fc_judgments_version: 65

This data as json

_id	_item	_version	_commit	tags	date	court	case-number	title	citation	url	counsel	timestamp	coram	html	_item_full_hash
65	57	1	1780	[ "Probate \u2013 Validity of will \u2013 Forgery \u2013 Conflicting handwriting analysis" ]	2024-07-29	Family Court	FC/S 16/2020	WZJ v WZK and another	[2024] SGFC 49	https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31850-SSP.xml	[ "Hsu Sheng Wei, Keith (Emerald Law LLC) for the Plaintiff", "Mahmood Gaznavi S/O Bashir Muhammad (Mahmood Gaznavi Chambers LLC) for the Defendants." ]	2024-08-02T16:00:00Z[GMT]	Shobha Nair	<root><head><title>WZJ v WZK and another</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WZJ <em>v</em> WZK and another </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31850-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 49</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">FC/S 16/2020</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">29 July 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Shobha Nair </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Hsu Sheng Wei, Keith (Emerald Law LLC) for the Plaintiff; Mahmood Gaznavi S/O Bashir Muhammad (Mahmood Gaznavi Chambers LLC) for the Defendants. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WZJ — WZK — WZL </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Probate</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Validity of will</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Forgery</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Conflicting handwriting analysis</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">29 July 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Shobha Nair:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 The central issue in this case is the validity of a will which was executed in Malaysia (<em>Malaysian will</em>) about 7 months after the testator executed one in Singapore (<em>Singapore will</em>). The testator passed away on 20 October 2019 and very soon after, there was chaotic engagement amongst family members on the validity of the Malaysian will and who should rightfully benefit from the estate of the deceased. Such engagement involved various allegations made by family members against each other including what each believed would be the intentions of the deceased based on the tenor of his relationship with each member during his lifetime. The plaintiff is the son of the deceased. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is the eldest daughter of the deceased while the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant is a lady who lived with the deceased in Malaysia for some time prior to the latter’s demise.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 Having heard the matter, I found for the plaintiff and declared the Malaysian will invalid. I ordered that probate be granted based on the Singapore will instead. I however dismissed the plaintiff’s application for the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant to be removed as executor of the Singapore will and similarly dismissed the plaintiff’s application for letters of administration with the Singapore will annexed to be granted to him (or in the alternative, that he be appointed as the sole executor). The counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety. As parties could not agree on costs, I ordered costs of $90 000 (all in) to be paid by the defendants jointly and severally. The parties appeal against the substantive orders.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Background</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 The deceased and his wife were divorced in 2005 and appear to have shared a cordial relationship after the divorce. From the union there are 3 children; 2 daughters and a son. As referenced above, the plaintiff is the deceased’s son, the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is his eldest child and daughter. The other daughter will be referred to as the younger daughter for purposes of these grounds of decision.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 It was not disputed that the deceased executed his first will in August 2016 which left all his assets to his brother. It was also not disputed that the deceased then executed a will on 30 May 2017 in Singapore which effectively revoked the August 2016 will. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant suggested that the deceased was influenced by his other 2 children and their mother into executing the Singapore will. The will names the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as the executor and trustee and the plaintiff as the subsititute executor if one of many listed events were to occur. Under the Singapore will, the estate of the deceased was to be divided equally amongst his 3 children. At the time the Singapore will was executed, the deceased was living in his ex-wife’s home to enable assistance for his medical appointments in Singapore.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 The deceased unfortunately suffered a heart attack sometime in June 2017 and was admitted to a Singapore hospital. After his discharge, he stayed with the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant at her home. It was the plaintiff’s position that the deceased was asked by the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant to leave her residence and he then lived in Johor from December 2017. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant stated that she did not ask that her father leave.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> In any event, a third will dated 28 December 2017 was claimed by the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants to have been executed by the deceased in Malaysia. The 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was named as the executor and trustee and the beneficiaries of the estate are the deceased’s 2 grandsons. These are the children of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 It is not disputed that the defendants are close friends. It was the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s position however that she only knew of the existence of the Malaysian will when informed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant on 8 November 2019. On 16 November 2019 the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant showed the Malaysian will to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant who then claimed to have returned it and not to have taken note of the contents of the will save for the fact that the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was named as executor and trustee.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 Although there was communication between the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and her mother on the existence of the Malaysian will in early December 2019, the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant proceeded to file an application for probate in January 2020 based on the Singapore will. She claimed that she acted in this way as she felt pressure from her mother and siblings. Further, she claimed that she was not legally trained to understand the significance of acting in the way she did.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The validity of the Singapore will</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 It is trite law that the burden of propounding a will lies in every case upon the party propounding the will (<b><em>ULV v ULW)</em></b>.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> Section 5 and 6 of the Wills Act (1838) provide the rules for the formal validity of wills and the mode of execution, respectively. The Singapore will was properly executed. There was no allegation of a lack of testamentary capacity on the part of the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 Both the plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant together with their mother were present when the deceased executed the will in his lawyer’s office in Singapore. Its execution was in the presence of 2 witnesses, one of whom was the deceased’s lawyer (<em>the Singapore lawyer</em>).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 Although there was suggestion by the 1st defendant that the Singapore will was executed under the influence of her mother and siblings, this was not a challenge that she robustly pursued. It would also be rather odd that the 1st defendant was named as the executor and equal beneficiary, if there were such influence.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Why the Malaysian will was rejected </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 After the divorce between the deceased and his wife in 2005, the 2nd defendant stated that she came to know the deceased. She was an administrative staff member at one of the deceased’s companies from 2009.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> It was her evidence that the deceased lived in a house in Johor more permanently from 2013 or 2014<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> and travelled to Singapore during the weekends. She also said that she looked after him in Malaysia. In fact, she was present in the house when the deceased was found dead in the early morning of 20 October 2019 when she woke up from sleep. He was found only in underclothes and remained in that state on the floor of the home till the ambulance arrived. The plaintiff and other family members expressed their unhappiness at finding the deceased in such a state and pointed to a lack of care by the 2nd defendant whether fairly or otherwise, in taking care of the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 It was the 2nd defendant’s evidence that the deceased went to a lawyer’s office in Malaysia to execute the Malaysian will on 28 December 2017. She claimed that she was present in the room when the deceased executed the will. She was named as executor and trustee. The execution of the will was witnessed by the Malaysian lawyer and a former driver of the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 The deceased had assets in Singapore and Malaysia, including immoveable properties and businesses. Three of these businesses were named after the plaintiff perhaps suggesting a sense of closeness to his son. The Malaysian will however made reference to specific Malaysian assets while only referring generally to all other assets in the name of the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">(i) The evidence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant and the witnesses to the execution of the Malaysian will could not be safely relied on.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 It was the 2nd defendant’s position that the reason why there was a sudden change of heart on the part of the deceased leading him to revoke the Singapore will was because the plaintiff stole the title deeds to the deceased’s Malaysian properties.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> This was disputed by the plaintiff who claimed that his father had told him on numerous occasions that the same Malaysian lawyer who had apparently drafted and witnessed the Malaysian will could not be trusted and that the lawyer had taken the title deeds to one of his properties and had sold the property.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id=""></a>The plaintiff had also stated that the deceased had on one occasion, asked his children whether he should lend S$35 000 to the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant for a coffee shop business. Only the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant was in favour of this. The money was lent and the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant engaged the Malaysian lawyer to assist in setting up the business. The business never materialised and the money unaccounted for.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> The suggestion from the plaintiff was that the Malaysian lawyer and the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant cannot be trusted. In my view, if the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant is to be believed on her position that the deceased was unhappy with the plaintiff thus prompting him to make a new will with the assistance of the Malaysian lawyer, why would his other children be removed from benefitting from his estate. His unhappiness was only with the plaintiff. I accepted the plaintiff’s position that there was much more that appears to have transpired between the deceased and the Malaysian lawyer in the past and between the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant and the Malaysian lawyer which makes the Malaysian will a document that required further scrutiny.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 The evidence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant is also in my view unbelievable as there was no reason for her to omit to inform the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant about the Malaysian will until the deceased had passed away almost 2 years later. They were both close and supportive of each other. It is more likely that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant always knew of the Malaysian will and not as she claimed, only in November 2019. In fact under cross-examination the Malaysian lawyer met with the plaintiff and his mother on 6 November 2019 but informed them that he did not have a copy of the Malaysian will with him. Soon after the visit, the Malaysian lawyer claimed that the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant informed him that she had given it to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant, the latter arriving at the Malaysian lawyer’s office on 13 November 2019 already having with her a copy of the will. Even at this point, knowing that the plaintiff wanted a copy of it, the Malaysian lawyer did not retain a copy nor inform the plaintiff that he was in possession of it. To complicate matters even further, the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant under cross – examination denied passing it to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant also claimed that she never brought the Malaysian will to the Malaysian lawyer on 13 November 2019 and insisted that the Malaysian lawyer was mistaken.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> The Malaysian will did not rather strangely, appoint the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as the executor of the will (as was the case in the Singapore will) even though the impression created by both defendants was that the relationship between the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and the deceased was extremely good.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 While the Malaysian will is dramatically different from the Singapore will insofar as it relates to the beneficiaries named, the deceased did not choose to change his nomination for his CPF money which mirrored the distribution of assets in his Singapore will. If the deceased was so angry with the plaintiff that he chose to change his will to provide only for his grandsons, that anger did not find expression in the way his CPF money was to be distributed. This raises concerns with the evidence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant on the reason why the deceased wanted to remove the plaintiff from his will.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 There are in my view large concerns with the evidence of the Malaysian lawyer and the second witness to the will. The plaintiff had consistently and vehemently insisted that the deceased had informed him that the Malaysian lawyer could not be trusted. This was echoed by his younger sister on finding out from the plaintiff that there was possibly a Malaysian will that was witnessed by the Malaysian lawyer.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> An aunt of the plaintiff and his siblings who lived in Johor since 2017 and visited the deceased often, stated that she was told by the deceased that he had executed a will that distributed his estate equally amongst his children. There was never any mention otherwise including any conversation that revealed that he had gone to a Malaysian lawyer to execute another will. In particular, the deceased never spoke of leaving anything to his grandchildren.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> The aunt in fact shared that the deceased said that he would give a little more to the plaintiff and his younger daughter when he spoke of specific properties in Singapore and Malaysia as he felt that he had already provided more to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> The aunt was not shown to have any greater affiliation to the plaintiff. Another witness lent force to the plaintiff’s narrative. A former driver of the deceased<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> who served him from 2017 till he passed on, spoke of having driven him to many places in Singapore and Malaysia. This included places where the deceased would meet the plaintiff and his younger sister, to the ex-wife’s home and the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s home, suggesting that the deceased maintained a cordial relationship with all the family members even if there may have been challenges over the years. This former driver said that he was never asked to drive the deceased to the Malaysian lawyer’s office. He also shared how the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s husband asked for a share of the deceased’s estate to be given to the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant as the latter had taken care of the deceased prior to his passing. There was no reason to doubt this piece of evidence which was also spoken of by the plaintiff and his mother and which transpired a few days after the passing of the deceased. It would be odd to have the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant provided for from the estate of the deceased when this was not in the Malaysian will. There are many possible reasons why the Malaysian will does not provide for the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant. One is that the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was promised a sum of money by the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and possibly the latter’s husband if the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant would claim that such a will existed which would leave everything to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s children without drawing attention to the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant may have wanted to distance herself from the Malaysian will which would at some point have to surface if it were to govern distribution of the deceased’s estate as she knew her siblings would be suspicious. By having the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant stated as the executor and trustee while enabling the only beneficiaries to be the children of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant prevented any attack or suspicion of the motives of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant. The question remains - was the will in fact a forged document? I found that the Malaysian will was in all probability a product of an attempt to deny the children of the deceased an equal share in the estate of the deceased and was not executed by the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 The evidence of the two witnesses to the will was rife with irregularities and inconsistencies. The Malaysian lawyer claimed he had handled many legal matters for the deceased whom he had known for decades. He described the relationship between the deceased and the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant as close.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> He went on to inform that the deceased executed the Malaysian will with the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant present and that the deceased signed with him and another individual as witnesses. This second witness he first described as a “Malay guy” and only later when prodded during cross-examination, as a former driver of the deceased. In his affidavit, he claimed that he informed the plaintiff of the second witness but in court under cross-examination, he claimed that he did not tell the plaintiff who the witnesses of the Malaysian will were. There was no reason why he would not have if a will was executed. Under cross-examination he eventually confirmed that his affidavit was correct and that he did tell the plaintiff about the witnesses.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 The Malaysian lawyer went on to say that “<em>my former client informed me that he wanted to impress his thumbprint on the 28 December 2017 Malaysia will as well</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> It was the plaintiff’s case that the deceased never used his thumbprint on documents. No document other than the Malaysian will was produced to show that the deceased had a pattern of affixing his thumbprint together with his signature. The Malaysian lawyer who had apparently acted for him on various legal matters over the years did not ask why the deceased felt the need to do this. The plaintiff had given in evidence that he had seen the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant removing the cloth that was placed over the deceased’s body during the wake and on being asked why, she tried to distract from this. It was the suggestion of the plaintiff therefore that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant may have used the thumbprint of the deceased as he lay dead, on this Malaysian will. While truth may sometimes be stranger than fiction, I found no evidence to corroborate this. An attempt to forensically examine the thumbprint did not point to any conclusion. I did accept however that it was unusual that the deceased would have affixed his thumbprint on the Malaysian will when this was not his practice. More relevant is the fact that this was not done for the Singapore will 7 months before the Malaysian will nor the insurance forms which was signed 9 months after the Malaysian will.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The Malaysian lawyer’s evidence was of concern in another material way. He claimed to have been asked by the deceased to prepare his will. It is unclear whether the lawyer informed him of the need for a second witness or if it was the deceased himself who decided on bringing his driver to be his witness. The lawyer claimed to have prepared the will. Yet he did not have a copy of it when asked by the plaintiff for it. He stated that he gave both the original signed will and a copy, to the deceased. The Malaysian lawyer was not merely a witness to the execution of the will. In the case of <b><em>Sudha Natrajan</em></b> v <b><em>The Bank of East Asia Ltd</em></b><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> the lack of notes or retention of a copy of a will were not seen as detrimental if the lawyer was only a witness. It is certainly different if he prepared the will in his professional capacity. This may of course be a lapse in professional judgment but one of the reasons the lawyer gave in evidence for the deceased having approached him instead of a lawyer in Singapore was that it was cheaper to get it done in Malaysia.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> He knew he was acting in his professional capacity and what his duties were given his vast experience in matters of this nature. No good reason was offered for not having kept a copy of a will drafted by him as a lawyer. Unlike the Singapore will, it was also not registered at a wills registry.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 When pressed by the plaintiff for a copy of the will on 6 November 2019, the Malaysian lawyer provided an unsigned copy to the plaintiff saying that he managed to get that from a saved soft copy. It was the plaintiff’s evidence that the Malaysian lawyer told him that the deceased did attend at his office but never signed the will. Given that there was no signed copy retained, this was probable. It was also the evidence of the plaintiff that the lawyer informed him that cultural norms dictated that the only son of the deceased should inherit the estate and that if he wanted to, he could take steps to have that done.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> This astonishing evidence if true has far reaching professional consequences for the lawyer. What is clear however is that no signed copy of the Malaysian will was retained by the Malaysian lawyer. The evidence of the plaintiff that he was informed by the Malaysian lawyer that S$25 000 was owed to him by the deceased for corporate taxes seems to find support in the evidence of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant herself who said she approached the lawyer’s office on 13 November 2019 (after she came to know of the existence of the Malaysian will) as she was informed that there were tax in arrears as well as another debt that their father owed. There is also evidence that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant had wanted payments to be made to the Malaysian lawyer towards taxes in arrears.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> The Malaysian lawyer’s motive is unclear but the evidence of the plaintiff was compelling in its suggestion that the Malaysian lawyer conducted his matters in a rather casual way, without proper records. Even his answers to questions in court were rather insouciant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 The evidence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> witness in the larger context of the Malaysian lawyer’s evidence was troubling as well. He claimed to have met the deceased in Malaysia when he was out of work. He was employed by the deceased as his driver. He worked for the deceased for about a year. Thereafter, he left to work in Singapore for about 2 years and claimed to have worked for the deceased again in early 2017. He was not clear of which month in 2017 he ceased employment. He stated that he had driven the deceased and the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant to the Malaysian lawyer’s office on many occasions. Under cross-examination, when asked who prepared his affidavit, he stated that it was the Malaysian lawyer. When asked to clarify whether he dictated the contents to the Malaysian lawyer, he said that it was in fact completely prepared by the lawyer.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span> The affidavit of the Malaysian lawyer and that of the 2<sup>nd</sup> witness to the Malaysian will are very similar. Given that the witnesses to the Malaysian will were both called to give evidence, the drafting of the affidavit by the Malaysian lawyer for the second witness was inappropriate. The second witness under cross-examination, was also unable to identify the ex-wife and the children of the deceased accurately but insisted in his affidavit that he was told by the deceased that the plaintiff and his younger daughter were greedy, and that his grandsons of his older daughter “deserved” to inherit his estate.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span>Such remarks crafted by the Malaysian lawyer and not coming from the witness himself was troubling. I noted as well that he had broken down in tears when asked about the will. He seemed very nervous which can be expected in court proceedings, but the degree of his anxiety in answering the question of whether he witnessed the execution of the will by the deceased was concerning. He claimed that he was just emotional thinking of the deceased who was like a father to him. This however, together with the parroting of evidence of the Malaysian lawyer in his affidavit especially when he is not fluent in English throws up concerns about the truthfulness of what was being said. It bears repeating that it was the evidence of the new driver who started to work for the deceased sometime in 2017 as well that he had never been asked to drive the deceased to the Malaysian lawyer’s office. This was at odds with the evidence of the Malaysian lawyer that the deceased approached the lawyer for many matters over the years.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">(ii) Evidence and conduct of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 It is somewhat incongruent with human nature for the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant who was surprised on being told by the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant that there was a Malaysian will, not to have asked more about it nor about the contents. This is so given that the defendants were close, and the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant was months ago seated in a Singapore law office aware that her father wanted her to be the executor of his will. Upon finally receiving the Malaysian will from the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant, she did not share it with her birth family knowing that they were no longer beneficiaries. Even if she were not curious and resisted the temptation of finding out if she was to benefit from the Malaysian will just as she was to have benefitted from the Singapore will, why did she not take immediate steps to be transparent with her mother and siblings upon finding out about the Malaysian will? It did not occur to her somewhat odd as well that despite her consistent evidence of being in a very close relationship with her father, she was so quickly removed as the executor of the Malaysian will. Even when she met her mother and the plaintiff on a flight to India by chance, she showed a picture of the will that appeared on her mobile phone and not the details.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 While she knew that the Singapore will had apparently been superseded by the Malaysian will, she chose to apply for probate in Singapore based on the Singapore will. The application has been granted but the grant has not been issued. It was the plaintiff and his younger sister’s position that she had not done so as her demands for payment to be made to the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was not agreed to by them nor their mother. This appears to have prompted her to stop the Singapore proceedings. I do not accept that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant chose not to extract the order simply because she was suddenly of the view that she should honour the later Malaysian will and no longer felt any pressure by her siblings to accept the Singapore will. Her insistence as well that she would gain nothing from the Malaysian will was to draw an artificial line between gaining directly from her father’s estate and indirectly through her children. The plaintiff’s insistence that the Malaysian will be forwarded for handwriting analysis made relations strained. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s position that she felt pressured to apply for probate on the Singapore will is hard to appreciate because she had legal counsel, and she did not feel similar pressure when she eventually aborted the proceedings. It was in fact the Singapore lawyer’s evidence that he was not informed of a Malaysian will. On being told that, the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant changed her initial position on having told her counsel of this to the position that he only knew there were Malaysian properties, and she was told that she could proceed to do the needful in Malaysia after getting probate in Singapore.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 It was the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s position that she was very close to the deceased, especially having taken care of him in her house for a period, while the plaintiff was not. From the evidence collectively it appeared that the deceased’s relationship with his ex-wife and all his children had its challenges at times. I could not find any evidence that he was close to one child to the exclusion of the others. In any event, who he chose to leave his wealth to may have nothing to do with whether he was close to an individual or not. If that were the case, he would have likely left something for the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant went on to say that the deceased was also very close to her sons<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span> suggesting that it should not surprise anyone in the family that her father left his estate to them. What is of significance is that although she never knew the existence of the will until after the deceased had passed on nor was she curious about its contents when first told, she stated in her affidavit.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">“…<em>my father impressed his signature on the 28 December 2017 Malaysia will to avoid any ambiguity</em>”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id=""></a>In my view, her position that the deceased must have done so to avoid ambiguity is not something a person absent at the execution would be able to categorically say. Unless of course, she knew this from those who were present. Yet she claims that even her close friend, the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant simply told her about the existence of the will in the month after the passing of the deceased. Further, why would there be a need to be concerned about ambiguity given that there were 2 witnesses? The Singapore will executed 7 months prior did not have a thumbprint and the deceased never executed documents this way in the past. Any position that his hands were weak and may tremble on writing was not accepted considering the history of the way the deceased acted and very specifically, the fact that he had signed on insurance documents in 2018 without the need to affix his thumbprint. These documents were handed to the plaintiff by the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant when the plaintiff arrived at the deceased’s home after the latter’s passing.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 The defendants’ counsel submitted that the issue of the thumbprint was raised by the plaintiff only in their Reply and Defence to Counterclaim (Amendment No.1), thereby causing prejudice to the defendants and would need to be treated as fatal to the plaintiff’s case.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> The reference in the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim (Amendment No.1) was clearly in reply to paragraph 46 of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No.1) which referred to the thumbprint having been affixed to “<em>avoid any debate as to the validity of the will</em>”. In any event, the defendants’ case cannot be said to have been prejudiced as leave of court to address this could have been sought if felt to be material. What is clear is that as a matter of practice, the deceased never affixed his thumbprint, and this formed the roots of the plaintiff’s position on this issue.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Reliance on forensic handwriting analysis – to what extent?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 With advancements in technology, the contribution of experts in handwriting analysis has been very helpful in the determination of many issues before the courts, be it criminal, civil or family matters. And much like any other science, there is often conflict in opinion. It is the responsibility of a court where there is such conflict to decide if the methodologies and equipment used has produced a more robust and hence more reliable conclusion by one expert as compared to another. In some cases, of course, both may be limited such that it would be safer to turn to evidence other than the conclusions drawn by the expert witnesses.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 The plaintiff called on an expert who has about 23 years of experience and has given evidence in many trials prior to this one. He was provided a copy of the Malaysian will where 2 signatures (Q1 and Q2) are found. He was also given 3 specimens (S1-S3) which he did not consider to be good specimen as they contained signatures that were made by the deceased in 2013. He informed in his report<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span> that signatures done many years ago would not provide for a fair comparison. He went on to compare Q1 and Q2 with the signature of the deceased found on the insurance forms which sought disability benefits. The 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant appears to have filled out this form for the deceased. This specimen (S4-1 to S4-5) were signed on 1 September 2018 (i.e. 9 months after the Malaysian will of December 2017). As mentioned previously, this specimen also does not bear the thumbprint of the deceased.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 Having highlighted the similarities in the signatures found on the Malaysian will and the specimen document S4 which he pointed out showed a moderate range of variation, he went on to elaborate on the significant differences which lent to his conclusion that there is “strong support” that the person who signed on Q1 and Q2 <b>is not</b> the same person who signed on S4.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> One of the limitations under which the expert worked however is the fact that only a copy of the Malaysian will was handed to the expert. This prevented stereomicroscopic comparative examination of the documents.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 After his evidence was given, the defendants’ counsel called on an expert. The decision to call this expert came after hearing dates were taken which impacted to some degree, the preparation of the plaintiff’s case. I allowed the application regardless but allowed the plaintiff’s expert a right to respond. The defendants’ expert has 40 years of experience and similarly, has experience in giving evidence in court proceedings. This expert had the benefit of the original Malaysian will, the specimens S1 to S4 and the Singapore will (S5).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 She opined that the signatures in 2017 and 2018, the wills and the insurance company forms, respectively <em>“showed unsteady pen movement and angular and less fluently made curves</em>”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span> She also stated that signatures that were made on the same day also showed significant inconsistencies. She put it down to natural variation. She also gave in evidence that Q1 and Q2 showed no hesitation and stiffness in pen movement and no laboured drawing and re-touching of strokes which are associated with manual copying or stimulations. She was of the view that no tracing had been done.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span> She compared S4 (just as the plaintiff’s expert did) and S5 (the Singapore will) with Q1 and Q2. She commented that the design, size, pen movement and stroke fluency were similar to the natural variation in S4 and S5. In other words, I must first accept that the variations seen in the specimen documents are natural variations. I had no reason to doubt it.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 The expert for the defendants believed the deceased “<b>probably” signed</b> the Malaysian will. This is a conclusion that is less than certain. In the range of certainty, the highest certainty levels would be if the signatures in Q1 and Q 2 are referred to as “is written by” or “it is highly probable written by”. <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 The expert also made a few observations about the analysis of the plaintiff’s expert. She pointed out what was already expressed as a limitation by the plaintiff’s expert, that is, that the original Malaysian will was not provided. She then went on to disagree with the description of a particular slant that appeared on the signatures in S4-5. She further disagreed with the plaintiff’s expert that there was a clear “pen lift” in Q2. She made in my view unfortunately, a comment on the plaintiff’s expert’s carelessness in that there were typographical errors, a wrongly labelled image and wrong paragraphing in his report<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span> which I do not believe reduces the weight that can be attributed to his core work.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 Given that the defendants called on their witness late in the day, I gave the opportunity for the plaintiff’s expert to file a supplementary affidavit after examining the original Malaysian will and the Singapore will. He was able to conduct a stereomicroscopic comparative examination. He concluded again that the <b>author of the questioned documents was not the author of the specimens in S4 and S5</b>.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_34" id="Ftn_34_1"><sup>[note: 34]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 The affidavit of another handwriting analyst engaged by the plaintiff and who resides in India was filed. He did not attend proceedings and was not subject to cross-examination and hence I ascribed no value to the same. He shared the opinion of the expert of the plaintiff who did attend these proceedings.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 Given that the core issue in this case was the validity of the Malaysian will, parties were encouraged during a case conference to consider jointly engaging an expert to analyse the signatures on the Malaysian will with the hope that matters would then be resolved amicably. Much disagreement arose on the scope of the engagement for the analysis to be done by the Health Sciences Authority (HSA). When parties finally agreed and a report appears to have been produced, the plaintiff chose not to rely on it.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 Section 116 (g) of the Evidence Act (1893) provides that:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id=""></a>“<em>The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks is likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case</em>”.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id=""></a>By way of illustration the section provides that the court can presume that evidence which could be produced but is not would if produced have been unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Relying on the legislative provision and referring to the case of <b><em>Harmony Shipping CO.S.A</em></b><b>.</b> v. <b><em>Saudi Europe Line Ltd</em></b>.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_35" id="Ftn_35_1"><sup>[note: 35]</sup></a></span> the defendants’ counsel urged the court to accept that the HSA report was unfavourable to the plaintiff.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 The court in <b><em>Harmony Shipping</em></b> however was referring generally to witnesses of fact and the rule that there is no property in a witness. The defendants were invited to consider applying for the production of the HSA report but during a case conference on 2 May 2023, the defendants’ counsel had confirmed that his clients did not intend to seek production of the report. Further, even as the defendants’ were of the view that the plaintiff was “expert shopping” in relying on the report that was in fact produced and omitting the HSA report, they did essentially the same by calling on their expert so close to the hearing.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_36" id="Ftn_36_1"><sup>[note: 36]</sup></a></span> In the case of <b><em>Sudha Natrajan</em></b> the court was of the view that it should not speculate on what any withheld evidence may contain or be. What then were the circumstances in the case before me which prevented an adverse inference? Litigation privilege is one of 2 aspects of legal professional privilege, the other being legal advice privilege. The plaintiff relied on litigation privilege by satisfying the court that there had been a reasonable prospect of litigation, and the communications/document were for the dominant purpose of litigation. Litigation privilege applies to expert witnesses. The defendants were additionally not prejudiced by the omission to produce the report. The 2 reports, from qualified local experts with sound knowledge and utilisation of accepted methods of analysis were in conflict, highlighting the tremendous challenge in relying on handwriting analysis in this case. In any event, as stated above, there was nothing limiting the defendants from applying to produce the HSA report.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 In light of the fact that the reports that were submitted to court contained differing conclusions and given especially that the experts themselves could not categorise their conclusions with the highest certainty level, I chose to look at all the other evidence instead of relying on the handwriting analysis in making my determination. While handwriting analysis as a growing science is certainly helpful, it remains equally very much an art allowing for different interpretations of the same documents. In some cases, like this one, it would in my view be unsafe to select one over the other in deciding the central issue here.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Why the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was allowed to continue as executor</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 Having found that the Singapore will was the last valid will, I considered the application by the plaintiff for letters of administration (with will annexed) to be granted to him or in the alternative, for an amendment to the grant appointing the plaintiff instead of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as the executor.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_37" id="Ftn_37_1"><sup>[note: 37]</sup></a></span> The alternative prayer was not feasible given that the Singapore will provide only specific situations where substitution could occur and none of the events had transpired. The closest reference to enable substitution was in the event the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant could not take care of “her” affairs as distinct from the estate affairs. Even if the request is based on the position that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is unfit to act as executor, the court cannot go beyond the intentions of the testator. Further, there can be no amendment to the grant of probate as no grant has been made. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant aborted proceedings once an order in terms of the application had been obtained, short of the actual grant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 I also dismissed the application by the plaintiff to apply for letters of administration (with will annexed). While there is in my view sufficient evidence to conclude that the deceased could not have executed the Malaysian will, I could not conclude with a high level of certainty as to the extent of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s involvement in this. While there was clearly evidence that she knew of the existence of the Malaysian will, the level of her culpability or knowledge that the deceased never properly executed the Malaysian will would require some conjecture.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 In the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s application for probate in Singapore, the order has been made. Further, the assets of the deceased are known, and the matter can be completed quickly enabling the shares of the beneficiaries to be received. It was the plaintiff’s submission<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_38" id="Ftn_38_1"><sup>[note: 38]</sup></a></span> that since the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant had proceeded to apply for a grant seeking to propound the Singapore will when she knew of the Malaysian will and had breached her fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, she should be removed as executor with the plaintiff stepping in instead. The reference to s 32 of the Probate and Administration Act (1934)<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_39" id="Ftn_39_1"><sup>[note: 39]</sup></a></span> would be misplaced as a grant has not yet been made. Section 32 refers to the revocation of grants and not setting aside orders made, as is the case here. Additionally, both executors and trustees owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate in relation to the administration of his estate. An executor essentially “calls in the estate” and ensures that the assets are converted into cash and pays off all the funeral and testamentary expenses, estate duty, debts and legacies. When he has done that, his duties as an executor are discharged. As she moves to fill in the shoes of a trustee, he owes a set of fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries including the important duty of keeping and providing accounts to the beneficiaries (<b><em>Lalwani Shalini Gobind and another</em></b> v <b><em>Lalwani Ashok Bherumal</em></b>).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_40" id="Ftn_40_1"><sup>[note: 40]</sup></a></span> The plaintiff and his younger sister can hold the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant accountable for the proper administration of the estate including the duty to account which is a continuing one. There has yet to be a grant of probate – once issued, this would usher in the duties of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as executor and trustee. There is no need to unwind the steps already taken in these proceedings given the ability of the beneficiaries to monitor and insist that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant remain accountable to them as the person their father trusted to execute his will.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Costs</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 The outcome of this litigation was in the plaintiff’s favour. Essentially the plaintiff had been successful in proving that the last valid will of his father was the one executed in Singapore. The fact that I did not enable him to take over the administration of the estate from his sister does not make him the unsuccessful party. The central issue was determined in his favour and he should be entitled to costs.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 Costs are in the discretion of the court and reference was made to Appendix G of the Supreme Court Practice Directions (2021). I gave parties ample time to agree on costs, but they were unable to do so. The hearing took 6 days. Despite numerous case conferences before the matter was fixed, the defendants chose to indicate that they wished to call an expert handwriting analyst some 10 days before the commencement of the hearing, having already known of the nature of the evidence of the plaintiff’s expert. The matter was not simple and there were many witnesses of fact called by the plaintiff to provide evidence. A cost order reflective of the complexity and effort expended was necessary. The sum of $90 000 (all in) was felt to be a fair amount.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 I ordered that the defendants be jointly and severally responsible for the costs as they participated in material albeit different ways to this litigation, which certainly could have been avoided.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 In this case, family members knew that a will had been left by their father to govern the distribution of his estate on his passing. Any information that is known by one or more persons that there may be yet another later will must be shared regardless of any concern about how it would be received or accepted. Any lack of transparency does not lend trust as to its authenticity. It also fuels frustration, disappointment, anger and unnecessary costs fighting each other in a courtroom. The money that these parties fought over was never money that was theirs in the first place. It was a gift. It was never to have them destroy relationships but to instead come together in their father’s memory with an even stronger tone to their relationships.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 The defendants were not honest and transparent in their dealings with the plaintiff and the larger family and it has occasioned this litigation and caused a great rift between them. Family in probate proceedings should be mindful of the unnecessary burden they place on generations after them from disputes of this nature.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Paragraph 94 of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s affidavit of 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>Paragraph 196 of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s affidavit.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/22704-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGHCF 2</a>.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Affidavit of 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant dated 20 April 2020.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Ibid. at paragraph 18.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>Ibid. at paragraph 39.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Paragraph 28 of the plaintiff’s affidavit of 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Ibid. at paragraph 29.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>Certified Transcripts (Day 3) at pages 227 to 229, 232 to 234 and (Day 4) at pages 204 to 207.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>Paragraph 29 of the sister’s affidavit of 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>Paragraph 20 of the plaintiff’s aunt’s affidavit of 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>Ibid.at paragraph 13.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>For clarity this is not the same driver who acted as a second witness to the Malaysian will.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>Paragraph 23 of affidavit of the Malaysian lawyer dated 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>Paragraph 70 of affidavit of 20 April 2022 and Certified Transcript (Day 3) at pages 260-261.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>Ibid. at paragraph 35.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/19733-SSP.xml')">[2016] SGCA 66</a>.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>Certified Transcript (Day 3) at pages 197, 20-221.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>Paragraph 39 of the affidavit of the plaintiff dated 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>Paragraphs 178-179 of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s affidavit of 20 April 2020.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>Transcript (Day 4) at page 11, lines 8 to 16.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>Paragraphs 26-28 of the affidavit dated 20 April 2022 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> witness to the Malaysian will.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>Certified transcript (Day 2) pages 13 to 14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>Paragraph 94 of 1<sup>st</sup> defendant’s affidavit dated 20 April 2022.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>Ibid.at paragraph 137.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>Paragraph 59 of defendants’ submissions.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>Fancini, Simone Ling, “Expert Handwriting Testimony: Is the Writing Really on the Wall?” 11 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advo. 99 (2006).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>Found in his affidavit of 20 June 2023.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>See paragraph 6.2 and 7 of report.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>See paragraph 5 (1)(a) of report in her affidavit of 15 September 2023.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>Ibid, at paragraph 5.2.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>Ibid.at paragraph 6.2 of the report.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>Ibid.at paragraph 7.6.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_34_1" id="Ftn_34">[note: 34]</a></sup>Affidavit of 20 September 2023.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_35_1" id="Ftn_35">[note: 35]</a></sup>[1979] 1WLR 1380.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_36_1" id="Ftn_36">[note: 36]</a></sup>Paragraph 102 of the defendants’ submissions.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_37_1" id="Ftn_37">[note: 37]</a></sup>Paragraph 24 (d) of the SOC (Amendment No.2).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_38_1" id="Ftn_38">[note: 38]</a></sup>Paragraph 90.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_39_1" id="Ftn_39">[note: 39]</a></sup>Paragraph 24 of the SOC (Amendment No.2).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_40_1" id="Ftn_40">[note: 40]</a></sup><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20280-SSP.xml')">[2017] SGHC 90</a>.</p></div></content></root>	719f20300c71a02939c6d080379b6ef255eb68e3

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11 rows from item_version in fc_judgments_changed