fc_judgments_version: 59
This data as json
| _id | _item | _version | _commit | tags | date | court | case-number | title | citation | url | counsel | timestamp | coram | html | _item_full_hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 59 | 51 | 1 | 1776 | [
"Family Law \u2013 Divorce \u2013 Ancillary Matters \u2013 Variation",
"Family Law \u2013 Matrimonial proceedings \u2013 Procedure",
"Res judicata \u2013 Issue estoppel"
] |
2024-07-18 | Family Court | Divorce No 3276 of 2018 (Summons No 2582 of 2023) | WZM v WZN | [2024] SGFC 50 | https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31740-SSP.xml | [
"Dharmambal Shanti Jayaram (Dharma Law LLC) for the applicant",
"Chia Soo Michael (MSC Law Corporation) for the respondent."
] |
2024-07-24T16:00:00Z[GMT] | Patrick Tay Wei Sheng | <root><head><title>WZM v WZN</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WZM <em>v</em> WZN </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31740-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 50</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Divorce No 3276 of 2018 (Summons No 2582 of 2023)</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">18 July 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Patrick Tay Wei Sheng </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Dharmambal Shanti Jayaram (Dharma Law LLC) for the applicant; Chia Soo Michael (MSC Law Corporation) for the respondent. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WZM — WZN </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Divorce</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Ancillary Matters</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Variation</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Matrimonial proceedings</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Procedure</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Res judicata</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Issue estoppel</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">18 July 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Patrick Tay Wei Sheng:</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 A former husband applied to vary the maintenance that he had agreed to pay to his former wife and his child following their divorce. I relieved the husband of his obligation to maintain the wife forthwith but declined to vary his obligation to maintain the child. The husband is dissatisfied with these decisions. I now provide my grounds for them.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Background</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 The spouses married in 2014 and divorced in 2018. They had a child in 2015. During the divorce, they agreed that the husband would provide monthly maintenance of $300 for the wife and $1,200 for the child. The total sum of $1,500 was to be paid to the wife on the first calendar day of each month. This agreement was recorded in an interim judgment, FC/IJ 3930/2018, which was made final in FC/FJ 5140/2018 (the “Consent Judgment”).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 The husband fell behind on these maintenance payments. In June 2020, the wife filed a Maintenance Summons, MSS 1613/2020, to enforce the arrears that had accrued. This summons was determined in October 2020 through a consent order, EMO 1054/2020. Thereunder, the husband acknowledged that the arrears totalled $37,500 and agreed to pay them in instalments of $500 per month. This consent order also clarified that the monthly maintenance payments of $300 for the wife and $1,200 for the child would continue.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 The husband again fell behind on his payments of the arrears under EMO 1054/2020 and of the ongoing maintenance under the Consent Judgment. In December 2021, the wife filed another Maintenance Summons, MSS 2680/2021, to enforce these arrears. This summons was determined in April 2022 through an adjudicated order of enforcement, EMO 284/2022. Therein, the court found that the arrears totalled $60,500 and ordered the husband to pay them in instalments of $1,000 per month. This order also confirmed that the monthly maintenance payments of $300 for the wife and $1,200 for the child would continue.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 In May 2023, the wife filed a third Maintenance Summons, MSS 1097/2023. Therein, she alleged that the husband had once again fallen behind on the payments of the arrears under EMO 284/2022 and of the ongoing maintenance under the Consent Judgment. According to the wife, these arrears totalled $63,000 as of May 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 In August 2023, the husband commenced these proceedings to vary his obligations to maintain the wife and the child under the Consent Judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Decision</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 The husband sought to be relieved of his obligations in the Consent Judgment to maintain the wife in the monthly sum of $300 and the child in the monthly sum of $1,200. He asked that this relief be back-dated to “a date to be determined by the Court”. He deposed that he had agreed to these sums during the divorce because “the [wife] wanted it and I gave in to her request”,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> and even though he would struggle to pay them. He claimed that he had entered into the Consent Judgment because he had been “psychologically troubled” and “depressed” during the divorce proceedings.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Further, during the divorce proceedings, I was psychologically troubled and felt depressed. I had failed to make sound choices and did not address my difficulties in making monthly maintenance payments due to my state of mind. I was also unrepresented then and felt pressured by everything was that ongoing. These factors contributed to me agreeing to the maintenance sums ordered in the [Consent Judgment].</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Issue estoppel </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 At the outset, the orders of enforcement of arrears of maintenance in EMO 1054/2020 and EMO 284/2022 (see [3] and [4] above) complicated the attempts by the husband to vary his maintenance obligations with retrospective or back-dated effect. In making these orders of enforcement, the court had determined the accrued arrears and the quantum of arrears that were due from the husband (insofar as cause had been shown as to why any other part of the arrears should not be enforced under r 116(9) of the Family Justice Rules 2014). These determinations crystallised the quantum of arrears as of the time when the order of enforcement was made. Unless these determinations were disturbed, whether on appeal or otherwise, they were final and conclusive judgments on the merits that created issue estoppel between the spouses (see <em>Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan No 301</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2005] 3 SLR(R) 0157.xml')">[2005] 3 SLR(R) 157</a> at [14]–[15]).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 This issue estoppel, which was part of the doctrine of <em>res judicata</em>, produced at least two consequences in subsequent proceedings between the spouses to vary orders of maintenance (including orders for the maintenance of children of the marriage). First, it prevented the spouses from challenging the quantum of arrears that were due at the time of the order of enforcement. Second, and by implication, it prevented the spouses from challenging the reasonableness of the substantive orders of maintenance that underlay those arrears as of the time of the order of enforcement. Further, this issue estoppel applied even if the earlier determinations had been erroneous because of the private and public interests protected by the doctrine of <em>res judicata</em> (see Sundaresh Menon CJ, “Transnational Relitigation and the Doctrine of Transnational Issue Estoppel”, paper delivered at the 8th Judicial Seminar on Commercial Litigation (14 March 2024) at paras 15–16). The private interest lay in the right of the spouses to be free from vexation by re-litigation of the issue of maintenance in respect of the same timeframe, which freedom enabled them to move on from the divorce, to heal, and to re-cast their futures. The public interest lay in upholding the integrity of the court process by securing the end of litigation that conduced to the efficient adjudication of disputes and that protected the authority of the judicial decisions from unceasing challenges.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 That said, issue estoppel was subject to a qualification known as the “<em>Arnold</em> exception” (see <em>Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/English/69027-E-M.xml')">[1991] 2 AC 93</a>). This <em>Arnold</em> exception enabled a litigant to, in exceptional cases, reopen an issue that had been previously determined. Nevertheless, stringent conditions governed the application of the <em>Arnold</em> exception. To invoke it, five conditions had to be met: (a) that the prior decision directly affected the future determination of the parties’ rights; (b) that the prior decision had been clearly wrong; (c) that the error in the prior decision had arisen because a point was not taken before the court that made the decision, and the point could not reasonably have been so taken; (d) that any rights accruing under the prior decision would not be clawed back, and any effects of the prior decision would not be undone; and (e) great injustice would arise were issue estoppel to apply (see <em>The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/18226-SSP.xml')">[2015] 5 SLR 1104</a> at [103] and [139]).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 As between the spouses in these proceedings, the quantum of arrears of maintenance for the wife and for the child had been determined in October 2020 (in EMO 1054/2020) and again in April 2022 (in EMO 284/2022). These determinations were final and conclusive judgments on the merits. Hence, and unless the husband could avail himself of the <em>Arnold</em> exception, issue estoppel applied in these proceedings to preclude him from challenging the quantum of arrears and the necessity of the substantive orders of maintenance that underlay those arrears as of October 2020 and April 2022.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Maintenance of wife</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 The husband claimed that the wife had been in a “stable financial position even during the Covid period when [he] was jobless and suffered an income loss”. He added that she did not need further support because her monthly income was $4,000 while his monthly income was only $3,000.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 I agreed with the husband that the wife had sufficient earning capacity to maintain herself and that it was no longer necessary for him to maintain her. The wife confirmed that her monthly income ranged between $2,780 and $4,500 depending on overtime, commissions, and bonuses. She also deposed that the monthly sum of $300 in maintenance for her under the Consent Judgment was to her a “token” amount.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 As the Family Court had repeatedly observed, “a spousal maintenance order is not to be regarded as a meal ticket for life and should not be intended to create life-long dependency by an ex-wife on the ex-husband” (see, <em>eg</em>, <em>UHK v UHL</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29612-SSP.xml')">[2023] SGFC 12</a> (“<em>UHK</em>”) at [39] and <em>VOX v VOY</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/25643-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGFC 11</a> at [38]). Here, the marriage lasted only four years while nearly six years had passed since the divorce. The income of the wife equipped her to support herself. It was thus justified to relieve the husband of his obligation to maintain her. As eloquently put by District Judge Kenneth Yap in <em>UHK</em>, the wife “should look towards this improvement positively, and draw satisfaction from her ability to be self-reliant and enjoy greater independence from her former husband’s support” (at [39]).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 Nevertheless, I did not rescind the wife maintenance with retrospective or back-dated effect. The husband initially prayed that the recission should be “backdated to a date to be determined by the Court”. He later deposed that he sought a recission from the date of these proceedings, <em>ie</em>, August 2023.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> Given the relatively short period of time between August 2023 and the conclusion of these proceedings in April 2024, most of which time was spent on mediation, I did not find such a back-dating of the rescission necessary.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 I noted that the husband also sought to “set aside any arrears of [wife] maintenance” that had accrued. In my view, this was a request that had to be made to the court hearing the pending application to enforce the arrears of maintenance, MSS 1097/2023 (see [5] above). In any event, the bulk of these arrears had accrued between the divorce in August 2018 and EMO 284/2022 in April 2022. These arrears had been determined and crystallised in EMO 1054/2020 and EMO 284/2022 (see [3] and [4] above). Issue estoppel to prevent the re-litigation of these arrears in these proceedings.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Maintenance of child</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 The husband began by complaining that he had not been granted access to the child and thus knew little about the life and expenses of the child.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> He then claimed that the monthly expenses of the child had fallen below $1,200 since the making of the Consent Judgment, and referred to the tables that had been exhibited in MSS 1613/2020 and MSS 2680/2021 (the “Expense Tables”) in support of this claim.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> He added that he was in any event unable to pay the arrears of maintenance that had accrued since the Consent Judgment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 I did not agree with the husband that the maintenance for the child should be reduced or rescinded.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 The complaints of the husband about his access to the child were not germane to his obligation to maintain the child. Issues about the access of a parent to a child were analytically distinct from issues about the obligation of that parent to maintain the child. Still, directions for the husband to exercise access to the child had since been made in related proceedings (see Summons No 2376 of 2023), and those directions appeared to have assuaged the concerns of the husband about his access to the child.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The claim by the husband that the expenses of the child had fallen below $1,200 after the Consent Judgment was based on the Expense Tables. The Expense Tables reflected the expenses of the child as of June 2020 and December 2021, when MSS 1613/2020 and MSS 2680/2021 respectively were filed. Yet those proceedings concluded in orders of enforcement that recorded the monthly arrears of maintenance at $1,500, including $1,200 for the child, as of October 2020 and April 2022 (see EMO 1054/2020 and EMO 284/2022). The quantum of child maintenance for which the husband was liable as of October 2020 and April 2022 had thus been determined to be $1,200. Further, issue estoppel precluded the husband from challenging that determination, regardless of whether it had been erroneous, unless the <em>Arnold</em> exception applied. And it was unclear how the <em>Arnold</em> exception could apply when the Expense Tables had been exhibited in MSS 1613/2020 and MSS 2680/2021, in which this determination had been made. Despite these Expense Tables, the husband <em>consented</em> to EMO 1054/2020 and did not challenge EMO 284/2022. It was no longer open to him to rely on the Expense Tables or to dispute his liability as of October 2020 and April 2022 to maintain the child in the monthly sum of $1,200. This constraint arose because of the public interest in upholding the integrity of the court process by securing the end of litigation (see <em>Kho Jabing v Attorney-General</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/19124-SSP.xml')">[2016] 3 SLR 1273</a> at [2])) and operated regardless of whether such an objection had been taken by the wife in these proceedings.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 In consequence of this issue estoppel, I was constrained to consider only the circumstances after October 2020 and April 2022 for the purpose of this application to vary the obligation of the husband to maintain the child. On the evidence before me, the monthly income of the husband had been $3,000 since November 2021 and had remained “stable” thereafter.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> Similarly, there had been little change in the monthly expenses of the husband, the wife, and the child since April 2022. Specifically, the husband adduced no evidence on the monthly expenses of the child after April 2022, and the wife deposed that those expenses amounted to $1,476.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> There was thus no material change of circumstances to justify a variation of the obligation of the husband to maintain the child.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 Ultimately, the issue estoppel that flowed from EMO 1054/2020 and EMO 284/2022 meant that the only circumstances that were relevant in these proceedings were those after April 2022. During this period, there had been little change in the earning capacity of the husband or in the expenses of the child. Even if the Expense Tables could have shown that the expenses of the child had decreased, it would have been unjust to have recourse to them. The husband had, by his consent to EMO 1054/2020 and his non-challenge of EMO 284/2022, forewent his right to rely on the Expense Tables and or to dispute his liability to maintain the child in the monthly sum of $1,200 as of April 2022. Insofar as the determinations in EMO 1054/2020 and EMO 284/2022 on the quantum of the arrears and the liability of the husband to maintain the child had been erroneous, the husband had ample opportunity to challenge them. Yet the husband did not avail himself of that opportunity. As a result, the public and private interests protected by issue estoppel and the wider doctrine of <em>res judicata</em> constrained me to proceed on those determinations in these proceedings.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 For these reasons, I relieved the husband of his obligation to maintain the wife but not of his obligation to maintain the child. This order was to take effect forthwith.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 I made no order on the costs of this application.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 21.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 37.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 22.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 24.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 27.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 29.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Husband’s First Affidavit at para 43.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Wife’s Affidavit at para 91.</p></div></content></root> | c86073512bf6412c628be9e242cd4a1c8d1605c1 |
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