fc_judgments: 90
Data source: lawnet.sg/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources
This data as json
| _id | _item_id | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _commit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 90 | a7de1faab165d895759131a1532943d8eb7122af | [
"Family law \u2013 Ancillary powers of court \u2013 Setting aside of division order \u2013 Whether consent order should be set-aside or varied because of one party\u2019s mental capacity under doctrine of unconscionability",
"Family law \u2013 Consent Orders \u2013 Whether contractual vitiating factors of unconscionability and incapacity apply"
] |
2024-10-09 | Family Court | Divorce Suit No. 3188 of 2021, (Summons No. 1758 of 2024) | XDN v XDO | [2024] SGFC 88 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F32296-SSP.xml | [
"Ms Tan Xuan Qi Dorothy and Ms Chua Qi Shan, Charmaine (PKWA Law Practice LLC) for the Plaintiff",
"Mr Nai Thiam Siew Patrick and Ms Choo Yean Lin (Tan Lee & Partners) for the Defendant."
] |
2024-10-18T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Kevin Ho | <root><head><title>XDN v XDO</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> XDN <em>v</em> XDO </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/32296-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 88</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Divorce Suit No. 3188 of 2021, (Summons No. 1758 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">09 October 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Kevin Ho </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Ms Tan Xuan Qi Dorothy and Ms Chua Qi Shan, Charmaine (PKWA Law Practice LLC) for the Plaintiff; Mr Nai Thiam Siew Patrick and Ms Choo Yean Lin (Tan Lee & Partners) for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> XDN — XDO </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Ancillary powers of court</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Setting aside of division order</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Whether consent order should be set-aside or varied because of one party’s mental capacity under doctrine of unconscionability</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Consent Orders</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Whether contractual vitiating factors of unconscionability and incapacity apply</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">9 October 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Kevin Ho:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 The Plaintiff-Wife (“Plaintiff”) filed for divorce against the Defendant-Husband (“Defendant”) in July 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 At that time, the divorce was filed on the simplified divorce track because the parties had executed all the relevant documents setting out their agreed terms of the divorce (including the ancillary matters for the divorce) prior to the Plaintiff filing the divorce application. Interim Judgment for divorce (“IJ”) was thus granted on 5 August 2021 where the orders relating to the ancillary matters (“AM Orders”) of divorce were made “<em>by consent</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> The Certificate of Final Judgment was granted on 9 November 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 In June 2024, more than 2½ years later, the Defendant filed the present application, <em>ie.</em> FC/SUM 1758/2024 (“SUM 1758”) seeking to revoke or vary some of the AM Orders contained in the IJ. The Defendant claims that he was labouring under certain “mental disorders” at the time the IJ was granted and thus – according to his counsel – the IJ was obtained despite the Defendant’s “<em>mental incompetence and mental incapacity</em>”, or that the IJ should be set aside on the grounds of “<em>unconscionability</em>” because the Plaintiff had taken advantage of the Defendant’s situation at the material time.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 For completeness, the Defendant seeks to set-aside Orders 3(c), 3(d)(a) – (f) of the IJ (“Disputed Orders”). In gist, these are the Orders relating to the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets which the Defendant says do not reflect a “<em>just and equitable</em>” division of the parties’ assets.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> The Defendant says these orders were not “<em>fair</em>” because they were made “<em>totally for the benefit of</em> [the Plaintiff]”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 To be clear, the Defendant does not seek to set aside the other orders in the IJ relating to: (i) custody, care and control, and access to their child, [K]; and (ii) the maintenance payable to the Plaintiff and [K].</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 Based on the parties’ written submissions and the counsel’s oral arguments, the issues before this Court are as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_6-p2_a"></a>(a) Does the Family Court have the power to vary or revoke the IJ on account of a parties’ alleged mental “incompetence” or “incapacity, and/or on account of alleged “unconscionability” by one party?</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_6-p2_b"></a>(b) Has the Defendant satisfied the relevant legal requirements to justify revoking or varying the Disputed Orders?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 I will discuss each of these issues, in turn.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Basis For Revoking Or Varying Consent Orders </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 I start by providing a brief overview of the applicable principles in relation to an application to revoke (or set-aside) orders dividing the parties’ matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(1) of the WC (for ease of reference, I will refer to such orders as, “division orders”).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 Section 112(4) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“WC”) allows the Court to “<em>extend, vary, revoke or discharge</em>” at any time such division orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 While s 112(4) appears, on first glance, to be broadly drafted, the Court of Appeal in <em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0924.xml')">[2013] 1 SLR 924</a> has made clear that this statutory provision does not give <em>carte blanche</em> to the Court to vary division orders given the need to ensure finality in ancillary matters proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> The Court of Appeal then proceeded to explain that the court may intervene to <em>vary</em> division orders where the order was unworkable, or has become unworkable.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> This is the oft-cited “unworkability” test.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The relevance of contractual vitiating factors</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 What is less clear are the situations where the court may <em>revoke</em> division orders made by consent between the parties.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 In <em>AYM</em>, the Court of Appeal recognised that fraud may be a sufficient basis to vary or set-aside a division.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> The Court of Appeal also referred to its earlier decision in <em>AOO v AON</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2011] 4 SLR 1169.xml')">[2011] 4 SLR 1169</a> (“<em>AOO</em>”) where a division order made by consent may be set-aside if there has been a lack of full and frank disclosure.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 In the course of its judgment, the Court of Appeal alluded to the fact that in the commercial sphere, the courts have recognised specific vitiating factors – <em>eg.</em> misrepresentation, mistake, duress, undue influence and unconscionability – which may operate to unravel a binding contract or agreement between the parties concerned.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> However, the Court of Appeal made clear that because the issue before the court did not relate to these vitiating factors, the Court of Appeal declined opining on the precise application (if at all) of each of these vitiating factors.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 Indeed, the Court of Appeal expressly noted that in its earlier decision of <em>AOO</em>, it also “<em>left open the issue as to whether or not a consent order could be set aside on grounds other than the absence of full and frank disclosure of the material facts…”</em>.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 In the subsequent decision of <em>UMM v UML</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22258-SSP.xml')">[2018] SGHCF 13</a>, the High Court (Family Division), referring to <em>AYM</em>, held that the power to set aside or vary a consent order on the division of assets must be exercised narrowly and observed in passing that the applicant must provide one of the “<em>vitiating factors</em>”, or that the order was or has become unworkable. However, the High Court did not specify which “vitiating factors” it was referring to, although the parties’ allegations in <em>UMM</em> related to claims involving “<em>duress or misrepresentation</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 Finally, it is also useful to have regard to the earlier decision of the High Court in <em>Lee Min Jai v Chua Cheow Koon</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/46305-M.xml')">[2004] SGHC 275</a> (“<em>Lee Min Jai</em>”), where the High Court opined that s 112(4) of the WC “<em>should not be construed be construed as an invitation to revise the terms of a settlement merely so that they appear more equitable or will be, in fact more equitable in the objective opinion of the court</em>” and that what the court should be alert to is that “<em>one party had not taken an unfair advantage over the other in the course of negotiating and settling the terms</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 As <em>Lee Min Jai</em> was decided well before the Court of Appeal’s decision in <em>AYM</em> or <em>UMM</em>, it is not entirely clear whether the High Court was referring to the same vitiating factors noted in the latter decisions when it had referred to concept of one party having taken “<em>unfair advantage</em>” over another.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 The upshot of the above discussion is that the issue of whether an otherwise binding consent order on the division of matrimonial assets could be set-aside (or varied) on the ground of undue influence and/or unconscionability has not been definitively addressed by the Court of Appeal or by the High Court. Although the High Court in <em>UMM</em> and <em>Lee Min Jai</em> alluded to the possible relevance of contractual vitiating factors and/or just and equitable grounds, the exact contours as to how these principles are to be applied were not discussed in detail.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The doctrine of unconscionability </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 For the purpose of the present case, <em>both</em> parties’ counsel took the position that the doctrine of unconscionability may apply to set-aside division orders made by consent.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> In particular, both counsel cited the Court of Appeal’s decision in <em>BOM v BOK</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/22844-SSP.xml')">[2019] 1 SLR 349</a> (“<em>BOM v BOK</em>”) as providing authoritative guidance of the doctrine in Singapore.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 Given both parties’ position on the applicability of <em>BOM v BOK</em>, I will proceed on the basis (without deciding definitively) that unconscionability represents a vitiating factor which allows this court to set-aside the Disputed Orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 In this regard, the Court of Appeal – after undertaking a comprehensive review of the different conceptions of the doctrine of unconscionability in various Commonwealth jurisdictions – held as follows (at [142] – [143]):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">142 In summary, and at risk of oversimplification, the <b>narrow doctrine of unconscionability applies in Singapore</b>. To invoke the doctrine<b>, the plaintiff has to show that he was suffering from an infirmity</b> that <b>the other party exploited in procuring the transaction</b>. Upon the satisfaction of this requirement, the <b>burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable</b>. In this regard, while the successful invocation of the doctrine does not require a transaction at an undervalue or the lack of independent advice to the plaintiff, these are factors that the court will invariably consider in assessing whether the transaction was improvident.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">143 It is important, though, to reiterate that the application of <b>the criteria of infirmity must not be overly broad</b>, lest we be led back, in effect, to the broad doctrine of unconscionability. It is also important to note that although there might be overlaps between our approach and the broad doctrine of unconscionability – at least because the latter would, by its very nature, encompass situations falling within the former – the broad doctrine of unconscionability still goes further than our approach because it may potentially encompass fact situations where the “special disability” concerned (see Amadio, per Deane J at [132] above) is something broader than the type of infirmity we referred to in the preceding paragraph. That said, an overly broad application of the narrow approach we have endorsed might assist in stretching our narrow approach to cover a fact situation that is not intended to fall within it. We therefore find it imperative to caveat at this stage that our approach ought not to be utilised in such a manner.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"></p><div align="right">[Emphasis added in <b>bold</b>]</div><p></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 Additionally, the Court of Appeal noted that whether there has been an infirmity on the part of party asserting unconscionability is an intensely fact-sensitive inquiry, and that not every infirmity would be sufficient to invoke the doctrine. The Court of Appeal also noted that “[s]<em>uch infirmity must also have been, or ought to have been, evident to the other party procuring the transaction</em>.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 I will thus apply the aforesaid legal principles in the present case.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Setting-aside a contract due to mental incapacity </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 Apart from alleged unconscionability, the Defendant also submits that the Disputed Orders should be set-aside or varied on account of his alleged “incapacity” and mental “incompetence” at the time they were made.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 As with the issue of unconscionability, neither counsel expressly addressed in their submissions the question of <em>what</em> is the exact legal nature of this assertion and the context under which it was made; counsel appeared to assume that “incapacity” or “incompetence”, if proven, are reasons to set-aside the Disputed Orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 While it might appear obvious, it remains relevant and important to properly situate the Defendant’s arguments. As I would allude to below, the gist of the Defendant’s case is that he was suffering from Adjustment Disorder (with Depressed Mood) and Alcohol Use Disorder (collectively, referred to as the “Disorders”). He therefore argues that he “<em>did not fully understand and comprehend or know the ramifications of what</em> [he] <em>was signing</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 In effect, the Defendant is saying that the draft IJ he had signed (which resulted in Disputed Orders being part of the AM Orders) was voidable due to his mental incapacity at that time under the common law.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 To be clear, I did not consider the relevance or application of the Mental Capacity Act 2008 as neither party raise the same for the Court’s consideration. I have also proceeded on the assumption that mental incapacity is a contractual vitiating factor which applies to matrimonial division orders made by consent between the parties.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 In <em>North Star (S) Capital Pte Ltd v Megatrucare Pte Ltd</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25970-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGHC 110</a>, the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) noted that the legal test of determining whether a contract is voidable due to a party’s incapacity (as set out in the earlier decision of <em>Che Som bte Yip v Maha Pte Ltd</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1989] 2 SLR(R) 0060.xml')">[1989] 2 SLR(R) 60</a>, a case cited in the Defendant’s Bundle of Authorities) required the party asserting a lack of capacity to prove that the other contracting party <em>knew or ought to have known that he was mentally disordered and had no contractual capacity</em>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 As the Defendant’s allegations also involved alcohol use, the High Court’s observations in <em>Resort World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lee Fook Kheun</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/22620-SSP.xml')">[2018] 5 SLR 1039</a> (“<em>Lee Fook Kheun</em>”) are also apposite. In <em>Lee Fook Kheun</em>, a case involving a claim by a casino patron to invalidate a credit facility agreement he had entered into with the casino, the High Court held (at [21]) that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">21 Intoxication results in impairment of mental capacity, and for that reason has been likened in the law to mental incapacity: see <em>Molton v Camroux</em> (1849) 4 Exch 17,19; 154 ER 1107,1108. A person seeking rescission must show that, first, when he entered into the transaction he was so drunk that he was unable to understand the general nature and effect of the transaction. This level of understanding was explained by Hallett J in <em>Manches v Trimborn</em> (1946) 115 LJKB 305, 307 as “such a degree of incapacity as would interfere with the capacity of the defendant to understand substantially the nature and effect of the transaction into which she was entering.” Second, the counterparty to the transaction must have known of his infirmity. In <em>York Glass Co Ltd v Jubb</em> (1925) 42 TLR 1 (CA) 2, the claim failed as the counterparty “did not know and had no reasons to know that [the complainant] was out of his mind at the time.”</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 In summary, the principles which may be gleaned from the case law is where a party asserts that he lacked mental capacity (whether by reason of an alleged medical condition, or intoxication) when he had entered into an agreement, that party must show:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_31-p2_a"></a>(a) that he had no mental capacity at the time he entered into the contract, and that he was unable to understand its general nature and effect; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_31-p2_b"></a>(b) that the <em>other party</em> knew about this infirmity and that he lacked contractual capacity.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id=""></a>It is only when <em>both</em> requirements are satisfied that the court would find that the contract is voidable.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 It follows from the discussion on the applicable legal principles set out above that the central issue before this Court is whether the Defendant was suffering from mental incapacity (<em>ie.</em> that he lacked contractual capacity when he signed the draft IJ on 7 June 2021), or some form of infirmity (in the context of the Defendant’s case under the doctrine of unconscionability), which the Plaintiff had known, and/or taken advantage, of.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 The key question was thus whether the alleged Disorders operated on his mind on 7 June 2021 such that it gives rise to an alleged incapacity or infirmity.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Defendant has failed to show that he was labouring under any incapacity or infirmity</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 Having considered the evidence, I find that the Defendant has wholly failed to establish his claim that he was so infirmed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 In support of his case, the main piece of evidence relied upon by the Defendant is the medical report which he had obtained from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) in November 2023 (“IMH 1<sup>st</sup> Report”), almost 2½ years <em>after</em> he had executed the Draft IJ.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 In gist, the IMH 1<sup>st</sup> Report was prepared in response to a request for a medical report on the Defendant and in it, the hospital set out the Defendant medical history and the doctors’ diagnosis (<em>ie.</em> the Disorders) following his admission into IMH on 31 August 2021.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> In a follow-up report prepared by IMH dated 22 December 2023 (“IMH 2<sup>nd</sup> Report”), IMH provided further clarifications on the nature of the Disorders and the possible causes of the same.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 In this regard, I agree with the Plaintiff that nowhere in the IMH’s 1<sup>st</sup> Report or 2<sup>nd</sup> Report was a definitive statement that the Defendant was <em>in fact</em> suffering from the Disorders in or around June 2021. Indeed, as the Plaintiff’s counsel pointed out in their submissions,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> the IMH 2<sup>nd</sup> Report merely opined that the <em>symptoms</em> of the Defendant’s Adjustment Disorder “appeared to have started about two to three months prior” to 31 August 2021. This was a largely tentative statement based on <em>inter alia</em> the Defendant’s <em>self-reporting</em> of increased alcohol consumption in the preceding months.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 Importantly, the IMH doctor who prepared the IMH Reports expressly stated that he was “<em>not able to comment on the Defendant’s mental capacity retrospectively as</em> [the doctor] <em>had not assessed him when he signed the Consent Order of Court for his divorce matters</em>”. This was a crucial point as that meant there was no objective evidence whatsoever as to whether the Defendant was in fact suffering from the Disorders in June 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 What was more critical was the complete absence of any medical opinion or evidence that the alleged Disorders did affect (or was even capable of affecting) the Defendant’s contractual capacity, or his understanding of the Draft IJ. The IMH 2<sup>nd</sup> Report merely explained that a person with Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood develops “<em>emotional symptoms of depressed mood like feeling low and hopeless in response to identifiable stressor or stressors</em>” and in respect of Alcohol use Disorder, that the individual would spend a great deal of time obtaining or using alcohol and exhibit symptoms of alcohol withdrawal and tolerance. None of the IMH Reports specifically mentions any mental impairment on the individual’s ability to understand or enter into contracts.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 It is plainly insufficient for the Defendant to merely point to his physical or mental ailments at a particular point in time, without establishing a link between those ailments and his ability to enter into contracts.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 I agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms Dorothy Tan (“Ms Tan”), who submitted that the present case is analogous to <em>UMV v UMW</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/21967-SSP.xml')">[2018] SGFC 60</a> (“<em>UMW</em>”). In <em>UMW</em>, a husband sought to set-aside a draft consent order which he had signed because <em>inter alia</em> he had been taken advantaged of as he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder or Bipolar Mood Disorder at the relevant time when the consent order was signed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 In rejecting the husband’s application, the learned District Judge in <em>UMW</em> noted that despite all the medical reports adduced by the husband, none of them “<em>went so far as to say either that the</em> [husband’s] <em>condition had impaired his ability to make decisions at the material time or that his free will had been overborne when he consented to the</em> [consent order]”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 I agree with the Family Court in <em>UMW</em> that there must be a causal link or connection between a party’s mental state/condition <em>and</em> his ability to understand the draft consent order when he executed it. Otherwise, any party would be allowed to renege on his/her legal obligations years later by pointing to the existence of some mental condition at the time the contract or agreement was signed even though the said condition had no effect on that party’s ability to enter into a binding contract.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Defendant was not exploited or taken advantage of</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 The lack of objective documentary evidence in support of the Defendant’s claim of mental incapacity or infirmity must also be weighed against the surrounding circumstances leading up to, and following, his execution of the Draft IJ on 7 June 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 As Ms Tan had pointed out in her submissions – the Plaintiff, through her solicitors, sent draft copies of the relevant divorce papers (which included the Draft IJ) in late April 2021. This was 4 months before the Defendant was admitted into the IMH, and more than 1 month before the Defendant signed the Draft IJ.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 Moreover, the circulation of the divorce papers in 2021 must not be considered in isolation. The Plaintiff also provided evidence that both parties had previously discussed the possibility of a divorce and the division of their matrimonial assets the year before, in 2020.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 In text messages exchanged between the parties on or around 21 February 2020, the parties discussed the terms of a potential divorce including the transfer of their matrimonial flat to the Plaintiff with “<em>no refund to</em> [the Defendant’s] <em>cpf</em>”. The Defendant then asked the Plaintiff what this proposal meant, and after the effect of such a term was made known to the Defendant, he responded “<em>ok</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 It was therefore not surprising that in the divorce papers circulated by the Plaintiff’s solicitors in April 2021, clauses were included for the transfer of the matrimonial home without refunds made to the Defendant’s Central Provident Fund (or “CPF”) account, in line with the proposal made the year before.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 In any case, the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ email dated 30 April 2021 fairly and unambiguously stated that the Defendant was “<em>strongly encouraged</em>” to “<em>seek independent legal advice</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span> The Defendant was also asked to identify any parts of the proposed divorce terms he did not agree with, and to provide his counterproposal.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 It was within this context that the Defendant responded to the Plaintiff’s solicitors, via email on 5 May 2021, indicating that he had already “<em>signed</em>” a copy of the papers and that the solicitors should verify the same with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s solicitors then replied to the Defendant informing him that arrangements need to be made for him to sign the documents in the presence of a Commissioner for Oaths (“CFO”).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> This was followed by a series of email correspondence between the Defendant and the Plaintiff’s solicitors arranging to execute the divorce documents.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 Thus, contrary to what the Defendant’s counsel had sought to argue,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span> I find that there was nothing in the exchange of correspondence between the parties which suggests any pressure being placed on the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 In fact, the Defendant was clear in his email responses that he had wanted to sign the documents to complete the “<em>proceeding</em>”. The correspondence also did not show the Defendant expressing any hesitation or uncertainty <em>vis-à-vis</em> the terms of the divorce.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 The parties eventually decided on 7 June 2021 as being the date the Defendant would attend before the CFO to sign the relevant divorce papers. The CFO in question was one Ms [N].</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 Given the seriousness of the allegations relating to the Defendant’s capacity to sign the Draft IJ, the Defendant was directed by the Court (at a Case Conference conducted for the present application) to invite Ms N to provide her response/account as to what had transpired on 7 June 2021.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55 Ms N stated, in her email reply to the Defendant’s solicitors on 1 August 2024, that she could not recall specifically the event in question given that it occurred in 2021 (some 3 years ago).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> However, Ms N was clear in that it was her practice when asked to witness the execution of divorce documents (for simplified divorce track cases) that she would ask the defendant to go through the papers, especially the draft interim judgment. She will then ask if the defendant understood the contents and whether the defendant agrees with the contents. She will remind the defendant of the clause in the draft interim judgment as regards his right to independent advice. She will only request the defendant to sign the draft interim judgment if the defendant agrees. This process is then repeated for the rest of the divorce papers.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56 In my view, there were no cogent reasons or basis provided by the Defendant to challenge Ms N’s evidence as to what she would normally do, or that she <em>did not</em> carry out the same steps in his case. In fairness to the Defendant’s counsel, he did not seek to challenge Ms N’s position at the hearing of SUM 1758.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57 I thus accept Ms N’s explanation and find that she had undertaken the same process when the Defendant attended before her on 7 June 2021.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58 I should add that next to where the Defendant’s and Ms N’s signatures were placed in the Draft IJ, there was appended in clear type-written print the words, “<em>I acknowledge that I have considered the terms of the agreement and have also been informed of my right to seek independent legal advice</em>”. This puts in beyond peradventure that the Defendant was not only informed of his right to seek legal advice, he had also freely and independently provided his assent to the terms in the Draft IJ.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59 Finally, the Defendant’s conduct <em>post</em>-execution of the Draft IJ also reflected his understanding <em>and agreement</em> with the divorce terms.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_60"></a>60 In support of the Plaintiff’s case, she exhibited the text messages she had exchanged with the Defendant on 12 August 2021, one (1) week after the IJ was granted by the Family Court.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span> In these messages, the Defendant discussed the sale of the parties’ cars and even sought to explain to the Plaintiff how she could reduce the costs of purchasing a new car.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_61"></a>61 These discussions on the cars are relevant because part of the Disputed Orders required the Defendant to sell the cars and for the sale proceeds to be retained by the Plaintiff. This was also one of the Orders he is now asking this Court to set-aside. If the Defendant was of the view that this was an order which should not have been made, why then did he discuss with the Plaintiff how to implement it? More importantly, there was nothing in the messages disclosed which suggests that the Defendant was dissatisfied with the Disputed Orders, that he did not understand what the Orders meant, or that he was labouring under some form of incapacity or infirmity; he was clear and specific as to what he wanted to inform the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_62"></a>62 Accordingly, I find that the Defendant was <em>not</em> suffering from any mental incapacity or infirmity which vitiated (or affected) his consent when he executed the Draft IJ. He was not in a state (whether induced by alcohol or otherwise) which rendered him unable to understand the general nature and effect of the transaction.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_63"></a>63 Further, and in any event, it is clear from the discussion on the applicable legal principles set out above (at [22] and [31]) that the mere presence of a mental infirmity on the Defendant’s part is insufficient to invoke the doctrine of unconscionability and/or mental incapacity to set-aside a legally binding contractual document. The Defendant must <em>also</em> show that the Plaintiff knew about the said infirmity and had taken advantage of, or exploited, the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_64"></a>64 In this regard, I find that the Plaintiff (or her solicitors) <em>did not</em> in any way take advantage of the Defendant in the execution of the Draft IJ. The evidence adduced showed that there were <em>no indicators</em> exhibited by the Defendant which would cause the Plaintiff (or her solicitors) to think or believe that the Defendant did not agree with the Draft IJ, or that he was labouring under any infirmity or incapacity.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_65"></a>65 In any event, any doubt which the Defendant could have exhibited by his behaviour or conduct (which I have found not to be present) would have been adequately addressed when the Defendant attended before the CFO and had executed the divorce documents in her presence.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_66"></a>66 As stated above, I find that the CFO, Ms N, had ascertained his understanding of the Draft IJ, including his right to seek independent advice and the Defendant had indicated his agreement to the terms.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_67"></a>67 Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to prove the existence of any mental incapacity on his part, or any unconscionability on the Plaintiff’s part, which justifies the Disputed Orders being set-aside or varied.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Other Observations</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_68"></a>68 My finding that the Defendant has not proven that he was labouring under any mental incapacity or infirmity as at 7 June 2021 (or in the overall divorce process) sufficiently disposes of SUM 1758.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_69"></a>69 However, I will make a few more observations arising from the submissions and issues raised by counsel.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_70"></a>70 First, much of the Defendant’s written submissions sought to present his case as one involving some abstract conception of “unfairness”, or that the terms of the IJ was not “just and equitable”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_71"></a>71 As Ms Tan had pointed out during her submissions, these abstract references do little to assist the Court in reaching a decision in the case. I would go further to say that a court applies the law, and the relevant legal principles; cases are not decided based solely because one party (or a court) later believes an outcome appears “unfair”. As Choo J in <em>Lee Min Jai</em> had aptly emphasised, s 112(4) of the WC should not be seen as an invitation to rewrite the terms of a settlement so that they appear “<em>more equitable</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span> That is not the purpose of the statutory provision.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_72"></a>72 Indeed, the Family Court’s processes and procedures have been designed to ensure that an unrepresented party would be given the relevant opportunity and information to take independent legal advice in cases under the simplified divorce track. For example, litigants are required to execute a draft consent order (or interim judgment) which contains an express clause to remind the litigant of his/her right to independent legal advice and that the terms of the draft order have been agreed to on that basis. To further reinforce this, the unrepresented litigant is required to sign the document before a solicitor or a CFO, who is not acting for the other party.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_73"></a>73 In the present case, all of the above procedural safeguards have been followed. Ms N, the CFO, confirmed that she had explained the relevant matters to the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s solicitors too acted appropriately and fairly by emphasising to the Defendant in their correspondence that he could seek independent advice and could even provide counterproposals if he wanted to.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_74"></a>74 I am unable to see how the Defendant was treated unfairly or unjustly. If the Defendant chose to agree to the terms of the Draft IJ and had executed the relevant documents, despite numerous reminders given to him to seek independent legal advice, it does not lie in his mouth now that he had been ignorant to the terms of the Draft IJ because he had not instructed solicitors to act for him at that time. Put simply, a bad bargain is not an unfair bargain.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_75"></a>75 Second, as alluded to above, both counsel appear to accept that the whole suite of vitiating factors (including concepts such as mental incapacity and the doctrine of unconscionability) applies with the same force and rigour to matrimonial consent orders as they do to contracts in the commercial sphere. This is despite the fact that the Court of Appeal has not, in fact, definitively determined the same.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_76"></a>76 As the applicability of these vitiating factors was not challenged by the parties, I had applied the same in my determination of the present case. However, my decision should not be taken as the court having accepted the position advanced by the parties.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_77"></a>77 In my view, one could argue that not all contractual vitiating factors recognised in the commercial sphere should apply unattenuated to matrimonial consent orders. As I had noted at [72] above, the execution of draft consent orders in matrimonial proceedings are subject to clear procedural safeguards. The legal force of the eventual order emanates from the court which does not act as a mere “rubber stamp”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span> This stand in contrast to commercial contracts where similar features may not be present.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_78"></a>78 Further, concepts such as whether the impugned commercial transaction was at a “<em>considerable undervalue</em>” or whether it was “<em>fair, just and reasonable</em>” (arising from the application of the narrow doctrine of unconscionability) may not automatically sit well with other principles of matrimonial law. It is, for instance, not clear whether these concepts are analogous to the principle of “just and equitable” division of the parties’ matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(10) of the WC.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_79"></a>79 If so, are parties then required to advance hypothetical scenarios/arguments before the variation court as to whether the marriage was a single or dual income, or what approach or methodology should be applied to divide the parties’ assets? These submissions may arguably be necessary if the court is required to assess whether what the parties had agreed under the impugned consent order was better (or worst) of than what the Family Court would hypothetically have ordered if the parties had chosen to undergo a contested hearing for the division of their assets.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_80"></a>80 In fact, such difficulties did arise in the present case (albeit in the form of a preliminary issue raised by the Plaintiff’s counsel). At the commencement of the hearing of SUM 1758, the Defendant’s counsel sought to provide the supposed values of the assets mentioned to in the Disputed Orders with the intention of showing how much the Defendant had unfairly “given up” as a result of what he believes to be an “unfair” order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_81"></a>81 Yet, Ms Tan rightly pointed out that the parties never had the benefit of any court-mandated disclosure or discovery process to ascertain the nature of their assets or the correct value of the same when the IJ was granted, precisely because they had already agreed to settle the divorce amicably. I note that there were also no allegations of material non-disclosure or fraud raised by the Defendant which suggest that he did not know what assets the parties owned (or the value thereof) at the material time.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_82"></a>82 The Defendant’s attempt to ascribe values for assets which existed more than 2 years earlier was therefore entirely speculative. This was especially given that the Defendant’s values were unsupported by any objective evidence. There is also the question as to whether the party responding to such assertions (for <em>eg.</em>, the Plaintiff in the present case) would be prejudiced given that he or she would then be required to ascertain the value of assets which may have since been disposed of, or lost, due to the effluxion of time.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_83"></a>83 It follows from the above that a court may not be in a position to then use these speculative figures or arguments to ascertain the hypothetical question of whether the terms of the consent order were at an “undervalue”, or that the division order was not “fair, just and reasonable” when it was granted.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_84"></a>84 However, as these issues were neither fully argued by the parties nor put before me, I shall say no more on the same.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_85"></a>85 Finally, I had, in the analysis set out above, focused on whether the Defendant has provided sufficient basis to set-aside the Disputed Orders. As I have found that he has failed to prove the existence of any incapacity or infirmity, or that he had been taken advantage of, the Disputed Orders will not be set-aside. I will also not <em>vary</em> any of the Disputed Orders for the same reasons.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_86"></a>86 To be clear, I did not consider the issue of whether the Disputed Orders (or the AM Orders generally) ought to be varied because of any alleged “unworkability” of specific terms in the AM Order. For example, the Defendant’s counsel alluded to the fact that the deadline for the sale of the parties’ matrimonial assets, as envisaged in the AM Order, has since expired.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_87"></a>87 In this regard, I agree with Ms Tan who submitted, in response to the Court’s clarification, that neither party made submissions on the issue of unworkability and, importantly, that the Defendant must be held to what he had specifically prayed for in SUM 1758, <em>ie.</em> for the Court to decide whether Disputed Orders ought to be set-aside or varied for the specific reasons of the Defendant’s incapacity or under the doctrine of unconscionability, and not some other reason.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_88"></a>88 If there are any concerns as to the continued workability of the AM Orders (including whether there has been overpayment by the Defendant through the use of his CPF monies<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_36" id="Ftn_36_1"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span>), those concerns should be properly ventilated at the appropriate forum when the appropriate application is before the Court.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_89"></a>89 In conclusion, I dismiss SUM 1758 in its entirety as the Defendant has not made out his claim that the Disputed Orders should be varied or set-aside.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_90"></a>90 It leaves me to express my gratitude to counsel for their submissions and, in particular, to Ms Tan for her oral and written submissions which I had found to be clear and detailed, and from which the Court has derived much assistance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_91"></a>91 I will hear the parties on the issue of costs.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit dd 15.07.24 (“PA1”) at [8] and [13] – [24]. The IJ is exhibited at pp. 27 – 29 of PA1.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>See Prayers 1 and 2 of the FC/SUM 1758/2024.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dd 12.09.24 (“DWS”) at [22].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>DWS at [27].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup><em>AYM v AYL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2013] 1 SLR 0924.xml')">[2013] 1 SLR 924</a> (“<em>AYM</em>”) at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup><em>AYM</em> at [23].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup><em>AYM</em> at [30].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup><em>AYM</em> at [31].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup><em>AYM</em> at [15].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup><em>AYM</em> at [31]; <em>AOO</em> at [22].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup><em>UMM</em> at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup><em>Lee Min Jai</em> at [5].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dd 12.09.24 (“PWS”) at [9]; DWS at [18].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>PWS at [41]; DWS at [18].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup><em>BOM v BOK</em> at [141].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>PA1 at [13] – [14].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit dd 05.06.24 (“DA1”) at pp. 14 – 16.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>The IMH clarified in a subsequent email that some of the dates in the original IMH Report had been erroneously stated as “202<u>3</u>” when it should have been “202<u>1</u>”: see DA1 at p. 21.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>PWS at [28].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>DA1 at p. 18.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup><em>UMW</em> at [34].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>PWS at [32]; Defendant’s Final Reply Affidavit dd 05.08.24 (“DA2”) at [8].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>PA1 at [9].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>PA1 at p. 32.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>PA1 at p. 37.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>PA1 at p. 54.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>See also DWS at [7] – [10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>DA2 at [12].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>DA2 at p. 50.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup><em>Ibid.</em></p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>PA1 at p. 67.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>DWS at [21], [22] and [29].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>See [16] above.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>See paragraph 116(5) of the Family Justice Courts Practice Directions.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup><em>AOO</em> at [18].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_36_1" id="Ftn_36">[note: 36]</a></sup>DA2 at [5].</p></div></content></root> | 1822 |
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