fc_judgments_version: 31
This data as json
| _id | _item | _version | _commit | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _item_full_hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | 23 | 1 | 1299 | [
"Family Law \u2013 Maintenance for Ex-Wife and child"
] |
2024-04-19 | Family Court | FC/D 399 of 2010 in FC/SUM 2054 of 2023 | WTP v WTQ | [2024] SGFC 19 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31392-SSP.xml | [
"Mr Jeremy Chong with Ms Nurul Nabilah of M/s JCP Law LLC for the Plaintiff",
"Mr Lee Yun En with paralegal Ms Cheyanne Doria of M/s Regal Law LLC for the Defendant."
] |
2024-04-24T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Christine Lee | <root><head><title>WTP v WTQ</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WTP <em>v</em> WTQ </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31392-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 19</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">FC/D 399 of 2010 in FC/SUM 2054 of 2023</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">19 April 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Christine Lee </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Mr Jeremy Chong with Ms Nurul Nabilah of M/s JCP Law LLC for the Plaintiff; Mr Lee Yun En with paralegal Ms Cheyanne Doria of M/s Regal Law LLC for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WTP — WTQ </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Maintenance for Ex-Wife and child</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">19 April 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Christine Lee:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 This case involves an appeal by the Plaintiff Father regarding the whole of my decision given on 5 January 2024 on his application in FC/SUM 2054 of 2023 for variation of the maintenance payable by him for the Defendant Mother and the sole child of the previous marriage.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 The Plaintiff Father filed his appeal in HCF/DCA 8 of 2024 on 19 January 2024.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Facts</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Parties</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 The Plaintiff Father (“the Plaintiff”) and the Defendant Mother (“the Defendant”) married on 3 May 1995, in the People's Government of Xiangcheng District, Zhangzhou City, People's Republic of China. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant are Singapore citizens. There is one child to the previous marriage namely, [Child 1] (m) DOB 17 July 2000 now aged 23 years (“the said child”). The marriage lasted about 15 years before the Plaintiff filed Writ of Divorce on 26 January 2010.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 Interim Judgement (“IJ”) was granted on 14 October 2010 on an uncontested basis on the Statement of Claim and the marriage was dissolved by reason that the Parties to the marriage had lived apart for a continuous period of at least 4 years immediately preceding the filing of the Writ. The IJ also contained the terms of a Consent Order regarding all the Ancillary Matters in the Statement of Claim. Accordingly, the Certificate of Final Judgement was issued on 17 January 2011.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 On 28 June 2023, the Plaintiff filed FC/SUM 2054/2023 for 3 prayers but Prayer 1 was in 2 parts as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <u>Prayer 1</u>: That paragraphs 3(6) and 3(7) of the Interim Judgment dated 14 October 2010 (IJ4842/2010/V) be varied as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">"3(6) That there shall be no maintenance for the Defendant”.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">3(7) That the child namely [Child 1] (M) shall be solely maintained by the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 Prayer 2 of FC/SUM 2054/2023 was on the issue of Costs:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <u>Prayer 2:</u> Parties to bear their own costs of this application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 Prayer 3 of FC/SUM 2054/2023 related to other relief orders:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <u>Prayer 3</u>: Such other orders as the Honourable Court deems fit.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The Parties cases</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 Both Parties were represented by Counsel at the hearing, which was held on one day only on 5 January 2024, whereupon I delivered my decision after hearing the submissions of both Counsel.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 As I was of the view that the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of Prayer 1 was redundant, I informed the Plaintiff's Counsel that I was striking out this prayer because the said child was over 21 years, and the case law was clear that the said child had to make his own application for maintenance if he so wished. I was also of the view that since the Court Order in Clause 3(7) of the IJ did not provide for maintenance for the said child beyond 21 years, that the Plaintiff was no longer liable to pay any maintenance for the said child. The Plaintiff's Counsel agreed<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>. As such, I held that there was no need to hear the Defendant’s Counsel on this prayer.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 The Plaintiff's Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s case for the 1<sup>st</sup> part of Prayer 1 was that this application was made under sections 118 and 119 of the Women’s Charter (“WC”) on the grounds that there had been a material change in the circumstances of the Plaintiff such that he was no longer able to provide maintenance for the Defendant Ex-Wife.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 It was submitted that on the timelines, the divorce was made more than 13 years ago. At the time the IJ By Consent Order was made in 2010, the Plaintiff was working as an architect earning over S$5,000 per month<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>. After the divorce, he started a company [C] in China in the Xiamen province and at the beginning, the income earned was similar to what he was earning at the time of the divorce and actually increased between 2015 to 2016 to about S$8,000 per month<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>. During this time, he kept up with his maintenance obligations and in fact, gave more as he could afford it.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 It was also submitted that the company started to struggle after 2016 and as of January 2018, the Plaintiff started to find difficulty in making the maintenance payments<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span>. The Plaintiff’s Counsel referred to the Defendant’s calculation of arrears at page 25 of the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit which showed the default and lump sum payments to make this up. However, the Plaintiff managed to pay up to over $140,000 from 2018 to-date and the last few payments were made by his current wife to keep him out of prison<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 The Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that the material change was that for the past 2 years, the company had been in negative territory and making losses and the Plaintiff had been forced to take loans from family and friends. It was submitted that effectively, the Plaintiff had no more income and was just incurring more and more debt<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 The Plaintiff’s Counsel agreed that maintenance for the Defendant ex-Wife extended until her passing or re-marriage. However, it was submitted that the Plaintiff Ex-Husband was not supposed to be the Defendant Ex-Wife’s “<em>general insurer of sorts</em>” as stated in the case of <b><em>ATE v ATD <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18402-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGCA 2</a></em></b> which was an order for ancillaries at the time of divorce. The Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that paragraphs 30 and 31 of the <b><em>ATE case</em></b>, as applied to the present case, was that when the division of property was a fair division at the time of the divorce and the Wife had always been working, now that the Husband was no longer able to maintain the Wife, this taken in totality, was that the Wife was not disadvantaged given that she had already gotten a lot of the wealth from the marriage<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 The Plaintiff’s Counsel also referred to the case of <b><em>AYM v AYL <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2014] SGCA 0046.xml')">[2014] SGCA 46</a></em></b> at paragraph 23 which held that: “<em>The cases have established that a material adverse change in the financial circumstances of the Husband, especially where the Wife is reasonably provided for, is a good basis for a downward variation of a maintenance order<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span>”.</em></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 The Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that in the present case, the Plaintiff was in debt and dependent on his new wife to keep him out of jail. On the other hand, the Defendant had done well for herself and she was working for most of her life. It was submitted that there was nothing to show that she could not find another job as her resignation only happened very recently and it was many years after the divorce<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span>. It was submitted that this warranted a rescission of the maintenance payable to the Defendant ex-Wife.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 The Defendant’s Counsel responded that on the material change of circumstances based on the <b><em>ATE case</em></b>, that decision was on the ancillary matters for the Wife’s maintenance. Therefore, it was not a case authority for variation. The Defendant’s Counsel referred to the case of <b><em>ATS v ATT <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19435-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGHC 196</a></em></b> before the Honourable Justice Belinda Ang from paragraphs 10 to 14. Reading from paragraph 10 of the case, Defendant’s Counsel submitted that “<em>as a starting point, the material changes in question must relate to the circumstances prevailing at the time the 2011 maintenance order was granted</em>”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 The Defendant’s Counsel also referred to paragraph 11 of the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> and submitted that “<em>a variation application that seeks to rely on circumstances prior to the order for maintenance should be rejected. It was submitted that, put simply, the Court must be vigilant to sieve out unmeritorious applications and to ensure finality in the judicial process. No applicant should be allowed to have another bite at the cherry merely because he or she is displeased with the outcome of Court proceedings</em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> also referred to the case of <b><em>Tan Huan Eng Agnes Florence v Trevor Symes <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/47028-M.xml')">[2005] SGDC 83</a></em></b> wherein the District Judge in that case had cautioned against back-door appeals that are disguised as variation applications and emphasised that if the change is alleged to be material, “<em>the evidence of change must have arisen after the maintenance order</em>”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The Defendant’s Counsel further referred to paragraph 12 of the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> and quoted that “<em>a variation application under s 72 and/or s 118 is not a de novo application; the variation Court decides from the vantage point that presumes the final maintenance order to be appropriate at the time it was made and examines whether the evidence demonstrates a change in circumstances has occurred since then to justify a variation or rescission of the final maintenance order made at the ancillary hearing</em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span><em>”</em>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 The Defendant’s Counsel also highlighted the three factors set out in paragraph 13 of the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> and quoted from the case that<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span>: “<em>Generally, when the “change in circumstances” condition in s 72 and/or s 118 is invoked, the variation Court strictly decides from the time-point post-ancillary order. The Court should thus examine whether:</em></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(<em>a</em>) <em>such change being alleged is a change from circumstances prevailing during the ancillary matters hearing.</em> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(<em>b</em>) <em>such change being alleged arose after the ancillary matters hearing; and</em> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(<em>c</em>) <em>such change being alleged is sufficient enough to satisfy the court that a variation or rescission of maintenance is necessitated (in light of the factors that determined the final maintenance order made at the ancillary hearing.”</em> </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 Finally, the Defendant’s Counsel also quoted paragraph 14 of the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> that: “<em>To summarise, what can qualify as material change within the meaning of s 118 would thus depend on the facts in light of the factors that informed the final maintenance order for the former wife</em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 The Defendant’s Counsel informed that the three factors set out in paragraph 13 of the <b><em>ATS case</em></b> were endorsed by the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in paragraph 10 of the case of <b><em>BZD v BZE <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24080-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGCA 1</a>.</em></b> It was submitted that therefore, the starting point for this case must come from the vantage point presuming the appropriateness of the maintenance order made on 14 October 2010<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 In response to my query that, if what the Plaintiff’s Counsel said was true in that the Plaintiff was no longer earning what he was earning at the time the maintenance order was made, whether these same factors were raised before the District Judge at the hearing for <b>MSS xx3/2023</b> wherein the Plaintiff had sought to vary downwards the agreed maintenance arrears and <b>MSS xx7/2023</b> wherein the Defendant sought to enforce the maintenance arrears, the Defendant’s Counsel informed that they were<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 However, the Plaintiff’s Counsel disputed this and submitted that they were not having a 2<sup>nd</sup> bite of the cherry. It was submitted that the earlier submissions in <b>MSS xx3/2023</b> and <b>MSS xx7/2023</b> (“the two MSS applications”) were for the reduction of the arrears that was payable. Whereas, in the current case, the application was in relation to the amount payable in the Maintenance Order. As there was another agreement entered into by the Parties, the District Judge declined to adjust the arrears of maintenance. Therefore, the two MSS applications were for a different set of circumstances<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 The Defendant’s Counsel responded that it was not accurate to say that the basis of the two MSS applications was different<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>. It was submitted that the District Judge did not just deal with the fact that there was a pre-existing agreement between the Parties<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span>. The Defendant’s Counsel referred to the Grounds of Decision (“GD”) dated 14<sup>th</sup> July 2023 for the two MSS applications [at paragraphs 23 to 33]<em>.</em> In summary, the Defendant’s Counsel referred to the parts of the GD whereby the District Judge noted that the Plaintiff had not demonstrated that there had been a change in circumstances warranting a downward variation of the arrears because according to his own evidence, his business had suffered greatly since 2016, which predated the enforcement orders. <em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></em></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that at paragraph 31 of the GD, the District Judge had also taken into account the fact that the Plaintiff had started a new family with his current wife and held that when the Plaintiff voluntarily took on additional financial obligations for his new family, the decision to take on any additional financial obligations must have regard to the existing ones. The District Judge found that the Plaintiff could afford to do both<em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span></em>. The Defendant’s Counsel pointed out that in the middle of the Plaintiff’s alleged business downturn in 2018, the Plaintiff had moved his current new family from China to Singapore but gave no reasons why<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 The Defendant’s Counsel also referred to the case of <b><em>George Sapooran Singh v Gordip d/o MD Garsingh <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19401-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGHC 197</a></em></b>, before the Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ramesh at paragraphs 39 and 40 and submitted on the factors that must be taken into account regarding the Plaintiff’s obligations to his new family, which have to be balanced against the pre-existing obligations to the family from the previous marriage<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 The Defendant’s Counsel summarised the three factors as: (i) the reasonableness of the commitments that the Plaintiff had assumed, whether as regards his new family or otherwise, bearing in mind the pre-existing obligations he owed to the family from the previous marriage. (ii) Whether the Plaintiff and his new family had explored and exhausted all reasonable solutions that would enable him to perform his obligations on both sides of the fence; and (iii) The financial circumstances and needs of the family from the previous marriage.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that in the present case, the Plaintiff not only remarried, but went on to have 2 children and relocated them from China to Singapore. It was also noted that the Plaintiff now no longer had to pay any maintenance for the said child of his previous marriage, and that instead of paying $2,000 per month, he was now only liable to pay $1,000 per month for maintenance. The Defendant’s Counsel also submitted that since the said child had not made any application for maintenance, essentially the Plaintiff’s obligation to his previous family had halved<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that the Defendant herself had suffered an adverse and material change of her circumstances. The Defendant’s Counsel referred to Tab 1 of the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit at page 66 for a medical report dated 9 September 2023 stating that her medical treatment was for the next 5 to 10 years and made it difficult for her to work. It was submitted that the Defendant’s official last day of service was 5 September 2023 and that she was also suffering from other medical issues and paying for her Mother’s (suffering from cancer) medical bills as well as paying for the said child’s medical school expenses<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 The Defendant’s Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff had not provided proof of his loss of income<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span>. The Defendant’s Counsel referred to paragraph 27 of the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit, wherein the Defendant had stated that the Plaintiff’s UOB account had not been disclosed<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 The Defendant’s Counsel also referred to paragraph 26 of the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit and submitted that, contrary to the Plaintiff’s allegations, the Plaintiff had been receiving at least $4,000 to $5,000 every month into his ICBC account<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span>. The Plaintiff had said that this was for salary arrears but he gave no proof of this. The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that the inference was that he was still drawing about $5,000 per month so there was no material change of circumstances in his salary from the IJ date<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 The Defendant’s Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff appeared to be in a much stronger financial position now as he was currently a joint owner of his HDB flat which was purchased in 2021. It was also fully paid up with a cheque which was issued from his current wife’s bank account. It was submitted that there was no evidence to show where the source of funds came from. However, this did show that the family was in a position of financial strength and stability to be able to fully pay off the flat at the purchase price of $635,000<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 The Defendant’s Counsel also submitted that the company [C] belonged solely to the Plaintiff and that what the Plaintiff had produced did not show the true state of the company’s financial position<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span>. It was submitted that this was because from the [C]’s website, it could be seen that the company had been involved in numerous major projects over the past few years as stated in paragraph 15 of the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 It was also submitted that paragraph 17 of the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit showed that it was unsafe to rely on the Plaintiff’s documents on the true state of the company’s affairs as these were not audited statements and were no more than a self-serving exercise<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span>. It was therefore submitted that the Plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proof to show that there had been a material change of circumstances to warrant the rescission of the Defendant’s $1,000 per month spousal maintenance<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_36" id="Ftn_36_1"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 The Plaintiff's Counsel responded that in the <b><em>George Sapooran Singh’s case</em></b>, there were 2 factors which had contributed to the Court’s decision. First, he had said that he had cancer but this was not true. So, this affected his credibility to the Court. It also did not affect his ability to work. The second reason was that he had claimed that he had to be the sole caregiver of his new wife but the Court found that it was not necessary for him to stop work to be the sole caregiver of his new wife<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_37" id="Ftn_37_1"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span>. So, the facts were quite different from the current case where it was submitted that the material change that the Plaintiff was relying on was his total loss of income<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_38" id="Ftn_38_1"><sup>[note: 38]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 The Plaintiff's Counsel also submitted that the Defendant had relied on a few bank statements which were only a narrow snapshot of a few months. It was submitted that the true situation was in the company’s statements<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_39" id="Ftn_39_1"><sup>[note: 39]</sup></a></span> that had been submitted in the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavits at pages 29 to 48 as prepared by the company’s accountants which were submitted to the Chinese authorities. It was also submitted that auditing was not necessary for a company of the size of the Plaintiff’s company<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_40" id="Ftn_40_1"><sup>[note: 40]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 The Plaintiff's Counsel referred to the Plaintiff’s Final Reply Affidavit at page 38 for the purchase of the HDB flat and the fact that the money came from his current wife. It was submitted that the Plaintiff was fortunate to have a wife of means but the obligation was on him to pay maintenance for his ex-Wife. The Plaintiff's Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s current wife’s resources were her own and the Plaintiff’s sole income came from the company [C] which had been making losses for the past couple of years. It was therefore submitted that the Plaintiff’s lack of income now was the material change<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_41" id="Ftn_41_1"><sup>[note: 41]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 The Plaintiff's Counsel also referred to the Plaintiff’s Final Reply Affidavit in paragraph 24 on the closure of the UOB account, which the Plaintiff said that he was forced to terminate as he did not maintain the minimum sum required to continue holding the account, which was $1,000 at any point in time. I noted that in paragraph 24 at page 7 of his Affidavit, the Plaintiff had also stated that prior to the termination, there was only $37.35 left in the UOB account.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 The Plaintiff’s Counsel also submitted that the Defendant’s claim of her change of circumstances was not an application before the Court. It was also submitted that in any event, the Defendant’s medical report at page 66 of her Affidavit showed that this was a condition that she had been suffering for a long time and she had continued to work for the past 16 years despite this problem<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_42" id="Ftn_42_1"><sup>[note: 42]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 With regard to <b>Prayer 2 of FC/SUM 2054/2023</b> on the issue of Costs, the Plaintiff's Counsel informed that it was still the Plaintiff’s position that the Parties were to bear their own costs of the application. However, the Defendant’s Counsel informed that the Defendant was seeking Costs of between $2,000 to $3,000. The Plaintiff's Counsel responded that if the Court ordered Costs against any Party, then it should be at $1,000<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_43" id="Ftn_43_1"><sup>[note: 43]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 For <b>Prayer 3 of FC/SUM 2054/2023</b> which related to other relief orders, the Plaintiff's Counsel informed that the Plaintiff was not asking for any other relief. However, if Court did not agree to total recession, then the Plaintiff asked the Court to consider downward revision to $100 per month as a nominal sum<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_44" id="Ftn_44_1"><sup>[note: 44]</sup></a></span>. The Defendant’s Counsel submitted that there should not be any downward revision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Plaintiff’s Appeal </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 The Plaintiff has appealed against the whole of my decision given on 5 January 2024 wherein I had dismissed the Plaintiff’s application to rescind the payment of $1,000 monthly maintenance to the Defendant or to vary this amount downward to the nominal payment of $100 as monthly maintenance to the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 The Plaintiff’s appeal also appears to cover my order that there should be no Costs awarded and as earlier stated, that I had struck out the Plaintiff’s application for the said child to be solely maintained by the Defendant, as being redundant.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">My Decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 <b>On Prayer 1(a):</b> In making my decision on Prayer 1(a) of the Plaintiff’s application that there be no maintenance payable for the Defendant, I noted that the Plaintiff’s case on the material change in his circumstances was that he was no longer earning the same income of $5,000 per month that he was earning at the time of the IJ Court Order granted in 2010<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_45" id="Ftn_45_1"><sup>[note: 45]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 I also noted that the Plaintiff's Counsel had submitted that the Plaintiff had become saddled with debts and that his income had gone into negative territory<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_46" id="Ftn_46_1"><sup>[note: 46]</sup></a></span>. I further noted the Plaintiff's Counsel’s submission that the Plaintiff should not be the Defendant’s general insurer for life<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_47" id="Ftn_47_1"><sup>[note: 47]</sup></a></span> and that this was consistent with the case law principles.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 However, I was of the view that the Plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that there was indeed a material change of his circumstances to warrant his application. In my view, the Plaintiff had failed to prove the loss or lack of income that he was relying on now, which had arisen after the IJ Court Order was made in 2010, and in light of the factors that had determined the maintenance order made in 2010, was sufficient enough to warrant a variation or rescission to not pay or reduce the payment of monthly maintenance for the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 In making this assessment, I noted that firstly, the Plaintiff had said that he had been in financial difficulty since 2018. However, the Plaintiff made no application to vary or reduce the maintenance payable by him for the Defendant or the said child until 2022 when he applied to reduce the agreed arrears in <b>EMO xxx1/2022</b>. Whilst I noted that the other Court’s reasons for dismissing the two MSS applications was based on a different set of circumstances, nonetheless it was not disputed in the present case that in 2022, despite his claim of financial difficulty since 2018, the Plaintiff had agreed to these arrears.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 Secondly, I took into account the fact that although the Plaintiff had said that his company [C] had been incurring debts for the past 2 years, he also did not appeal against <b>EMO xxx1/2022</b>, which decision was made in December 2022, for him to pay instalments of $2,000 per month for the agreed arrears. This was on top of the then monthly maintenance payable by him for both the Defendant and the said child in the sum of $2,000 per month.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 Thirdly, I noted that the Plaintiff did not explain why he chose to move his new family to Singapore in 2018, despite being in financial difficulty. In fact, the Plaintiff himself stated that it was a known fact that the costs and standard of living in Singapore is higher than in China. This was stated in paragraph 27 at page 8 of the Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 In addition, I was of the view that the Plaintiff’s obligations to his new family must take into account his obligations to his previous family. In the present case, I noted that the Plaintiff’s new family was not prejudiced as they were not dependent on him financially because his current wife was of sufficient financial means to be able to fully pay for their current HDB flat in the sum of $635,300 in one cheque payment by way of a Cashier’s Order that was exhibited at pages 35 to 38 of the Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 I was also of the view that since the Plaintiff no longer had to pay maintenance for the said child, then his liability to pay maintenance for his previous family had already been reduced by half. On the other hand, based on the 3<sup>rd</sup> factor in the <b><em>ATS case<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_48" id="Ftn_48_1"><sup>[note: 48]</sup></a></span></em></b>, I noted that the Defendant had been assessed in 2010 to require the monthly maintenance of $1,000 and that her current circumstances were such that she continued to require the monthly maintenance payable by the Plaintiff. As such, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s application to rescind or downward vary the payment of $1,000 monthly maintenance to the Defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 <b>On Prayer 1(b):</b> In making my decision on Prayer 1(b) of the Plaintiff’s application that the said child shall be solely maintained by the Defendant, I noted that this was already the case as the said child was over 21 years old (the said child was aged 23 years at the time of the hearing) and Clause 3(7) of the IJ Court Order did not provide for continued maintenance to be payable by the Plaintiff for the said child beyond 21 years<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_49" id="Ftn_49_1"><sup>[note: 49]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55 I also noted that the said child had not made any application for maintenance from the Plaintiff on his own behalf. In addition, I noted the Defendant’s Counsel’s submission that the Defendant was already paying for the said child’s medical school expenses<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_50" id="Ftn_50_1"><sup>[note: 50]</sup></a></span>. This was not disputed by the Plaintiff's Counsel. Therefore, I struck out Prayer 1(b) as I was of the view that this Prayer was redundant. As noted earlier, the Plaintiff's Counsel had agreed with my position<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_51" id="Ftn_51_1"><sup>[note: 51]</sup></a></span> at the hearing.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56 <b>On Prayer 2:</b> In making my decision on Prayer 2 of the Plaintiff’s application that Parties were to bear their own costs of this application, I am unable to understand why this is being appealed against as this was exactly what the Plaintiff had asked for in Prayer 2.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57 <b>On Prayer 3:</b> In making my decision on Prayer 3 of the Plaintiff’s application for other relief orders, this has been covered in my decision regarding Prayer 1(a) of the Plaintiff’s application as explained above.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58 Accordingly, I dismissed Prayer 1(a) and Prayer 3, struck out Prayer 1(b) and granted Prayer 2 of the Plaintiff’s application in FC/SUM 2054 of 2023 based on the reasons given above.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59 I have nothing further to add to my said reasons.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 6 in lines 22 to 32.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 8 at lines 29 and 30.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 9 at lines 31 and 32 and page 10 from lines 1 to 2.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 10 from lines 7 to 13.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 11 from lines 27 to 32.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 12 from lines 4 to 30.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 13 from lines 25 to 32 and page 14 from lines 1 to 11.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 15 from lines 23 to 32 and page 16 from lines 1 to 14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 17 from lines 4 to 23.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 19 from lines 19 to 28.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 19 from lines 29 to 31 and page 20 from lines 1 to 12.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 20 from lines 14 to 22.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 21 from lines 1 to 7.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 21 from lines 18 to 28.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 21 from line 32 to page 22 from lines 1 to 4.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 23 from lines 4 to 9.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 24 from line 10 to page 25 at line 26.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 26 from lines 1 to 24.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 26 from lines 28 to 31.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 27 from lines 4 to 9.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 28 from lines 10 to 22.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 29 from lines 28 to 32 and page 30 from lines 1 to 16.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 30 from lines 18 to 29.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 32 from lines 3 to 17.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 32 from lines 25 to 32 and page 33 from lines 23 to 32.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 34 from lines 12 to 26.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 36 from lines 11 to 32 and page 37 up to line 23.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 38 from lines 1 to 4.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 39 from lines 20 to 27.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 39 from lines 1 to 3.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 40 from lines 1 to 25.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 38 from lines 14 to 20, page 41 from lines 1 to 32 and page 42 from lines 1 to 9.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 42 from lines 17 to 23.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 42 from lines 23 to 32 and page 43 from lines 2 to 10.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 43 from lines 14 to 32 and page 44 from lines 1 to 8.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_36_1" id="Ftn_36">[note: 36]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 44 from lines 18 to 23.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_37_1" id="Ftn_37">[note: 37]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 45 from lines 7 to 18.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_38_1" id="Ftn_38">[note: 38]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 48 from lines 6 to 16.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_39_1" id="Ftn_39">[note: 39]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 49 from lines 10 to 19.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_40_1" id="Ftn_40">[note: 40]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 50 from line 1 to page 52 at line 11.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_41_1" id="Ftn_41">[note: 41]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 54 from lines 1 to 2.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_42_1" id="Ftn_42">[note: 42]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 56 from lines 16 to 32 and page 57 from lines 1 to 3.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_43_1" id="Ftn_43">[note: 43]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 58 from lines 16 to 24.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_44_1" id="Ftn_44">[note: 44]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 59 from lines 1 to 10.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_45_1" id="Ftn_45">[note: 45]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 12 at lines 31 and 32 and page 13 from lines 1 to 10.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_46_1" id="Ftn_46">[note: 46]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 13 from lines 1 to 9.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_47_1" id="Ftn_47">[note: 47]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 13 from lines 14 to 18.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_48_1" id="Ftn_48">[note: 48]</a></sup>“<em>in light of the factors that determined the final maintenance order made at the ancillary hearing”.</em></p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_49_1" id="Ftn_49">[note: 49]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 6 in lines 16 to 22.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_50_1" id="Ftn_50">[note: 50]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 37 from lines 17 to 23 and at page 60 from lines 5 to 12.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_51_1" id="Ftn_51">[note: 51]</a></sup>See Notes of Evidence at page 6 at lines 26 and 27.</p></div></content></root> | 3d07a61e7e3560ba3d7fb9368a19fb92ac776a12 |
Links from other tables
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