fc_judgments_version: 58

This data as json

_id _item _version _commit tags date court case-number title citation url counsel timestamp coram html _item_full_hash
58 50 1 1775 
[
    "Family Law \u2013 Costs"
]
 2024-07-11 Family Court Divorce No 2741 of 2020 (Summons No 1298 of 2024) WYV v WYW [2024] SGFC 47 https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31733-SSP.xml 
[
    "The plaintiff in person and unrepresented",
    "Sarah-Mae Thomas and Larissa Mira Balmadres (Sarah-Mae Thomas LLC) for the defendant"
]
 2024-07-19T16:00:00Z[GMT] Soh Kian Peng <root><head><title>WYV v WYW</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WYV <em>v</em> WYW </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31733-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 47</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Divorce No 2741 of 2020 (Summons No 1298 of 2024)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">11 July 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Soh Kian Peng </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> The plaintiff in person and unrepresented; Sarah-Mae Thomas and Larissa Mira Balmadres (Sarah-Mae Thomas LLC) for the defendant </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WYV — WYW </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Costs</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">11 July 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> Assistant Registrar Soh Kian Peng:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1       This is my decision in respect of costs for SUM 1298 of 2024 (“SUM 1298”). My substantive decision in respect of SUM 1298, which was the Father’s application to strike out the Mother’s application for a variation of access orders in relation to the children of their marriage, can be found in <em>WYV v WYW</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31695-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 44</a> (“<em>WYV</em>”).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2       I heard parties on 11 July 2024 and made no order as to costs. These are the reasons for my decision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Parties’ Arguments </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3       Counsel for the Father, Ms Sarah-Mae Thomas (“Ms Thomas”), argued that her client, having succeeded in his striking out application, should be entitled to costs. As to the quantum of costs, Ms Thomas submitted that it should be fixed at $4500, plus disbursements of $577.52. In calibrating the quantum of costs, Ms Thomas urged me to take into account the Mother’s conduct, specifically, that it was clear that there was no basis for taking out SUM 893.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4       In response, the Mother argued that she did have a basis for taking out SUM 893. She explained that she could not, as a mother, sit idly by in the face of what the children had told her. The Mother urged me to, in considering whether there was a basis for taking out SUM 893, account for the fact that she was a self-represented person. The Mother also asserted that she was currently unemployed and did not have any resources to spare – while she did have a licence as a property agent, it was difficult for her to close any deals because she had to look after the children.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5       In response, Ms Thomas pointed out that the Mother had provided no evidence that she was in dire financial straits. What was in evidence, however, was that the Mother was renting out her HDB flat. Ms Thomas further argued that the Mother should not be allowed to escape without paying costs, especially since the Father had to engage counsel to deal with SUM 893.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6       At this juncture, I asked Ms Thomas to address me on the case of <em>JBB v JBA</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/18024-SSP.xml')">[2015] 5 SLR 153</a> (“<em>JBB</em>”) and whether the proposition of law, that it was appropriate to make no order as to costs in a situation where parties had an acrimonious relationship, should be applied in the present case.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7       Ms Thomas argued that the proposition in <em>JBB</em> cannot be taken as a shield for abusing the process of court. There could not be a blanket exception for every litigant who takes out a vexatious claim or tries to abuse the court process. There was bound to be acrimony in divorce cases, but her client should not be harassed by applications of this nature and the cost consequences had to reflect that. Ms Thomas also highlighted the point that insofar as the court might make no order as to costs to avoid aggravating relations between the parties with an order of costs – this was to facilitate co-parenting arrangements. However, in the present case, the co-parenting arrangements had been frustrated as Father had not been able to see his daughter for the past two years.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8       I allowed the Mother to respond to the points which Ms Thomas had made. She stood by her assertion that finances were tight on her end, and that she had no income at all despite having a property agent licence. The Mother also further argued that the Father’s allegations of alienation had not been established.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9       To this, Ms Thomas raised one final point in reply – that DJ Amy Tung (“DJ Tung”) had, in her decision for MSS 1384/2022, rescinded DJ Yong’s orders in relation to the Mother’s maintenance. Ms Thomas highlighted that DJ Tung had found that the Mother had misrepresented that she had not passed her real estate examination. In this vein, Ms Thomas characterised the Mother as a person who would misrepresent facts time and time again to the court, and urged me to assess all that the Mother had said in this light.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10     The Mother’s reply was that she had only misrepresented the fact that she did not have a real estate licence – she did not make any misrepresentation as to the earnings she had made.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">My Decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11     The principles relating to costs are summarised in <em>WXE v WXF</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31618-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 40</a> at [7] – [9]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">7    Insofar as the principles governing costs are concerned, they can be found in Rules 852 and 854 of the Family Justice Rules 2014. In essence, if the court does award costs, the starting point is that costs shall follow the event. The court can, however, depart from this starting point, taking into account factors such as the conduct of parties.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">8    One reason for departing from this starting point, and ordering that each party is to bear their own costs, or making no order as to costs, is to “minimise acrimony and discontent between parties” (see also <em>VJL v VGM</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24701-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGFC 59</a> at [135]; <em>TIJ v TIK</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18469-SSP.xml')">[2015] SGFC 147</a> at [23]). That was the point which had been made in <em>JBB</em>. There is much sense to taking such an approach. From a practical perspective, an order to pay costs may well create the potential for further discontent between parties. For instance, one party may well be tempted to, in an attempt to spite the other party, refuse to pay costs. This would spawn further applications to enforce the costs order (see <em>VWM v VWN</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26685-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGFC 107</a> at [134] – [135]).</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">9    It bears noting that what had been said in <em>JBB</em> is not a hard and fast rule – it does not mean that parties should always have to bear their own costs in matrimonial proceedings (see <em>WQR v WQS</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30388-SSP.xml')">[2023] SGHCF 41</a> at [88]). Ultimately, costs are in the court’s discretion, and in certain cases, for example, where a party has acted unreasonably in the proceedings, that party may very well be ordered to bear the other party’s costs: see <em>UHG v UHH</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/21040-SSP.xml')">[2017] SGFC 116</a> at [63] – [68]; <em>UTN v UTO and another</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23424-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGHCF 18</a> at [107]; <em>TNX v TNY</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/18869-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGFC 50</a> at [51] – [60]. This may also be the case where a party has taken an adversarial stance in proceedings – an award of costs would reflect that doing so is simply unacceptable in our family justice system that adopts therapeutic justice: <em>VVB v VVA</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/29144-SSP.xml')">[2022] 4 SLR 1181</a> at [26]; <em>WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31457-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGHCF 20</a> at [14].</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12     In the present case, as I had observed in my written grounds for SUM 1298, both the Father and the Mother did have an acrimonious relationship (<em>WYV</em> at [89]), and there was a risk that the children would be triangulated into their dispute. I had also encouraged both parties to set aside their differences and to find ways to work together in the best interests of their children (<em>WYV</em> at [94]).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13     It is with this in mind that I deemed it fit to make no order as to costs. The children are at a stage of their lives where they will need the support and guidance of both their parents (<em>WYV</em> at [89]). That can hardly be achieved if both parents continue to wage war against each other in court.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14     To avoid doubt, the time limited for filing an appeal shall begin to run from the date of this judgment.</p> </div></content></root> 25b20ea15404db35e586ff6069c85b3a2ac505a4

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