed the Husband’s application broadly on the basis that the proposed responses or new evidence is unnecessary or has limited impact to the outstanding issues to be determined.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_61" id="Ftn_61_1"><sup>[note: 61]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_61"></a>61 The Husband submits that leave should be granted to reply to the Appealed Items as the evidence he intends to adduce will facilitate a fair adjudication of the ancillary matters.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_62" id="Ftn_62_1"><sup>[note: 62]</sup></a></span> Out of the six Appealed Items, five are relevant to the issue of indirect contributions<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_63" id="Ftn_63_1"><sup>[note: 63]</sup></a></span> and one is relevant under s 112(2)(g) of the Women’s Charter (“the Charter”).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_64" id="Ftn_64_1"><sup>[note: 64]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_62"></a>62 The Husband says that the parties are still in a relatively early stage of the ancillary matters as a hearing date has not been fixed.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_65" id="Ftn_65_1"><sup>[note: 65]</sup></a></span> If the evidence that he is seeking to admit at this juncture is disallowed and turns out to be important in an appeal in future, it would not satisfy the <em>Ladd v Marshall</em> rule and the Husband would thus suffer prejudice.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_66" id="Ftn_66_1"><sup>[note: 66]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_63"></a>63 The Wife submits that the affidavit filed by the Husband in support of SUM 92 is his twelfth affidavit. The Husband has already had ample opportunity to present his case whether through his AOM, or in the course of the several applications filed by him.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_67" id="Ftn_67_1"><sup>[note: 67]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_64"></a>64 The Husband refers to the broad principle of law in <em>Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2010] SGCA 0015.xml')">[2010] SGCA 15</a> where the CA emphasised that “every litigant has a general right to bring all evidence relevant to his or her case to the attention of the court” and where “the relevance of evidence sought to be adduced is unclear, or even doubtful”, it is “usually both prudent and just to err in favour of admission rather than exclusion”. <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_68" id="Ftn_68_1"><sup>[note: 68]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_65"></a>65 The Husband also refers to <em>SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18440-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGCA 5</a> where the CA held as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">It is axiomatic that in order to arrive at a fully considered decision based on justice and fairness, the court concerned must have all the relevant evidence before it. The present appeal turns on this one fundamental point. Put simply, was all the relevant evidence before the judge in the court below? If it was not, then there would have been no way for the judge to have arrived at a considered decision simply because he would have been in receipt of the full picture.”</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_66"></a>66 In my view, these general principles must be considered against the unique nature of proceedings for the division of matrimonial assets where different considerations apply. As noted by Debbie Ong J (as she then was) in <em>UYP v UYQ</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23358-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGHCF 16</a> (“<em>UYP</em>”):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">63 It is significant to note that a civil trial is markedly different from an AM proceeding. In civil proceedings, parties set out their cases in their pleadings and are bound by them. Facts which are pleaded to support a cause of action are proved in the court proceedings. Where there are gaps in evidence and a party asserting a fact is unable to prove it, he or she may not have discharged the requisite burden of proof. A successful litigant would be one who has proved his or her pleaded facts that support the pleaded case. A court may find against a litigant who fails to provide evidence to prove those facts. <b>In contrast, in proceedings for the division of MAs, the court is presented with only a fraction of each party’s “contribution” to the marriage, yet parties seek the court’s determination on what is a just division based substantially on each party’s direct and indirect contributions in the </b><b><em>entire marriage</em></b><b>. Had a similar approach as that used in civil matters been taken, the Family Court presented with a 30-year marriage would have had to examine the entire contributions and conduct of each spouse over 30 years, possibly examining the daily records of each act done, each decision made, each word uttered every day and night over 30 years, for that is the only way to fully assess what contributions each had made to the marriage. This is an impossible exercise. Neither does such an exercise accord with the aspirations of the family justice system to enable the harmonious resolution of family disputes and for parties to continue family life after divorce in the most dignified manner possible.</b> The court determines the division of assets by affidavit evidence unless leave is granted for the cross-examination of witnesses (see rr 42, 81(2) and 590 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014)). This mode of proceedings is suitable because the “broad brush” approach is core to the exercise of discretion in s 112. It is appropriate because marriage is an intimate partnership between two spouses who had decided very solemnly to join their lives together.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">64 Thus when applying the <em>ANJ v ANK</em> approach, the court must bear in mind that findings on the parties’ contributions are necessarily impressionistic as it can only have sight of a portion of all that had occurred during the marriage, and will not be able to reach with mathematical specificity each party’s contributions for the entire length of the marriage. This is especially true for long marriages, as the court’s finding on the parties’ “contribution” cannot fully reflect all that goes into building a life together nor will it be likely that records of transactions remain completely available. This observation should not be taken to suggest that parties should therefore dredge up their past in order to present to the court 30 years’ worth of daily journal records on their married lives. On the contrary, this would run counter to how family disputes ought to be resolved.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis in bold added]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_67"></a>67 The CA in <em>UYQ v UYP</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24104-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGCA 3</a>, in affirming the learned judge’s views, reiterated (at [4]) as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">In our view, it would assist the parties to find a way forward and put this painful chapter of their lives behind them by focusing on the <em>major details</em> as opposed to every conceivable detail under the sun. We caveat that this does not mean parties should swing to the other extreme by being remiss in submitting the relevant records. Put simply, there ought to be <em>reasonable accounting rigour that eschews flooding the court with details that would obscure rather than illuminate</em>. Henceforth, therefore, courts should discourage parties from applying the <em>ANJ v ANK</em> approach in a rigid and calculative manner. Parties would do well to understand that such an approach <em>detracts</em> from their respective cases instead of enhancing them. And in extreme situations where the court’s time and resources have been wasted in a wholly disproportionate manner, a party may face sanctions in the form of the appropriate costs orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_68"></a>68 Further, under rule 89 of the Family Justice Rules, parties are only permitted to file one AOM and a reply affidavit to the other party’s AOM. Rule 89(3) provides that no further affidavit shall be received in evidence without the leave of the court. The purpose of rule 89 is to discourage parties from filing multiple rounds of affidavits that would only increase legal costs and acrimony and drag out court time unnecessarily. By limiting the number of affidavits, it provides a cut-off point so that parties do not engage in a never-ending cycle of reply and rebuttal over every allegation raised.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_69"></a>69 In my view, the AR had exercised her discretion correctly in refusing to grant leave to the Husband to file a further affidavit to respond to the Appealed Items. The reasonings provided by the AR are consistent with the principles enunciated in <em>UYP</em> and the raison d'être of rule 89. Bearing in mind the “broad brush” approach which is core to the exercise of the discretion in s 112 of the Charter, I found nothing exceptional in the reasons provided by the Husband that would warrant a departure from the default position that limits parties to two affidavits each. In circumstances, I affirmed the AR’s decision and dismissed the appeal.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [1].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>M/S Drew & Napier’s letter dated 12 March 2024 at [3].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>M/S Drew & Napier’s letter dated 12 March 2024 at [4] & [5].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [3].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [9].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [11.3].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [11.6].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [11.8].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [12].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [12.3] & [15.5].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [12.4].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [15.4].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [15.6].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [15.7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [18].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [19].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [21].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [22.1].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [22.2].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [26].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [11] & [28].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [15].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [13].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [14].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [13].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [23(b)].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [32].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [33].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [34].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at [35].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [102].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [101].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [99].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_36_1" id="Ftn_36">[note: 36]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [105].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_37_1" id="Ftn_37">[note: 37]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [106].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_38_1" id="Ftn_38">[note: 38]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [57].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_39_1" id="Ftn_39">[note: 39]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 16 at [3].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_40_1" id="Ftn_40">[note: 40]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 17 at [4] and p 20 at [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_41_1" id="Ftn_41">[note: 41]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 17 at [6].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_42_1" id="Ftn_42">[note: 42]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 17 at [7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_43_1" id="Ftn_43">[note: 43]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 18 at [10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_44_1" id="Ftn_44">[note: 44]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 18 at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_45_1" id="Ftn_45">[note: 45]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at p 19 at [15].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_46_1" id="Ftn_46">[note: 46]</a></sup><em>Third Eye</em> at [7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_47_1" id="Ftn_47">[note: 47]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [9].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_48_1" id="Ftn_48">[note: 48]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_49_1" id="Ftn_49">[note: 49]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [14].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_50_1" id="Ftn_50">[note: 50]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_51_1" id="Ftn_51">[note: 51]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [17].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_52_1" id="Ftn_52">[note: 52]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [17].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_53_1" id="Ftn_53">[note: 53]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit in support of SUM 3414 filed on 2 November 2023 (DA1) at [25].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_54_1" id="Ftn_54">[note: 54]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit in response to DA 1 filed on 30 November 2023 (PA1) at p 20.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_55_1" id="Ftn_55">[note: 55]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [8].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_56_1" id="Ftn_56">[note: 56]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [47].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_57_1" id="Ftn_57">[note: 57]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [51].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_58_1" id="Ftn_58">[note: 58]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [39.2].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_59_1" id="Ftn_59">[note: 59]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [55].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_60_1" id="Ftn_60">[note: 60]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [9].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_61_1" id="Ftn_61">[note: 61]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence dated 16 January 2024 at pp 21 – 23.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_62_1" id="Ftn_62">[note: 62]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [44].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_63_1" id="Ftn_63">[note: 63]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at pp 29 (s/no 1), 34 (s/no 4), 41 (s/no 6), 44 (s/no 10), 50 (s/no 12).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_64_1" id="Ftn_64">[note: 64]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at p 42 (s/n 9).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_65_1" id="Ftn_65">[note: 65]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [46].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_66_1" id="Ftn_66">[note: 66]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [47].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_67_1" id="Ftn_67">[note: 67]</a></sup>Respondent’s Written submissions for FC/AR 1/2024 at [120].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_68_1" id="Ftn_68">[note: 68]</a></sup>Defendant/Appellant’s Written Submissions for FC/RA 1/2024 at [44].</p></div></content></root> | 1310 |
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