fc_judgments_version: 36
This data as json
| _id | _item | _version | _commit | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _item_full_hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 36 | 28 | 1 | 1307 | [
"Family Law \u2013 Interlocutory Injunction"
] |
2024-05-09 | Family Court | D 2347/2023 (FC/SUM 3775/2023) | WWG v WWH | [2024] SGFC 23 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31478-SSP.xml | [
"Mr Rajwin Singh Sandhu (Rajwin & Yong LLP) for the Plaintiff",
"Mr Poh Jun Zhe, Malcus (Mo Junzhe) (Chung Ting Fai & Co.) for the Defendant"
] |
2024-05-15T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Chia Wee Kiat | <root><head><title>WWG v WWH</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WWG <em>v</em> WWH </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31478-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 23</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">D 2347/2023 (FC/SUM 3775/2023)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">09 May 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Chia Wee Kiat </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Mr Rajwin Singh Sandhu (Rajwin & Yong LLP) for the Plaintiff; Mr Poh Jun Zhe, Malcus (Mo Junzhe) (Chung Ting Fai & Co.) for the Defendant </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WWG — WWH </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Interlocutory Injunction</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">9 May 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Chia Wee Kiat:</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 The Plaintiff shall be referred to as the “Wife” and the Defendant shall be referred to as the “Husband”. The parties were married on 22 May 2011 and an Interim Judgment of Divorce was granted on 1 February 2024. They have three children, aged 14, 12 and 9.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 The parties have a number of assets that included several immovable properties.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> FC/SUM 3775/2023 (“SUM 3775”) is the Wife’s application for an injunction to restrain the Husband from selling one of the immovable properties, [Property A], pending the determination of the ancillary matters. Property A is a condominium in the sole name of the Husband.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 I heard and dismissed the application on 13 March 2024. The Wife filed a request for further arguments on 20 March 2024. I heard the further arguments on 4 April 2024 and affirmed my decision to dismiss the application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 As the Wife has appealed against my decision <em>vide</em> HCF/RAS 5/2024 filed on 17 April 2024, I now set out the grounds of my decision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Wife’s application</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 The Wife says that Property A is a matrimonial asset.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> She says that she paid for the fixture and fittings and also the downpayment. She says that she resided at Property A with her three children from around 2017 to 16 April 2017.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> As a result of the Husband’s violent behaviour and gambling habit, she tried many times to divorce the Husband and each time the Husband would promise that he would change.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 The Wife says that the Husband had, on 19 December 2021, agreed to give her 20% of the net sale proceeds in the event that Property A is sold. This was in return for the Wife forbearing to pursue divorce proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> She exhibited an email from the Husband where he stated as follows:<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">I will give [Wife] 20% share of nett sales proceeds in the event of sale of [Property A] condo, and if we buy another replacement property she shall maintain her 20% share of new property.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 The Wife says that the Husband also promised many times that the children and her can stay in Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> However, the Husband broke his promises and continued to be violent. She then started the divorce proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 The Wife says that the Husband is trying to sell Property A to pay off his gambling debts and failed investments<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> and wants an injunction to stop him from doing so.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Husband’s response</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 The Husband does not dispute that Property A is a matrimonial asset.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 The Husband says that as the marriage is a sole income marriage,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> he would take up loans using credit cards to fund the purchase of the matrimonial properties. Thereafter, for tax and stamp duty purposes, he would arrange for the properties to be held under the Wife’s name.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 The Husband says there are four immovable properties in the Wife’s sole name.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> One of the immovable properties, a HDB flat, was the matrimonial home which he had fully paid for before the marriage.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span> The Husband says that as part of the family financial arrangement, he transferred the HDB flat to the Wife so that he was able to free up his name and avoid ABSD to purchase Property A.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 The Husband says that apart from the immovable properties, the matrimonial assets included the parties’ bank accounts and CPF monies.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> The Husband says that the Wife had throughout the marriage, transferred matrimonial monies to her parents or brother in China without his consent. The Husband believes that the Wife has bank account and immovable property in China.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 The Husband says that the value of the matrimonial pool is about $2,285,030.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> As the marriage lasted for about 12 years,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> the Husband believes that the Wife is entitled to about 30% of the matrimonial pool. Even if, for the sake of argument, the Wife is entitled to 50% of the matrimonial pool which is about $1,142,515, the money in the matrimonial pool is sufficient to meet the Wife’s share of the matrimonial assets.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 The Husband says that if Property A is sold for $1,560,000, after repaying the outstanding loan which is about $802,619.51 and after refunding his CPF of about $403,071.04, the cash sale proceeds would only be about $354,309.45.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span> This is around 15.5% of the matrimonial pool.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 Hence, the sale of Property A does not prejudice the Wife and the estimated sale proceeds can in any event be notionally added back into the matrimonial pool for division.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span> On the other hand, the Husband says that he will suffer irreversible harm if he is sued by the banks and made a bankrupt if he is unable to pay off his credit card debts.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Analysis</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 Where any matrimonial proceedings are pending, the court may grant an injunction to prevent the sale of a matrimonial asset pending the ancillary matters hearing. This is pursuant to s 132 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Revised Edition) (“the Charter”), which states as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">132.—(1) Where —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(a) any matrimonial proceedings are pending;</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">the court has power on application —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-2">(f) to set aside any disposition of property, if it is satisfied that the disposition of property has been made within the preceding 3 years, with the object on the part of the person making the disposition of —</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(i) reducing that person’s means to pay maintenance; or</p> <p class="Judg-QuoteList-3">(ii) depriving that person’s wife, former wife, incapacitated husband or incapacitated former husband of any rights in relation to that property; and</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(g) if it is satisfied that any disposition of property is intended to be made with any such object, to grant an injunction preventing that disposition.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">(2) In this section —</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">“disposition” includes a sale, gift, lease, mortgage or any other transaction whereby ownership or possession of the property is transferred or encumbered but does not include a disposition made for money or money’s worth to or in favour of a person acting in good faith and in ignorance of the object with which the disposition is made;</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-2">“property” means property of any nature, movable or immovable, and includes money.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 Section 132 of the Charter was considered in <em>Lee Chi Lena v Chien Chuen Chi Jeffrey (Qian Jie, co-defendant)</em> (“<em>Lee Chi Lena</em>”) <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/[2011] SGHC 0091.xml')">[2011] SGHC 91</a> where Choo Han Teck J set out the following principles:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Given the time lag between the initiation of matrimonial proceedings and a final judgment of divorce, disposing matrimonial assets and translating them into new assets by the parties in the ordinary course of living and investment is frequently necessary, especially when each of them are seeking to begin a new life<b>. Thus it cannot be that every decision to dispose of a matrimonial asset by one spouse is susceptible to injunctive intervention by the other spouse. A balance must be struck. Therefore, whether or not an injunction will be granted depends on whether the other spouse will be prejudiced by such a disposition. In determining whether there is prejudice in this context, the court should take into account whether there are adequate matrimonial assets which will remain to satisfy the likely division proportion a court will make in favour of the non-disposing party.</b> Hence, in a case where there is only one matrimonial asset of substantial value and a husband wishes to dispose of it, a court should allow a wife's application for an injunction because there are no adequate remaining assets to satisfy a likely award in her favour in those circumstances. On the present facts, however, that is not the case. There are other properties of substantial value available.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis in bold added]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 As noted in the above passage, whether or not an injunction will be granted depends on whether the other spouse will be prejudiced by such a disposition. The question of prejudice is to be determined by taking into account whether there are adequate matrimonial assets which will remain to satisfy the likely division proportion a court will make in favour of the non-disposing party.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 Although the Wife bears the burden of proof, she made no effort to show why the remaining matrimonial assets will not be sufficient to satisfy the likely division proportion in her favour. This is not withstanding the fact that she had every opportunity to respond to the Husband’s reply affidavit, where he had set out clearly his computation of the asset pool, the likely division proportion and why the Wife would not be prejudiced.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The Wife says that parties are “still in the process of preparing their cases for the division of assets, so neither can submit with the exactitude of evidence their contribution”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> I did not find this to be a convincing explanation for the lack of effort on her part, bearing in mind that she is the party making the application. She could have at least provided a <em>prima facie</em> case of the likely division proportion from her perspective, especially since she had the benefit of reading the Husband’s reply affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 Instead, the Wife submitted that Property A was a matrimonial home and if the property is sold, she “will be prejudice (<em>sic</em>) in that it (<em>sic</em>) would not be able to purchase [Property A] from the Defendant” <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>. Even on this point, I noted that neither her supporting affidavit nor reply affidavit reveal any intention on her part to purchase Property A from the Husband. Nor did she explain in what way she would be prejudiced if she could not own Property A. It should be noted that she is the sole legal owner of the family’s HDB flat which she occupies with the children and three other immovable properties. So there is no question of the Wife and the children not having a place to stay.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 What is clear from her evidence is that the parties had envisaged that Property A may be sold, as she was promised a 20% share of the sale proceeds in the event of a sale. The Wife was aware that the Husband had difficulty holding on to Property A and might be compelled by the credit card company to sell the property if he could not repay his debts.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 As the Wife did not put forth any evidence that would enable me to properly consider if she would be prejudiced by the sale of Property A, I was left with the Husband’s evidence which shows that there are adequate matrimonial assets which will remain to satisfy the likely division proportion in favour of the Wife. In the circumstances, I found that the Wife had not discharged the burden of proof.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 The Wife had clarified in her further arguments that she was relying on the principle in <em>American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd</em> [1975] 1 ALL ER 504 (“<em>American Cyanamid</em>”).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> She submitted that the purpose of the interlocutory injunction is to maintain the <em>status quo</em> pending the trial and the balance of convenience lies in granting the interlocutory relief.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 In my view, I do not think that the <em>American Cyanamid</em> principle is applicable in the context of pending matrimonial proceedings where the injunctive relief being sought is to prevent the sale of a matrimonial asset pending the determination of the ancillary matters. This is because there is an express statutory provision in the Charter that applies specifically to this type of injunction.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 I find support for this line of reasoning in <em>TQ v TR</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/60589-M.xml')">[2009] SGCA 6</a> where the Court of Appeal (“CA”) discussed the interaction of statute law and the common law in the context of the legal status of a prenuptial agreement in Singapore. The CA held (at [50]):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Put simply, where one or more of the provisions of the Act expressly covers a certain category of prenuptial agreement, then that provision or those provisions will be the governing law. Where, however, the Act is <em>silent</em>, then the legal status of the prenuptial agreement concerned will be governed by <em>the common law.</em></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis in original]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 By a parity of reasoning, s 132 of the Charter is the governing law in the present case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 In any event, as noted in <em>TRW Inc v Terus Jaya Auto (S) Pte Ltd</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/4923-M.xml')">[1992] SGHC 31</a>, a case authority cited by the Wife:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">The principle in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 is that an injunction should not be granted unless otherwise damage is likely to be caused which could not be remedied by money compensation. In a case where the grant of an injunction may result in damages not being compensable, the court must determine the case according to the balance of convenience.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 As noted earlier, the Wife has not shown that the remaining matrimonial assets will not be sufficient to satisfy the likely division proportion in her favour. Neither has she shown that damage is likely to be caused which could not be remedied by money compensation. Consequently, even on the <em>American Cyanamid</em> principle, she would not have succeeded in her application for an interlocutory injunction.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 For the above reasons, the application was dismissed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 The Husband had offered to provide the Wife with a statement of accounts on how the sale proceeds of Property A would be utilised. The balance of the sale proceeds is to be deposited into the conveyancing account of his solicitors pending the outcome of the ancillary matters hearing. In light of the concession by the Husband, I made the order accordingly.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [5]; Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [30].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at p 8.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [10].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [14].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [15].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at p 28.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [16].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 9 December 2023 (P1) at [18].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 27 February 2024 (P2) at [23].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [7].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [15(e)].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [15(b)].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [30].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [27].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [27].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [25].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [28].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [30].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [33].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [34].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>Husband’s Submissions dated 11 March 2024 at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>Husband’s Submissions dated 11 March 2024 at [12].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [36].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>Husband’s affidavit dated 8 February 2024 (D1) at [37].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>M/ Rajwin & Yong LLP letter dated 20 March 2024 at [6].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>M/ Rajwin & Yong LLP letter dated 20 March 2024 at [9].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>Wife’s affidavit dated 27 February 2024 (P2) at [20].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>M/ Rajwin & Yong LLP letter dated 20 March 2024 at [11].</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>M/ Rajwin & Yong LLP letter dated 20 March 2024 at [13].</p></div></content></root> | 30e3efc55d4c8a972751d4a5144ae1011fb57186 |
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