fc_judgments_version: 33
This data as json
| _id | _item | _version | _commit | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _item_full_hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 25 | 1 | 1300 | [
"Family law \u2013 Maintenance \u2013 Variation of Maintenance Order \u2013 Whether remarriage terminates periodic maintenance order for a fixed period",
"Family law \u2013 Consent Orders \u2013 Whether maintenance order is a periodic order or for a lump sum amount payable by instalments"
] |
2024-04-16 | Family Court | Divorce Suit No. 4124 of 2019, (Summons No. 3215 of 2023) | WWC v WWD | [2024] SGFC 17 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31395-SSP.xml | [
"Ms Chang Man Phing and Ms Heidi Ngo (WongPartnership LLP) for the Plaintiff",
"Mr Yap Teong Liang (TL Yap Law Chambers LLC) for the Defendant."
] |
2024-04-25T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Kevin Ho | <root><head><title>WWC v WWD</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WWC <em>v</em> WWD </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31395-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 17</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Divorce Suit No. 4124 of 2019, (Summons No. 3215 of 2023)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">16 April 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Kevin Ho </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Ms Chang Man Phing and Ms Heidi Ngo (WongPartnership LLP) for the Plaintiff; Mr Yap Teong Liang (TL Yap Law Chambers LLC) for the Defendant. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WWC — WWD </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Maintenance</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Variation of Maintenance Order</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Whether remarriage terminates periodic maintenance order for a fixed period</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Consent Orders</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Whether maintenance order is a periodic order or for a lump sum amount payable by instalments</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">16 April 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Kevin Ho:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 In August 2019, the Plaintiff and the Defendant reached what appeared to be an amicable decision to end their almost three-decade long marriage.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 The Plaintiff applied for divorce in Singapore as he had been working here since 1999. At the time of the divorce application, the parties were already in their early 50s.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> The divorce application itself was filed as a simplified divorce application on the ground that the parties have been separated for 3 years and the Defendant consented to the divorce.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 An Interim Judgment for divorce (“IJ”) was eventually granted on 11 September 2019 and the orders relating to the ancillary matters of divorce contained in the IJ were recorded “<em>by consent</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> These consent orders were based on the terms of a draft IJ which parties had carefully negotiated; multiple drafts of the proposed IJ were exchanged between the couple<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> before the final version was duly executed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> and thereafter submitted to the court.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 Following the finalisation of the divorce, the Defendant continued to reside in the United States of America, where she had been since 2015 and where she continues to reside today.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> The Plaintiff, on his part, complied with the terms of the IJ and paid maintenance to the Defendant. He also funded her health insurance premiums.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 Unfortunately, the terms of the parties’ divorce settlement are now being litigated before this Court, 5 years after their divorce.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 Specifically, the Plaintiff filed FC/SUM 3215/2023 (“SUM 3215”) requesting that the Court rescind (or vary) paragraph 3(d) of the IJ.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> This paragraph sets out the Plaintiff’s maintenance obligations to the Defendant, the specific wording of which is as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">d. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant a sum of US$10,000 per month being maintenance for the Defendant. The payments shall be made with effect from 1 August 2019 and thereafter on the 1st day of each subsequent month for fifteen (15) years until 1 August 2034.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">The Plaintiff shall provide funding for the Defendant’s international health insurance premiums from 1 August 2019 for fifteen (15) years until 1 August 2034.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">After 1 August 2034, the Plaintiff is at liberty to extend maintenance to the Defendant at his sole discretion.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"></p><div align="right">(collectively, the “Maintenance Order”)</div><p></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 The Plaintiff’s reason for rescinding the Maintenance Order is that the Defendant has since remarried. He says he was made aware of the Defendant’s new marital status after he was formally introduced to the Defendant’s new spouse at their adult son’s (ie. the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s child) wedding in August 2022.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> The evidence, in my view, suggests that he found out earlier.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 Be that as it may, the Plaintiff (who has himself remarried) believes that given the Defendant’s remarriage, he should no longer need to pay her maintenance,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> or that his maintenance obligations should be reduced.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 The questions before this Court – as put forward by the Plaintiff – appear, at first glance, straightforward:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_9-p2_a"></a>(a) Does the Defendant’s remarriage terminate his obligation to pay her maintenance?</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_9-p2_b"></a>(b) Alternatively, can the Plaintiff rely on the Defendant’s remarriage and her present circumstances to vary (or reduce) his payment obligations ?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 The answer to these seemingly straightforward questions, however, require some discussion given the legal arguments raised, and positions taken, by both parties.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Effect of Remarriage: Section 117, Women’s Charter 1961 </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 The answer to the first question as regards the legal effect of the Defendant’s remarriage lies in the application of s 117 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“WC”).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> This represents the <em>main</em> plank of Plaintiff’s case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 Section 117 provides as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>Duration of orders for maintenance</b> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <b>117</b>. Except where an order for maintenance is expressed to be for any shorter period or where any such order has been rescinded, an order for maintenance expires —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(<em>a</em>) if the maintenance was unsecured —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(i) on the death of either spouse or former spouse;</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(ii) in the case of maintenance payable to a former wife — upon her remarriage; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(iii) in the case of maintenance payable to an incapacitated former husband — upon his remarriage; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(<em>b</em>) if the maintenance was secured —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(i) in the case of maintenance payable to a wife — on her death;</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(ii) in the case of maintenance payable to a former wife — on her death or upon her remarriage;</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(iii) in the case of maintenance payable to an incapacitated husband — on his death; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(iv) in the case of maintenance payable to an incapacitated former husband — on his death or upon his remarriage</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 Of particular relevance in the present case is s 117(<em>a</em>)(ii) which states that maintenance payable to a former wife expires “<em>upon her remarriage</em>”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 On a plain reading of this statutory provision, the Maintenance Order in the present case would have expired when the Defendant married her current husband on 31 January 2020.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> This would have occurred <em>automatically</em> as the extinguishment of the Plaintiff’s maintenance obligation was by operation of statutory law. There is no need for the Plaintiff to file a formal application to rescind the Maintenance Order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 This approach coheres with the statutory framework set out in ss 117 and 118 of the WC.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 Section 117 provides that a maintenance order expires upon the occurrence of the various statutory preconditions (eg. death or remarriage), “[e]<em>xcept where an order for maintenance is expressed to be for any shorter period or where any such order has been rescinded…</em>” (“Exception Preamble”). This dovetails with s 118 which confers upon the court the power to vary or rescind any “<em>subsisting order</em>” for maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 An application for rescission pursuant to s 118 should be made <em>before</em> the occurrence of the preconditions set out in s 117. This is because once a maintenance order has expired by operation of s 117, there would no longer be a “subsisting order” in respect of which the court can vary or rescind.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 Given that a plain reading of s 117 would mean that the Plaintiff is no longer obliged to pay the Defendant any maintenance from the time of the latter’s remarriage, counsel for the Defendant sought to persuade the Court to adopt a slightly different reading of the statute.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 In the course of oral arguments, the Defendant’s counsel suggested that the phrase “<em>where an order for maintenance is expressed to be for any shorter period</em>” in the Exception Preamble should be read to mean that if a maintenance order provides for a specified period of time, then the maintenance order would continue to subsist for the entirety of the specified period regardless of the ex-wife’s remarriage.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 According to counsel, such a reading can inferred from the decision of the High Court in <em>BNS v BNT</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/20688-SSP.xml')">[2017] 4 SLR 213</a> (“<em>BNS</em>”). In <em>BNS</em> (which involved a first instance ancillary matters hearing), the High Court found that the wife in that case to be in a settled relationship with a new partner and in making a maintenance order, the High Court included a proviso that the said order would lapse upon remarriage should the wife remarry before the end of two years. In so doing, Valerie Thean JC (as her Honour then was) made the following observations (at [55] – [56]):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">55 I deal with two further issues raised in the Husband’s submissions. The first issue is that the Wife is in a settled relationship and thus there should be no lump sum order. I agree. In addition, s 117 of the WC provides that maintenance generally expires upon remarriage:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2"> <b>Duration of orders for maintenance</b> </p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">117. Except where an order for maintenance is expressed to be for any shorter period or where any such order has been rescinded, an order for maintenance expires —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(a) if the maintenance was unsecured —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-4">(i) on the death of either spouse or former spouse;</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-4">(ii) in the case of maintenance payable to a former wife — upon her remarriage; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-4">(iii) in the case of maintenance payable to an incapacitated former husband — upon his remarriage; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(b) if the maintenance was secured —</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-4">…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">56 To obviate any argument that the present order for maintenance for two years is an order “expressed to be of any shorter period” within the meaning of that provision, I add a caveat to my order that it will lapse upon the Wife’s remarriage should she remarry before the end of the two years.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 As I understand it, counsel’s argument is that Thean JC must have decided to add the caveat to the maintenance order in <em>BNS</em> because had her Honour not done so, the two-year maintenance order would have superseded the operation of s 117 and continue to give the wife a right to maintenance even if she had remarried before the end of the two years.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 The Plaintiff’s counsel disagreed with the inference which the Defendant’s counsel sought to draw from what had been ordered in <em>BNS</em> as this was not stated explicitly in the judgment. The Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that Thean JC was simply being clear when making her Honour’s order and this was apparent from the judgment where her Honour had explained that the proviso was added so as “<em>to obviate any argument</em>”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 Having considered the nature of the case in <em>BNS</em> and the context of High Court’s decision, I agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel that <em>BNS</em> does not stand for the proposition that absent a “caveat” (or “proviso”), a periodic maintenance order for a fixed term should be read as an order for a “shorter period” within the meaning of s 117.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 It is apparent from a plain reading of the statutory provision that the Exception Preamble provides for only 2 distinct scenarios when a maintenance order would not be terminated by operation of s 117(<em>a</em>), ie.:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_24-p2_a"></a>(a) where the maintenance specifies a “shorter” period, ie. where the end date of the order occurs <em>before</em> the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse; and</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_24-p2_b"></a>(b) where the maintenance has been rescinded by the court <em>before</em> the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id=""></a>The reason underlying both scenarios is clear – in both situations, the obligation on the paying spouse would already have ended before the recipient spouse had died or remarried, and it would be unnecessary to provide for the expiry of the order in question.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 In effect, the Defendant’s argument seeks to replace the phrase “<em>shorter</em>” in the Exception Preamble with the phrase “specified”, in that so long a maintenance order <em>specifies</em> that it would be in force for a certain period, the automatic expiry date set out in s 117(<em>a</em>) would no longer apply.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 With respect, I am unable to agree with the Defendant’s reading of the provision as it goes against the express language used in s 117(<em>a</em>). The well-established principles of statutory interpretation (as explained by the Court of Appeal in <em>Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21018-SSP.xml')">[2017] 2 SLR 850</a>) requires the court to have regard to the text of the statutory provision, its ordinary meaning, and the context of the statute.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 I find that adopting the Defendant’s reading of s 117(<em>a</em>)(ii) would lead to anomalous results, considering the context of the provision. This is especially so when considered against the other scenarios contemplated in s 117(<em>a</em>).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 For instance, adopting the Defendant’s interpretation for s 117(<em>a</em>)(ii) suggests that s 117(<em>a</em>)(i) should be interpreted in a similar fashion, ie. a maintenance order with a specified period would, under the Defendant’s approach, also continue to be in force despite a recipient ex-spouse’s death. That would surely be an absurd outcome – to whom is the maintenance payor expected to continue paying maintenance to, after the ex-spouse’s death? Can the deceased ex-spouse’s estate then make monthly maintenance claims for the entire period? Neither of these outcomes is supported by the statute.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 Moreover, the Defendant’s reading effectively means that a person can <em>exclude</em> the operation of the statute by specifying a time-period (however long or short) to a maintenance order. In the absence of clear statutory language permitting the parties to do so, I decline to adopt such a reading.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 For completeness, I should add that the Defendant’s reading does not accord with the legislative policy behind s 117(<em>a</em>)(ii) which simply recognises that a former wife’s right to maintenance should cease upon remarriage.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 By way legislative history, the idea that remarriage automatically terminates a person’s obligation to pay maintenance to his former wife was not always part of the WC. It was added as part of the legislative amendments made to the WC in 1996.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> Before the relevant amendments were made, the only scenario which terminates a husband’s obligation to pay maintenance is upon the former’s wife’s death.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 The insertion of the additional termination event for remarriage came as a result of the <em>Report of the Select Committee on the Women’s Charter (Amendment Bill)</em> (Bill No. 5/96) which was presented to Parliament on 15 August 1996. The Select Committee had supported the suggestion raised by one representor for the insertion of such a termination event; in his speech to move the Bill for its third reading, the then Minister for Community Development explained that such an addition provision was “<em>logical and fair</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> There was no suggestion that there should be any exception to this provision or that spouses can privately exclude its operation.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 Accordingly, I find that s 117 would apply, in the present case, to any maintenance order which was in existence as at the time of the Defendant’s remarriage to her current spouse.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Interpretation of the Interim Judgment</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 Notwithstanding the applicability of s 117 (as discussed above), that is not necessarily the end of the matter as the Defendant has a second string to her bow.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 Counsel for the Defendant argued that the Maintenance Order should be read (or interpreted) as an order for “lump sum” maintenance payable by the Plaintiff. Indeed, this was the gist of the Defendant’s case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 The Defendant submitted that if the Maintenance Order was to be read as a lump sum maintenance order (instead of an order for periodic maintenance), the Defendant’s remarriage would not have had any legal effect on the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay her the monthly sum of US$10,000 as all he had been doing (and must continue to do) is paying, by equal monthly instalments, a fixed maintenance sum of US$1,800,000 over a period of 15 years.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 The Plaintiff strenuously challenges this argument on the basis that such a reading of the Maintenance Order was not supported by the evidence adduced by the parties. He also raised a related legal challenge that even if this Court finds that it should be understood as an order for lump sum maintenance should still be considered as a subsisting order which could be varied or rescinded by the court. I will address the latter argument later in this judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 In my view, the parties’ arguments raise the following two sub-issues:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_a"></a>(a) How should a court interpret the Maintenance Order (which is part of the by-consent IJ entered into by the parties), including what principles and/or canons of interpretation the Court can rely on in the exercise of interpretation?</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_38-p2_b"></a>(b) Applying those principles, whether the Maintenance Order, in the present case, should be interpreted as being an order for lump-sum maintenance?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 I will address both sub-issues in turn.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 As regards sub-issue (a) above, after hearing counsel’s oral arguments, I directed both counsel to provide further written submissions to provide their views (and the relevant research) as to the approach which should be taken by the Court. Both counsel duly filed their respective supplemental submissions, and I had considered these submissions in reaching my decision.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 At the outset, I recognise that the Maintenance Order was clearly <em>court orders</em> and not merely an agreement between the parties. They were made by the Family Court as part of the parties’ divorce proceedings in 2019. The difference, however, is that the Maintenance Order was not made after contested proceedings; it was part of a by-consent IJ agreed between the parties through private negotiations without the direct involvement of the court. For ease of reference, I shall refer to such consent orders as “Matrimonial Consent Order(s)”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 In the case of court orders made after contested proceedings, the interpretation of such orders is often straightforward. In <em>BRZ v BSA</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25247-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGHCF 17</a> (“<em>BRZ</em>”), the High Court made the following observations (at [21]) in relation to the interpretation of court orders:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <em>The law on interpretation of court orders</em> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">21 As much of the dispute turns on the proper interpretation of the AM Order, I begin by setting out the principles that apply to the interpretation of court orders. <u>The starting point should be the language of the order. An interpretation would necessarily consider the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and the manner in which they are used. Regard must also be had to the whole of the order. As far as possible, each part of the court order should be read consistently with every other part and with the intention of the court which granted the order</u>: <em>Hoban Steven Maurice Dixon and another v Scanlon Graeme John and others</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2007] 2 SLR(R) 0770.xml')">[2007] 2 SLR(R) 770</a> at [41]. It is common sense that the court, in making an order, would not have wished to have different parts of the order produce different results. Beyond that, the interpretation of the court order should strive for consistency with the prevailing principles. As the High Court considered in <em>Sujatha v Prahbakaran Nair</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[1988] 1 SLR(R) 0631.xml')">[1988] 1 SLR(R) 631</a> (“<em>Sujatha</em>”) at [16]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">… [W]here an order of court is capable of being construed to have effect in accordance with or contrary to established principles of law or practice, the proper approach, in the absence of manifest intention, is not to attribute to the judge an intention or a desire to act contrary to such principles or practice but rather in conformity with them. …</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2"></p><div align="right">[Emphasis added in <u>underline</u>]</div><p></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 I would add that the interpretation of orders made by a judge after contested proceedings would usually not pose a significant challenge to the parties given the availability of other means to understand and ascertain the judge’s intention when making the relevant order – for eg. notes of evidence and written grounds of decision may be available to the parties. Requests can also be made to the court for the clarification of its judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 In contrast, Matrimonial Consent Orders are different in that such orders are typically based on out-of-court agreements reached by the parties themselves without the court’s direct involvement in the preparing/drafting of such Orders. Parties generally have freedom to choose the terms/language used in the Matrimonial Consent Orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 Nevertheless, the Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the principles relating to the interpretation of commercial contracts should not be adopted in the present case, given the unique nature of orders made in family proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 As stated above, I agree that the <em>nature</em> of a Matrimonial Consent Order is different from an agreement to settle legal proceedings in the civil and/or commercial context. A Matrimonial Consent Order is, for example, different from other type of court orders (such as <em>Tomlin</em> order<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>) which record the litigants’ settlement agreements in civil proceedings. Unlike such orders, the legal effect of a Matrimonial Consent Order is derived from being an order of court,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> and not merely because of a commercial contract the parties had entered into.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 However, recognising the legal nature of a Matrimonial Consent Order (which may affect the way in which its terms are enforced or varied) does not necessarily shed light on how to interpret (or read) its terms, especially where these terms were not the result of adjudication by the court.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 In my view, the principles of contractual interpretation may be relevant when a court is tasked with interpreting specific clauses set out in a Matrimonial Consent Order which were principally prepared by the parties. This would be the case where the clauses were the product of extensive negotiations between the parties prior to the making of the Matrimonial Consent Order, or, in some cases, the terms of a Matrimonial Consent Order reflect an earlier written contract or document (such as a deed of separation) where the terms of the parties’ intended divorce were spelt out in detail.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 As noted by the High Court in <em>Seah Kim Seng v Yick Sui Ping</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/17865-SSP.xml')">[2015] 4 SLR 731</a> (“<em>Seah Kim Seng</em>”) at [29]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">…the fact that a consent order was recorded means that the intention of the respective parties may be relevant in a broad sense; such intention has to be considered in the light of the compromise required in reaching an agreement and expressed in the consent order. <u>What matters ultimately is the common understanding between the parties. The court cannot ultimately substitute its own agreement in place of what the parties came to</u>…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"></p><div align="right">[Emphasis added in <u>underline</u>]</div><p></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 I recognise that in <em>Seah Kim Seng</em>, the High Court was considering an application to vary a consent order due to its alleged unworkability. Nevertheless, the High Court’s reference to the parties’ intentions suggests that in understanding a Matrimonial Consent Order, the surrounding circumstances and the parties’ understanding at the time of its making remain relevant.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 To be clear, my observations above pertain only to the use of relevant legal principles to aid in the construction and/or interpretation of a Matrimonial Consent Order drafted by the parties. The purpose of this exercise is to ascertain what the parties had understood or intended when they agreed to include a term in the Matrimonial Consent Order, especially where some of its terms are ambiguous.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 The interpretation of a Matrimonial Consent Order is distinct from its nature as a court order, and my observations here should not be taken as implying that other principles of contract law should be automatically “imported” into the matrimonial context. One unique nature of matrimonial proceedings is that the WC statutorily allows the court to vary or rescind maintenance orders (including those reached through parties’ agreement),<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span> and the principles applicable to such variation applications are well-established.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 Notwithstanding the discussion above, on the facts of the present case, I find that the outcome of my decision would not have been significantly different regardless of whether I had used principles relating to contractual interpretation, or if I had interpreted the IJ as if it was a court order (made after adjudication). My reasons are as follow:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_a"></a>(a) To begin with, the exercise of contractual interpretation and the interpretation of a Court Order both place primacy on the text of the document in question.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_b"></a>(b) As the High Court noted in <em>BRZ</em>, the starting point for interpreting a court order should be the “<em>language of the order</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span> Similarly, in the interpretation of contracts, the Court of Appeal had, on various occasions, emphasised the importance of considering the text of the document in question<sup>.</sup><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_c"></a>(c) In the present case, the text of the Maintenance Order is plain in that it states unequivocally that “[t]<em>he Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant a sum of US$10,000 per month being maintenance for the Defendant</em>”, and that is to be paid on the “<em>1st day of each subsequent month for fifteen years until 1 August 2023</em>”.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_d"></a>(d) The reference to a sum of US$10,000 payable “per month” and payable on the “1st day” of each month puts in beyond peradventure that it was a periodic maintenance order.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_e"></a>(e) The same interpretative exercise similarly applies to the part of the Maintenance Order relating to the Plaintiff’s payment of the Defendant’s health insurance premiums (“Insurance Premium Clause”).</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_f"></a>(f) Looking at the Maintenance Order as a whole, reading the same in its plain language and considering how parties had included the Insurance Premium Clause in the same clause as that relating to the payment of monthly maintenance, I find that the Insurance Premium Clause was also part of the Plaintiff’s monthly maintenance payment obligations.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_53-p2_g"></a>(g) Indeed, the parties had situated this Clause immediately before the proviso giving the Plaintiff the discretion to “<em>extend maintenance</em>” – this reinforces my finding that the parties intended for the payment of insurance premiums to be a facet of the Plaintiff’s <em>maintenance</em> obligations.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 In my view, against the backdrop of the plain language used in the Maintenance Order, to accept the Defendant’s interpretation of the same would be to ignore (or even contradict) the actual text of the Order. That would not be permissible regardless of which principles of interpretation are applied.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55 The Defendant’s suggested understanding of the Maintenance Order requires the Court to read in additional words – for eg. “<em>lump sum</em>” and “<em>instalments</em>” – so that her reading of the Order as an order for lump sum maintenance would make sense. It would also require the Court to ignore words used – ie. “<em>monthly payments</em>” – and replace them with a fixed sum of US$1.8million; what was clearly described as monthly maintenance payments must be also read as monthly “instalment” repayments of a fixed amount.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56 Moreover, the fact that the last sentence of the Maintenance Order expressly gives the Plaintiff a “discretion” to “extend maintenance” roundly contradicts the Defendant’s claim; one cannot extend a lump sum maintenance order for a fixed sum of US$1.8 million.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57 I thus do not find the Defendant’s proposed interpretation of the Maintenance Order to be one which the plain words and expressions used by the parties can reasonably bear. I therefore cannot accept her interpretation.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58 It follows from the above discussion that the Maintenance Order should be understood as being a periodic maintenance order where the Plaintiff was obliged to pay a monthly sum of US$10,000 to the Defendant monthly.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59 Accordingly, being a periodic monthly order, the Maintenance Order expired upon the Defendant’s remarriage in 2020 by virtue of s 117(<em>a</em>)(ii) of the WC; it no longer has any effect by the time the Plaintiff filed the present application in October 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_60"></a>60 Before I conclude my discussion as to how the Maintenance Order (or the IJ) ought to be interpreted, I will address the Defendant’s submission that she was unrepresented at the time of divorce proceedings in 2019,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span> and that she had trusted the Plaintiff.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> For completeness, I note that the Defendant has not alleged, in her affidavits or in her counsel’s submissions, that there had been fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake perpetuated by the Plaintiff which led to the execution of the draft IJ or in recording the Maintenance Order as a by-consent order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_61"></a>61 In my view, little weight can be placed on the Defendant’s reference to her lack of legal representation or knowledge in 2019. The main difficulty I had with the Defendant’s argument in this regard was that the draft IJ she had executed contained a clear endorsement stating that the Defendant “<em>acknowledge</em>[s] <em>that</em> [she has] <em>considered the terms of the agreement and have also been informed of my right to seek independent legal advice</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span> This endorsement was expressly affixed next to where she had placed her signature (and assent) to the terms of the draft IJ. The Defendant executed the document before, and was witnessed by, a Notary Public.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_62"></a>62 In my view, the Defendant, having chosen to sign and agree to the terms as stated in the draft IJ after having been informed of her right to seek legal advice, must be taken to have accepted the terms of the Maintenance Order and how the relevant statutory provisions may operate on the same.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Other observations</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_63"></a>63 Although my decision on the applicability of s 117 above fully disposes the present application filed by the Plaintiff, both parties and their counsel had provided their submissions on two other issues which I will briefly address.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_64"></a>64 First, counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that <em>even if</em> this Court had found that the Maintenance Order to be an order for a lump sum maintenance (paid over a 15-year period), s 118 would still have been applicable because the Maintenance Order should be considered as still “subsisting” when this present application was filed.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span> This stands in contrast to the Defendant’s case which appears to assume that an order for lump sum maintenance cannot be varied or rescinded by the Court.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_65"></a>65 As I have found that the Maintenance Order was <em>not</em> for the payment of maintenance in a lump sum, it is strictly not necessary for me to address the question of the court’s power to vary an order for lump sum maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_66"></a>66 Nevertheless, having considered the parties’ submissions, I am of the view that the court <em>can</em> (in the sense that it has the power to) vary or rescind a lump sum maintenance order which has not been fully executed. Whether the court does so depend on the facts of the case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_67"></a>67 It is plain from a reading of s 118 that the court can vary or rescind an order for maintenance so long as it is a “subsisting” order. An order (regardless of whether it is expressed to be for a specified period or for the payment of a lump sum over a series of instalments) would be “subsisting” – ie. that it remains in force or effect – if the payment period has not yet ended at the time of the variation or rescission application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_68"></a>68 This is also the view taken by Professor Leong Wai Kum in <em>Elements of Family Law in Singapore</em> (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed., 2018), where the learned author opined (at [18.097]) that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">…[a]lthough a lump sum order of maintenance is less amenable to being varied or rescinded, it is not impossible for a court to consider doing either when an extremely good reason is proffered, even, after the lump sum order has been fully executed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_69"></a>69 Indeed, Professor Leong’s approach goes further as she suggests that the court can vary even a fully executed lump sum maintenance order. As this was not an issue raised in the present case (since there is no dispute that the Maintenance Order in the present case would not have been fully executed even if it was for the payment lump sum maintenance), I will leave this issue to be addressed at the appropriate time and forum.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_70"></a>70 The second issue relates to Plaintiff’s <em>alternative</em> case which I have alluded to at [9(b)] above, ie. whether this Court should nevertheless vary or rescind the Maintenance Order, assuming s 117 was not applicable to the present case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_71"></a>71 In the event that I am wrong as to the applicability of s 117 (ie. that the Defendant’s remarriage did not operate to terminate the Maintenance Order), I would have accepted the Defendant’s argument and would <em>not</em> have exercised my discretion to either vary or rescind the said orders.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_72"></a>72 Having reviewed the evidence provided by both parties, I am of the view that there has been <em>no material change</em> of circumstances which warrants the variation of the Maintenance Order sought by the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_73"></a>73 In reaching this view, I take into account the following matters:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_a"></a>(a) I find that the parties’ negotiations and the surrounding circumstances leading up to the making of the IJ to support the Defendant’s case that the Plaintiff had intended to make provision for the Defendant – his spouse for almost three decades. This is reflected in the discussions between both parties in the months before August 2019 (when the divorce was finalised with the making of the IJ).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_b"></a>(b) In my view, the Plaintiff was clear in that he had agreed to pay the Defendant maintenance for a period of 15 years back in 2019. If s 117 had not terminated the Maintenance Order <em>by operation of law</em>, there would have been no justifiable basis for the Plaintiff to apply to vary the Maintenance Order.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_c"></a>(c) Indeed, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s submission that he only found out about the Defendant’s remarriage at their son’s wedding. I agree with the Defendant that on 16 March 2020, the Plaintiff sent the Defendant a message stating unequivocally that:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">“…I was naïve when you asked me to change from a lifetime-unless married to an [sic] 15 years-unconditional USD 10k monthly allowance…not knowing you already started an affair, probably prior [sic] our decision to get separated in Dec 2018 and planned to live with [the Defendant’s current spouse] (by the way, <u>I heard the news, not from you of course…congratulations on your marriage, and all the very best!</u>...even if you portrayed to me that you would just get married to get the US green card)…”</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2"></p><div align="right">[Emphasis added in <u>underline</u>]</div><p></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id=""></a>That the Plaintiff knew of the Defendant’s remarriage was also supported by his text message in 2022 which references the Defendant having “<em>remarried right after</em>” their divorce.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_d"></a>(d) Despite being aware of the remarriage, the Plaintiff continued paying the Defendant the monthly amount of US$10,000. This shows that the Plaintiff had himself thought that the Defendant’s remarriage alone would not have justified a reduction in the maintenance amount payable.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_e"></a>(e) Had s 117 not applied, I would have placed weight on the parties’ negotiated agreement especially given that issues such as when the Defendant’s ability to support herself (including through earning an income from employment, receiving inheritance, etc.) were specifically considered and the parties had agreed to the 15-year maintenance period.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span> Such an agreement should generally be honoured.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span> In the context of consent orders relating to the division of matrimonial assets, Choo J in <em>WRP v</em> WRQ <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31044-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGHCF 12</a> recently observed as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">5 […] Although the idea of sanctity of contract is not applied directly in matrimonial proceedings as if they were commercial enterprises, weight is given to the negotiated settlement of the parties. Much give and take are involved in reaching such settlements, and the court should keep this in mind lest it gives more to the taker by taking more from the giver, contrary to the parties’ intentions […].<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id=""></a>I find these observations to also be applicable in the present case in light of the evidence submitted by the parties.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_f"></a>(f) To avoid doubt, I also find that the Defendant’s current income (earned through her work as a real estate agent in the United States) does not represents a material change to her circumstances justifying a reduction of the maintenance amount of US$10,000 which the Plaintiff had agreed to pay. I accept the Defendant’s evidence that she is earning a relatively meagre amount (if at all).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_73-p2_g"></a>(g) As regards the Plaintiff’s earning capacity and personal expenses, I find that he remains able to support the Defendant if the Maintenance Order remains in force. His own remarriage does not amount to a sufficient change in circumstances to justify a downward variation (or complete recission) of the Maintenance Order as he would have entered his new marriage fully aware that he was obliged to maintain the Defendant for the 15 years he had promised.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_74"></a>74 Accordingly, had the Defendant not remarried, I would not have exercised the power given by s 118 to vary or reduce the amount payable under the Maintenance Order.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Remaining Procedural Issue</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_75"></a>75 I turn now to a final procedure-related issue which arises given the manner in which the Plaintiff had chosen to frame the prayers set out in SUM 3215.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_76"></a>76 In each of his prayers, the Plaintiff had asked for various parts of paragraph 3(d) of the IJ to be “<em>rescinded or varied forthwith</em>”. As I had found that s 117 operates automatically upon the Defendant’s remarriage in 2020 to end all of the Plaintiff’s maintenance obligations, there would be no subsisting order in respect of which I am empowered by the WC to rescind or vary.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_77"></a>77 I therefore make no orders on prayers 1 to 3 of SUM 3215 <em>on the basis that the orders in paragraph 3(d) of the IJ have expired upon the Defendant’s remarriage</em>.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_78"></a>78 The present case was an unfortunate one where an amicable divorce between two parties (who had shared an almost three-decade long marriage) ended up in litigation years later.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_79"></a>79 While the Plaintiff had promised to take care of the Defendant by giving her financial provision for a period of time, this promise came in the form of a periodic maintenance order which both parties agreed to. The nature of such maintenance orders is that they would terminate upon the ex-wife’s remarriage in accordance with the provisions of the WC. The Defendant’s decision to remarry shortly after the divorce thus resulted in the expiry of the said maintenance order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_80"></a>80 Despite this, both parties continued to follow the order and, as a result, the Defendant has received almost half a million US dollars’ worth of maintenance payments from the Plaintiff since their divorce.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_81"></a>81 I note that the Plaintiff’s counsel’s indication during the hearing that the Plaintiff is not seeking the return of any overpayment of maintenance. I find this gesture to be reasonable and I hope that with this decision, both parties can move on with their lives now that they have both remarried.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_82"></a>82 I will hear the parties on the issue of costs.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Written Submissions dd 16.02.24 (“PWS”) at [4] – [7]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>The IJ is exhibited at pp. 36 and 37 of PA1</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>Defendant’s Affidavit d 05.01.24 (“DA1”) at pp. 28 – 56</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Affidavit dd 12.10.23 (“PA1”) at pp. 31 – 35</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Defendant’s Written Submissions dd 19.02.24 (“DWS”) at [11]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>PA1 at [19]; DA1 at [34]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>PA1 at p. 37</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>PA1 at [22]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>PA1 at [40]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>PA1 at [46] – [47]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>All references to statutory provisions in this judgment are references to the Women’s Charter 1961</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>DA1 at [6]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup><em>Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/21018-SSP.xml')">[2017] 2 SLR 850</a> at [37], [38] and [50]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>Women’s Charter (Cap. 353, 1997 Rev. Ed.)</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>See the predecessor to s 117, ie. s 111 of the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353, 1985 Rev. Ed.)</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup><em>Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report</em> (27 August 1996) vol. 66 at col. 525 (Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister for Community Development)</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>DWS at [9]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>Plaintiff’s Supplemental Submissions dd 12.03.24 at [16]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>See eg., <em>HQH Capital Ltd v Chen Liping</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/30533-SSP.xml')">[2023] 4 SLR 885</a> (at [24] – [32]) where the High Court (General Division) discussed the nature and effect of a <em>Tomlin</em> Order</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>See <em>AOO v AON</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2011] 4 SLR 1169.xml')">[2011] 4 SLR 1169</a> at [14]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>See also Defendant’s Supplemental Submissions dd 12.03.24 at [17]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup><em>AXM v AXO</em> at [22] and [23]; see also ss 118 and 127 of the WC</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>See <em>BRZ</em> at [21]; see also <em>VZL v VZM</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/27392-SSP.xml')">[2022] SGFC 34</a> at [38] for a detailed summary of the applicable approach to the interpretation of court orders</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>See for eg., <em>Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19965-SSP.xml')">[2017] 1 SLR 219</a> at [30]; <em>Lucky Realty Co Pte Ltd v HSBC Trustees (Singapore) Ltd</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/18494-SSP.xml')">[2016] 1 SLR 1069</a> at [2]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>DWS at [3]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>DWS at [24]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>DA1 at p. 57</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>PWS at [64]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>DA1 at pp. 28 – 33</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>DA1 at p. 67</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>DA1 at [31] – [33]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>See eg., <em>VRX v VRY</em> [2021[ SGFC 62 at [13]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup><em>WRP v WRQ</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31044-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGHCF 12</a> at [5]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>DA1 at [51] – [53]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup><em>George Sapooran Singh v Gordip d/o MD Garsingh</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19401-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGHC 197</a> at [39] – [40]</p></div></content></root> | 9014e64725ad0bdc90d6b215291cabf62d87b97d |
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