_id,_item_id,title,content,pdf-link,pdf-content,timestamp,url,unique_id,_commit
39,6a8db262533f23464772485715b6e590e9d8e7d4,"In the Matter of Kwa Kim Li (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Kwa Kim Li (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint by Mr Lee Hsien Yang and Dr Lee Wei Ling (the Complainants), both executors of Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s estate, on 9 September 2019. There were initially four heads of complaint, including that the Respondent had:


Failed to follow the instructions of the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew (the Testator) to destroy his superseded wills (the First Complaint); Breached privilege and her duties of confidentiality by sending emails with records of communications with the Testator to Mr Lee Hsien Loong (LHL) who was not an executor of the estate of the Testator (the Estate) (the Second Complaint); Failed to keep proper contemporaneous notes and records of all the advice given to and instructions received from the Testator (the Third Complaint); and Given false and misleading information to the executors in her emails of 4 June 2015 and 22 June 2015 (the Fourth Complaint).

Council determined that there should be a formal investigation by the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) only on the Second Complaint. The Complainants, being dissatisfied with the Council’s determination, applied to the High Court for an order to direct Law Society to appoint a DT for the First and Fourth Complaints as well.

The Chief Justice empaneled a DT presided by Mr Narayanan Sreenivasan, SC and Mr Tan Kheng Ann Alvin as DT member.

Charges

The Respondent plead guilty to a charge prosecuted by the Law Society (the Law Society’s Charge), and contested a charge prosecuted by the Complainants (the Complainants’ Charge):

Law Society’s Charge

You, KWA KIM LI, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are charged that you on or about the 4th day of June 2015 by your letter dated 4th June 2015 sent to Mr Lee Hsien Loong (LHL) are guilty of knowingly disclosing to LHL, without the consent / authority of the two Executors and Trustees named in Will No. 7 namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (LWL) and Mr Lee Hsien Yang (LHY), the following documents and information which was confidential to your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (Mr Lee), and which was acquired by you in the course of your engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor namely; five of the previous Wills of Mr Lee prepared by you upon his instructions and email trails between Mr Lee and you from 11th December 2011 to 2nd November 2012 (Documents Set A) and explanations as to why your client Mr Lee changed his previous Wills which amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).

Complainants’ Charge

You, Mdm Kwa Kim Li, are charged that, by way of your letter 22 June 2015, you misled the Executors of the Estate of your former client Mr Lee Kuan Yew, namely Dr Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee Hsien Yang, by omitting to disclose your communications with Mr Lee Kuan Yew between November 2013 and 13 December 2013 in response to their enquiries and by making the false and misleading representation that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had never instructed you to change his will dated 2 November 2012, such act amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).

Findings and Determination of the DT; Council’s Sanctions

Law Society’s Charge

The DT accepted that the Respondent was replying to queries by Mr Lee Hsien Loong and Ms Lee Wei Ling under the notion that she ought to respond to queries from beneficiaries, who also happened to be her first cousins with whom she grew up. The DT also accepted that the Testator had previously indicated to her that he would inform his children of his intentions and the reasons for his testamentary dispositions. The DT further accepted that the Respondent had a close personal relationship with the Testator.

The DT found that there was no evidence suggesting that the Respondent was acting from any improper motives. However, it would have been clear to the Respondent that she was dealing with sensitive family issues. The Respondent was aware that Ms Lee Wei Ling had previously voiced unhappiness on the change from a position where she has a slightly larger share to equal shares. The DT noted that in such situations, it is imperative that solicitors act strictly within their professional boundaries and exercise care and caution. The Respondent’s misconduct was her failure to scrupulously safeguard the Testator’s confidentiality; and this misconduct was unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

Pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the DT determined that, while there is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83 of the Legal Profession Act (Act), the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty in the sum of $5,000.

The DT opined that it did not think that a low culpability – low harm situation involving misconduct under section 83(2)(h) of the Act was one that should be referred to the Court of Three Judges, particularly in the absence of any dishonesty or deceit, or gross negligence.

Complainants’ Charge

The DT found that the Respondent’s omission to disclose the emails of 30 November 2013 and 12 December 2013 in her email of 22 June 2015 is misleading. The DT further found that the Respondent’s statement in the same email, that she did not receive any instructions from the Testator to change his Will, was false.

However, the DT did not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent knowingly or deliberately misled the Complainants. The DT assessed the harm as low, and found that the culpability was low to medium.

Nevertheless, the DT noted that the Respondent was communicating with the beneficiaries on matters important to them, and since she had chosen to respond to the queries, it was therefore incumbent upon the Respondent to be complete and accurate in her response. The DT found that had the Respondent exercised due care and diligence, she ought to have disclosed the November / December 2013 communications in the 22 June 2015 email, and ought not to have stated that she had received no instructions to change the Testator’s Will.

Pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the DT determined that, while there is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty in the sum of $8,000.

Costs

The DT ordered that the Respondent pay: (a) the Law Society’s costs in the sum of $5,000 and to bear all disbursements that have been reasonably incurred which are to be taxed if parties are not able to agree; and (b) the Complainants’ costs in the sum of $12,000 and disbursements in the sum of $9,182.29.

Council’s Decision

Council adopted the DT’s findings and imposed a global financial penalty of $13,000 (being $5,000 for the Law Society’s Charge and $8,000 for the Complainants’ Charge) on the Respondent.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Feb_24_Full_DT_Report-com.pdf,"DT 19 OF 2022

IN THE MATTER OF KWA KIM LI
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966

REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Disciplinary Tribunal:
Mr N Sreenivasan, S.C. – President
Mr Tan Kheng Ann Alvin – Advocate & Solicitor

Counsel for the Law Society
of Singapore

Counsel for the Complainant

Mr R S Bajwa
Bajwa & Co
with Mr Rezza Gaznavi of
Mahmood Gaznavi
Chambers LLC

Mr Abraham Vergis, SC
with Ms Asiyah Arif and
Mr Kyle Chong
Providence Law Asia LLC

Counsel for the
Respondent

Mr Cavinder Bull, SC
with Ms Gerui Lim and
Ms Elisabeth Liang
Drew & Napier LLC

Dated this 5th day of May 2023

Introduction

1.

These proceedings (“DT 19”) arise from a complaint by Mr Lee Hsien Yang (“LHY”)
and his sister, Dr Lee Wei Ling (“LWL”), made on 9 September 2019 (the
“Complaint”). The Respondent solicitor is Ms Kwa Kim Li. The Respondent is a
partner in the firm of M/s Lee & Lee, and is an advocate and solicitor of more than 40
years’ standing.

2.

The Complaint covered various matters, which came before this Disciplinary Tribunal
through different procedural routes.

Procedural History

3.

In the Complaint by LHY and LWL, there were four heads of complaint. These were:(a) First, that the Respondent had failed to follow the instructions of the late Mr Lee
Kuan Yew (the “Testator”) to destroy his superseded wills (the “First Complaint”);
(b) Second, that the Respondent had breached privilege and her duties of
confidentiality by sending emails with records of communications with the Testator
to Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“LHL”) who was not an executor of the estate of the
Testator (the “Estate”) (the “Second Complaint”);
(c) Third, that the Respondent had failed to keep proper contemporaneous notes and
records of all the advice given to and instructions received from the Testator (the
“Third Complaint”); and
(d) Fourth, that the Respondent had given false and misleading information to the
executors in her emails of 4 June 2015 and 22 June 2015 (the “Fourth
Complaint”).

4.

After consideration of the Complaint by the Review Committee, the Inquiry Committee
and the Council of the Law Society (the “Council”), the Council determined, pursuant
to section 87 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (the “LPA”), that there should be a
formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal of only the Second Complaint. Two
charges were framed in relation to the Second Complaint, both framed with alternative
charges. The Council accordingly applied to the Chief Justice, pursuant to section 89
of the LPA, to appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and investigate the matter. The
Statement of Case prepared by the Law Society of Singapore (the “LSS”), containing
1

the two charges and the alternatives charges, is attached as Annex A. These charges
are referred to as the LSS Charges.

5.

LHY and LWL were dissatisfied with the determination of the Council in relation to
those parts of the Complaint that were not referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal for formal
investigation. They applied to the High Court, pursuant to section 96 of the LPA, for an
order directing the LSS to apply to the Chief Justice to the appointment of a
Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of those matters also. As a result of that application, an
order was made, pursuant to section 96 of the LPA, that the LSS apply to the Chief
Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal in relation to the First and the
Fourth Complaint (in addition to the Second Complaint).

6.

Upon appeal by the LSS from the order made by the High Court, the Court of Appeal
held inter alia that there was no prima facie case in relation to the First Complaint and
held that the First Complaint should not be referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal for formal
investigation.

7.

As provided under section 97(5) of the LPA, LHY and LWL, as the complainants who
had obtained the order in respect of the Fourth Complaint, were to have conduct of the
proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal in relation to the charges brought in
relation to the Fourth Complaint. Subsequently the order was varied such that only
LHY would have such conduct. The Statement of Case prepared by LHY (the
“Complainant”), containing the additional charge, is attached as Annex B. The charge
contained therein is referred to as the Complainant’s Charge.

8.

The LSS retained conduct of the charges brought under the Second Complaint.

9.

Disciplinary Tribunal 19 of 2022 (the “DT” or “DT 19”) was appointed to hear the
matters arising from both the LSS and the Complainant’s Statements of Case
(comprising the Second and Fourth Complaints respectively). Mr R S Bajwa acted for
the LSS and Mr Abraham Vergis SC acted for the Complainant. Mr Cavinder Bull SC
acted for the Respondent in both matters. In this Report, the following terminology will
be used hereafter:
(a)

Statement of Case filed by the LSS (Annex A) - LSS SOC;

(b)

Statement of Case filed by LHY (Annex B) - Complainant’s SOC;

(c)

Defence of the Respondent to Complainant’s SOC (Annex C)- Defence to
Complainant’s SOC.
2

Background to the matters before the DT

10.

LHY and LWL are the two younger children of the Testator and the trustees and
executors of the Estate. The Testator’s eldest child is LHL, the current Prime Minister
of Singapore. The Testator was the first Prime Minister of Singapore and widely
acclaimed and acknowledged as the father of Singapore as a nation. The Respondent
had acted as the Testator’s solicitor over many years. In particular, the Respondent
had acted in relation to the preparation of six wills for the Testator, from 20 August
2011 to 2 November 2012.

11.

On 29 November 2013, the Testator contacted the Respondent regarding certain
testamentary matters. Communications continued by way of emails, and possibly by
way of conversations, up to 13 December 2013. The nature of these communications
and the Respondent’s characterisation of these communications are apposite to the
Complainant’s Charge. Subsequently, a seventh will was executed on 17 December
2013, with the involvement of LHY and his wife, Ms Lee Suet Fern, herself an
experienced solicitor.

12.

The Testator passed away on 23 March 2015. The Testator’s will and testamentary
directions attracted significant public interest, in particular arising from the Testator’s
intentions in relation to the demolition of the Testator’s home at Oxley Road. Of less
public interest, but probably of equal relevance to the present matters was the manner
of apportionment of the Testator’s estate amongst his three children.

13.

The LSS Charges and the Complainant’s Charge arise from two emails that the
Respondent sent, on 4 June 2015 and 22 June 2015, in response to queries from LHL
and LWL. These emails were sent to LHL, LWL and LHY. The LSS Charges relate to a
breach of confidentiality, in that the Respondent is alleged, by way of the two emails,
to have disclosed client confidential information to parties not entitled to receive the
information, namely LHL. The Complainant’s Charge relates to the allegation that the
two emails were misleading responses to the queries, by omitting matters that should
have been included and/or by containing false and misleading representations. We will
examine the ingredients of the charges with greater specificity below.

3

The Proceedings Before the DT

Preliminary Directions

14.

DT 19 was appointed to hear the matters arising from both the LSS SOC and the
Complainant’s SOC. We directed that both cases would be heard together, with
witnesses only giving evidence once, and the evidence, agreed documents and
agreed facts being admitted in relation to both matters. Counsel for the LSS would
lead evidence in relation to the LSS SOC and counsel for the Complainant would lead
evidence in relation to the Complainant’s SOC. It was indicated to us that the LSS and
the Respondent were likely to agree on a statement of facts insofar as the LSS SOC
was concerned. It was also indicated that the Respondent would be making
representations to the LSS in relation to LSS charges.

15.

Insofar as the Complainant’s SOC was concerned, Counsel for the Complainant
indicated that the only witness being called would be LHY. We were told that his
evidence would be formal, and relate to the documents upon which the Complaint was
based. The only witness for the Respondent was to be the Respondent herself.

16.

Given that the matters before DT 19 related to estate matters, the documents to be
tendered in the course of the hearing were likely to contain private matters. Parties
were directed to agree on redactions to be made to documentary exhibits and agreed
documents, where possible. All such redactions were made by agreement and we
were not required to make any determination on redactions.

17.

Directions were given for the filing of the Respondent’s defences, witness statements,
an agreed bundle, opening statements, and agreed statements of facts. These
directions were complied with.

Preliminary Issues

18.

Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the LSS indicated that it had received
representations from the Respondent. The LSS indicated that it would be tendering an
agreed statement of facts in relation to an amended charge. The amended charge was
4

the alternative to the First Charge in the LSS SOC, with further particularization. The
LSS stated that this new charge, the Amended First Alternative Charge, would be
made out on the statement of facts agreed with the Respondent, and that it would not
be calling any evidence. The Respondent confirmed this position and stated that she
accepted that the Amended First Alternative Charge was made out in law and on the
facts. A copy of the Amended First Alternative Charge is at Annex D and a copy of the
Agreed Statement of Facts, agreed between the LSS and the Respondent, is at
Annex E.

19.

There were two preliminary issues raised by the Complainant. The first was an
application for the Complainant to give evidence by video link. The second was
whether we should continue to consider both the original charges and their
alternatives, as set out in the LSS SOC even though the LSS chose to proceed on only
one charge upon a “plea bargain” arising from representations made by the
Respondent to the LSS. Before setting out the specifics of the two issues, and our
considerations and rulings, we touch on the nature of disciplinary tribunal proceedings,
as this informed the approach that we adopted.

20.

In the normal course of events, the Council applies to the Chief Justice for the
appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal under section 89 of the LPA, where the Council
determines under section 87 of the LPA that there should be a formal investigation, or
where the Court makes an order under section 96 of the LPA. Under section 93 of the
LPA, the Disciplinary Tribunal must, after hearing and investigating the matter, record
its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts, make one
of three determinations:
(a)

that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under sections 83
or 83A of the LPA;

(b)

that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under
sections 83 or 83A of the LPA, the practitioner should be ordered to pay a
penalty, be reprimanded, be ordered to comply with one or more remedial
measures, or be subjected to a remedial measure in addition to a penalty or
reprimand; or

(c)

that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under sections 83 or
83A of the LPA.

21.

It is clear from section 93 that the main role of the Disciplinary Tribunal is that of fact
finder. This is consonant with its duty to conduct a formal investigation. Upon its
5

findings of the facts of the case, the Disciplinary Tribunal will form a view on the gravity
of the case, in terms of the need for any further disciplinary action at all, or for the
sanctions of penalty or reprimand to be imposed, or for the more serious consequence
of referring the matter to the Court of Three Judges (“C3J”). The language of the
various sections is not predicated on the Disciplinary Tribunal operating as an
adjudicator in an adversarial hearing.

22.

However, the situation in practice and as contemplated in the Legal Profession
(Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (“DT Rules”) is predicated on an adversarial /
adjudication model. For example, Rule 3(2) / 3(4) and Rule 4(2) / 4(4) of the DT Rules
require the Statement of Case to contain charges. Rule 8 provides for a Defence to be
filed. Rule 10 provides for the manner in which evidence is to be adduced. Rule 23
provides for the Evidence Act to apply, as it applies in civil and criminal proceedings.
Cost orders can be made against the respondent practitioner or a complainant who
makes a frivolous or vexatious complaint. These provisions suggest that the
Disciplinary Tribunal “tries” the respondent practitioner on the charges in the
Statement of Case.

23.

We are of the view that, as the Disciplinary Tribunal is an investigative body, our key
concern should be ascertainment of facts.

24.

However, the the Disciplinary Tribunal is required to adjudicate the charges in the
statement of case, as modified by any decision of the LSS not to proceed on any
particular charge or to proceed on amended charges. The question which arises is
whether we should exercise our powers to investigate all facts or whether we should
be bound by the position taken by the LSS; in short whether the position taken by the
LSS would circumscribe the findings that the Disciplinary Tribunal may make.

25.

The C3J decision in Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2021]
SGHC 27 is directly on point and extremely pertinent to the issues in this case. In that
case, the LSS had amended the charge originally set out in the Statement of Case,
which contained an element of deceit, to a charge where the element of dishonesty
had been removed. Using the parlance of criminal practice, a reduced charge was
preferred. At [31], the C3J considered the fact that the disciplinary proceedings had
been conducted on the basis of the reduced charge and stated very explicitly that “It
cannot be gainsaid that the respondent could only be held to account for the specific
misconduct that she had been charged for. To hold otherwise would be prejudicial to
6

the respondent since it is the charge that informs a lawyer facing disciplinary
proceedings of the case that he or she has to meet and impacts the decision he or she
makes as to how to respond to the disciplinary proceedings.” The C3J went on to find
that the Disciplinary Tribunal in that case had therefore erred in making findings that
the respondent solicitor had acted deceitfully, even if she had indeed done so,
because the amended charge and the agreed statement of facts contained no
allegation of dishonest conduct whatsoever, even though the original charge did. At
[37], the C3J considered the decision in Law Society of Singapore v Yeo Khirn Hai
Alvin [2020] 4 SLR 858, and approved the position that it was only where the “Law
Society has framed a defective charge that fails to reflect the substance of the
complaint, that the DT lacks jurisdiction in hearing and investigating the charge and
making a determination thereon, and the DT’s decision is liable to be set aside.”
(emphasis added). The issue is therefore clearly whether the amended charges
proceeded with still reflect the substance of the complaint. On the facts of Law
Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar, the C3J found that while the
amended charge did not capture the full extent of the respondent’s transgressions, it
was not so defective as to warrant setting aside the DT’s determination for want of
jurisdiction. We are therefore of the view that the question of whether the substance of
the complaint is proceeded with is a fact-sensitive exercise, where the proceeded
charge must be considered against the substance of the complaint.

The First Preliminary Issue

26.

We now deal with the First Preliminary Issue. Shortly before the commencement of the
evidentiary hearing, the Complainant applied for his evidence to be given by video link.
The application was supported by an affidavit. The Respondent objected to the
application. The reason given by the Complainant was that his “passport was currently
being held by immigration authorities in connection with an immigration issue and that
he was unlikely to get it back in time for the Hearing.” A video hearing was held to
determine the application. The Complainant submitted that he was unable to travel due
to matters beyond his control, that there were appropriate administrative arrangements
and technical facilities available for him to give evidence by video link, and that the
Complainant would face unfair prejudice if the application was not granted. Despite
repeated requests by the DT, Counsel for the Complainant declined to state the
purpose for which the passport had been handed over, or even when the Complainant
had handed over the passport. This latter question was critical as it touched the
question of whether the Complainant’s inability to travel was a matter beyond his
7

control or occasioned by his own actions. This argument was made forcefully by the
Respondent’s counsel, who also submitted that the Respondent would be prejudiced
by the inability to cross-examine the Complainant in person. The Complainant’s
response was that the Complainant was a formal witness and that the Complainant’s
case was based on documents.

27.

After careful consideration, we allowed the application for the Complainant to give
evidence by video link even though we were disturbed by the Complainant’s refusal to
give reasons why and the circumstances under which he did not have possession of
his passport. Allowing the Complainant to give evidence by video link would permit us
to carry out our investigative function with the full benefit of all available evidence. We
were of the view that the Respondent would not be prejudiced by having to conduct
the cross-examination by video link. In making our determination, we applied the
standard and the tests set out in the section 281(5B) of the Criminal Procedure Code
2010 and section 62A(2) of the Evidence Act 1893.

The Second Preliminary Issue

28.

As stated above, the LSS and the Respondent had reached an agreement whereby
the LSS would proceed on one amended charge and the Respondent would admit to
an Agreed Statement of Facts. The Respondent also agreed that the facts admitted to
would make out the amended charge. The charge proceeded with was marked as the
Amended First Alternative Charge, attached hereto as Annex D. This was tendered
with an Agreed Statement of Facts, marked as ASOF-LS, and attached as Annex E.
The Amended First Alternative Charge related to the email of 4 June 2015 sent by the
Respondent to LHY, LWL and LHL. The original Second Charge and its alternative
related to the Respondent’s email of 22 June 2015.

29.

The Complainant took the position, communicated to us by letter dated 2 February
2023, that the Complainant was concerned about the LSS’s course of action as it
would result in a situation where we would not be able to investigate the original
Second Charge and its alternative. The Complainant went on to state that he reserved
his right to apply for judicial review. The Complainant did not state his position as to
the proper course of action we should take.

30.

All parties were invited to address the point raised by the Complainant, on the first day
of the hearing, before the evidentiary hearing commenced. The LSS’s position was
8

that it was not offering evidence in relation to the original First Charge and the original
Second Charge and Second Alternative Charge. The LSS went further to state that DT
19 not only should not, but could not, consider the matters set out in the original First
Charge, the original Second Charge and the original Second Alternative Charge. The
Complainant took the position that we could and should consider all the matters in the
LSS SOC, even in relation to charges where the LSS chose not to offer evidence. We
indicated that we were inclined to agree with the position taken by the LSS. However,
the Respondent took the position that we could consider all the matters in the LSS
SOC, and therefore the Respondent should be permitted to file a Supplementary
Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief addressing the matters in the original Second Charge. In
doing so, the counsel for the Respondent adverted to the fact that the Complainant
might take this issue further and that it was in the Respondent’s interest that she
address the facts relating to the LSS’s Second Charge and its alternative and that a
finding on the merits be made thereon.

31.

We gave leave to the Respondent to file the Supplementary Affidavit of Evidence-inChief and indicated that we would consider the correct approach to be taken in relation
to charges where no evidence was offered, in the course of our determination.

32.

Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the LSS has a discretion to
consider representations and to weigh the merits of possible defences and consider
facts raised by a respondent solicitor; and thereafter to determine whether any charges
should be amended and whether no evidence should be offered on any charge. Where
there are multiple charges, we are of the view that the same approach can be taken in
considering whether to offer evidence on any of the charges.

33.

We have considered the strictures of the C3J in Law Society of Singapore v
Constance Margreat Paglar that amendments [or offering of no evidence in respect
of some of the charges] should not result in the gravamen of the complaint being so
diluted or modified as to result in a want of jurisdiction. In this regard, we cite its
statement at [39] where the C3J states, “… save to reiterate that the Law Society’s
duty to investigate complaints referred to it implies a concomitant duty to frame
appropriate charges that adequately reflect the gravamen of the complaint (see Alvin
Yeo at [78]). These are weighty obligations that the Law Society has been entrusted
with, and the principle of self-regulation in disciplinary matters makes it even more
imperative that the Law Society thoroughly discharges these duties. Any failure to fulfil
these responsibilities would only serve to undermine the overriding purpose of legal
9

disciplinary proceedings - to protect the public and uphold public confidence in the
legal profession (see Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068
at [41]). Having said that, the Law Society does of course retain the discretion to
amend charges in appropriate circumstances after it has considered the relevant facts
and the law. A complainant’s view of the gravamen of the complaint may not always be
sustainable.” (emphasis added)

34.

The position taken by the LSS in not offering evidence on the original Second Charge
and its alternative was predicated on its view that the email of 22 June 2015 was not a
breach of confidentiality as the email did not contain confidential information. This was
a view that could be reasonably held on an assessment of the evidence. We are not
privy to the substance of the representations made and form no view on the merits of
the representations. We find that the gravamen of the complaint (i.e., a breach of
confidentiality) was the subject matter of the original First Charge and its alternative,
and was addressed by the Amended First Alternative Charge. Further, in choosing to
proceed with the alternative to the original First Charge rather than the original First
Charge, the Law Society was pitching its case as a breach of section 83(2)(h) of the
LPA, as opposed to a breach of section 83(2)(b). This was a position taken after
consideration of the law, and was a position that could be reasonably held. The
amended charge still addressed the gravamen of the complaint, which was the breach
of confidentiality. There was accordingly no want of jurisdiction. For the reasons set
out in Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar at [31], we are of the
view that it is not open to us to consider the charges which were not proceeded with
and in relation to which evidence was not offered.

35.

We bear in mind the Respondent’s concerns that our view may be wrong, and that the
Complainant may proceed with judicial review on the question of our failure to exercise
jurisdiction on the original First Charge and the original Second Charge and its
alternative. Accordingly, we have proceeded to consider the merits of the charges not
proceeded with, in our discussion of the facts below.

The LSS SOC

32.

The Amended First Alternative Charge (Annex C) is set out below.

You, KWA KIM LI, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore, are charged that you on or about the 4th day of June 2015 by your
10

letter dated 4th June 2015 sent to Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“LHL”) are guilty of
knowingly disclosing to LHL, without the consent / authority of the 2 Executors
and Trustees named in Will No. 7 namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL”) and Mr Lee
Hsien Yang (“LHY”), the following documents and information which was
confidential to your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee”), and which was acquired
by you in the course of your engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor namely; 5 of the
previous Wills of Mr Lee prepared by you upon his instructions and email trails
between Mr Lee and you from 11th December 2011 to 2nd November 2012
(“Documents Set A”) and explanations as to why your client Mr Lee changed his
previous Wills which amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable
profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act
(Cap. 161).

33.

The Amended First Alternative Charge was supported by an Agreed Statement of
Facts (Annex E). Of significance is [9] of the Agreed Statement of Facts, where the
Respondent admits that she did not obtain the consent/authority of the 2 Executors
and Trustees named in the Testator’s Will dated 17 December 2013 (“Will No. 7”),
namely LHY and LWL, prior to sending [by e-mail] the letter dated 4 June 2015 to LHL,
LWL and LHY. We sought confirmation from the Respondent’s Counsel that the
Respondent admitted to and accepted the facts set out in the Amended First
Alternative Charge and Agreed Statement of Facts, and admitted that these facts
amounted to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the
Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession, within the meaning of
section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

34.

The Respondent so confirmed and submitted that the circumstances of this case did
not require referral to the C3J, and that we should issue a reprimand or impose a
modest penalty. The Law Society took the position that a reprimand was not sufficient
and that a penalty of $3,000 to $5,000 should be imposed.

35.

Before we deal with the substance of the Amended First Alternative Charge, we
address a point of difference between the LSS and the Respondent. Both parties took
the common position that the information and documents set out in the charge were
confidential to the Testator, and upon his death, to his Estate. The LSS took the
position that the confidentiality could not be breached unless LHY and LWL, as
Executors, gave permission. The Respondent took the position that they could not give
11

permission until Probate was granted. Nothing turned on this as the Respondent did
not seek the permission of LHY and LWL in communicating to LHL.

36.

The Respondent pitched her breach of confidentiality as a breach of the lowest level,
submitting that that the Testator would have wanted her to share the information with
LHL, LWL and LHY. Her position was that she released the information out of a deep
sense of loyalty to the Testator, although she accepts that she did not have specific
instructions from the Testator, prior to his death, to release such information. The LSS
did not take a position on whether the Testator would have wanted the Respondent to
release the information to LHL, but agreed that the Respondent’s culpability and the
harm caused by the breach was not substantial. On consideration of all the facts, we
accept this submission.

37.

We accept that the Respondent was replying to queries by LHL and LWL under the
notion that she ought to respond to queries from beneficiaries, who also happened to
be her first cousins, with whom she grew up. We accept that the Testator had
previously indicated to her that he would inform his children of his intentions and the
reasons for his testamentary dispositions. We also accept that the Respondent had a
close personal relationship with the Testator. We note that there is no evidence before
us suggesting that the Respondent was acting from any improper motives.

38.

However, it would have been clear to the Respondent that she was dealing with
sensitive family issues. The Respondent was aware that LWL had previously voiced
unhappiness on the change from a position where she has a slightly larger share to
equal shares. In a situation such as the present case, it is imperative that solicitors act
strictly within their professional boundaries and exercise care and caution. The
Respondent’s misconduct was her failure to scrupulously safeguard the Testator’s
confidentiality; and this misconduct was unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

39.

In the premises, we determine pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, that while no
cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83, the
Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the
misconduct committed. Further, we are of the view that a penalty that is sufficient and
appropriate to the misconduct committed is a penalty of $5,000. Given the DT’s role as
a filter of case, we do not think that a low culpability-low harm situation, involving
misconduct under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA is one that should be referred to the C3J,
particular in the absence of any dishonesty or deceit, or gross negligence.
12

40.

On the question of costs, the LSS asked for a very modest $5,000. Pursuant to section
93(2) read with section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, we order the Respondent to pay the
LSS’s costs in the sum of $5,000 and to bear all disbursements that have been
reasonably incurred which are to be taxed if parties are not able to agree.

41.

We now deal with the original First Charge, the original Second Charge and the
alternative to the original Second Charge. As stated earlier, we are of the view that
these are not matters for our consideration. If we are wrong and should have
considered these matters, there would have made no difference to our earlier
determination – that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists
under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of
$5,000 being a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed.
As the party framing the Statement of Case, the LSS is entitled to frame alternative
charges, to choose which alternative to proceed upon, and to amend the charges.

42.

In any event, we are the view that the misconduct in the present case does not fall
within the ambit of grossly improper conduct within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of
the LPA and the original First Charge would not have been made out.

43.

In relation to the original Second Charge, we accept the Respondent’s submissions
that the contents of the 22 June 2015 letter were different in nature from that of the 4
June 2015 letter. The thrust of the letter was to distance the Respondent from any
involvement in the preparation of Will No. 7, not to give information about that will and
its execution. We also accept the Respondent’s submissions that the information
contained in the 22 June 2015 letter was already known to the parties. Specifically, the
contents of the 1st Will (the will of 20 August 2011, which has been referred to in other
proceedings as the 2nd Will), which was mirrored in Will No. 7, had been discussed
with LHL, LWL and LHY at the time the 1st Will was executed. It was also clear that
LHL, LWL and LHY had entered into a deed of Family Arrangement immediately after
and predicated upon the contents of the 1st Will. In any event, even if the information
disclosed in the 22 June 2015 was information confidential to the Testator and his
Estate, we do not find that the disclosure amounted to misconduct under section 83(2)
of the LPA.

44.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s position on the original Second
Charge and its alternative was frivolous and vexatious. We do not agree. There is a
13

significant zone between a frivolous and vexatious complaint that ought not to have
been made at all and a finding that misconduct has not been made out beyond
reasonable doubt. We recognize that the Complainant had viewed the two letters as
part of a continuum, while the LSS had analysed the two letters as two discrete acts.
While we accept that the LSS’s approach is the correct one, we will not go so far as to
state that the Complainant’s approach was frivolous and vexatious.
The Complainant’s SOC

45.

The Complainant’s SOC contained a single charge, as follows:

You, Mdm Kwa Kim Li, are charged that, by way of your letters dated 4 June and
22 June 2015, you misled the Executors of the Estate of your former client Mr
Lee Kuan Yew, namely Dr Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee Hsien Yang, by omitting
and/or otherwise failing to disclose your communications with Mr Lee Kuan Yew
between November 2013 and 13 December 2013 in response to their enquiries
and/or by making the false and misleading representation that Mr Lee Kuan Yew
had never instructed you to change his will dated 2 November 2012, such act
amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of
the Supreme Court within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act
(Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).

46.

The Complainant and the Respondent tendered an Agreed Statement of Facts as well,
which is at Annex F, together with an Agreed Bundle of Documents. The Complainant
and the Respondent also filed affidavits of evidence-in-chief, upon which they were
cross-examined. We observe the following:
(a)

The letters of 4 June 2015 and 22 June 2015 are dealt with together in a single
charge, without making any distinction between the different contents of the two
letters and the different queries that were being addressed by the Respondent.

(b)

In terms of the Respondent misleading LWL and LHY as executors, there are
two separate averments, namely that the Respondent misled LWL and LHY by
omitting to disclose and/or otherwise failing to disclose her communications with
the Testator which had taken place between November 2013 and 13 December
2013 and/or making the false and misleading representation that the Testator
had never instructed her to change his will.

14

47.

The Respondent did not raise any objections as to duplicity in the charges. We are
mindful that it is our function to formally investigate the matter and make a
determination upon the facts, and the purpose of the charge is to give the Respondent
notice of the case to meet. Nonetheless, we are obliged to identify the specific
ingredients made out, and to make our determination only upon the facts that we have
found to be made out beyond reasonable doubt.

48.

We identified to the Complainant and Respondent the steps that we were of the view
would be involved in making our determination on the Complainant’s Charge. These
were:
(a)

To identify the queries that the Respondent was addressing in each of the two
letters. The queries could be identified by evidence of what LHL and LWL asked
the Respondent, what the Respondent and those receiving the letters would
have understood the response as relating to, and what the two letters
themselves had set out as the queries being responded to.

(b)

Following from the findings on point (a) above, whether the responses in each of
the two letters were misleading, either by omission or expressly so.

(c)

Following from the findings on point (b) above, whether the responses were
knowingly or deliberately misleading or misleading as a result of a lack of due
care and diligence.

(d)

Following from the findings in point (c) above, whether the Respondent’s conduct
was unbefitting that of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme
Court, and if so whether a reprimand or penalty should be imposed or whether
the matter should be referred to the C3J.

49.

The key documents in relation to this charge are:
(a)

The email exchanges between the Respondent and the Testator dated 30
November 2013, 12 December 2013 and 13 December 2013.

(b)

The Respondent’s exchange of emails with LWL on 3 June 2013.

(c)

The Respondent’s email to LHL, LWL and LHY on 4 June 2015, which has also
been referred to as the 4 June 2015 letter.

(d)

The Respondent’s email to LHL, LWL and LHY on 22 June 2015, which has also
been referred to as the 22 June 2015 letter.

50.

The Complainant and the Respondent have characterized the background to and the
contents of these documents quite differently. In approaching these differences, we
have given weight to the plain and simple meaning of the language used in the
15

documents. In considering what the emails addressed and were intended to address,
we construed the actual language used. To the extent that we considered evidence of
witnesses, we were mindful that the two parties who raised queries, LHL and LWL, did
not give evidence. The party who did give evidence was the Respondent who was the
party to whom the queries were addressed. In the final analysis, we had to consider
the plain meaning of the documents, with the background as context, and consider the
Respondent’s explanation. In doing this, we were mindful that the burden of proof on
the Complainant was proof beyond reasonable doubt.

51.

The communications between the Respondent and the Testator in November /
December 2013 clearly show the following:
(a)

The Testator contacted the Respondent on 29 November 2013 and discussed
his concerns that the Oxley Road property would be “de-gazetted” and wished to
make arrangements such that any increase in value upon such “de-gazetting”
would be shared by LHL with LWL and LHY, and not be retained by just LHL,
who was to be bequeathed the Oxley property.

(c)

In the week before 12 December 2013, the Respondent and the Testator had a
further discussion and discussed the shares that LHL, LWL and LHY would each
get. In doing so, the Testator indicated his wish to give all three children equal
shares, as opposed to his existing will where LWL received an extra share.

(d)

In her email of 12 December 2013, the Respondent stated that she would
prepare a codicil to effect the Testator’s wish, for the Testator’s signature that
week or when he was ready. The Respondent also stated that she had “some
thoughts” on the Oxley Road property and would call the Testator later that day.

(e)

On 13 December 2013, the Testator sent an email to the Respondent asking for
a further amendment to his will, regarding the bequest of two carpets to LHY.

52.

The Testator passed away on 23 March 2015. The two emails that are the subject
matter of the Complainant’s Charge were sent by the Respondent on 4 June 2015 and
22 June 2015.

The 4 June 2015 Email

53.

There is no evidence from LHL or LWL as to what queries were being addressed in the
4 June 2015 email. LWL’s email of 3 June 2015 gives some indication as she stated “It
would be useful to have emails, and not just a summary of evolution of the Oxley
clause”. No reference at all is made to Will No. 7, executed on 17 December 2013. The
16

heading was “Papa’s Wills”. The Respondent’s email of 4 June 2015 is headed
“Chronology of 6 Wills - my file records will focus on Oxley”. This does seem to be a
follow up on LWL’s 3 June 2015 email. It is noteworthy that no mention is made of any
issue in relation to any change that equalizes the shares amongst the three children.

54.

The Respondent’s 4 June 2015 email focused entirely on the evolution of the
distribution amongst the children and matters relating to the Oxley Road property in the
1st to 6th Wills, which had been prepared by the Respondent. No mention at all is
made of the exchange of emails and the communications between the Respondent
and the Testator in November / December 2013.

55.

We first observe that there is no extraneous evidence as to the query made by LHL or
LWL, except for the 3 June 2015 email. We find that there is nothing in the direct
extraneous evidence that shows that there was any query that required reference to
the November / December 2013 communications between the Testator and the
Respondent as part of the answer.

56.

We now consider the Complainant’s second argument; which is that the Respondent
and the recipients knew that the context of the queries related to the execution of Will
No. 7 and therefore the Respondent should have included reference to the November /
December 2013 communications between the Testator and the Respondent as part of
the answer. We note that the Respondent had started her email with the words “[LHL]
and [LWL] have requested me for file records of your father’s previous Wills, for
notes/emails/information on his instructions regarding Oxley.” The Complainant reads
this line with emphasis on the second part, that is, the Respondent should have given
information relating to the Testator’s instructions regarding the Oxley Road property.
The Respondent urges us to construe the query with emphasis on the first part, and to
read the query as being limited to the 1st to 6th Wills. The Respondent also urges us to
read the word “instructions” as being limited to a direction by a client to carry out a
particular task.

57.

In the absence of evidence from LHL and LWL as to what their queries were, we are
constrained to consider the Respondent’s evidence only, and weigh it against the
background evidence and the actual words in the 4 June 2015 email. As candidly
admitted by Counsel for the Complainant, LHY did not have any personal knowledge in
this regard.

17

58.

An omission, whether wilful or negligent, that amounts to professional misconduct can
only arise if there is a clear breach of duty to furnish that information. In the present
case, we are unable to find any evidentiary basis for a query that would clearly have
required a response containing reference to the November / December 2013
communications. We agree with the Respondent that the reference to instructions
relation to the Oxley Road property are circumscribed by the earlier reference to the 1 st
to 6th Wills. This is made clear by the fact that the earlier 6 wills are identified and
copies were given.

59.

We wish to point out that the question before us is not whether the Respondent should
have given details of the November / December 2013 communications in the 4 June
2015 letter, but whether there was any query that made her failure to do so misleading.
We do not find sufficient evidence, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was
any query that required a reference to the November / December 2013
communications.

60.

The Complainant’s alternative argument was that the great degree of detail given by
the Respondent would have led the recipients to conclude that all information was
given. Quite apart from the absence of evidence in this regard, we are obliged to
consider the issue objectively and not what the recipients subjectively hoped or
expected to be informed about.

61.

Since there is no clear query established, we find that the issues relating to whether
the answer was misleading, and the subsequent considerations, do not arise in relation
to the 4 June 2015 email. For completeness, we do not find that the Complainant’s
Charge in relation to the Respondent’s 4 June 2015 email is made out on the facts.

The 22 June 2015 Email

62.

We now consider the 22 June 2015 email. Again, there is a no evidence from LHL and
LWL on the queries that they raised. However, unlike the 4 June 2015 email, the 22
June 2015 email itself contained clear statements as to what queries were being
raised. The queries being addressed were:
(a)

A request for the draft will of 19 August 2011; and

(b)

The background which led to the signing of Will No. 7.

18

63.

Given that Will No. 7 was a return to the will of 20 August 2011 (i.e., the 1st Will) and
that both the 1st Will and Will No. 7 were based on the 19 August 2011 draft, it was
clear that the subject matter being addressed was Will No. 7. This is reinforced by the
second query, requesting the background which led to the signing of Will No. 7.

64.

The Complainant submitted that this was clearly a request for information relating to
the circumstances leading up to the execution of Will No. 7. We agree. Indeed, as the
queries were quite obviously a follow-up to the answers received on 4 June 2015, the
logical inference was that LHL and LWL were seeking information specifically in
relation to Will No. 7, in relation to which the Respondent had given no information in
her earlier 4 June 2015 email. The query therefore concerns the circumstances leading
up to the execution of Will No. 7.

65.

We move on to consider the second issue, which is whether the Respondent’s
answers were misleading. We note that there was no reference at all to the November
/ December 2013 communications with the Testator. In this regard, we note that that
the distribution of shares and issues relating to the Oxley Road property were changes
that were discussed in the November / December 2013 communications and were
matters that were addressed and changed in Will No. 7. We also note that although
these matters were discussed between the Respondent and the Testator, the
Respondent stated in the email that “After your father signed Will no. 6 dated 2nd
November 2012, he did not instruct me to change his Will. I first learnt about Will no. 7
via email from Fern and Lin Hoe.”

66.

The Respondent’s explanation was that her statement was true and complete as she
was not involved at all in the preparation or execution of Will No. 7, and that it would be
inappropriate and irresponsible for her to guess or speculate as to the Testator’s
reasons for the treatment of the Oxley Road property in Will No. 7. The Respondent
submits that she had made it clear that she was not involved in Will No. 7. The
Respondent submits further that the November / December 2013 communications
were not material to the background to the signing of Will No. 7 and did not contain any
instructions from the Testator about Will No. 7. The Respondent characterizes the
November / December 2013 communications as relating to the possibility of preparing
a codicil to the 6th Will, but her understanding was that the Testator was still in the

19

midst of considering or compiling possible amendments to include or provide for in the
proposed codicil.

67.

We do not agree with the Respondent’s submissions. The issues are quite simple. The
first question is whether the November / December 2013 communications should have
been disclosed in response to a query on the background to the signing of Will No. 7.
The second question is whether the omission to disclose made the response
misleading. The third question is whether it was true that the Respondent did not
receive any instructions to change the Testator’s Will.

68.

It was clear that the live issue to LHL and LWL was the Testator’s mindset in terms of
his wishes in relation to the distribution of the Oxley Road property. The failure to
disclose the November / December 2013 communications, coupled with the statement
that the Testator did not instruct the Respondent to change his Will gave the clear and
unequivocal impression that the Respondent had no knowledge as to how Will No. 7
came about. On the face of the 30 November 2013 and 12 December 2013 emails, it
was clear that the Respondent knew that the Testator wished to equalize the shares of
his childrenn and to address matters relating to the Oxley Road property. Unlike the 4
June 2015 email, the Respondent did not circumscribe her answers to any particular
series of wills or time periods. We find that the nub of the queries by LHL and LWL was
to find out how Will No. 7 came about, and not the formalities of its execution. It is clear
that the Respondent knew that the Testator wanted to change the 6th Will and that the
changes related to the shares amongst the children in the Oxley Road property.

69.

We observe that the query was for the background which led to the signing of Will No.
7. These words clearly suggest that the answer given would be expansive and address
the issues in the mind of the querists.

70.

The Respondent argues that her use of the word “instruct”, in stating that the Testator
did not instruct her to change the Will, was not false. The basis for this argument was
that there were no instructions, but only discussions, as the Respondent was not
expressly told to make any changes. The Complainant argues that the word “instruct”
should be given its dictionary meaning i.e. “To convey information as a client to an
attorney” and “the facts and details relating to a case given by a client to his or her
20

solicitor”. We are of the view that the word “instruct” should be given a meaning that
the parties reading the 22 June 2015 email would have understood it to mean. We
accept the submission made by the Complainant. On that basis we find the statement
that the Testator did not instruct the Respondent to change his Will to be untrue. The
instructions may not have been finalized, but it is clear that the Respondent received
instructions relating to the changes that were shortly made.

71.

The Complainant had further argued that instructions were in fact actually finalized for
the Respondent to change the 6th Will. This is based on the wording of the
Respondent’s email of 12 December 2013 to the Testator which states “We discussed
last week that you would now like to sign a Codicil to change this, and to give Ling
equal shares with Loong and Yang out of the total estate. I will prepare the codicil for
you to sign this week, or when you are ready.”

72.

The Complainant also points to the change in caption of the emails from “your question
on the properties in your name” in the email of 30 November 2013 to “Codicil to
equalize Ling”

in the Respondent’s email of

12 December

2013 as an

acknowledgement by the Respondent that she had received instructions to change the
6th Will.

73.

The Respondent disagreed with the suggestion that there were final instructions from
the Testator in this regard. Her explanation was that she had actually sent the email of
12 December 2013 to the Testator to ask whether that was what he really wanted.

74.

Her evidence was that it was normal for her to have many discussions with the
Testator over an issue with him changing his mind several times before coming to a
conclusion, hence she assumed this to be part of that process when asked to recall the
circumstances surrounding what led her to send the Testator the email of 12
December 2013.

75.

Given her view that the emails (from 30 November 2013 to 13 December 2013) did not
contain any final instructions, her position was therefore that the statement in her 22

21

June 2015 email that she did not receive any instructions to change the 6th Will was not
false or misleading.

76. We find that the Respondent’s omission to disclose the emails of 30 November 2013
and 12 December 2013 in her email of 22 June 2015 is misleading. We further find that
her statement in that same email that she did not receive any instructions from the
Testator to change his Will is false. We now move on to the next stage of the inquiry,
whether the responses were knowingly or deliberately misleading or misleading as a
result of a lack of due care and diligence.

77.

The Respondent’s subjective view that the omission of the November / December
2013 communications from her 22 June 2015 email did not render it misleading does
not accord with the objective analysis of what the November / December 2013
communications amounted to.

78.

There was no direct evidence that the Respondent knowingly or deliberately misled the
recipients of the 22 June 2015 email. There was no evidence or even suggestion that
she chose to avoid disclosure for personal or any partisan purposes. The Complainant
suggested that the Respondent did not disclose her November / December 2013
communications with the Testator out of embarrassment that she had been tardy in
carrying out his instructions. There was no evidence to support this suggestion. We
briefly considered the possibility that the Respondent was deliberately choosing to
distance herself from Will No. 7, and the issues amongst the Testator’s children in
relation to it. There is some evidence that LWL had reached out to the Respondent in
relation to her unhappiness in having her share reduced. However, this was not put to
the Respondent. Therefore, on the evidence before us, we do not find proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Respondent knowingly or deliberately misled LHY and LWL
or that she intentionally made a false statement.

79.

Nevertheless, the Respondent was communicating with the Testator’s beneficiaries on
matters that were obviously important to them. The Respondent was aware that LWL
had expressed some unhappiness in relation to Will No. 7 in terms of the change to her
share. Having chosen to respond to the queries, it was incumbent upon the
Respondent to be complete and accurate in her response. We find that had the
22

Respondent exercised due care and diligence, she ought to have disclosed the
November / December 2013 communications in the 22 June 2015 email and ought not
have stated that she had received no instructions to change the Testator’s Will.

80.

We now consider the appropriate determination. We expressly asked Counsel for the
Complainant to address us on the issue of harm caused by the Respondent’s breach
of duty. We were referred to paragraph 30 of the LHY’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief,
wherein he stated that the Respondent’s failure to disclose the fact that the Testator
had communicated his wishes to give his children equal shares and her failure to
disclose the context in which the Testator decided to include the demolition clause in
Will No. 7 “caused unnecessary doubt and confusion about what prompted the
[Testator] to change his 2 November 2012 Will”. Counsel for the Complainant
confirmed that this was the only harm alleged.

81.

Given the absence of any further background or information, we assessed the harm as
low. We were mindful that the 22 June 2015 email was in response to a second query
for information and was quite specific. Accordingly, we find that the culpability was low
to medium.

82.

In the premises, we determine pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, that while no
cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83, the
Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the
misconduct committed in relation to the Respondent’s 22 June 2015 email. Further, we
are of the view that a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct
committed is a penalty of $8,000. For completeness, we set out an amended charge,
that encapsulates our findings, which is as follows:
You, Mdm Kwa Kim Li, are charged that, by way of your letter 22 June 2015, you
misled the Executors of the Estate of your former client Mr Lee Kuan Yew,
namely Dr Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee Hsien Yang, by omitting to disclose your
communications with Mr Lee Kuan Yew between November 2013 and 13
December 2013 in response to their enquiries and by making the false and
misleading representation that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had never instructed you to
change his will dated 2 November 2012, such act amounting to misconduct

23

unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court within
the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).

83.

We now address the question of costs. Parties made written submissions on costs on
3 March 2023. The Complainant’s submissions sought $60,000 in costs at [1] of his
cost submissions but sought a different figure of $15,000 in [5] of his costs
submissions. Disbursements were sought in the sum of $9.182.29. Pursuant to section
93(2) read with section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, we order that the Respondent should
pay the Complainant’s costs in the sum of $12,000 and disbursements in the sum of
$9,182.29.

84.

We would like to thank Counsel for their assistance in addressing our questions and
concerns, in the course of submissions.
Dated this 5th day of May 2023

___________________________

__________________________

Narayanan Sreenivasan SC

Tan Kheng Ann Alvin

President

Member

24

Ce
IN THE MATTER OF KWA KIM LI
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CHAPTER 161)

STATEMENT OF CASE
. Kwa Kim Li (the ""Respondent""), an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore of 35 years' standing, was admitted to
the Roll of Advocates & Solicitors on 16"" January 1980, and was at
all material times, practising as an advocate and solicitor at the law
firm of Lee & Lee.

. The Complainants are Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL.”) and Mr Lee Hsien
Yang (""LHY’), and the complaint was made by a letter dated 5!
September

2019

Society""),

supported by a Statutory Dectaration declared on the

same day.

to

the

Law

Society

of Singapore

(""the

Law

. LWL and LHY were the Executors and Trustees named in the Last
Will and Testament of Mr Lee Kuan Yew (‘Mr Lee”) dated 17
December 2013 (Will no.7) . Probate of Will no. 7 was obtained by

the Executors and Trustees sometime in October 2015.

. Rule 24 of the Legal Profession (Professional
(Revised Edition 2010) (""PCR 2010"") states:

Conduct}

Rules

(1) An advocate and solicitor shall not in any way, directly or
indirectlyi. disclose any confidential information which the
advocate and solicitor receives as a result of the
retainer; or

ii.

disclose

the contents

instructions

of the papers recording such

unless with the consent of the client or is required by law or order

of court.

8.

On 4 June 2015, the Respondent responded to the requests from
LHL, by way of a letter/email addressed to LHL, LHY and LWL and

provided copies of the following documents to LHL,LHY and LWL;

a) The previous 6 Wills;
b) Email trail between Mr Lee and the Respondent from 17"" August
2011 to 2°¢ November 2012 (“Documents set A”)
9.

By the text of the 4° June 2015 letter addressed to LHL,LHY

and

during the 15-month period and the duration during which
prepared the 6 previous Wills on his instructions

she

LWL the Respondent also expiained the background as to why Mr
Lee signed 6 Wills over 15 months and in doing so disclosed
confidentiat information that she was privy to as Mr Lee's solicitor

10. Further to her letter dated 4"" June 2015 and upon the request of
LHL for a copy of draft will dated 19"" August 2011 and about the
background which led to the signing of Will no. 7, the Respondent
on 22°° June 2015, under her covering email/etter of the same
date, forwarded to LHL,LHY and LWL, the following documents:

a) The draft Will of Mr Lee dated
b)
c)

19 August 2011

with covering

email;
Email trails of 16 December 2013 from Lee Suet Fern;
Email trails of 3° January 2014 from Lin Hoe;

(collectively referred to as “Documents set B”)
14.1n addition to Documents Set B, the Respondent by the text of her
letter dated 22""4 June 2015 also provided information to LHL, LHY

and LWL that she did not receive any instructions from Mr Lee to
change his will after he had signed Will no.6 dated 2°4 November
2012 and that she first learnt about Will No.7 via email from Lee
Suet Fern and Lin Hoe

12.Whilst, LHY and LWL were the 2 Executors and Trustees named in
Will no. 7 and were thereby authorised to receive the information

contained in the Respondent's letter dated 4"" June 2015 and 22""4
June 2015 as well as the Documents set A and Documents set B.
LHL was not authorised to receive the same from the Respondent
without the consent/authority of the 2 Executors and Trustees

named in Will no. 7, namely, LHY and LWL.

13.The Respondent did not seek nor obtain the consent/authority of

the 2 Executors and Trustees named in Will no.7, namely, LHY and

LWAL prior to sending the letter dated 4'* June 2015 and the letter

dated 22™4 June 2015 to LHL

14.In providing the previous 6 Wills, the documents set A and the
documents set B and the background explanation to LHL without
the consent /authority of the 2 Executors and Trustees named in
Will no.7, namely LWL and LHY, the Respondent had breached the
confidentiality principle set out in Rule 24 of the PCR 2010.
15. The Respondent's disclosure of confidential information amounted
to a breach of the confidentiality principle set out in Rule 24(1) of
the PCR 2010. The breach of Rule 24(1) of the PCR 2010 amounts
to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional
duty within the meaning of Section 83{2)(b) of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap. 161)(""LPA""}
16.Further

and/or

in the

alternative,

the disclosure

of confidential

information by the Respondent amounts to misconduct unbefitting

of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or
as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of
Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA
17. Accordingly, the Law Society
against the Respondent:

formulates

the following

charges

48TCHARGE
You, KWA KIM LI an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are charged that you are guilty of a breach of Rule
24(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(Revised Edition 2010) (""PCR 2010"") in that you on or about the 4!""
of June 2015 had knowingly disclosed to Mr Lee Hsien Loong
(‘LHL”)

without

the consent

/ authority

of the 2 Executors

and

Trustees named in, Will no.7 namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL"") and
Mr Lee Hsien Yang (‘LHY’), fhe following documents and
information which was confidential to your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew

(""Mr Lee""), and which was acquired by you in the course of your
engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor namely; The previous 6 Wills of
Mr Lee prepared by you upon his instructions and email trails
between Mr Lee and you from 17 August 2011 to 2"" November
2012 (“Documents set A”) and explanations as to why your client
Mr Lee changed his previous 6 Wills and by such breach of Rule

24(1) of the PCR 2010 you are guilty of

grossly improper conduct

in the discharge of your professional! duties within the meaning of
$83(2)(b) of the Legal Professional Act (Cap. 161).

ALTERNATIVE 48T CHARGE
You, KWA

KIM LI an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court

of Singapore are charged that you are guilty of knowingly disclosing
to

Mr Lee Hsien Loong

(“I-HL”) without the consent / authority of

the 2 Executors and Trustees named in Will.no 7 namely Ms Lee
Wei Ling (“LWL”) and Mr Lee

Hsien Yang

(“LHY’), the following

documents and information which was confidential to your client,
Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee’), and which was acquired

by you in

the course of your engagement as Mr Lee's solicitor namely; The

previous 6 Wills of Mr Lee prepared by you upon his instructions

and email trails between Mr Lee and you from 17 August 2011 to
2"" November 2012 (“Decuments

Set A”) and explanations as to

why your client Mr Lee changed his previous 6 Wills which amounts

to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer
of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession

within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act

(Cap. 161)

2"") CHARGE
You, KWA KIM Lt an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are charged that you are guilty of a breach of Rule
24(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(Revised Edition 2010) (""PCR 2010"") in that you on or about the

224 of June 2015 had knowingly disclosed to Mr Lee Hsien Loong
(""LHL"") without the consent / authority of the 2 Executors and
Trustees named in Will no. 7, namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL"")

and Mr Lee Hsien Yang (""LHY""), the following documents and
information which was confidential to your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew

(""Mr Lee”), and which was acquired by you in the course of your
engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor namely; the draft Will of Mr Lee

dated

19

August

2011

with

covering

email,

email

trails of 16

December 2013 from Lee Suet Fern and email trails of 3% January
2014 from Lin Hoe (“Documents Set B”) and information that you
did not receive any instructions from Mr Lee to change his will after
he had signed will no.6 dated 2 November 2012 and that you first
learnt about will No.7 via email from Lee Suet Fern and Lin Hoe

and by such breach of Rule 24(1) of the PCR 2010 you are guilty of

grossly

improper conduct

in the discharge of your professional

duties within the meaning of s83(2)}(b) of the Legal Professional Act
(Cap. 161).

ALTERNATIVE 2°? CHARGE
You, KWA KIM LI an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore are charged that on or about the 22"" of June 2015, you
had knowingly disclosed to Mr Lee Hsien Loong (LHL) without the
consent / authority of the 2 Executors and Trustees of Will no. 7

namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL"") and Mr Lee Hsien Yang (""LHY”),
the following documents and information which was confidential to
your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee”), and which was acquired by
you in the course of your engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor namely;

the draft Will of Mr Lee dated 19"" August 2011 with covering email,
email trails of 16 December 2013 from Lee Suet Fern and email trails
of 3% January 2014 from Lin Hoe (""Documents Set B”)
and
information that you did not receive any instructions from Mr Lee to

change his will after he had signed will no.6 dated 2""? November 2012
and that you first learnt about Will No.7 via email from Lee Suet Fern
and Lin Hoe and such breach of confidentiality amounts to misconduct
unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme

Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning
of Section 83({2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)

Dated this 16th day of Sep 2022

R.S. Bajwa

BAJWA & CO.
SOLCITORS

FOR THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE

IN THE MATTER OF KWA KIM LI,
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CAP 161, 2009 REV. ED.}

STATEMENT OF CASE

Counsel for the Complainant
Mr Abraham Vergis, S.C.
Ms Asiyah Arif
Providence Law Asia LLC
1 Raffles Place
One Raffles Place Tower 2
#29-62

Singapore 048616
Tel: 64381969

Dated this 25"" day of July 2022

Complaint in his sole name.

LHY will therefore be referred to in these

proceedings as the “Complainant”.

i.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

§.

At the material

times in or around

June

2015,

the relevant statutory

provisions in force were the Legal Profession Act (2008 Rev Ed) (""LPA"")
and the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (2010 Rev Ed)
PCR’).

6.

Section 83(1) of the LPA provides that “aif advocates and solicitors shail be
subject to the control of the Supreme Court and shall be liable on due cause
shown” to be struck off the roll, suspended from practice, pay a penalty
and/or to be censured.

7.

Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA provides that:
Such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and
solicitor—

(h) has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession;

8.

Rule 2(2) of the PCR provides that:
“In the interpretation of these rules, regard shall be had to the
principle that an advocate and solicitor shall not in the conduct of

his practice do any act which would compromise
following obligations:

or hinder the

(a) fo maintain the rule of law and assist in the administration of

justice.
(b) to maintain the independence and integrity of the profession.”
A solicitor has a duty and an obligation under the PCR not to do anything
which

would

compromise

or

hinder

their

obligations

to assist

in the

administration of justice and to maintain the independence and the integrity
of the honorable profession. This includes the general duty to act honestly,
competently

and

with due

care

and

diligence

in the conduct of her

professional duties.

10.

As detailed below, the Respondent has on this failed to act honestly and/or
discharge her professional obligations with due care and diligence, which
amounts to conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor under 83(2)(h) of

the LPA.
CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE COMPLAINT

14

The original Complainants,

LWL and

LHY, together with Mr Lee Hsien

Loong (“LHL”), are siblings and the children of Mr Lee.

12.

Prior to his death, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee”) executed a total of eight
wills. Mr Lee’s initial will was prepared

by his wife, Ms Kwa Geok Choo,

and was signed by Mr Lee and dated 7 December 1995.
Lee

instructed the Respondent

to draft and

engross

Thereafter, Mr

his next six wills

between August 2011 and November 2012, each of which was signed by

Mr Lee and dated as follows:
a.

20 August 2011 (""First Will’),

b.

21 December 2011 (‘Second Will’);

c

6 September 2012 (""Third Will’),

d

20 September 2012 (“Fourth Will’);

e.

4 October 2012 (“Fifth Will’); and

f.

2 November 2012 (""Sixth Will’).

(collectively referred to as Mr Lee's “six wills”)

In or around end-November 2013, Mr Lee asked the Respondent to draft
another will to effect further amendments to his Sixth Will.

14.

On 30 November 2013, the Respondent sent Mr Lee an email to record the
contents of her discussion with Mr Lee the previous evening, and to advise

Mr Lee on the amendments that Mr Lee was intending to make to his last
will (‘30 Nov

Email”). Specifically, the email recorded that Mr Lee had

asked the Respondent to re-cap the contents of his Sixth Will. Mr Lee had

also raised the possibility that his family home at 38 Oxley Road (“Oxley”)
might be “de-gazetted” after his passing and sought the Respondent's
advice on the legal implications if that were to happen.

15,

On

12 December

2013,

the Respondent

sent another email to Mr Lee

setting out further information regarding his Sixth Will and recorded the
contents of a discussion with Mr Lee the previous week (""12 Dec Email’).

In her email, the Respondent said:

“Under your present will dated 2 Nov 2012, [LWL] has been given

1 share more than [LHL] and [LH], out of your total estate. This is

because you reasoned that [LWL] does not have double income like
her brothers.
We discussed last week that you would now like to sign a Codicil to
change this, and to give {LWL] equal shares with [LHL] and [LHY]

out of the total estate.
! will prepare the codicil for you to sign this week, or when you are
ready.

Regarding the Oxley property, | have some thoughts and will call
you later today.”

16.

On 13 December 2013, Mr Lee replied to the Respondent to request an
additional amendment

to his will to give two carpets to LHY

(“13 Dec

Email""). The 13 December 2013 email stated:

“Another amendment is a cadicif to specify that two carpets: a silk
one on the wall over my PV and another a larger woollen one on

the wall above the bed in my bedroom, fo go to [LHY].”
17.

The 30 Nov Email,

12 Dec Email and the 13 Dec Email are collectively

referred to as the “Emails”.

Mr Lee thereafter finally determined to revert to the terms of his First Will,
and he accordingly executed his last will and testament on 17 December
2013 (""Last Will’), on terms which substantially mirrored the contents of
his First Wil. In his Last Will, Mr Lee named LHY and LW/ as the executors
and trustees of his estate.

Mr Lee passed away on 23 March 2015. The Executors stepped into Mr

Lee’s shoes and represented his Estate thereafter.

20.

On 3 June 2015, LWL wrote to the Respondent to request information
about Mr Lee’s wills.

21.

On 4 June 2015, in response the request from LWL (and a purportedly
similar request from LHL) for the Respondent's file records of copies of Mr
Lee's previous Wills and for any notes, information and emails relating to
or connected with Mr Lee's instructions regarding his Oxley property, the
Respondent issued a letter to the Executors and LHL titled “Chronology of
6 Wills — my file records with focus on Oxley’ {the “4 June Letter’).

22.

In the 4 June Letter, the Respondent set out a comprehensive account of
Mr

Lee’s

six

wills

and

her

discussions

with

Mr

Lee

regarding

his

testamentary wishes based on her file records.

23.

The summary included Mr Lee's instructions in respect of the preparation
of his

six wills

and

various

instructions and wishes,

drafts

of the

same,

the

changes

to

his

and correspondence with him in relation to the

Oxiey property. The Respondent also attached copies of all six wills and
her email correspondence with Mr Lee.

24.

However, the Respondent omitted to mention the fact that and/or failed to
disclose the Emails which would show that in or around 30 November 2013,

Mr Lee had given the Respondent instructions to amend the terms of his
Sixth Will by way of another will. In particular, the Respondent did not reveal
that Mr Lee had specifically sought the Respondent's advice in November
2013

on what

was

to be done with Oxley,

nor did she disclose to the

Executors her Emails with Mr Lee on this issue.

25.

It would

have

been

evident to the Respondent

that the Emails and her

communications with Mr Lee in November to December 2013 were relevant
to the inquiries made by LWL and LHL as:

a

The Respondent issued the 4 June Letter in response to the specific
requests from LWL and LHL for “notes/emails/information on his
instructions to {the Respondent] regarding Oxley’. The Emails are
self-evidently relevant and material to the requests made to the
Respondent.

b.

Mr Lee had passed away in March 2015, less than 3 months before
the 4 June Letter was sent out. There was significant public interest
and nation-wide discussion over the mainstream media and social
media over whether Oxley should be gazetted and preserved as a
heritage site or demolished in honour of Mr Lee’s wishes. The said
Emails recorded the /ast time the Respondent had communicated

with Mr Lee in respect of Mr Lee’s testamentary intentions for Oxley,
and

immediately

correspondences

preceded
were

the signing of his Last Will. These

therefore

critical

to

understanding

the

context of Mr Lee's wishes and his underlying concerns regarding
Oxley, and in particular, the fact that Mr Lee had reiterated his
testamentary intention to ultimately have his family home at Oxley
demolished. Given Mr Lee’s standing as the former Prime Minister

and

founding

father

of modern

Singapore

and

the

historical

significance of Oxley, the Respondent's records of her discussions
with Mr Lee were both of personal importance to him and potentially
of national importance.

The Respondent clearly understood the scope and significance of
the requests made by LWL and LHL. In her 4 June Letter, she set
out

a

comprehensive

record

of

her

discussions

and

correspondence with Mr Lee. The Respondent's account included
her previous discussions with Mr Lee regarding Oxley, whether or
not it directly related to any of Mr Lee's wills or resulted in any
changes to any of Mr Lee’s witls.
cancelled

versions

She had even put together

of his previous wills to reconstruct

all the

relevant events.

26.

On

22

June

Executors

and

2015,
LHL

the

Respondent

in response

then

sent

a further

to further queries

from

letter to the
LWL

and

LHL

regarding the signing of the Last Will (the “22 June Letter’). In her email,
the Respondent explained

“Further to my note to you dated 4 June 2015, [LHL] has asked me:
1}

For a copy of draft Will dated 19” August 2011;

2)

About

the background

which

fed to the signing

father’s last Will dated 17 December 2013

27.

It would

of your

(""Will no. 7°)""

similarly have been evident to the Respondent that Mr Lee's

instructions to her te amend the contents of his Sixth Will and Mr Lee’s
request for her advice regarding Oxley (all of which were captured in the
Emails between the Respondent and Mr Lee which were exchanged up to

4 days before he signed his Last Will), would have been relevant to these
specific

requests

for

information,

and

in light of the

facts

set out

in

paragraph 25 above. However, the Respondent omitted to disclose to the

Executors the fact of her communications with Mr Lee regarding his will
and Oxley in November to December 2013, or the existence of the Emails

between her and Mr Lee.

28.

The Respondent was also able te disclose another chain of emails dated
46 December 2013 to 3 January 2014 relating to the execution of Mr Lee’s
Last Will, ie. shortly after the Emails were
disclose copies

of the Emails or make

sent.

mention

However,

she

did not

of the communications

between her and Mr Lee that were referenced in the Emails.

29.

Instead,

in her 22 June

Letter,

the

Respondent

misrepresented

to the

Executors in specific and unambiguous language that ""fajfter [Mr Lee Kuan
Yew] signed Will no. 6 dated 2°"" November 2012, he did not instruct [the
Respondent] to change his Wilf’.

11

30.

The Respondent's statement was false and/or misleading, as the Emails
demonstrate that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had in fact instructed the Respondent
to change

his Sixth Will in his discussions with her in November

to

December 2013. His instructions and those discussions were recorded or
referenced in the Emails.

31

After the 4 June

Letter and the 22 June

Letter, the Respondent

did not

attempt to correct her misrepresentation that Mr Lee had not instructed her
to change his will after his Sixth Will was executed or notify the Executors
about the existence or contents of the Emails.

32.

Thereafter, the Executors, through their then solicitors, Rajah & Tann LLP,
made repeated requests to the Respondent for copies of all her documents

and records on file in respect to Mr Lee’s wills. In or around March 2019, in
response to the Executors’ requests, the Respondent

her records

and documents to the Executors,

provided copies of

including copies of the

Emails. It was only then that the Executors discovered the existence of the
Emails and learned that the Respondent had made false and/or misleading

statements in her 4 June Letter and 22 June Letter. The Respondent did
not disclose the existence of or copies of the Emails or make any attempt
to correct the false and/or misleading statements in her 4 June Letter and
22 June Letter at any time prior to March 2019.

33,

The Respondent's accounts in the 4 June Letter and the 22 June Letter
would have given the Executors the impression that Mr Lee had never

expressed to her his intention to change the terms of his Sixth Will or to
divide his estate equally between his children. This caused unnecessary
doubt and confusion about whether Mr Lee had intended to change his
Sixth Will, and what his concerns were in respect of Oxley prior to executing

his Last Will.

The Respondent omissions and misrepresentation to the Executors were
made knowingly and deliberately, or in the alternative, as a result of lack of
care and diligence on her part. The Respondent's actions, in knowingly and
deliberately making false and misleading statements and/or omitting to
mention

or failing to disclose

information

received from one of the Executors, would

in response

to the

inquiries

be in breach of her general

duties of honesty, competence, due care and diligence under Rule 2{2) of
the PCR and would accordingly amount to a breach of Section 83(2)(h) of
the LPA.

35.

Even

if the

Respondent

made

false and

misleading

statements

to the

Executors and/or had omitted disclosing information and documents

in

response to the Executors' specific inquiries unintentionally, be it as a result
of carelessness,

negligence

and

lack of due

care and

diligence,

her

conduct feli short of the standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness

expected

of a solicitor who

found

herself in the critical context

and

circumstance that the Respondent was in, and would accordingly amount

to a breach of Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

CHARGES
36.

Accordingly, the Complainant formulates the following charge against the
Respondent.

CHARGE

37.

You, Mdm Kwa Kim Li, are charged that, by way of your letters dated 4
June and 22 June 2015, you misled the Executors of the Estate of your
former client Mr Lee Kuan Yew, namely Dr Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee Hsien
Yang, by omitting and/or otherwise failing to disclose your communications
with Mr Lee Kuan Yew between November 2013 to 13 December 2013 in
response to their enquiries and/or by making the false and misleading
representation that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had never instructed you to change
his will dated

2 November

2012,

such

act amounting

to misconduct

unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court
within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161,
2009 Rev Ed).

Dated this 25"" day of July 2022

«2| idence
a

~

Counsel for the Complainant
Providence Law Asia LLC

DT/19/2022

IN THE MATTER OF KWA KIM LI
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CAP 161, 2009 REV ED)

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
(TO STATEMENT OF CASE OF THE COMPLAINANT)

Solicitors for the Respondent

Mr Cavinder Bull SC

Ms Gerui Lim
Ms Elisabeth Liang
Drew & Napier LLC
10 Collyer Quay
#10-01 Ocean Financia! Centre
Singapore 049315

Tel: 6535 0733
Fax: 6535 4906
Ref: CAB/GRL/439722

Dated this 14"" day of November, 2022.

With regard to paragraph 14 of the SOC:

(a)

it is admitted that on 30 November 2013, the Respondent sent LKY

an email to note the contents of an oral discussion between her and
LKY.

(b)

The discussion had taken place the previous night;

the second and third sentences of paragraph 14 of the SOC

are

admitted; and

(c)

it is not admitted that LKY intended to make amendments te his last
will. As far as the Respondent was aware, LKY was in the midst of
considering whether he would make amendments to his then-last
will dated 2 November 2012 (“Sixth Will”), and also considering
potential options available to him.

In her discussion with LKY on

the night of 29 November 2013 and in her email of 30 November
2013, the Respondent

had provided advice to LKY on potential

options for his consideration. As far as the Respondent was aware,
LKY had not made any decisions nor given any instructions which
he wanted

the Respondent

to act on.

in the past,

LKY would

typically consider and discuss with the Respondent the possible
options available to him and consequences

of any changes,

and

take some time to mull over them. A number of times, he would also
discuss

his considerations

with

his children,

instructions to the Respondent to act on.

before giving firm

Paragraph

15 of the SOC

is admitted.

The

Respondent

subsequently

departed from Singapore to London on about 15 December 2013. Up till
her

departure

from

communication

the

Respondent

is admitted.

LKY’s

on

understood

not

receive

any

The Respondent did not prepare any such codicil.

Paragraph 16 of the SOC
emai]

did

from LKY to instruct her that he was ready to sign the

proposed codicil.

10.

Singapore,

at

10.50pm

LKY to mean

13

When the Respondent received

December

that he was

2013,

the

Respondent

still in the midst of considering or

compiling amendments to include or provide for in a codicil to his Sixth Will.
As the Respondent was departing for London shortly, she intended to have
further discussions

with

LKY

on

his intentions

after she

returned

to

Singapore on about 21 December 2013.

44.

However, as set out below, the abovementioned events were superseded

by LKY’s execution of a new will.

12.

On 17 December 2013 and shortly before 2.59pm, the Respondent sighted
an email from Mrs Lee Suet Fern (“LSF”) to her dated 17 December 2013
which had been sent around 1.16pm.

LSF’s email stated, infer alia, “just a

quick note to say this has been dealt with already.”

13.

Embedded in LSF's email dated 17 December 2013 was an earlier email
dated

16 December

2013

from

LSF

to LKY

sent

at around

7.08pm.

Although the 16 December 2013 email had been copied to the Respondent
and the Complainant, the Respondent had not sighted this email previously

and did not appear to have received it.

LSF’s 16 December 2013 email

stated:
“Dear Pa Pa
This was the original agreed Will which ensures that all 3 children
receive equal shares, taking inte account the relative valuations (as
at the date of demise) of the properties each receives
Kim Li

Grateful if you could please engross.
Kind regards

Fern”

14.

Reading

LSF’s

emails

dated

16 and

17

December

2013

together,

the

Respondent understood LSF's email of 17 December 2013 to mean that:

(a)

following LKY’s discussions with LSF and/or the Complainant, LKY
had instructed LSF to prepare a new will for his execution;

(b)

the new will had since been prepared and engrossed without the
Respondent's

knowledge and involvement,

and executed

by LKY

(‘Seventh Will’); and

(c)

the Sixth Will was accordingly revoked and superseded by LKY’s
latest Seventh Will.

15.

Shortly after reading LSF’s emails dated 16 and 17 December 2013, the
Respondent

emailed

LSF

on

17

December

2013

at around

2.59pm

to

inform LSF that the Respondent did not seem to have received LSF’s email

dated

16 December 2013.

The Respondent also asked whether LSF's

email dated 17 December 2013 meant that “/LKY] has signed a new will
yesterday, in which case the former will which is on my record, is revoked?
if so, | will update my file record.”

16.

LSF replied to the Respondent by an email dated 17 December 2013 sent
at around 3.10pm.

LSF stated, “Yes, he has signed already.

going back to his 2011

In fact this is

will so it supercedes all. He read it extremely

carefully before signing.”

17.

Based on LSF’s above statements:

(a)

LKY's latest testamentary wishes were set out in his Seventh Will;

{b)

it was implicit that LKY had decided not te proceed with the possible
codicil to the Sixth Will that he had previously discussed with the
Respondent; and

(c)

there was

nothing

further for the Respondent

to do apart from

updating her file record to note that the Sixth Will had been revoked
and superseded.

18.

The Respondent does not plead to paragraph 17 of the SOC.

19.

The Respondent has no personal knowledge of the matters pleaded at the
first sentence of paragraph 18 of the SOC and does not plead to the same.

Paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Statement of Defence (""SOD"") are repeated.
The second sentence of paragraph 18 of the SOC is admitted.

20

The first sentence of paragraph

19 of the SOC

is admitted. The second

sentence of paragraph 19 is admitted insofar as the Complainants obtained
a grant of probate on 6 October 2015 in respect of LKY's estate.

21

Paragraph 20 of the SOC is admitted. The Respondent understood Ms Lee

Wei Ling’s (“LWL"") request to be for information about LKY’s intentions with
regard to his property at 38 Oxley Road (“Oxley Property”) as expressed
in the six wills which the Respondent had prepared for LKY and which LKY
had executed (""Six Wills”).

22.

With regard to paragraph 21 of the SOC, the Respondent's letter dated 4
June 2015 was sent in response to requests from LWL and Mr Lee Hsien

Loong (“LHL”) for information focusing on LKY’s intentions with regard to
the Oxley Property. Save as aforesaid, paragraph 21 of the SOC is denied

23.

Paragraph 22 of the SOC is denied. The Respondent's 4 June 2015 letter
did not purport to be a comprehensive account of her discussions with Mr
Lee regarding his testamentary wishes.

The Respondent's 4 June 2015

letter expressly stated that its purpose was to “summarise your father's
Wills based on my file records chronologically, focusing again on Oxley.”
[Emphasis added.]

24.

Paragraph

23 of the SOC

dated 4 June

2015

is admitted insofar as the Respondent's

letter

had provided points of information and documents

which were materially relevant to her summary of the Six Wills focusing on
the Oxley Property.

25.

With regard to paragraph 24 of SOC:

(a)

it is admitted the Respondent's

letter dated 4 June

2015 did not

refer to or attach copies of her emails with LKY dated 30 November

2013, 12 December 2013 and 13 December 2013.

These emails

were not material to, and did not impact any of the Six Wills which
were summarised in the Respondent's fetter dated 4 June 2015 with
a focus on the Oxley Property;

(b)

when the Respondent prepared the 4 June 2015 letter, she did not
recall her emails with LKY dated 30 November 2013, 12 December
2013 and 13 December 2013. Those emails had not registered with
the

Respondent

as

having

any

particular

significance

and/or

material import, because they had never led to any decision or
instructions by LKY in relation to Oxley Property, nor any decision
or instructions by LKY for the Respondent to change his Sixth Will,

nor

any

draft

instrument

being

prepared

by

the

Respondent.

Paragraphs 7 to 17 of the SOD are repeated; and

(c)

save as expressly admitted above, paragraph
denied.

24 of the SOC

is

26.

With regard te paragraph 25 of the SOC

including subparagraphs 25(a) to

25(c):

{a)

the first sentence of subparagraph 25(a) is admitted;

(b)

the first sentence of subparagraph

25(b) is admitted. The second

sentence of subparagraph 25(b) is admitted insofar as there were

substantial discussions in mainstream media and social media over
the appropriate treatment of the Oxley Property and LKY's wishes

for the Oxley Property.

it is admitted that LKY’s standing was as

the former Prime Minister and founding father of modern Singapore;

(c)

with regard to paragraph

25(c), paragraphs

21, 22 and 24 of the

SOD are repeated; and

(d)

save

as

expressly

admitted

above,

paragraph

25

of the

SOC

including subparagraphs 25{a) to 25(c) are denied.

27.

Paragraph 26 of the SOC is admitted, save that LWL and LHY were not
Executors of LKY’s estate at the time the Respondent sent the 22 June
2015 letter to LHL, LWL and LHY.

28.

Paragraph
repeated.

27 of the SOC

is denied.

Paragraphs 7 to 17 of the SOD

are

10

29.

The Respondent was not involved in the preparation of LKY’s Seventh Will
and did not discuss or receive any instructions from LKY regarding the
contents of his Seventh Will. Where the Respondent had received further
queries from LHL and LWL about the “background which led to the signing
of [LKY’s] last Will dated 17 December 2013"", the Respondent's letter dated
22 June 2015 had accurately and truthfully conveyed the fact that any
instructions given by LKY for the preparation of the Seventh Will, and his
execution of the Seventh Will, had occurred without the Respondent's
involvement.

This was evident from two email chains enclosed to the

Respondent's 22 June 2015 letter, namely:

(a)

the emails from LSF pleaded at paragraphs 12 to 16 of the SOD;

(b)

an email dated 3 January 2014 from Mdm

Wong

trailing emails) which inter alia: {i) recorded

that the Respondent

had

Seventh

merely

been

provided

copies

of the

Lin Hoe (with

Will and

a

subsequent codicil after they were executed “for her record"", while
the originals were kept in LKY's office. This differed from LKY’s
usual

practice

in

respect

of

the

Six

Wills

prepared

by

the

Respondent, where he had asked the Respondent to safekeep the
originals of the Six Wills for him; and (ii) also showed that after LSF's
email dated 16 December 2013, arrangements were made for LKY
to execute the Seventh Will without the Respondent's involvement.

30.

Paragraph 28 of the SOC is admitted. The Respondent's letter dated 22
June 2015 enclosed the email chains referred to at paragraph 28 of the

11

SOC because they were relevant to communicating the matters pleaded at

paragraph 29 of the SOD above.

31.

The Respondent's

letter dated 22 June 2015 did not enclose the emails

dated 30 November 2013,

12 December 2013 and 13 December 2013.

These were not relevant or material to the Respondent's responses in her

letter dated 22 June 2015, which only addressed the two queries pleaded
at paragraph 26 of the SOC.

When the Respondent prepared her letter

dated 22 June 2015, she also did not recall her emails with LKY dated 30
November 2013,

12 December 2013 and 13 December 2013, which had

not registered with her as having any particular significance and/or material
import because they had never led to any decision or instructions by LKY
for the Respondent to change his Sixth Will, nor any draft instrument being
prepared by the Respondent. Paragraphs 7 to 17 of the SOD are repeated.

32.

Save where a statement from the Respondent's letter dated 22 June 2015
is reproduced at paragraph 29 of the SOC, paragraphs 29 and 30 of the
SOC

are denied.

It was not a misrepresentation,

nor false or misleading,

for the Respondent’s letter dated 22 June 2015 to state that LKY had not
instructed the Respondent to change his Sixth Will. That statement was
truthful and accurate.

Contrary to paragraph

give the

any

Respondent

30 of the SOC,

instructions to change

LKY did not

his Sixth Will in his

discussions with her in November to December 2013. Further, the emails

dated 30 November 2013, 12 December 2013 and 13 December 2013 did
not contain or lead to any instructions by LKY for the Respondent to change
his Sixth Will.

In addition,

the Sixth Will was

never

changed

by any

12

instrument prepared by the Respondent

upon LKY’s instructions, nor did

the Respondent prepare any draft instrument with the intention of changing
the Sixth Will.
was

The Sixth Will was superseded by the Seventh Will which

instructed,

involvement.

33.

In

respect

subsequently

prepared

and

executed

without

the

Respondent's

Paragraphs 7 to 17 of the SOD are repeated.

of

paragraph

31

of

the

SOC,

the

Respondent

did

not

attempt to correct statements in her 4 and 22 June 2015

letters because

she

had

not misrepresented

facts

as alleged

or at all.

The first two sentences of paragraph 32 of the SOC are admitted.

The third

Paragraph 31 of the SOC is therefore denied.

34.

and fourth sentences of paragraph 32 of the SOC are denied, including the
allegation that false and/or misleading statements had been made

by the

Respondent in her letters dated 4 and 22 June 2015.

35.

Paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the SOC are denied.

36.

There is no basis for the charge formulated in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the

SOC. The Respondent denies the charge set out in paragraph 37 of the
soc.

Dated this 14° day of November, 2022.

—_—

SOLICITORS FOR THE RESPONDENT
DREW & NAPIER LLC

Oa

\-

—)

AMENDED

YOU,

KWA

1°! ALTERNATIVE CHARGE

KIM LI an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court

of Singapore are charged that you on or about the 4'"" day of June
2015 by your letter dated 4"" June 2015 sent to Mr Lee Hsien Loong
(""LHL"") are guilty of knowingly disclosing to LHL without the
consent / authority of the 2 Executors and Trustees named in
Will.no 7 namely Ms Lee Wei Ling (“LWL”) and Mr Lee Hsien Yang
(‘LHY”), the following documents and information which was
confidential to your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee”), and which
was acquired by you in the course of your engagement as Mr Lee’s
solicitor namely; 5 of the previous Wills of Mr Lee prepared by you
upon his instructions and email trails between Mr Lee and you from

11° December 2011 to 24 November 2012 (“Documents Set A”)
and explanations as to why your client Mr Lee changed his previous
Wills which amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme

Court or as a member

of an

honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the
Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)

IN THE

MATTER OF KWA KIM LI

AN ADVOCATI

AND SOLICITOR

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CHAPTER 161)

AGREED STATEMENT

OF FACTS

Kwa Kim Li (the ""Respondent""), an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore of over 40 years’ standing, was admitted to the Roll of Advocates &
Solicitors on 16"" January

1980, and was at al! material times, practising as an

advocate and solicitor at the law firm of Lee & Lee,

The

Complainants

are Ms

Lee

Wei

Ling

(“LWL"")

and

Mr

Les

Hsien Yang

(“LHY""), and the complaint was made by a letter dated 5"" September 2019 to the
Law

Society

of

Singapore

(""the

Law

Society''),

supported

by

a Statutory

Declaration declared on the same day.

LWL

and LHY

were the Executors and Trustees named in the Last Will and

Testament of Mr Lee Kuan Yew (""Mr Lee"") dated 17 December 2013 (""Will
no.7”), LWL,

LHY

and Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“LHL”) were Mr Lee’s three

children and the only beneficiaries of Will no. 7, Probate of Will no. 7 was
obtained by LWL and LHY sometime in October 2015.

The Respondent acted for Mr Lee as his lawyer and in her capacity as an Advocate

and Solicitor in the preparation of his Last Will and Testament. She had thereby
received from Mr Lee confidential information as a result of the retainer. The
Respondent did so over a period of time from August 2011 to November 2012, and
from time to time received instructions from Mr Lee to infer alia change his Last

Will and Testament, This resulted in the Respondent preparing altogether 6 Wills
of Mr Lee, who executed the same. The Wills were dated as follows:

a) The Last Will of Mr Lee dated 20"" August 2011;
b) The Last Will of Mr Lee dated 21% December 2011;
c)

The Last Wil of Mr Lee dated 6"" September 2012;

d) The Last Will of Mr Lee dated 20"" September 2012;
e)

The Last Will of Mr Lee dated 4"" October 2012: and

f)

The Last Will of Mr Lee dated 2""! November 2012;

(Collectively referred to as ""the previous 6 Wills"").

Mr Lee passed away on 23

March 2015,

Sometime after the passing of Mr Lee, LHL and LWL separately requested the
Respondent

to

provide

her

wills/notes/emails/information

on

file

records

Mr

Lee's

of

Mr

instructions

Lee's

previous

her

regarding

to

Oxley.

On 4"" June 2015, the Respondent responded to the requests from LHL
LWL

by way

beneficiaries

of a letter addressed
of Mr

Lee’s Estate.

following documents to LHL, LHY

to LHL,

The

LHY

Respondent

and

LWL

provided

and

as the only
copies

of the

and LWL;

a) The previous 6 Wills; and
b) Email trail between Mr Lee and the Respondent from 17"" August 2011 to 2™
November 2012 (“Documents set A”)

By the text of the 4"" June 2015 letter addressed to LHL, LHY
Respondent
signed

6

also provided a summary
Wills

over

15

months

and

of the background
in

doing

so

and LWL,

as to why

disclosed

the

Mr Lee

confidential

information that she was privy to as Mr Lee's solicitor during the 15-month
petiod and the duration during which she prepared the 6 previous Wills on his
instructions.

9.

The Respondent did not seek nor obtain the consent/authority of the 2 Executors and
Trustees named

in Will no.7, namely,

LHY

and LWL,

prior to sending the letter

dated 4"" June 2015 to LHL, LWL and LHY,

Dated this

day of

A

2023

wee

R.S BAJWA
BAJWA

& CO

SOLICITORS

DREW
FOR ee

THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE

& NAPIER

SOLICITORS

FOR

THE RESPONDENT

DT/19/2022

IN THE MATTER OF KWA KIM LI,
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CAP 161, 2009 REV. ED.)

AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
(COMPLAINANT’S CHARGE)

Counsel for the Complainant
Mr Abraham Vergis, S.C.
Ms Asiyah Arif
Mr Kyle Chong

Counsel for the Respondent
Mr Cavinder Bull, S.C.
Ms Gerui Lim
Ms Elisabeth Liang

Providence Law Asia LLC
1 Raffles Place
One Raffles Place Tower 2
#29-62
Singapore 048616
Tel: 64381969

Drew & Napier LLC
10 Collyer Quay
#10-01 Ocean Financial Centre
Singapore 049315
Tel: 65350733

Dated this 31st day of January 2023

1

AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Respondent, Mdm Kwa Kim Li, is an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore. She was admitted to the roll of advocates
and solicitors on 16 January 1980.

2.

The Respondent is and was at the material times the Managing Partner of
Lee & Lee (“the Firm”).

3.

The original Complainants, Ms Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee Hsien Yang
(“LWL” and “LHY” respectively), are the sole Executors and Trustees of the
Estate of Mr Lee Kuan Yew (the “Executors”). LHY, LWL and Mr Lee Hsien
Loong (“LHL”), are siblings and the children of Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“Mr
Lee”).

4.

Prior to his death, Mr Lee executed a total of eight wills. The Respondent
was Mr Lee’s solicitor who drafted and engrossed six of his wills between
August 2011 and November 2012, each of which was signed by Mr Lee
and dated as follows:
a.

20 August 2011;

b.

21 December 2011;

c.

6 September 2012;

d.

20 September 2012;

e.

4 October 2012; and

f.

2 November 2012 (“2 November 2012 Will”).

(collectively referred to as Mr Lee’s “Six Wills”)

2

5.

In or around end-November 2013 there were discussions between Mr Lee
and the Respondent on whether he wished to draft a new will and if so,
what might be included in such a further will.

6.

On 30 November 2013, the Respondent sent Mr Lee an email to record the
contents of an oral discussion which had taken place between her and Mr
Lee the previous night (“30 November Email”). Amongst other things, the
email recorded that Mr Lee had asked the Respondent to re-cap the
contents of his 2 November 2012 Will, and that Mr Lee had raised the
possibility that his family home at 38 Oxley Road (“Oxley Property”) might
be “de-gazetted” after his passing and sought the Respondent’s advice on
the legal implications if that were to happen. The Respondent concluded
the email by asking Mr Lee to “Please let [her] know [his] thoughts, and
[she] can make the appropriate changes to the Will”.

7.

On 12 December 2013, the Respondent sent an email to Mr Lee (“12
December Email”) stating:

“Under your present will dated 2 Nov 2012, [LWL] has been given
1 share more than [LHL] and [LHY], out of your total estate. This is
because you reasoned that [LWL] does not have double income like
her brothers.
We discussed last week that you would now like to sign a Codicil to
change this, and to give [LWL] equal shares with [LHL] and [LHY]
out of the total estate.

3

I will prepare the codicil for you to sign this week, or when you are
ready.
Regarding the Oxley property, I have some thoughts and will call
you later today.”

8.

On 13 December 2013, Mr Lee sent an email to the Respondent (“13
December Email”) stating:

“Another amendment is a codicil to specify that two carpets: a silk
one on the wall over my PV and another a larger woollen one on
the wall above the bed in my bedroom, to go to [LHY].”
9.

The 30 November Email, 12 December Email and the 13 December Email
are collectively referred to as the “Emails”.

10.

The Respondent subsequently departed from Singapore to London on
about 15 December 2013. The Respondent did not prepare any codicil for
Mr Lee.

11.

While the Respondent was overseas, Mr Lee executed his last will and
testament dated 17 December 2013 (“Last Will”). In his Last Will, Mr Lee
named LHY and LWL as the only executors and trustees of his estate. LHL
was not named as an executor and trustee of Mr Lee’s estate.

12.

The Respondent was informed by Mrs Lee Suet Fern (“LSF”) that Mr Lee
had executed the Last Will. LSF sent the Respondent an email dated 17
December 2013 at around 1.16pm. The email stated, inter alia, “just a quick

4

note to say this has been dealt with already”. Embedded in LSF’s email
dated 17 December 2013 was an earlier email dated 16 December 2013
sent from LSF to Mr Lee at around 7.08pm. LSF’s 16 December 2013 email
stated:
“Dear Pa Pa
This was the original agreed Will which ensures that all 3 children
receive equal shares, taking into account the relative valuations (as
at the date of demise) of the properties each receives.
Kim Li
Grateful if you could please engross.
Kind regards
Fern”

13.

The Respondent emailed LSF on 17 December 2013 at around 2.59pm.
Her email stated that she did not seem to have received LSF’s email dated
16 December 2013. The Respondent also asked whether LSF’s email
dated 17 December 2013 meant that “[Mr Lee] has signed a new will
yesterday, in which case the former will which is on my record, is revoked?
If so, I will update my file record.”

14.

LSF replied to the Respondent by an email dated 17 December 2013 sent
at around 3.10pm. LSF stated, “Yes, he has signed already. In fact this is
going back to his 2011 will so it supercedes all. He read it extremely
carefully before signing.”

5

15.

Mr Lee passed away on 23 March 2015.

16.

On 3 June 2015, LWL wrote to the Respondent to request information
about Mr Lee’s wills.

17.

On 4 June 2015, in response to LWL’s request and a separate request from
LHL for information focusing on LKY’s intentions with regard to the Oxley
Property, the Respondent issued a letter to the Executors and LHL titled
“Chronology of 6 Wills – my file records with focus on Oxley” (the “4 June
Letter”) with enclosures.

18.

The 4 June Letter stated, amongst other things:
“To:
Hsien Loong, Wei Ling, and Hsien Yang
4 June 2015.
Loong and Ling have requested me for file records of your father's
previous Wills, for notes/emails/information on his instructions to me
regarding Oxley.
I thought best to write this note addressed to the 3 of you as the only
beneficiaries of his Estate.
Your father signed 6 Wills with me over the period of August 2011 to
November 2012. (2 in 2011, and 4 in 2012).
He instructed me several times, by phone, by email and personally at
his office typically in the evenings before his Chinese class.
I attach file copies of the 6 cancelled Wills, numbered 1 to 6 for ease.
Background why your father signed 6 Wills over 15 months.
Regarding the 6 Wills which your father signed over August 2011 to
November 2012, I would estimate that I prepared at least 15 drafts for
his review over that period, to take into account the many changes he
wanted to make. There were also one or two occasions that I went to
his office for signing after he approved the draft Will, but he had second
thoughts, did not sign the Will and asked for further changes. I am
telling you these details for you to know that your father spent much
time and thought on his 6 Wills.

6

Much of the discussions and changes revolved around:
1) Where Ling is to stay - at Oxley or in his other properties, or at Ho
Ching's Belle Vue apartment, whether or not to give Ling a life interest
in Oxley.
2) The division of the Estate - although he was aware that it was
intended/agreed that he would divide his entire Estate into 3 equal
shares for the 3 children, he asked me to prepare Wills no. 3 and 6
where the Estate was to be divided unequally. He said he would talk to
the children to inform them why he wanted to divide the Estate
unequally.
3) Oxley - how to give the children least problem after he is gone.
You have asked me to focus on Oxley. I set out a brief 3 point
summary regarding the Oxley Clauses in the 6 Wills:
…
I now summarise your father’s Wills based on my file records
chronologically, focusing again on Oxley…”
19.

On 22 June 2015, the Respondent sent a further letter to LWL, LHY and
LHL in response to further queries from LWL and LHL regarding the signing
of the Last Will (the “22 June Letter”). The letter stated:
“Dear Hsien Loong, Wei Ling and Hsien Yang,
Further to my note to you dated 4 June 2015, [LHL] has asked me:
1) For a copy of draft Will dated 19th August 2011;
2) About the background which led to the signing of your father’s last
Will dated 17 December 2013 (“Will no. 7”)
Wei Ling also asked me the same question 2 in May 2014.
I thought it best to write to all of you, so that everyone has the same
reply from me.
After your father signed Will no. 6 dated 2nd November 2012, he did
not instruct me to change his Will.
I first learnt about Will no. 7 via email from Fern and Lin Hoe.”

7

20.

The 22 June Letter enclosed copies of emails dated 16 December 2013 to
3 January 2014 relating to the execution of Mr Lee’s Last Will.

21.

On 6 October 2015, the Executors obtained a grant of probate in respect
of Mr Lee’s estate.

22.

On 25 February 2019, the Executors, through their then solicitors, Rajah &
Tann LLP, asked the Respondent for copies of all her documents and
records on file in respect to Mr Lee’s wills. In or around 8 March 2019, in
response to the Executors’ requests, the Respondent provided copies of
her records and documents to the Executors, including copies of the
Emails. The Emails had not been enclosed to the 4 June or 22 June Letters.

23.

On 5 September 2019, the Executors filed a complaint against the
Respondent (“Complaint”). The Complaint comprised four distinct heads
of complaint. The fourth head of complaint, namely that the Respondent
had given the Executors false and misleading information in her 4 June and
22 June Letters, is the subject of the present charge.

Dated this 31st day of January 2023

8

",2024-02-12T04:00:28+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2024/,"In the Matter of Kwa Kim Li (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2024/",1091
1,87b42ad0f3658b6132e9a9ab8ad488c495dc0fb6,"In the Matter of Teo Eng Thye (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Teo Eng Thye (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Ms Goh Yng Yng Karen (the Complainant), who was the daughter of the late Mdm Liew Khoon Fong (Mdm Liew) and executrix of Mdm Liew’s will.


The complaint arose from two Powers of Attorney (POA) dated 20 November 2017. POA 6414 was related to the sale of 107 Namly Avenue (Namly Property), while POA 6417 was related to the purchase of a condominium unit (Condominium Unit). At the material time, Mdm Liew was 87 years old.

On or around 17 November 2017, Mdm Liew’s son (Kelvin), as well as Kelvin’s wife (Jacqueline), visited the Respondent to seek his assistance to prepare two POAs for Mdm Liew who was not present at this meeting.

On Kelvin’s instructions, the Respondent prepared the two POAs for Mdm Liew on or around 20 November 2017. The Respondent had prepared the draft POAs without receiving any written, or any other authority, from Mdm Liew authorising Kelvin to give him instructions on her behalf.

The Respondent met and spoke to Mdm Liew for the first time on 20 November 2017 at the Namly Property. Kelvin, Jacqueline, their sons, one Goh Eng Sheng Daniel (Daniel) and one Goh Eng Chun David (David) were present. Mdm Liew signed the POAs at this meeting.

POA 6414 authorised Kelvin to act on Mdm Liew’s behalf to sell the Namly Property and have the sale proceeds paid to Daniel, then 19 years old, to hold on trust for Mdm Liew for the purchase of the Condominium Unit.

POA 6417 authorised Kelvin to purchase the Condominium Unit in Mdm Liew and Daniel’s names, with Kelvin having the authority to add himself as a joint owner. It also authorised Kelvin to borrow monies from banks and other financial institutions on the security of the Condominium Unit if the sale proceeds from the Namly Property sale were insufficient. Kelvin was also authorised to execute documents, such as an option to purchase and sale and purchase agreement on behalf of Mdm Liew.

On 22 November 2017, Kelvin granted an Option to Purchase (OTP) to buyers for the purchase of the Namly Property. The OTP was exercised on 7 December 2017, and the Respondent was appointed by Kelvin to act as Mdm Liew’s conveyancing lawyer with respect to the sale of the Namly Property.

On 1 December 2017, the OTP for the Condominium Unit was granted to Kelvin and Jacqueline with the OTP being exercised on 8 December 2017 in the names of Kelvin, Jacqueline and Mdm Liew. The Respondent also acted for Kelvin, Jacqueline and Mdm Liew in this transaction.

On 13 December 2017, the Complainant discovered that a caveat had been lodged against the Namly Property.

On 15 January 2018, the Complainant commenced HC/S 45/2018 (Suit 45) in her capacity as Mdm Liew’s sole donee under a Lasting Power of Attorney to stop the sale of the Namly Property. On 17 September 2020, the High Court determined that Mdm Liew had lacked the mental capacity to understand and execute the POAs on 20 November 2017 and declared the POAs void. The Respondent was not a party to Suit 45 but had given evidence at the trial.

Mdm Liew passed away on 10 June 2020.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Davinder Singh SC, and Mr K Anparasan as DT member to investigate the complaint.

Seven charges were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA), in that the Respondent had acted for Mdm Liew in the preparation of the two POAs dated 20 November 2017 with the client as the donor and Kelvin as attorney, without ensuring that Kelvin had the authority to give those instructions on behalf of Mdm Liew, and when the Respondent had no evidence of such authority, failed to obtain confirmation of the said instructions from Mdm Liew regarding the preparation and drafting of the said POAs, in breach of Rule 5(5)(a) and 5(5)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR).

Second Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA, in that the Respondent had failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to Mdm Liew, in the preparation of the two POAs dated 20 November 2017 with the client as the donor and Kelvin as attorney, and permitted Mdm Liew to execute the said POAs without first taking sufficient steps to satisfy himself that Mdm Liew understood the nature and effect of the terms that were set out in the POAs, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR.

Third Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA, in that the Respondent had failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to Mdm Liew, by failing to take sufficient steps to safeguard Mdm Liew’s interests by ensuring that he received his instructions, and explained the nature and effect of the two POAs dated 20 November 2017, to Mdm Liew without the presence of the attorney or other family members of the attorney so as to avoid any undue influence being exerted over the client, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR.

Fourth Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA, in that the Respondent had acted for Mdm Liew, Kelvin and Jacqueline in the purchase of the Condominium Unit, where there was a diversity of interests that existed between the parties, and failed to advance Mdm Liew’s interests unaffected by Kelvin’s and/or Jacqueline’s interests, by removing Mdm Liew’s name from the OTP dated 1 December 2017, in breach of Rules 20(5) and 20(6) of the PCR.

Fifth Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA, in that the Respondent failed to inform Mdm Liew of all information known to him that may reasonably affect her interests in respect of the purchase of the Condominium Unit, in particular the removal of her name, the non-inclusion of Daniel’s name, and the inclusion of Jacqueline’s name, in the OTP dated 1 December 2017, in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR.

Sixth Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA, in that the Respondent had failed to inform Mdm Liew of all information known to him that may reasonably affect Mdm Liew’s interests in respect of the POAs, in particular the medical report prepared by Dr Ang Yong Guan and correspondence from Templars Law LLC relating to Mdm Liew’s alleged lack of mental capacity as at the time of the execution of the POAs, in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR.

Seventh Charge

For misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor in the discharge of his professional duties as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore as set out in section 83(2)(h) of the Act, in that the Respondent, who had acted for Mdm Liew in respect of the matters that were the subject-matter of Suit 45, failed to advance Mdm Liew’s interests unaffected by Kelvin’s interests, by failing to take Mdm Liew’s instructions or her donee’s instructions when he was served with a subpoena by solicitors acting in Suit 45, and instead taking Kelvin’s instructions.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that the First Charge and Second Charge were made out, while the remaining Charges were dismissed.

With reference to the First Charge, the DT noted that the disparity between the Respondent’s evidence about the meeting on 20 November 2017 and what was said in the Respondent’s Attendance Note was simply too huge to be credibly accounted for. The DT further observed that it was not just the nature, terms and implications of the POAs which required careful explanation, but also the issues arising from the interaction between the two POAs.

The DT stated that as Mdm Liew was 87 years old at the time and had difficulty speaking, the Respondent should not only have carefully explained the relevant matters, but should also have asked if they were in line with her wishes and instructions and how she thought they were in her interests – including asking why she felt that it was in her interest for the POAs to be irrevocable. Also, as Mdm Liew was unable to communicate her understanding verbally or in writing, the Respondent should have called for a pause and asked for her condition to be reviewed by an independent medical expert or declined to act for her.

Two specific red flags were raised by the DT – (1) the fact that Mdm Liew nodded when the Respondent read the POAs to her, in light of these particular POAs that he was asked to draft by Kelvin, and the fact that one of them dealt with the disposal of her home, it should not have been accepted by the Respondent as evidence that she understood the terms, nature and consequences in the POA; (2) the fact that she did not ask any questions in light of the issues in the POAs should have raised a red flag.

Crucially, the Respondent also did not take steps to meet Mdm Liew privately and without the presence of Kelvin and Daniel, who stood to benefit from the POAs, and their family members to determine whether Mdm Liew was acting under any misrepresentation, misapprehension or improper influence. The Respondent also did not ask Mdm Liew whether the POAs accorded with her wishes under any will.

As for the Second Charge, the DT found that the offending conduct was the same, hence it did not add to the Respondent’s culpability.

In the Third Charge, the DT found that this aspect of the Respondent’s conduct was insufficient to amount to a breach of Rule 5(2)(c), and his conduct should not be viewed in isolation, and was just one of the matters that has to be taken into account in determining whether the Respondent breached his duties.

The Fourth to Seventh Charges were dismissed based on the fact that Law Society had failed to discharge its burden to show that there was in law a solicitor-client relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Liew at the material time in relation to the Condominium Unit.

The Respondent was ordered to pay a financial penalty that was sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed, and the Law Society’s costs of $5,000.

Council accepted the findings and recommendations of the DT and imposed a financial penalty of $2,000 on the Respondent.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/dtr-2023-06-c.pdf,"DT/SEC/21/2021

IN THE MATTER OF TEO ENG THYE
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CHAPTER 161)
Between
THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE
.---Applicant
And
TEO ENG THYE
.---Respondent

Mr Davinder Singh, S.C. (President)
Mr K. Anparasan (Advocate & Solicitor)

Mr Vikna Rajah and Ms Antje Wong for the Law Society of Singapore
Mr Peter Cuthbert Low, Ms Elaine Low and Ms Christine Low for the Respondent

REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

A.

INTRODUCTION

1.

The Complainant is one Goh Yng Yng Karen. She is the daughter of the late Mdm
Liew Khoon Fong (alias Liew Fong) (“Mdm Liew”) and executrix of Mdm Liew’s

will.
2.

Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin (“Kelvin”) is Mdm Liew’s son. His wife is Goh Sok
Ngoh Jacqueline (“Jacqueline”). Goh Eng Sheng Daniel (“Daniel”) is one of their
two sons,

The Respondent is Mr Teo Eng Thye. He is an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore and was admitted on 19 April 2000. He is, and was at
all material times, a director of City Law LLC.

The Complainant’s complaints arise from

two Powers

of Attorney dated 20

November 2017. Both were lodged with the Supreme Court of Singapore as HC/PA
6414/2017 (“POA

6414”) and HC/PA

related to the sale of 107

Namly

6417/2017 (“POA

Avenue,

Singapore

6417”). POA
267676

6414

(the “Namly

Property”) and POA 6417 related to the purchase of a condominium unit (the
“Condominium Unit”).

On 15 January 2018, the Complainant commenced HC/S 45/2018 (“Suit 45”) in her

capacity as Mdm Liew’s sole donee under a Lasting Power of Attorney registered
on 16 September 2014 (the “2014 LPA”), inter alia, against Kelvin in relation to
the sale of Namly Property.

On 17 September 2020, the High Court determined that Mdm Liew had lacked the
mental capacity to understand and execute the POAs on 20 November 2017 and
declared the POAs void. The Respondent was not a party to Suit 45 but gave
evidence at the trial of that Suit.

THE HEARING AND THE WITNESSES

The Disciplinary Tribunal (the “DT”) was constituted on 8 October 2021. The
hearing took place on 4 and 5 May 2022.

The Applicant called the Complainant as its only witness.

The Respondent gave evidence on his own behalf. He did not call any other witness.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS

10.

The following matters are not in dispute’.

11.

Mdm Liew passed away on 10 June 2020. The Complainant was also the executrix
of Mdm

12.

Liew’s will.

On or around 17 November 2017, Kelvin and Jacqueline visited the Respondent to
seek his assistance to prepare two POAs for Mdm Liew, who was not present at this
meeting. The Respondent recorded a summary of Kelvin’s instructions in a note
dated 17 November 2017.

13.

On Kelvin’s instructions, the Respondent prepared the two POAs for Mdm Liew on

or around 20 November 2017. The Respondent accepts that Mdm Liew was his
client.

14.

The Respondent prepared the draft POAs without receiving any written, or any
other authority from Mdm Liew authorising Kelvin to give him instructions on her
behalf.

15.

At 12.28pm on 20 November 2017, the Respondent’s secretary emailed the two
draft POAs to Kelvin’s email address kjgoh@hotmail.com on the Respondent’s
behalf. In that email, he requested that Kelvin “go thru [sic] the drafis and let us
have your comments if any.”

16.

At around Spm on 20 November 2017, the Respondent visited the Namly Property.
There, he met and spoke to Mdm Liew for the first time in connection with the
POAs and their execution (the “Meeting”). Kelvin, Jacqueline and their sons,

Daniel and Goh Eng Chun David, were present throughout.
17.

Mdm Liew listened and nodded while the Respondent took her through the POAs.

1 The DT has in this section and others adopted in many places the language that the parties
have used in the pleadings, affidavits of evidence and submissions

18.

Very generally speaking, the first POA authorised Kelvin to act on Mdm Liew’s
behalf to sell the Namly Property and have the sale proceeds paid to Daniel, then
19 years old, to hold on trust for Mdm Liew for the purchase of the Condominium
Unit (the “1** POA”).

19,

Broadly, the second POA authorised Kelvin to purchase the Condominium Unit in
Mdm Liew and Daniel’s names, with Kelvin having the authority to add himself as
a joint owner (the “2™! POA”). It also authorised Kelvin to borrow monies from
banks and other financial institutions on the security of the Condominium Unit if
the sale proceeds from the Namly Property sale were insufficient. Kelvin was also
authorised to execute documents, such as an option to purchase and sale and
purchase agreement, on behalf of Mdm Liew.

20.

Mdm Liew signed the POAs at the Meeting. She was 87 years old at the time.

21,

The Respondent prepared an attendance note of the Meeting (the “Attendance
Note”).

22.

On 22 November 2017, Kelvin granted an option to “Leow Tang Liea and/or
nominees” to purchase the Namly Property (the “Namly OTP”). Leow Tang Lie
was, at the material time, a director of Pinnacle Development (Greenmead) Pte Ltd
(“Pinnacle”). The Namly OTP was exercised on 7 December 2017. Pursuant to the
1 POA, Kelvin appointed the Respondent as Mdm Liew’s conveyancing lawyer

with respect to the sale of the Namly Property.
23,

On

1 December

2017, the Option

to Purchase

the Condominium

Unit (the

“Condominium OTP”) was granted to Kelvin and Jacqueline.

24.

The Condominium OTP was exercised on 8 December 2017 in the names of
Kelvin, Jacqueline and Mdm Liew. On the same day, the Respondent furnished the
signed acceptance copy of the Condominium OTP to the seller’s solicitors, Sterling

Law Corporation (“SterlingLaw”). In that letter, the Respondent said he was
acting for Kelvin, Jacqueline and Mdm Liew. Daniel was not named as a purchaser
in the Condominium OTP.
25.

According to the e-Notice of Transfer, the Condominium Unit was sold to Kelvin
and Jacqueline on 8 December 2017.

26.

On or about 13 December 2017, the Complainant discovered that a caveat had been
lodged against the Namly Property in favour of Pinnacle. Following this discovery,
the Complainant instructed her lawyers, Templars Law, to write to Pinnacle’s
solicitors, WongPartnership, to persuade Pinnacle to defer the completion of the
sale of the Namly Property.

27.

On 15 December 2017, Templars Law wrote to WongPartnership to draw attention
to the unusual circumstances surrounding the sale of the Namly Property and asked
that Pinnacle agree to defer the completion of the sale until Mdm Liew’s mental
capacity could be determined by a medical expert. That letter also added that the
Complainant was the sole donee under the 2014 LPA, that the Complainant
reasonably

believed

that

Mdm

Liew’s

mental

capacity

had

significantly

deteriorated since September 2017, and that Kelvin had moved Mdm Liew to an

unknown location’.
28.

On 22 December 2017, Templars Law sent the 2014 LPA to WongPartnership*.

29.

On 30 December 2017, Dr Ang Yong Guan issued a medical report in respect of

Mdm Liew’s mental capacity‘.
30.

On 5 January 2018, Templars Law wrote to WongPartnership and enclosed Dr
Ang’s report. The report stated that the 1 POA was invalid and unenforceable, and

2 page 1044 of the Complainant's AEIC
» page 1048 of the Complainant's AEIC
“page 1064 of the Complainant's AEIC

that Mdm Liew lacked the mental capacity to make the decision to sell the Namly

Property. Templars Law asked that the sale be stopped®.
By

31.

an email

and a letter dated

10 January 2018, Templars

Law

wrote to

WongPartnership to ask if they had instructions to accept service of process on

behalf of their client®.
On 10 January 2018, WongPartnership wrote to the Respondent to ask how “[his]

32.

client” intended to resolve the matter. They stated that, if the sale and purchase
could not be proceeded with, that “[his] client” would compensate Pinnacle for all
losses. WongPartnership enclosed Templars Law’s letters dated 15 December 2017,
22 December 2017, 5 January 2018 (with Dr Ang’s medical report attached) and 10

January 20187.
33.

On 15 January 2018, the Complainant commenced Suit 45 in her capacity as Mdm
Liew’s donee, pursuant to the 2014 LPA, against Pinnacle and Kelvin to stop the
sale of the Namly Property.

34.

Onor around 24 January 2018, the Respondent wrote to SterlingLaw. In that letter,
the Respondent stated his clients’ intention to withdraw Mdm Liew’s name from
the purchase of the Condominium Unit.

35.

On 12 February 2018, Templars Law wrote to the Respondent to inform him that:

a.

the Complainant was the sole donee under the 2014 LPA;

b.

Dr Ang opined that Mdm Liew had been suffering from dementia since the
middle of 2017 and lacked mental capacity to make financial decisions; and

S page 1062 of the Complainant's AEIC
* page 1072 of the Complainant's AEIC
7 page 1074 of the Complainant's AEIC

c.

the Complainant had commenced Suit 45 against Kelvin for the sale of the
Namly Property and to request a statutory declaration setting out the full
circumstances under which Mdm Liew came to sign the POAs*.

36.

On27 February 2018, the Complainant’s application for an interlocutory injunction
to restrain the sale of the Namly Property from being completed was refused. The

sale was allowed to proceed on the basis that the sale proceeds would be paid into
Court. Eventually, the sale was completed and the sale proceeds of S$5.1m were

paid into Court.
37,

On or around 27 February 2018, the Respondent wrote to SterlingLaw. In that
letter, the Respondent referred to a fresh Option to Purchase for the Condominium
Unit, to be signed by the seller pursuant to the withdrawal of Mdm Liew’s name as
a joint purchaser of that unit. Kelvin and Jacqueline exercised this Option to
Purchase, with the exercise date backdated to 8 December 2017 (the “Amended
Condominium OTP”).

38.

On 3

February 2020, Templars Law issued a subpoena in Suit 45 against the

Respondent requiring him to attend the trial and to produce documents that they
had asked for in their letter of 21 January 2020. It was served on the Respondent

on 4 February 2020°.
39.

The Respondent then consulted Drew & Napier, who were Kelvin’s solicitors, in
relation to the subpoena. According to the Respondent”, he believed that he was
entitled to seek instructions from Kelvin and/or his solicitors because Kelvin was
a party to Suit 45.

40.

The Respondent informed Templars Law over the phone that he would not be
tesponding

to

the

Complainant’s

confidentiality’.

® page 1078 of the Complainant's AEIC

° page! 103 of the Complainant's AEIC
%° paragraphs 70 of the Respondent's AEIC
31 paragraph 62 of the Respondent's AEIC

request

because

of

solicitor-client

41.

On 12 February 2020, the Accountant-General was directed to pay out the sale

proceeds of the Namly Property to Mdm Liew.

42.

The Respondent filed an affidavit of evidence-in-chief and appeared as a witness in
Suit 45.

THE RESPONDENT’S JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTION

43.

In paragraph 3 of the Respondent’s Defence (Amendment No. 1) (the “Defence”),
the Respondent pleaded that, insofar and to the extent that any of the matters in the

Statement of Case (Amendment No.1) (the “SOC”) and the charges in paragraph
37 of the SOC go beyond or are different from the complaint, they are not within
the jurisdiction or remit of the DT.

However, the Respondent does not pursue that point in his Closing Submissions.

45.

Notwithstanding this, we are unable to agree with this point. As the Applicant has
argued, and as made clear from the Complainant’s complaint dated 26 October
2020, the charges against the Respondent “encapsulate the gravamen

of the

complaint”: LSS v Yeo Khirn Hai Alvin and another matter [2020] 4 SLR 858 at

[64]-[65}.
THE APPLICANT’S RELIANCE ON THE JUDGMENT

IN SUIT 45 AND

PROOF OF MDM LIEW’S MENTAL CAPACITY

46.

In the SOC, the Applicant pleaded Mdm Liew’s mental capacity (see paragraph
3(b)) and referred to one Dr Ang’s medical report dated 30 December 2017, which
the Applicant said, “opined that Mdm Liew started suffering from dementia around
the middle of 2017 and was progressively getting worse” (see paragraphs 26-30).

The Applicant also pleaded what it said were the High Court’s findings in Suit 45,
including those in relation to Mdm Liew’s mental capacity to understand and
execute the POAs and the Respondent’s conduct (see paragraphs 35-36).

47.

In the Defence, the Respondent denied paragraph 3 of the SOC (see paragraph
43A), disputed the findings in Dr Ang’s report of 30 December 2017

(see paragraph

67), pleaded that that report was insutticient evidence that Mdm Liew did not have
mental capacity when she signed the POAs and agreed to the sale of the Namly
Property (see paragraphs 68 and 69), and that it had not been enough for Dr Ang
to have relied solely on the information that the Complainant had provided to
conclude that Mdm Liew lacked the mental capacity to agree to the sale of the
Namly Property (see paragraph 69).

48.

The Respondent also pleaded that while the SOC reproduced the High Court’s
findings in Suit 45 (see paragraphs 76- 88), the findings of the High Court in Suit

45 are opinion evidence (see paragraph 89).
49.

The Applicant

would have therefore been aware from the Defence that the

Respondent had pleaded that the findings in Suit 45 relied on by the Applicant are
in the nature of opinion. The Applicant would also have been aware of the

Defence’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence that Mdm Liew lacked
mental capacity when she signed the POAs and agreed to the sale of the Namly
Property.

50.

As mentioned above, the Applicant only called the Complainant as a witness. It did

not call Dr Ang or any expert on the issue of Mdm Liew’s mental capacity.
51.

In her Affidavit of Evidence in Chief (“AEIC”), the Complainant referred to and
telied on parts of the Judgment in Suit 45 (see e.g., paragraphs 16, 17, 38, 46, 53,

62, 63, 65, 71, 73, 86, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94). She also referred to and relied on Dr
Ang’s reports (see e.g., paragraphs 122-124) and on Dr Ang’s opinion that “Mdm

Liew was suffering from dementia which started around the middle of 2017 and
was progressively getting worse”.

52.

However, while the Complainant is a medical doctor, she was called as a witness

of fact and not as an expert witness on Mdm Liew’s mental capacity. As she

testified, she was not qualified to comment on Mdm Liew’s mental capacity (TS,
4 May 2022, page 25 lines 3-7).

53.

In his closing submissions, the Respondent contended that in view of section 45 of
the Evidence Act, Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor JP [2000] SGHC 111 at
[141], Zrans-World (Aluminium) Ltd v Cornelder China (Singapore) [2003] 2

SLR(R) 501 at [19], the findings of fact in Suit 45 (that were referred to and relied
on by the Complainant in her AEIC and at the hearing) are not evidence and not

admissible for their truth.
34,

The Respondent also submitted that the hearing before the DT was a de novo
hearing. The Applicant did not respond to this point.

55.

At the end of the hearing, the DT gave the parties liberty to ask for leave to submit
reply submissions to the other side’s closing submissions. The Applicant did not
ask for leave to respond to these submissions.

56.

As per Rule 23 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules, the Evidence
Act applies to proceedings before the DT in the same manner as it applies to civil
and criminal proceedings.

57.

The position under section 45 of the Evidence Act as set out in Arul Chandran and
Trans-World was later reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Zainal bin Kuning v
Chan Sin Mian Michael [1996] 2 SLR (R) 858 at [69], where it held that a
“judgment determining a fact in one trial cannot be used or relied upon in another

trial”.
58.

This was also

addressed by the Singapore Intemational Court (“SICC”)

in

Beyonics Asia Pacific and others v Goh Chan Peng and another [2020] 4 SLR 215
which, applying Arul Chandran, held at [33] that “evidence of statements made in

an earlier case may be adduced in order to seek to discredit evidence given by a
witness in a later case, but there is an important distinction between reliance upon

statements made in a previous action and conclusions reached by the court in that
previous action on the basis of those statements”.

59.

The SICC also applied Zainal bin Kuning and held at [35] that “a finding of fact in
a previous judgment cannot be relied upon to prove primary facts which have to
be proved in a subsequent action,

60.

Here, although the Respondent was a witness, he was not a party to Suit 45. Neither
was the Applicant. The Applicant has not submitted that any exception to section

45 of the Evidence Act applies.
61.

While there had been an agreement in relation to the documents in the bundles of
documents, it was qualified. On the first day of the hearing, Mr Peter Low for the
Respondent informed the DT that the Respondent agreed to the documents in the
bundles of documents, “subject to cross-examination”. In cross-examination, Mr
Low challenged the assertion that Mdm Liew lacked mental capacity at the material
time and took issue with Dr Ang’s reports and views.

62.

On the question of whether the hearing before the DT was a de novo hearing,
although the Respondent did not cite any authority, his submission is supported by
Re Parti Liyani [2020] SGHC 227 at [48] where the Honourable Chief Justice held
that “the Disciplinary

Tribunal

is obliged

to hear

the matter de novo”.

The

Disciplinary Tribunal in that case accordingly treated the hearing before it as a de
novo hearing: see The Law Society of Singapore v Tan Yanying and another [2022]

SGDT 6 at [20].
63.

In the circumstances, we agree with the Respondent that the Applicant cannot rely
on the findings in the Judgment in Suit 45 to prove the existence or truth of matters
that the Respondent has not admitted or agreed to in this case. We also find that

there was no evidence before us of Mdm Liew’s mental capacity.
THE STANDARD OF PROOF

64.

It is trite that the charges have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: Law Society
of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] 4 SLR 308 at [6].

G.

THE CHARGES

THE FIRST CHARGE
65.

The First Charge is as follows:

That

you,

Teo

Eng

as an advocate
in

section

whilst

you

Thye,

are charged

83(2)(b)(i)
acted

of

with

Supreme

Kelvin

with

Court
the

as the attomey,

Profession

the

for Madam

of the 2 Powers

respectively

improper

and solicitor of the Supreme

preparation
the

with

Legal

Liew

of Attommey
as

client

1966

that,

Fong)

in the

dated 20 November

2017

lodged

and

HC/PA

as

donor

one

Goh

Conduct)

in

(alias Liew

6414/2017

in breach of Rule

(Professional

Fong

Act

HC/PA
the

or practice

Court of Singapore as set out

Profession

Khoon

conduct

and
5(5)(a)

Rules

2015

6417/2017

Yong

Chiang

and 5(5)(b) of the Legal
you

took

instructions

from Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin without ensuring that he had the authority
to give those
evidence

instructions

of such

instructions

from

on behalf of your

authority,
your

you

client

client and

failed

to obtain

regarding

the

when

confirmation

preparation

and

you had no
of the

said

drafting

of

the said Powers of Attorney.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

66.

The Applicant recounts the following: First, the Respondent met Mdm Liew for
the first time only at the Meeting. Second, the Meeting was his first and only
contact with her. Third, he did not, at the 17 November 2017 meeting with Kelvin,

obtain confirmation of Kelvin’s authorisation to act for Mdm Liew in relation to
the POAs.

67.

It is argued that although it became plain to the Respondent during the Meeting
that Mdm Liew was not able to communicate verbally, the Respondent should not
have been satisfied with Mdm Liew’s nods and smile as he went through the POAs

with her, not least because the Respondent accepted that there was a greater need
for him to confirm Kelvin’s instructions with Mdm Liew because Kelvin stood to
benefit from the POAs.

68.

The

Applicant

contended

the following:

First, Mdm

Liew’s

responses

were

insufficient to confirm her instructions. Second, the Respondent did not speak to
her alone to confirm

if Kelvin’s

instructions

were

indeed

hers.

Third,

the

Respondent did not ask her to repeat the instructions that she had allegedly given
to Kelvin. It argued that the Respondent could have asked Mdm Liew to confirm
her instructions by writing them down.

69.

The Respondent relied on the dicta in Law Society of Singapore v K Jayakumar
Naidu [2012] 4 SLR 1232 (“K Jayakumar Naidu”) to contend that solicitors should
not be held to the same “strict protocols appropriate in a business setting” and that

“by and large, family members do not take advantage of each other”.
70.

He

also argued

that there was nothing remarkable

or suspicious about the

circumstances of this case.
Tl.

The Respondent contended that since Kelvin was Mdm Liew’s son, the Respondent
was entitled to assume that Kelvin had the authority to give him instructions on her
behalf. He contended that at the 17 November 2017 meeting he informed Kelvin
that he needed to personally take Mdm

Liew’s instructions and to witness her

execution of the POAs.
72.

The Respondent said that at the Meeting, he took instructions from Mdm Liew
personally, verified Kelvin’s instructions, and also confirmed Mdm Liew’s own
instructions. According to him, after explaining the terms of the POAs, he not only
asked Mdm Liew if she understood what he had said but also asked her why she
wanted to move out and if she wanted to buy a single-storey condominium unit to

live in. He contended that he was satisfied that she possessed mental capacity at
the time.
73.

The Respondent further argued that he witnessed her execution of the POAs,

adding that he even observed her taking off her glasses and reading them before
signing.

74.

The Respondent also argued that he was entitled to rely on Mdm Liew’s nodding
as confirmation of her instructions, and for that purpose relied on section 5(1)(d)
of the Mental Capacity Act (“MCA”). He said that he had used simple language
when explaining the terms of the POAs, that Mdm

Liew was able despite her

physical limitations to sit upright on her own, and that she even took off her glasses

to read the POAs before signing them. He added that if he had stated anything
incorrect, Mdm Liew would have corrected him, just as she was able to correctly
identify the members of her family and even referred to Kelvin by his nickname.

75.

Insofar as section 5(1)(d) of the MCA is concemed, the Applicant’s position was
that nodding is insufficient where, as here, Mdm Liew did not ask any questions or
make any amendments to the POAs.

76.

Both parties relied on a number of authorities, which we have considered. Some of
them were cited for more than one of the charges.

Il.

77.

OUR FINDINGS
Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (the “Act”) concerns, inter

alia, a breach of any rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council.

78.

Rule 5(5) is the subject of the First Charge. That Rule provides that where a legal
practitioner is given instructions purportedly on behalf of his or her client, the legal
practitioner must,

under

Rule

5(5)(a),

ensure that the person

giving

those

instructions has the authority to give those instructions on behalf of the client or,
under Rule 5(5)(b), if there is no evidence of such authority, obtain the client’s

confirmation of those instructions within a reasonable time after receiving those
instructions.

79.

It is alleged that the Respondent breached both Rule 5(5)(a) and Rule 5(5)(b).

80.

Insofar as Rule 5(5)(a) is concerned, it is not in dispute that the Respondent met
Mdm Liew for the first (and only) time on 20 November 2017. That means that the
Respondent was unable to ensure at that meeting that Kelvin had Mdm

Liew’s

authority to give instructions to him in relation to the POAs when he met Kelvin
and Jacqueline on 17 November 2017 and when his assistant secretary emailed, on
his

behalf,

the

drafis

<kjgoh@hotmail.com>

of the

POAs

to Kelvin

at Kelvin’s

email

address

at around 12.28pm on 20 November 2017 requesting that

Kelvin “go thru the drafts and let us have your comments if any”.
81.

However, that does not mean that Rule 5(5)(a) was breached. Rule 5(5)(b) shows
that in cases where it is not possible to obtain evidence of such authority, the
solicitor must obtain the client’s confirmation of those instructions within a
reasonable time after receiving those instructions.

82.

In this case, the Respondent acted reasonably and in compliance with Rule 5(5)(a).
It was the Respondent’s uncontested evidence that at the 17 November 2017
meeting, he told Kelvin to bring Mdm Liew to his office to enable him to take her
instructions and witness her execution of the POAs, and that when Kelvin asked if
there was another way for the Respondent to do that since Mdm Liew was unable
to walk and had trouble speaking, he informed Kelvin that he could visit Mdm
Liew at the Namly Property.

83.

The Meeting was arranged for Monday 20 November 2017, the first working day
after 17 November 2017, which was a Friday. In his contemporaneous note of the

17 November 2017 meeting’, the Respondent recorded “To visit client 20/11/17
evening 5-6pm to the house”.
84.

According to the Respondent, the Meeting was arranged for him to meet Mdm
Liew for the Respondent to take her instructions and witness her execution of the

POAS,
85.

In the circumstances, we do not agree that there was a breach of Rule 5(5)(a).

2see paragraph 10 of the Respondent's AEIC and TAB-I of TET-I
» see paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Respondent's AEIC

86.

The next question we will address is whether at the Meeting, the Respondent had

obtained Mdm Liew’s confirmation of Kelvin’s instructions.
87.

The Court of Appeal’s observations in Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline
(Chee Ping Chian Alexander and another, interveners) [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [60]
on the duty of solicitors who undertake the task of preparing and/or witnessing the
execution of wills are instructive:

“In our view, this case demonstrates that solicitors who undertake the task of
preparing wills and/or witnessing the execution of wills must take the necessary
precautions or steps in order to fulfil their duties to their clients. The precautions
are not complicated nor are they time consuming. In any case, as solicitors, they
must do what is required, however complicated or difficult the task may be. The

central task is to ensure that the terms of the will reflect the wishes of the testator.
How this is done depends on the circumstances of each case. In every case, the
solicitor should be cautious about taking instructions from any person who is to be
named as a beneficiary in the will.”

88.

At [61], the Court of Appeal in the same case reiterated the following points that
were made in Low Ah Cheow v Ng Hock Guan [2009] 3 SLR (R) 1079:

“73.

The preparation of a will involves serious professional responsibilities,

which

solicitors must uncompromisingly

observe and discharge.

Regrettably,

it seems to us that, all too often nowadays, solicitors appear to consider the
preparation of a will to be no more than a routine exercise in form filling.
This is wrong. Before preparing a will, the solicitor concerned ought to have a
thorough

discussion

with

potential complications

the testator on all the possible

legal issues

that might arise in the implementation

and

of the terms

of the will. The solicitor ought to painstakingly and accurately document his
discussions

with

and his instructions from

the

testator.

He

should

also

confirm with the testator, prior to the execution of the will, that the contents

of the will as drafted accurately express the latter’s intention.”

89.

In Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 477 at [95], the

Court of Three Judges held, in relation to a solicitor’s duty when asked to prepare
a Power of Attorney to be executed by the client, that:

“The respondent was obliged to take reasonable care to advise and ensure that the
complainants understood the implications of executing a power of attorney in the
prevailing circumstances”.

90.

In Zan Phuay Khiang at [97], the Court also observed that where “there was a real
possibility that the execution of a power of attorney had not been initiated by the
[clients] themselves, but at a third party's behest instead....it was imperative for

the [solicitor] to have privately met with the [clients] and ensured that the [clients]
were not acting

under any misrepresentation or improper influence and could

communicate with him freely”.
91.

In K Jayakumar Naidu, the Law Society decided not to pursue the charge relating

to the respondent’s failure to advise his client on the nature, purport and
consequence of the Power of Attorney. In that context, the Court of Three Judges

said at [44] and [45]:
“44, The gravamen of the first charge relates to the respondent's alleged failure to
advise HCS on the nature, purport and consequence of the power of attorney.

45, As the Law Society eventually did not pursue this charge we need not dwell on
this save to make the following observation. To require solicitors to hold their

clients’ family members to the same strict protocols appropriate in a business
setting would place them in an untenable attitude of opposition with their clients’
families and would not be in the interest of the client. Nor would it accord with the
common experience that, by and large, family members do not take advantage of
each other. The Law Society was therefore correct in eventually submitting that
there was nothing remarkable or suspicious about the circumstances in which HBS
approached the respondent to prepare the power of attorney. At that stage, he need
not have done anything more than confirm that HCS wanted to sell the flat and that

he wanted HBS to act on his behalf.”

92.

However, the Court also said this at [1]:

“A solicitor should also ensure that the client understands sufficiently any risks
that may arise. This duty is elevated when a solicitor has reason to suspect that

there are special risks or unusual pitfalls involved in the subject transaction.
Naturally, the extent of this duty depends on the precise identity, sophistication and
circumstances of the client: a vulnerable client, such as one who is mentally and/or
physically disadvantaged, uneducated or impecunious, may require comprehensive
and comprehensible advice for even the simplest of matters; in contrast, a client
who is a seasoned businessman
management

team may

or a corporate entity with an in-house risk

be reasonably presumed to have greater situational

awareness. In a similar vein, the extent of the duty will also vary with the client’s
apparent

familiarity

owe

clients

their

advance

with

a

proposed

a fundamental

their client’s interests

duty

and

transaction.

All

of undivided

loyalty

not place

themselves

solicitors
to

also

ethically

in a position

of

conflict.”
Goh Yng Yng Karen v Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin [2021] 3 SLR 896"" held at [119]
that:

“It is well established that what amounts to a transaction that calls for an
explanation is a “fact-sensitive inquiry” where

“much would depend on the

strength of inferences to be drawn from the circumstances”: Moh Tai Siang v Moh
Tai Tong and another /20/8] SGHC 280 at [80]. I note also the observation in
Royal Bank of Scotland ple v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 at [22] citing with
approval the view of Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 185
that a transaction calls for an explanation where
accounted

Sor

on

the

ground

it cannot

“be reasonably

of

Sriendship,

relationship, charity or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act.”

% which is being relied on for the law as set out by the Court

93.

After considering Muriel Chee and Low Ah Cheow, the High Court opined that in
cases involving a solicitor’s duty in connection with a client’s disposal of property
to his or her successors,

there is no material

distinction between

a situation

involving wills and one which involved the making of an inter vivos gift.

94,

In view of these authorities, the question whether there was a breach of Rule 5(5)(b)
is a “fact-sensitive inquiry” where

“much

would depend on the strength of

inferences to be drawn from the circumstances”.

It is important therefore to

consider all the circumstances. In doing that, it must be borne in mind that this case
involved family members (see Jayakumar Naidu). This requires a consideration of
the circumstances leading to and what happened at the Meeting.

95.

The starting point is what the Respondent said happened.

96.

According to the Respondent"", during the meeting on 17 November 2017, Kelvin
informed him that Jacqueline and their family were residing with his mother, Mdm
Liew, at the Namly Property. Furthermore, Mdm Liew had instructed him that she

wanted to move out of the Namly Property as soon as possible for two principal
reasons: First, that as she was wheelchair-bound, it was inconvenient for her to
move up and down the stairs in the Namly Property, as well as to and from her

bedroom to the toilet. Second, that as she spent most of her time at the Namly
Property,

Mdm

Liew

was

affected

by

ongoing

construction

work

in the

neighbouring properties which generated noise, dust, and pollution, causing her
discomfort and affected her sleep during the day. As such, she suggested that she,
Kelvin, and his family move to a single-storey condominium unit where she would
be able to move freely and more independently in her wheelchair. Further, Kelvin,
his family, and their domestic helper would be on the same floor and thus be able

to respond to her needs more easily.
97.

According to the Respondent, at the 17 November 2017 meeting, Kelvin had told
him that Mdm Liew had instructed him to engage a lawyer to prepare two Powers
of Attomey for Kelvin to act on her behalf in the sale of the Namly Property and

8 paragraph 9 of the Respondent's AEIC

the purchase of a single-storey condominium unit. She had also instructed that the
Powers of Attorney should allow for the following:

a.

Kelvin to sell and absolutely dispose of the Namly Property;

b.

Kevin to request for all sale proceeds to be issued to Daniel to be held on
trust for Mdm Liew for the purchase of the single-storey condominium unit.
(Mdm Liew wanted to give the Namly Property to Daniel, her favourite
grandson), and;

c.

Kevin to purchase the single-storey condominium unit in her and Daniel’s
names with the option to include Kelvin as a joint owner.

98.

The Respondent also said that at the 17 November 2017 meeting, Kelvin requested
that

he

prepare

the

Powers

of

Attorney

for

the

sale

of

the

Namly

Property and for the purchase of a single-storey condominium unit.

99.

The Respondent said’ that he also asked Kelvin whether Mdm Liew had a history
of mental illness or had ever been admitted to the Institute of Mental Health
(“IMB”) or any other mental health facilities and Kelvin informed him that Mdm
Liew was in perfect mental health and that he could verify the same after meeting
her. The Respondent also said that he did not sense anything was amiss, given that
he had adult children approaching him on their parents’ behalf before and that
Kelvin had identified himself to the Respondent as a medical doctor. He said he
had trusted Kelvin when he said that Mdm Liew was in perfect mental health and
had never been admitted to IMH or any other mental health facilities. He added
that he was satisfied that he would be able to verify Mdm Liew’s mental capacity

himself and to take her instructions when he met her on 20 November 2017.
100. According to the Respondent, at the Meeting, the Respondent met Mdm
Kelvin, Jacqueline and their two sons were present throughout.

16 paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Respondent's AEIC

Liew.

101.

The Respondent said""? that Kelvin had begun the Meeting by introducing him to
Mdm Liew as the lawyer who he had approached to act for her. The Respondent

explained tv Mdin Liew that he was there because Kelvin had told him that Mdm
Liew had asked Kelvin to engage a lawyer to prepare legal documents to give
Kelvin

the power

to sell the Namly

Property

and purchase

a single-storey

condominium unit, and for the lawyer to act in the sale of the Namly Property and
the purchase of the single-storey condominium unit. Mdm Liew nodded her head
in affirmation of the Respondent’s explanation.

102.

The Respondent also said that upon meeting Mdm Liew, he had introduced himself
and asked for her name. As Mdm

Liew had difficulty speaking audibly, the

Respondent was unable to decipher her response. He then read out Mdm Liew’s
name from her NRIC card, which Daniel handed him. Mdm Liew confirmed her
identity by nodding and smiling.

103.

The Respondent then asked Mdm Liew if she recognised the people around her.
She said yes, and introduced him, one by one, to her family members who were
present, in the following order: Kelvin, Jacqueline, Daniel and David, and lastly
her domestic helper. She was able to softly refer to Kelvin as “Vin”, which the
Respondent understood was her affectionate nickname for him. She also correctly
identified each individual present in the room.

104.

Following the confirmation of Mdm

Liew’s identity, he then asked Mdm Liew

three times if she was comfortable having the Meeting in the presence of Kelvin,
his family members, and the domestic helper. Mdm

Liew nodded her head in

response each time she was asked, indicating that she was comfortable.
105.

The Respondent then proceeded to ascertain if Mdm

Liew possessed mental

capacity by first asking her if she had a history of mental illness or if she had ever
been admitted to IMH or any other mental treatment facilities. In response, Mdm
Liew shook her head, indicating that she did not have a history of mental illness

» paragraphs 21-37 of the Respondent's AEIC

and that she had not ever been admitted to IMH or any other mental treatment
facilities.

106. The Respondent tumed to Kelvin and asked the same questions in Mdm Liew’s

presence. Kelvin confirmed that Mdm Liew had no history of mental illness, nor
had she ever been admitted to IMH or any other mental treatment facilities. The

Respondent proceeded to ask Mdm Liew if she understood the purpose of the
Meeting. Mdm Liew nodded her head, indicating that she understood the purpose
of the Meeting.

107. Throughout their interaction, the Respondent observed that Mdm Liew was fully
alert, and was able to understand and respond to his questions although she was

unable to walk and had difficulty speaking audibly. As such, the Respondent was
satisfied that Mdm Liew possessed mental capacity.

108.

The Respondent asked her if the Namly Property was suitable for her to continue

residing in. In response, Mdm Liew shook her head, indicating that the Namly
Property was not suitable for her to continue residing in. He also asked if the noise

from the construction from the neighbouring properties was one of the reasons why
the Namly Property was no longer suitable for her to live in. Again, Mdm Liew
nodded her head.

109.

The Respondent asked if Mdm Liew had difficulty manoeuvring up and down the
stairs in the Namly Property, and in response, she nodded her head.

110.

He asked Mdm Liew if she wished to move to a single-storey condominium unit to
avoid having to manoeuvre up and down stairs and to avoid the noise from the
neighbouring properties, and Mdm Liew nodded her head again.

111.

The Respondent asked Mdm Liew to confirm that she wished to appoint Kelvin as
her attomey

to

sell

the

Namly

Property

and

to purchase

a single-storey

condominium unit. She nodded. He then proceeded to explain the following, inter
alia, in respect of the POAs to Mdm Liew:

a

He explained to Mdm

Liew that the sale proceeds of the Namly Property

were to be used to purchase a single-storey condominium unit in the joint
names

of herself

and

Daniel.

He

also

explained

the

meaning

and

consequences of Daniel holding the sale proceeds on trust for Mdm Liew. He
further explained that as Daniel was not 21 years of age, his share in the
property would be held on trust by Kelvin and that usually for trust matters,
a separate trust deed would be drafted. However, as at the time of the
execution of the two POAs, the address of the single-storey condominium
unit was not yet known, the trust deed could not yet be drafted;

Q)

The Respondent explained the meaning of joint tenants and tenants-incommon and the implications. To explain the concept of a joint tenancy and
the right of survivorship to Mdm Liew, he employed a hypothetical situation

in which persons A, B and C were joint tenants of a property. He explained
that if A passed away, B and C would be the owners of the entire property.
Likewise, if B passed away, A and C would be owners of the entire property,

and if C passed away, A and B would be owners of the entire property. He
then explained that in a tenancy-in common, each tenant possesses their own
share which can be distributed according to their will or by intestacy;

G3)

He explained that if the sale proceeds of the Namly Property were insufficient
to purchase the single-story condominium unit, Kevin’s name would be
included as a joint tenant for the purposes of obtaining a bank loan to finance
the remaining balance of the purchase price. He then asked Mdm Liew if she
wanted Kelvin’s name to be included as a joint tenant in the event a bank
loan is required to finance the balance purchase price. Mdm Liew nodded,
indicating her assent and that she understood the above. The Respondent then
explained to Mdm Liew that the two POAs had the effect of giving the Namly
Property to Daniel, and asked Mdm Liew if she intended to give the Namly
Property to Daniel. Mdm Liew nodded. He asked Mdm Liew if she intended
to give the Namly Property to David. Mdm Liew shook her head, indicating
that she did not wish to give the Namly Property to David; and

(4)

He said that Kelvin’s consent would be required to revoke the two POAs. He
informed Mdm Liew that the two POAs were irrevocable without written
approval from Kelvin or the Family Justice Courts. He explained that this
meant that Mdm Liew could not withdraw, cancel, or amend the two POAs
after their execution,

and

asked

if she understood.

Mdm

Liew

nodded,

indicating that she understood.

112.

The Respondent said he repeated these explanations twice. Mdm Liew nodded her
head in response to each explanation, indicating that she understood the terms and
the consequences of the two POAs. When the Respondent finished his explanation,

he asked Mdm Liew if she understood what he had said. She nodded her head.
113.

He asked Mdm Liew once more if she wanted to move out of the Namly Property
because it had become inconvenient for her to stay there, and that she wanted to
buy a single storey condominium unit to live in instead. Mdm Liew nodded her
head again.

114.

The Respondent was satisfied that she had mental capacity to sign the two POAs.
He then placed the two POAs in front of Mdm Liew, who removed her glasses and

took some time to read them before signing them in his presence. The Respondent
then affixed his stamp to the two POAs and countersigned against them.

115.

He observed that during the Meeting, Mdm

Liew appeared relaxed, alert and

showed no signs of discomfort or that she was not acting on her own.

116.

We are unable to accept the Respondent’s evidence of what happened during the

Meeting for the following reasons:117.

First, this evidence does not accord with the Respondent’s Attendance Note of the
Meeting which he prepared at around 6.15pm when he retumed to his office after

the Meeting'®. According to the attendance note:

+8 see paragraph 39 of the Respondent's AEIC and TAB 5 of TET-1

a.

Mdm

b.

The Meeting took place between Spm to 5.45pm;

c.

The Meeting concemed “2x Powers of Attorney at 107 NamlyAve”;

d.

The Respondent “saw Mdm Liew around Spm and read the POA to her”;

e.

Liew is recorded as the client;

| “She was aware that her son had told me to come and she had given
instruction to her son”. Her response, if any, was not recorded;

f.

The Respondent “ask{ed] her whether she understand what I was saying
and whether she recognise the people around her”. Mdm Liew’s response,
if any, was not recorded;

g.

| The Respondent “askfed] her whether she was admitted to woodbridge or
mental clinic before, she said No”;

118.

h.

“She said that staying here is inconvenient and want to move out”;

i.

“She was relaxed ... and no sign of oppression or discomfort”; and

j.

“end 5.45pm”.

The Respondent sought to explain the difference between his evidence and the
Attendance Note by saying that the latter did not fully reflect his communications
with Mdm Liew.

119.

While we accept the Attendance Note was not, and could not have been, meant to
be a verbatim note of what was said at the Meeting, the fact is that the Respondent
‘was conscious of the need to have a contemporaneous record of what he considered
to be the main and important aspects of the Meeting. Further, the fact that he
prepared it immediately after the Meeting meant that his memory of the Meeting

was fresh at that time.

120.

The disparity between his evidence about the Meeting and what is said in the
Attendance Note is simply too huge to be credibly accounted for.

121,

According to the Attendance Note, the Respondent “read the POA to her”. There
is nothing about him explaining the POAs (let alone more than once) in the manner
that he claimed in his evidence. There is also nothing in the Attendance Note about

him explaining the nature and effect of the POAs to Mdm Liew. The Applicant
submitted that the Respondent accepted that he did not say any of this in his
affidavit of evidence-in-chief in Suit 45 (his “45 AEIC”).

122.

In his Defence, the Respondent also claimed that he explained the nature and
consequences of joint ownership of the Condominium Unit by Mdm Liew, Kelvin
and Daniel. This was not in the Attendance Note. The Applicant submitted that the

Respondent did not say this in his 45 AEIC.
123. The

Respondent

also

took

the

position

that

he

explained

the

meaning

and consequences of Daniel holding the sale proceeds of the Namly Property
on trust for Mdm

Liew and that as Daniel was below 21 years of age, his

share in the property would be held on trust by Kelvin.

This was not in the

Attendance Note. The Applicant submitted that this was different from what the
Respondent said in his 45 AEIC where the Respondent said that he explained that
the sale proceeds would be held by Daniel on trust for her to purchase the

Condominium Unit.
124,

As the Applicant pointed out, the Respondent’s own understanding of the legal
effect of the 2 POA was inaccurate and that Kelvin could, at his own discretion,

add himself as a joint tenant to the purchase of the Condominium Unit. It was also
not correct that Kelvin would be added as a joint tenant to the purchase of the
Condominium Unit only if there were insufficient funds to finance the purchase the
Condominium Unit from the sale proceeds of the Namly Property.

125.

According to the Attendance Note, Mdm Liew “was aware that her son had told
me to come and she had given instruction to her son”. However, her response, if
there was any, was not recorded. This also begged the question whether she

understood what the Respondent was talking about when he said that “she had

given instructions to her son”.
126,

The Attendance Note also said that the Respondent “ask/ed/ her whether she
understand what I was saying and whether she recognise the people around her”.
This presents a particular difficulty because the POAs had unusual clauses and

features that gave rise to various issues that needed very careful explanation,
particularly to an 87 year old lay person who could not readily interact because of
her speaking difficulties.

127.

In fact, it was not just the nature, terms, and implications of the two POAs which
required careful explanation but also the issues arising from the interaction between
the two POAs. They raised, inter alia, the following issues or concerns:

a.

The concept of joint tenancy;

b.

That Mdm

Liew would be making an inter-vivos gift to Daniel to the

exclusion of others;

c.

How that intention could still be fulfilled if Kelvin included his name in the
purchase of the Condominium Unit;

d.

The fact that she could not on her own change her mind;

e.

That Daniel was a minor (the Respondent knew that Daniel was about 19

years old at the time!® and cannot be a trustee);
£.

What the terms of the trust would be and how would they affect Mdm Liew
and her rights;

39 NE dated 25 February 2020, page 79, line 16, Tab 19 of Exhibit KG-I at page 720

g. | What would happen if after the Namly Property was sold, complications
arose in relation to the purchase of the Condominium Unit e.g., because
Daniel refused to allow the sale proceeds to be used, and;

h.

The fact that Kelvin could choose to be one of the purchasers of the
Condominium Unit at a consideration of his own choosing, which might

create a conflict of interest.
128. Mdm

Liew was

87 years old at the time. She had difficulty speaking. The

Respondent should not only have carefully explained these matters but should also
have asked if they were in line with her wishes and instructions and how she
thought they were in her interests, including asking why she felt that it was in her
interest for the POAs to be irrevocable by her. In this connection, the Applicant
pointed out that it was the Respondent’s evidence in his 45 AEIC that Mdm Liew
did not provide reasons for the POAs to be irrevocable and he did not see any
necessity to ask her about that.

129,

If Mdm Liew was unable to communicate her understanding verbally or in writing,
then the Respondent should have called for a pause and asked for her condition to

be reviewed by an independent medical expert or declined to act:-

a.

The fact that Mdm Liew nodded when the Respondent read the POAs to her,
in light of these particular POAs that he was asked to draft by Kelvin and the
fact that one of them dealt with the disposal of her home, should not have
been accepted by the Respondent as evidence that she understood their terms,
nature and consequences; and

b.

The fact that she did not ask any questions in light of the issues and concerns
referred to above should have raised a red flag.

130. The Respondent said that because his 45 AEIC was drafted for a different purpose
from present proceedings, it did not contain as many details as his AEIC in these
proceedings. We are unable to accept that. Although he was not a party to Suit 45,
the question whether the Respondent properly explained the POAs to Mdm Liew

at the Meeting and whether she executed the two POAs with a full understanding
of their terms and effect was an important issue of fact in that case. Therefore, it
would have been important for the Respondent to be as comprehensive as possible
in his evidence at the High Court Trial about what happened at the Meeting.

131.

The Respondent also did not take steps to meet Mdm Liew privately and without
the presence of Kelvin and Daniel, who stood to benefit from the POAs, and their
family members

to determine whether Mdm

Liew was not acting under any

misrepresentation, misapprehension, or improper influence. The Respondent also

did not ask Mdm Liew whether the POAs accorded with her wishes under any will.
In this connection, we were shown photos of the Meeting that were taken by
Jacqueline which showed that Kelvin stood or sat in front of Mdm Liew, to her
right, and that David and Daniel stood directly in front of Mdm

Liew”, The

proximity was vexing and should have alerted the Respondent to insist on a private
meeting with Mdm Liew.

132.

If the Respondent’s account of what he did at the Meeting is correct, then the
Meeting could not have taken around 45 minutes (around Spm to 5.45pm).

133.

We note that the Respondent’s evidence in these proceedings about what he
claimed to have explained to Mdm Liew was given after he would have read the
High Court’s decision in Goh Yng Yng Karen, where he gave evidence and findings
were made about him and his conduct, and which highlighted what he omitted to
do at the Meeting.

134. In coming to these findings, we were conscious of the obiter dicta in K Jayakumar
Naidu which has been referred to above about family settings. However, even
there,

the

Court

recognised

that

there

may

be

remarkable

or

suspicious

circumstances or situations where family members may seek to take advantage of
each other. We are satisfied that for the reasons set out above, including the unusual
clauses and features of the POAs, Kelvin and Daniel’s benefits as well as the fact

% photos at Tab 21 KG-I at pages 804-806 of the Complainant's AEIC

that Mdm Liew could not by herself revoke the POAs, this situation called for

special vigilance and care.
135.

We are unable to agree with the Respondent’s position on the MCA”!,

136.

Section 4 of the MCA states that a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if
at the material time the person is unable to make a decision for himself or herself
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or
brain. Section 5(1)(d) of the MCA provides that for the purposes of section 4, a

person is unable to make a decision for himself or herself if the person is unable to
communicate his or her decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any
other means).

137.

All that section 5(1)(d) does is to list visual illustrations of when it can be said that
a person is unable to make a decision for herself. It does not say, and does not
amount to legislative endorsement, that if a person can communicate by sign
language or other means, she is able to make a decision for herself. The latter does

not flow from the former.
138.

We are also unable to accept the Respondent’s reliance on evidence of other events
involving Mdm Liew which, according to him, show that Mdm Liew had mental

capacity. As he accepted”, he did not know about these other events at the Meeting.
139,

In coming to our decision, we have not had any regard to the question of whether

Mdm Liew had mental capacity at the material time. Unlike Suit 45, where expert
evidence was led, there was no expert evidence on that issue before us.

140.

In the circumstances, we find that the Respondent breached Rule 5(5)(b) as alleged
in the First Charge.

2 paragraph 121 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions
2 paragraph 107 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions

THE SECOND CHARGE

141,

The Second Charge is as follows:

That you, Teo

Eng Thye, are charged with improper conduct or practice

as an advocate

and solicitor of the Supreme

in

section

83(2)(b)(i)

of

the

whilst you acted for Madam

Legal

Court of Singapore

Profession

Liew Khoon

Act

as set out

1966

in

that,

Fong (alias Liew Fong) in the

preparation of the 2 Powers of Attorney dated 20 November 2017 lodged
with

the

Supreme

respectively
Kelvin

with

Court
the

HC/PA

6414/2017

and

HC/PA

as

donor

and

one

Goh

in breach of Rule

5(2)(c)

of the Legal

Profession

Rules

failed

to

with

reasonable

to your

client,

client

as the attorney,

(Professional

Conduct)

diligence

competence

and

that you permitted

as

your

the

2015

in the

you

provision

client to execute

act

of services

the said

6417/2017

Yong

Powers

Chiang

in

of Attorney

without first taking sufficient steps to satisfy yourself that your client understood
the nature and effect of the terms that were set out in the said Powers of Attorney.

142. Under Rule 5(2)(c), a legal practitioner must act with reasonable diligence and
competence in the provision of services to the client.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

143.

According to the Applicant, solicitors breach their duty to advance their clients’
interests with diligence and competence if they fail to advise on the issues peculiar
to the matter at hand and to ensure that the client understands any risks that may
arise: K Jayakumar Naidu at [1].

144,

The Applicant argued that there was a breach of Rule 5(2)(c) on two grounds: first,
that the Respondent failed to ascertain that Mdm

Liew had sufficient mental

capacity to make a decision with respect to the POAs;

and second, that the

Respondent failed to render proper advice for Mdm Liew to understand her position
and the risks with respect to the nature and effect of the POAs.

145.

The Respondent’s position on the first ground was that there was no evidence of

mental incapacity and that in any event he relied both on his own independent and
in-person assessment that Mdm Liew was mentally competent as well as Kelvin’s
confirmation that Mdm

Liew was mentally competent. The Respondent’s own

assessment of Mdm Liew’s mental capacity was based on the fact that Mdm Liew
was able to communicate by nodding her head.
146.

With regard to his position on the second ground, the Respondent maintained that
he acted consistently with his duties.

Il.

OUR FINDINGS

147.

For the reasons set out under our discussion in relation to the First Charge, we find
that the Respondent breached Rule 5(2)(c) as alleged in the Second Charge.

148.

However, we should add that because the offending conduct in First Charge and
the Second Charge is the same, our finding under the Second Charge does not, in
our view, add anything to the Respondent's culpability.

THIRD CHARGE
149. That

you,

Teo

Eng

Thye,

are

charged

with

improper

conduct

or practice

as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore as set out
in section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.
in breach
Rules

of Rule

2015,

you

5(2)(c)

of the Legal

failed

act with

to

Profession

reasonable

161)

1966 in that,

(Professional

diligence

and

Conduct)

competence

in the provision of services to your client Madam Liew Khoon Fong (alias Liew
Fong) by failing to take sufficient steps to safeguard the interests of your client by
ensuring that you received your instructions and explained the nature and effect of
the 2 Powers of Attorney dated 20 November 2017 lodged with the Supreme Court
as HC/PA 6414/2017 and HC/PA 6417/2017 respectively with the client as the

donor and one Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin as the attorney, to the client without the
presence of the attomey

or other family members

of the attorney so as to

avoid any undue influence being exerted over the client.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
150. The Applicant contended that the Respondent should have met Mdm
explained the POAs,

Liew,

and taken her instructions in Kelvin’s and his family’s

absence. Kelvin and Daniel were beneficiaries and the Respondent should have

been concerned that Mdm Liew could not have been able to communicate her
wishes in front of them. It relied on Jayakumar [68] and Tan Puay Khiang [97].

151.

The Respondent argued that he had asked Mdm Liew thrice if the Meeting could
proceed in the presence of Kelvin and his family. He said that Kelvin was, after all,

Mdm Liew’s son and his family were her family members. He contended that he
observed that Mdm Liew appeared relaxed, alert and showed no signs that she was
not acting on her own free will.

IL

OUR FINDINGS

152.

Rule 5(2)(c) has been set out above.

153.

In our discussion above under the First Charge, we said that all the circumstances
had to be considered. The allegation that the Respondent should have received his
instructions and explained the POAs without the presence of the attorney or other
family members of the attorney cannot be viewed in isolation and was just one of
the matters

that has to be taken

into account

in determining

whether

the

Respondent breached his duties. We are not satisfied that a charge based only on
this one aspect of his conduct is sufficient to amount to a breach of Rule 5(2)(c).

154,

In the circumstances, we dismiss this charge.

TH C)

GI

155.

That

you,

Teo

Eng

Thye,

are charged

with

as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme

improper

you

acted

Yong

Chiang

Kelvin

Ardmore

Park

for

Madam
and Goh

#36-02,

Liew
Sok

Singapore

Khoon

Ngoh

1966 (Cap.
Fong

Jacqueline

259962,

or practice

Court of Singapore as set out

in section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act
whilst

conduct

where

(alias

161) in that,
Liew

Fong),

in the purchase

there

was

of 1

a diversity

of

interests that existed between the parties, you failed to advance Mdm Liew Khoon
Fong’s (alias Liew Fong) interests unaffected by the interest of Goh Yong Chiang
Kelvin and/or Goh Sok Ngoh Jacqueline, by removing Mdm Liew’s name from
the

Option

property,

to

which

Purchase

dated

is a breach

1

December

of Rule

20(5)

2017
and

in respect
Rule

20(6)

of the

said

of the

Legal

Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015.

THE PARTIES’ POSTIONS
156.

The Applicant argued that the Respondent’s position that he was acting only for
Kelvin in the purchase of the Condominium Unit is mistaken because he admitted
that he was acting for Kelvin, Jacqueline and Mdm Liew when the Condominium
OTP

was

exercised.

This was

also seen in his letter of 8 December

2017 to

SterlingLaw when the Condominium OTP was exercised”. He therefore was under
an obligation to inform Mdm Liew, his client, when her name was removed as a
purchaser of the Condominium Unit.

157.

It contended

that a diversity

of interests arose when

Kelvin

instructed the

Respondent to remove Mdm Liew’s name as a purchaser and that that removal was
to Mdm

Liew’s disadvantage and conversely to the advantage of Kelvin and

Jacqueline. Further, as the Respondent would have been aware that Kelvin’s

instructions conflicted with the 2™ POA, he should have directly informed Mdm
Liew of Kelvin’s instructions, which would result in Mdm Liew losing her most

significant asset, the Namly Property”*.

® paragraphs 76, 77 and 78 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions
» paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions

158.

The Complainant testified that the Respondent should have informed Mdm Liew,
his client, that her name was to be removed under the Amended Condominium
Ol? and that as a result, she would no longer own a property under her name. The
Respondent should also have ceased to act in the conveyancing transaction or
ceased to act for Mdm Liew and obtain her informed consent, in writing, for him

to continue to act in the conveyancing transaction».
159,

Instead, the Respondent sent the 24 January 2018 letter to seek the vendor’s
consent for Mdm Liew’s name to be removed although he was aware that Mdm

Liew might be prejudiced”®.
160.

The Respondent made the same arguments for the Fourth Charge and the Fifth
Charge.

161. He denied there was a conflict of interests in representing Mdm Liew, Kelvin and
Jacqueline because Mdm Liew received fair consideration for the sale of the Namly
Property. Thus, there was common

interest among

the three to purchase the

Condominium Unit for the family’s residential purposes and Kelvin and Jacqueline
became the Respondent's clients as purchasers of the Condominium Unit only after
the original plan to purchase that unit under the terms of the 2"" POA, read with the

1° POA, was aborted”’,
162. He argued that the Option to Purchase that was exercised on 8 December 2017 was
not exercised pursuant to the 2"" POA. By that time, he had been told that the
“money most likely will not come in”, In any event, the 2"" POA was contingent on
the sale proceeds of the sale of the Namly Property being used to purchase the
Condominium Unit’. He was also of the view that, as Mdm Liew would no longer
be a party to the purchase of the Condominium Unit, there would be no prejudice

%5 paragraph 109 of the Complainant's AEIC
28 paragraph 89 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions
» paragraphs 146 and 154 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions
% paragraph 156 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions

to her and as such there was no need for him to cease acting for Mdm Liew or the

others as there was no conflict of interests”.
163. The Respondent also contended that, since he believed that the POAs were valid
and enforceable, he was entitled to take instructions from Kelvin as Mdm Liew’s

attomney in the purchase of the Condominium Unit.>° He also pointed out that the
proceeds of sale were to be used for the purchase of a single-storey condominium

unit and the 2™ POA did not specify any particular address of that unit.""
164. The Respondent said that when he wrote the letter dated 24 January 2018 to
SterlingLaw, he acted in his capacity as Kelvin’s solicitor in the purchase of the
Condominium Unit. This, according to him, was because the Complainant had
commenced Suit 45 against Kelvin who had informed him that Mdm Liew would
no longer be a party to the purchase of the Condominium Unit which would be
purchased in the names of Kelvin and Jacqueline, that that purchase would be

financed by his and Jacqueline’s own savings and that he wanted the Respondent to

act for Kelvin and Jacqueline in the purchase of the Condominium Unit®?.
165.

The Respondent also said that as the 2014 LPA had not been activated at the time,

there was no need to inform Mdm Liew of the removal of her name, the non-

inclusion of Daniel’s name, and the inclusion of Jacqueline’s name*>.
Il.

OURFINDINGS

166. Rules 20(5) and 20(6) provide that where a legal practitioner acts for 2 or more
different parties in a matter or transaction, and a diversity of interests arises between
those parties during the course of the retainer for the matter or transaction, he or she
must throughout the remainder of the course of the retainer for the matter or
transaction continue to be vigilant of any conflict or potential conflict between the

?° paragraph 146 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions
® paragraph 140 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions

3 paragraphs 140 and 142 of the Respondent’s Closing Submissions
® paragraphs 58 and 59 of the Respondent's AEIC
® paragraphs 141 and 142 of the Respondent's Closing Submissions

interests of any of the relevant parties and inform each relevant party in the matter
or transaction if, in the course of the retainer, the legal practitioner has difficulty in

advising on and dealing with the relevant parties’ divergent interests competently,
evenly and consistently.

167. The following discussion is on the assumption that there was in law a solicitor-client

relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Liew. We will come back to that
below.

168. Before 24 January 2018, when the Respondent wrote to SterlingLaw to say that his
clients intended to withdraw Mdm

Liew’s name

from the purchase of the

Condominium Unit, he had been aware of the letters from Templars Law to
WongPartnership dated 15 December 2017, 22 December 2017, 5 January 2018 and
10 January 2018.

169. The Respondent was also aware of the following: First, the Complainant claimed to

be the sole donee under the 2014 LPA, and that she claimed that Kelvin had moved
Mdm Liew to an unknown location. Second, Dr Ang had issued a medical report
which said that Mdm Liew was suffering from dementia which started around the

middle of 2017**. Third, the Complainant’s position was that the 1‘ POA was
invalid and unenforceable, that Mdm Liew lacked the mental capacity to decide to
sell the Namly Property, and that her lawyers had asked that the sale be stopped and
had asked WongPartnership if they had instructions to accept service of process on

behalf of their client.
170. He therefore found himself in a position where, in acting for Mdm Liew, Kelvin
and Jacqueline, he had secured for her an interest in the Condominium Unit and
Kelvin was now asking him to divest one of his clients of her interest. Those
instructions could not have been given under the POAs meant to facilitate the sale
of the Namly Property and the purchase, with Mdm Liew being one of the buyers,
of a single-storey condominium unit. The Respondent would also have known that

* page 1070 of the Complainant's AEIC

the fact that Daniel’s name was not added to the Condominium OTP was not
consistent with Mdm Liew’s alleged intention to make a gift to him.
171. Further, he had been put on notice of the matters in Templars Law’s letters. He
would have known that, should the 1 POA be said to be invalid because of Mdm
Liew’s alleged mental condition, that would also call into question the validity of

the 2"" POA which was signed at the same time.
172. He therefore found himself in a position where if the POAs were valid, and he
withdrew Mdm Liew’s name, he would affect her interests. If the POAs were not
valid, he could not act on Kelvin’s instructions, which were purportedly given under
the POAs, to remove her name.

173. In these circumstances, he was under a duty to check the position with Mdm Liew
to ensure that there was no divergence of interests between her on the one hand and
Kelvin and his family, on the other. He was under a duty to satisfy himself that she
continued, after the POAs, to have the mental capacity to instruct him in the sale of
the Namly Property and the purchase of the Condominium Unit, as well as ask Mdm
Liew if the purchase in Kelvin, Jacqueline and her names was consistent with her

intention to make a gift to Daniel, and whether she agreed with giving up her interest
in the Condominium Unit. If the Respondent had not been given access to her or
was unable to properly obtain instructions, he should have ceased acting for all his

clients.
174, However, this does not mean that the Fourth Charge has been made out.
175. These Rules, and the Fourth Charge, are premised on there being a retainer and a

solicitor-client relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Liew at the material
time. In fact, the Applicant’s Closing Submissions emphasise the Respondent’s

duty to his “client”.

% see eg paragraph 88

176. It is not the Applicant’s case that the Rules apply even where there is no retainer

but that a solicitor believed that there was one.
177. If, as is the Complainant’s case, the POAs were null and void, and the High Court
in Suit 45 has found them to be null and void, then the question which arises is

whether there was in law a solicitor-client relationship between the Respondent and
Mdm Liew after she signed the POAs which have been found by the High Court to
be null and void.
178. The fact that he informed SterlingLaw that he acted for Mdm Liew and that he

purported to act for Mdm Liew when the Condominium OTP was accepted and
thereafter does not mean that there was that relationship in law or that in law, he
had been retained by her.
179. As this issue was not addressed by either the Applicant or the Respondent, at a posthearing conference on 19 July 2022, we raised this for the parties to consider their

positions on it since it affected the 4"" to 7"" Charges. We asked the Applicant’s
counsel whether it wished to proceed with these charges. The Applicant’s counsel
said that he will consider the matter and take instructions and get back to us. The
Respondent’s counsel said that he did not address this point because of an oversight.
180. By a letter dated 26 July 2022, the Applicant’s counsel said that the Applicant would
like to proceed on these charges. In that letter, the Applicant’s counsel referred to
Mahidon Nichiar bte Mohd Ali and others v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin [2015] 5
SLR

62 and the disciplinary proceedings which followed

from that decision,

reported as The Law Society of Singapore v Harjeet Singh [2016] SGDT 9. He
argued that in light of these cases, the Applicant was of the view that there “could
still be a breach” of the relevant Rules referred to in these charges.
181. With respect, we are unable to see how either case is of assistance. In Mahidon,
there was a solicitor-client relationship between the appellants and the solicitor
before the deed in issue, i.e., the RBI Deed, came to be executed: see [17]. It was in
that context that the Court of Appeal considered the scope of the solicitor’s duties

and whether he had breached them. Those findings had no impact on the solicitor-

client relationship. Unlike the present case, it was not a situation where the
solicitor’s authority was based on the very document which the solicitor was found
not to have properly advised.
182. As we set out above, the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. We are not
satisfied that the Applicant has discharged that burden to show that even though the
POAs have been found to be null and void, there continued thereafter to be a
solicitor-client relationship in law between the Respondent and Mdm Liew.
183.

For these reasons, we dismiss the Fourth Charge.

EIFTH CHARGE
184. That you,

Teo

Eng

Thye,

are charged

with

improper

conduct

or practice

as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore as set out in section
83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 in that, whilst you acted for Madam
Liew Khoon Fong (alias Liew Fong) in the purchase of 1 Ardmore Park #36-02,
Singapore 259962, you failed to inform the client of all information known to you
that may reasonably affect the interests of the client in respect of the purchase of 1
Ardmore Park #36-02, Singapore 259962 in particular of the removal of her name,
the non-inclusion of the name of Daniel Goh Eng Sheng and the inclusion of the
name of Goh Sok Ngoh Jacqueline from the Option to Purchase dated 1 December
2017 in respect of the said property, which is a breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the Legal
Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015.

I.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

185. The Applicant argued that the Respondent had failed to inform Mdm Liew that her
instructions under the 2 POA were not being followed by Kelvin, the attorney,
because the Condominium Unit was purchased with Jacqueline and not Daniel. It
also argued that the Respondent had assumed a

responsibility to Mdm

purchase the Condominium Unit,

% paragraphs 89 and 94 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions

Liew to

186. The Respondent made the same arguments as he did in relation to the Fourth
Charge.

I.

QUR FINDINGS

187. Rule 5(2)(b) has been set out above.

188. This charge is premised on there being a solicitor-client relationship between the
Respondent and Mdm Liew at the time of the alleged failure.

189. For the reasons set out under the Fourth Charge in relation to whether the Applicant
has

discharged

its burden

to show

that there was

in law

a solicitor-client

relationship, we dismiss this charge.
SIXTH CHARGE

190, That

you,

Teo

Eng

Thye,

are

charged

with

improper

conduct

or practice

as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore as set out in section

83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 in that, whilst you acted for Madam
Liew Khoon Fong (alias Liew Fong) in the preparation, execution and registration
of 2 Powers of Attorney dated 20 November 2017 lodged with the Supreme Court
as HC/PA 6414/2017 and HC/PA

6417/2017 respectively with the client as the

donor and one Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin as the attorney, you failed to inform the
client of all information known to you that may reasonably affect the interests of
the client in respect of the said Powers of Attorney in particular of the medical report
prepared by Dr Ang Yong Guan dated 30 December 2017 and correspondence from
Templars Law LLC dated 12 February 2018 relating to the alleged lack of mental
capacity of the client as at the time of execution of the said Powers of Attorney,
which is a breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)

Rules 2015.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
191. The Applicant contended that the Respondent knew from correspondence which

was forwarded to him that the Complainant had challenged Mdm Liew’s mental

capacity*’, It argued that the Respondent was privy to the Dr Ang’s medical report
dated 30 December

2017 which

said that Mdm

significantly deteriorated since the middle of 2017

Liew’s mental

capacity had

and of the Complainant’s

complaint that Kelvin had concealed Mdm Liew from her’®.
192. The Applicant contends that, in spite of the above, the Respondent failed to inform

Mdm Liew of this challenge and instead informed Kelvin*®.
193. The Applicant further said that the Respondent should have been put on notice of
the possibility that Mdm Liew was suffering from dementia which started around

the middle of 2017 and did not inform her of that to obtain her instructions. It was
wrong for the Respondent to assume that the Complainant’s concerns were entirely

without substance and did not even consider that there was a risk that Mdm Liew
had not authorised Kelvin to find a lawyer to prepare the POAs and yet proceeded

to forward the correspondence to Kelvin®,
194, The Respondent argued that when he received the letter dated 10 January 2018 from

WongPartnership, he forwarded it to Kelvin, who was Mdm Liew’s attorney, to ask
if there had been a change in Mdm Liew’s mental capacity since the Meeting.

Kelvin denied that there was any change*"".
195. Insofar as Templars Law’s letter dated 12 February 2018 was concemed, the
Respondent maintained that as the information sought was protected by solicitor-

client privilege and as the Respondent was of the opinion that the 2014 LPA had

» paragraph 100 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions
%* paragraphs 98 and 104 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions
%° paragraph 100 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions

“ paragraph 108 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions
* paragraph 158 of the Respondent’s Closing Submissions

not been properly activated, there was no need for him to respond and therefore no

need for him to take Mdm Liew’s instructions on that letter.
i.

OUR FINDINGS

196. Rule 5(2)(b) has been set out above.

197. This charge is premised on there being a solicitor-client relationship between the
Respondent and Mdm Liew at the time of the alleged failure.
198. For the reasons set out under the Fourth Charge in relation to whether the Applicant

has discharged

its burden to show that there was in law a solicitor-client

relationship, we dismiss this charge.
SEVENTH CHARGE

199. That

you,

Teo

Eng

Thye,

are

charged

with

in the

discharge

of your

advocate

and

solicitor

advocate

and

solicitor of the Supreme

section

83(2)(h)

whilst

you had

of
acted

the

Legal

for Madam

misconduct

unbefitting

professional

of an

duties

as

an

Court of Singapore as set out in
Profession

Liew

Khoon

Act
Fong

1966

in

(alias Liew

that,

Fong)

in

respect of the matters that were the subject-matter of Suit No 45 of 2018,
where

in

Chiang

the

said

Kelvin

Suit

was

a

your

client was

defendant,

the

you

plaintiff and

failed

to

advance

one

Goh

her

Yong

interests

unaffected by the interests of Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin, by failing to take the

instructions
subpoena

by

of your

client or her donee

the

acting

solicitors

for

when

your

you

client

in

instead taking the instructions of Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin.

L

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

were

served

the

said

with
Suit

a
and

200. The Applicant argued that whether the Respondent complied with the subpoena is

irrelevant to this charge“. It said that the Respondent should not have sought
instructions in relation to the subpoena from Kelvin because he had no authority to
make decisions and act for Mdm Liew with respect to the subpoena. Further, since
Kelvin was a defendant in Suit 45, it was improper for the Respondent to take advice

from Kelvin’s solicitors*.
201.

The Complainant said“ that the Respondent had conceded during the hearing before
the Inquiry Committee (Transcript dated 25 March 20121 page 56) that he should

have taken instructions from Mdm Liew and not from Kelvin, who was represented
by Drew & Napier. She also said that the Respondent did not advance Mdm Liew’s

interests as he disclosed the subpoena to Kelvin and obtained advice from Kelvin’s
lawyers as to the manner in which he should comply with the subpoena, even though

Kelvin was a defendant in Suit 45. She said that since the Respondent had received
the 2014 LPA by then, he should have known that Kelvin had no authority to make
decisions and act for Mdm Liew with respect to the subpoena.

202. The Respondent argued that he believed that he was entitled to take instructions
from

Kelvin

and/or his solicitors because

Kelvin was

a party to Suit 45, the

documents that were requested were protected by solicitor-client privilege and that
the POAs were valid and enforceable. Further, because Suit 45 was to determine
whether Mdm Liew had mental capacity, he continued to take instructions from

Kelvin**.
IL.

OUR FINDINGS

203.

Section 83 (2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 states that due cause may be
shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor has been guilty of such misconduct
unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a

member of an honourable profession.

2 paragraph 113 of the Applicant's Closing Submissions

* paragraph 115 of the Applicant’s Closing Submissions
“ paragraphs 145 and 146 of the Complainant's AEIC

*5 paragraphs 167 and 170 of the Respondent’s Closing Submissions

204. We do not agree that this Charge has been made out.
205. When the Respondent was served with a subpoena, his interests were potentially
divergent from those of the Complainant, who was representing Mdm Liew. Suit
45 was an action to nullify the POAs. The Respondent’s conduct was going to be

squarely in issue, and he would likely be criticised. In our view, he was fully entitled
to speak to whoever he wished, including Kelvin and any law firm which felt able

to advise him on his own position and exposure.
206. We disagree with the assertion that the Respondent should have taken instructions
from

Mdm

Liew,

who

was

effectively the plaintiff in Suit 45, through the

Complainant who initially acted pursuant to the 2014 LPA and later as executrix of
Mdm Liew’s estate, and therefore on the other side of the Suit.

207. There is another reason we do not agree that this charge has been made out. This
charge is premised

on there being a

solicitor-client relationship between the

Respondent and Mdm Liew at the time of the alleged failure.
208. For the reasons set out under the Fourth Charge in relation to whether the Applicant
has

discharged

its burden

to show

that there was

in law a

solicitor-client

relationship, we dismiss this charge.

CONCLUSION

209. In conclusion, we find that the First and Second Charges have been made out. We

dismiss the remaining Charges.
210. In considering whether cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists, we
have had regard to the fact that it was not the Applicant’s case and was not put to

the Respondent that he acted with any deliberation, dishonesty, or for improper
motives. It appears from the Respondent’s evidence that he appears to have been
influenced about the scope of his obligations by the small fee that he would eam
from preparing and attending to the execution of the POAs. That was an unfortunate

24th

",2023-06-10T04:00:28+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2023/,"In the Matter of Teo Eng Thye (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2023/",1049
2,c94496223939eaecba1cac0ab5c95aae23200a72,"In the Matter of Carolyn Tan Beng Hui (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Carolyn Tan Beng Hui (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

On or about 2 May 2017, sale proceeds from the sale of a residential property were deposited with the Respondent’s law firm, Tan & Au LLP (TALLP). The property was registered to Seo Puay Guan (SPG), who was one of seven siblings. The other siblings had alleged that SPG held the property on trust for their late mother, and each claimed an interest in the balance sale proceeds.


TALLP filed interpleader proceedings in Originating Summons No. 1100 of 2017 (OS 1100) with the seven siblings as respondents. OS 1100 was fixed for hearing for three days from 12-14 September 2018 before Dedar Singh Gill JC (as he then was) (the JC) where SPG was cross-examined on 12 September 2018 and 13 September 2018.

The learned JC asked the counsels to attend in his physical chambers to deal with house-keeping matters. The attendance in chambers concluded shortly after noon on 13 September 2018, and at 1.22pm, TALLP filed SUM 4260 of 2018 in OS 1100 (the Recusal Application) for the learned JC to recuse himself from further hearing the proceedings.

The Respondent filed an affidavit in support the next day (the Recusal Affidavit) which contained allegations against other legal practitioners without letting them have the opportunity to respond to the said allegations. The Respondent had also made further statements against the learned JC in the Recusal Affidavit which was disrespectful to the Court.

The recusal application was heard on 25 September 2018 before the learned JC and was dismissed. An affidavit opposing the application was filed by the late David Kong who was the solicitor for three of the siblings. The Respondent took umbrage at statements made in David Kong’s affidavit and filed a police report accusing him of perjury.

The solicitors for the siblings of SPG jointly made a complaint to the Law Society.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Tan Chuan Thye SC and Mr Chong Yee Leong as DT member to investigate the complaint.

The following charges were preferred against the Respondent:

Under DT 6 of 2019

First Charge

For breaching Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR) in permitting an affidavit to be filed on behalf of TALLP in HC/OS 1100/2017 which contained allegations against other legal practitioners without allowing them an opportunity to respond to the said allegations.

Second Charge (Alternative Second Charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA)

For breaching Rule 13(2) of the PCR in being disrespectful of the Court in the making of certain statements in respect of the learned JC in an affidavit filed in HC/OS 1100/2017.

Under DT 6A of 2019

First Charge (Alternative First Charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA)

For breaching Rule 13(2) of the PCR in filing or causing to be filed documents against the Court’s directions and orders, which are discourteous of a Court.

Second Charge (Alternative Second Charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA)

For breaching Rule 29 of the PCR in having permitted documents to be filed on behalf of TALLP in HC/OS 1100/2017 containing allegations against other legal practitioners without allowing them an opportunity to respond to the said allegations.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT’s findings are summarised below:



The DT cited dicta by Andrew Phang JA in China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 509 and Law Society of Singapore v Tan Buck Chye Dave [2007] 1 SLR(R) 581 to remind counsels that “… one can disagree and yet not be disagreeable…” and that there should be “… more civility within the legal profession itself …” and “… more camaraderie within the profession …”.

Council accepted the findings and recommendations of the DT, and imposed a financial penalty of S$10,000 on the Respondent.

Dissatisfied, the Respondent sought to review and set aside the decision of the Council to impose a financial penalty of S$10,000 in HC/OS 432/2021 (OS 432). The Judge in OS 432 found that the penalty imposed was appropriate and justifiable.

The Respondent appealed against the decision of the Judge in OS 432 (the Appeal). The Appeal was dismissed on 12 September 2022 with costs of $30,000 (all-in) payable to the Law Society.*

To access the full report, click here.

*The decision of the Court of Appeal can be found in Tan Beng Hui Carolyn v Law Society of Singapore [2023] SGCA 7.
",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/dtr-2023-05.pdf,"12th

November

Annex 1

38

39

40

Annex 2

29

30

31

Annex 3

52

53

54

55

56

58

",2023-05-01T04:00:01+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-may-2023/,"In the Matter of Carolyn Tan Beng Hui (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-may-2023/",1049
3,c108894221d0faf7ed81c20748e57b73c4b84b6f,"In the Matter of Ong Lian-Yi Gregory (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Ong Lian-Yi Gregory (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Ms Scarlett Merida Xi Wei Yuan (the Complainant).


On or around 27 October 2015, the Complainant was served with a statutory demand for a sum of S$970,547.26 (Statutory Demand) allegedly due to one Ang Boon Kim t/a ABK Leasing (ABKL) under a loan agreement.

The Complainant wished to dispute the alleged debt, and met the Respondent on 28 October 2015 and 29 October 2015 respectively to hand him relevant documents and pay a deposit of S$7,000.00 with instructions to file an application to set aside the Statutory Demand (Setting Aside Application).

From 1 November 2015 to 4 December 2015, the Complainant and the Respondent exchanged various e-mails and WhatsApp messages wherein the Respondent had provided assurances to the Complainant that there should be no issues with her Setting Aside Application.

The Complainant was made a bankrupt on 24 December 2015 and the Complainant terminated the Respondent’s engagement on 18 January 2016. The Respondent returned the deposit of $7,000.00 to the Complainant on 19 January 2016.

The bankruptcy order annulled on 27 August 2018 after an application by the Complainant’s new lawyers.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Giam Chin Toon SC and Mr Teo Weng Kie as DT member to investigate the complaint.

Three charges (and its alternatives) were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge

For grossly improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in that the Respondent had failed to act promptly and diligently on the instructions of the client to set aside the Statutory Demand and/or to apply for an extension of time of the said deadline, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Rules).

Second Charge

For grossly improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed of the progress of the application to set aside the Statutory Demand and/or the application to extend the time to set aside the Statutory Demand, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the Rules.

Third Charge

For grossly improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent failed to use all legal means to advance the client’s interests to the extent that he may reasonably be expected to do so, and failed to take the necessary steps to apply to set aside the Statutory Demand and/or to apply for an extension of time of the said deadline, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) read with Rule 5(2)(j) of the Rules.

An alternative charge premised on section 83(2)(h) was preferred for each principal charge.

At the hearing, only the Alternative First Charge and Alternative Second Charge were proceeded with (Proceeded Charges), and the remaining charges withdrawn.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that the Proceeded Charges were made out.

The DT found that the Respondent was at all times fully aware of the deadline for the Setting Aside Application, but on the evidence, he had not shown any sign of concern or urgency even though time was fast running out. The Respondent’s conduct throughout the engagement was lackadaisical.

The DT was satisfied that the Respondent’s conduct was grave enough to amount to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

In arriving at the recommended sanction, the DT considered some mitigating factors such as the Respondent not having gained financially from the matter, no prior antecedents, and there was no form of dishonesty and/or untruthfulness in the matter. In balancing this, the DT was also cognisant that the Respondent’s actions had caused suffering and inconvenience to the Complainant as she was adjudged a bankrupt.

The DT found that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the LPA, but the Respondent should be ordered to pay a financial penalty of $5,000.00 with costs of $2,500.00 to be paid to the Law Society.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT, including but not limited to the finding that the Respondent’s actions had caused suffering and inconvenience to the Complainant as she was adjudged a bankrupt, and the Respondent was ordered to pay a financial penalty of $5,000.00. The Respondent was to pay the Law Society’s costs of $2,500.00 also.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/dtr-2023-04-c.pdf,"IN THE MATTER OF ONG LIAN-YI GREGORY
(AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR)
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSIONAL ACT 1966

REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Disciplinary Tribunal
Mr Giam Chin Toon, SC President
Mr Teo Weng Kie Member
Counsel for the Law Society
Allen & Gledhill LLP
Ms Fay Fong
1 Marina Boulevard, #28-00
Singapore 018989
Ref No.: FFONG/dc/1021006176

Counsel for the Respondent
K&L Gates Straits Law LLC
Mr N. Sreenivasan, SC / Ms Ranita
Yogeeswaran
9 Raffles Place
#32-00, Republic Plaza
Singapore 048619
Ref No.: SN/RY/tm/4901608.00001

Dated this 27th day of June 2022

1
INTRODUCTION THE CHARGES

1.

Complainant
referred a complaint against Mr Ong Lian-

Respondent
Law Society

October 2020.

2.

The Respondent was admitted to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme
Court of Singapore on 10 June 1992. At all material times, the Respondent practised
with the firm of David Ong & Co.

3.

Pursuant to the complaint, the Law Society referred the matter to the Inquiry
IC
investigated by a Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal

4.

The Law Society had preferred 3 charges each with an alternative charge against the
Respondent when the Tribunal was constituted. These charges are as follows:

1ST CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the
Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap. 161, No. S 706), to wit,
by failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of
services to a client in that despite accepting instructions on or about 28 October 2015,

2
you failed in the period of 28 October 2015 to 18 January 2016 to act promptly and
diligently on the instructions of the client to set aside the Statutory Demand which had
been served on the client on 27 October 2015 within the time allowed for such an
application to be made (i.e. 10 November 2015) and/or to apply for an extension of
time of the said deadline, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct under the
provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) which amounts to grossly improper
conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal
Profession Act (Cap. 161).

ALTERNATIVE 1ST CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore, are charged that you did fail to act with reasonable diligence and
competence in the provision of services to a client in that despite accepting
instructions on or about 28 October 2015, you failed in the period of 28 October 2015
to 18 January 2016 to act promptly and diligently on the instructions of the client to
set aside the Statutory Demand which had been served on the client on 27 October
2015 within the time allowed for such an application to be made (i.e. 10 November
2015) and/or to apply for an extension of time of the said deadline, and you have
thereby committed an act amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable
profession under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).

3
2nd CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) read with Rule
5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap. 161, No. S
706), to wit, by failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the
provision of services to a client, by failing to keep the client reasonably informed of

failing to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the application to set
aside the Statutory Demand which had been served on the client on 27 October 2015
and/or the application to extend the time to set aside the Statutory Demand, and you
have thereby breached a rule of conduct under the provisions of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap. 161) which amounts to grossly improper conduct or practice as an advocate
and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).

ALTERNATIVE 2nd CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore, are charged that you did fail to act with reasonable diligence and
competence in the provision of services to a client, did fail to keep the client
reasonably informed of th
2015 to 18 January 2016, failing to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress
of the application to set aside the Statutory Demand which had been served on the
client on 27 October 2015 (the

and/or the application to extend

the time to set aside the Statutory Demand and you have thereby committed an act

4
amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the
Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under Section 83(2 )( h)
of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).

3rd CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) read with
Rule 5(2)(j) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap. 161,
No. S 706), to wit, by failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the
provision of services to a client, by failing to use all legal means to advance the
interests, to the extent that a legal practitioner may reasonably be expected to do so,
by, between 28 October 2015 to 18 January 2016, failing to take the necessary steps
to apply to set aside the Statutory Demand which had been served on the client on 27
October 2015 within the time allowed for such an application to be made (i.e. 10
November 2015) and/or to apply for an extension of time of the said deadline, and
you have thereby breached a rule of conduct under the provisions of the Legal
Profession Act (Cap. 161) which amounts to grossly improper conduct or practice
as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap. 161).

ALTERNATIVE 3rd CHARGE

You, ONG LIAN-YI, GREGORY, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore, are charged that you did fail to act with reasonable diligence and

5
competence in the provision of services to a client, did fail to use all legal means to
advance the

interests, to the extent that a legal practitioner may reasonably be

expected to do so, by, between 28 October 2015 to 18 January 2016, failing to take
the necessary steps to apply to set aside the Statutory Demand which had been served
on the client on 27 October 2015 within the time allowed for such an application to
be made (i.e. 10 November 2015) and/or to apply for an extension of time of the said
deadline, and you have thereby committed an act amounting to misconduct unbefitting
an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of
an honourable profession under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap
161).

5.
Submissions, had raised certain defects in respect of the charges. He submitted that
the First Charge and the Third Charge (and their corresponding alternative charges)
form what is essentially a single offence and/or are sufficiently close as to constitute
a unitary offence for the purpose of sentencing. 1 He raised the issue again at the
Hearing
the Tribunal asked Counsel for the Law Society, Ms Fong, whether she had received
instructions on the points raised and her reply was that she had not as the objections
were raised about only a week before the Hearing. The Tribunal therefore granted her
time to obtain instructions from the Law Society on the objections.

1

6
6.

When the Hearing resumed, Ms Fong informed the Tribunal that the Law Society had
considered the matter and her instructions are to withdraw the first, second, third and
Alternative 1st
Alternative 2nd Charge

Charge
pro

Proceeded Charges

7.

The Respondent thereupon claimed trial on the Proceeded Charges.

8.

The Respondent also confirmed that he admits to the facts as stated in the Agreed
ASOF
though he had claimed trial on the Proceeded Charges. As both parties had requested
for the Hearing to proceed on a documents-only basis, there was no examination and
cross examination of witnesses.

AGREED FACTS

9.

On or around 27 October 2015, the Complainant was served with a statutory demand
Statutory Demand
ABKL

10.

agreement.

The Complainant wished to dispute the alleged debt. She met the Respondent on 28
October 2015 and 29 October 2015 respectively to hand relevant documents and pay
a deposit of S$7,000.00 to him with instructions to file an application to set aside the
Statu

Setting Aside Application

7
11.

Thereafter, correspondences between the Respondent and the Complainant took place
and these can be summarised as follows:

(i)

The Complainant wrote to the Respondent on 1 November 2015 to provide a
chronology, pursuant to his request to provide him with

background facts

and a
legal research and then draft

(ii)
setting out his comments and questions to the chronology, as he was of the
view that the chronology had

In the

same email, he set out his opinion on the defence including the timeframe
within which the Statutory Demand had to be set aside. He said that according
to her, the Statutory Demand had been served on 27 October 2015 and as such,
she had 14 days to set it aside. He advised that the due date was therefore 10
November 2015.

(iii)

On 4 November 2015, the Respondent followed up by email time-stamped
1.44pm, which reminded the Complainant to reply to his queries as the
timelines were continuing to run. He also emphasised that he needed these
answers in order to prepare the originating summons and supporting affidavit
to set aside the Statutory Demand. On the same day, at 1.51pm, the
Complainant provided further answers to the Responden
she would provide the rest of the answers in later emails.

questions and said

8
(iv)

By email on 4 November 2015 at 11.22pm, the Complainant sought to provide

Whatsapp messages. On 9 November 2015, the Complainant asked for an
update and the Respondent said that he was studying her case.

(v)

On 10 November 2015, which was the deadline the for setting aside, the
Complainant sent a Whatsapp message to enquire as to the status of the filing.
She noted that the deadline had arrived, to which the Respondent said that her
understanding was correct. He then said
for extension of time so long as filed within a reasonable period. BTW today
is a public holiday. Happy

(vi)

As there was no further word from the Respondent, the Complainant followed
up by Whatsapp on 1 December 2015, asking about her
and expressing a hope to have updates soon. The Respondent replied, saying
that he was in court. He also said
She responded, asking if there was a deadline. There was no reply from
the Respondent.

(vii)

The Complainant then sent an email on 2 December 2015, time-stamped
5.12pm, again inquiring about the deadline for submission of the setting aside
application.

9
(viii)

That same day, the Respondent replied via email with time-stamp 5.51pm,
assuring the Complainant that he was applying for extension of time to file the
setting aside application and that

(ix)

However, as at the time of the deadline to set aside the Statutory Demand (i.e.
10 November 2015), the Respondent had not in fact prepared the application.
He had also not filed any ap

EOT

Application

(x)

Accordingly, as the Statutory Demand had remained unsatisfied and/or
unchallenged, the Complainant was presumed to be unable to pay her debts.
A bankruptcy application was filed against the Complainant on 25 November
2015.

(xi)

On 4 December 2015, the Respondent sent a Whatsapp message to the
Complainant stating

very

busy with court hearings this week. I will complete drafting all court papers
and call you when I am

(xii)

On 24 December 2015, a bankruptcy order was made against the Complainant.

(xiii)
engagement.

10
(xiv)

On 19 January 2016, the Respondent returned the deposit of $7,000.00 to the
Complainant.

(xv)

the
bankruptcy order issued against the Complainant was annulled and the
Statutory Demand was set aside.

A.

DOCUMENTS TENDERRED AT THE HEARING

12.

The following Affidavits of Evidence in Chief were filed and referred to at the
Hearing:

(i)
2022; and
(ii)
2022.

13.

Both Affidavits of Evidence in Chief AEICs

were brief. The

merely referred to the ASOF as being true and accurate. The

AEIC
AEIC also

merely confirmed the contents of the ASOF. He had added that he verily believed that
his conduct that is the subject matter of these proceedings does not amount to
misconduct that warrants sanction pursuant to the Act, and on this basis, he
respectfully requested that this Tribunal acquit him of the charges made against him.

11
14.

The following bundles were tendered at the Hearing:

(i)

Agreed Bundle of Documents dated 7 March 2022, which included the ASOF
at pages 407-412 (the ABOD

(ii)
(iii)

2022;

(iv)

and

(v)

2022.

B.

15.

2022;

SUBMISSIONS

At the Hearing, Counsel for the Law Society, Ms Fong, had summarised the salient
background facts with some details which were not found in the ASOF. However,

mind. Mr Sreenivasan S.C. for the Respondent confirmed that he does not dispute
these facts even though they were not in the ASOF.2 In any case, the facts were
documented in the ABOD.

16.

Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2013] SGHC 5 ( Selena
Chiong ) wa
be sufficiently grave and could be considered to be a breach of an essential duty of an
advocate and solicitor such that it is inexcusable and would constitute professional
misconduct.3 Ms Fong also cited a textbook authority authored by Jeffrey Pinsler SC.4

2
Transcript for the Hearing, page 32 at line 17 and page 33 at line 2, where Counsel for the Respondent was
dealing with the limited issue of the emails of 4 November 2015.
3
[14].
4
[17].

12

17.

The decision of Zhou Tong v Public Prosecutor

Zhou Tong

was next referred to. Members of the profession have to be competent and diligent in
advising their clients when representing their interests. This fundamental professional
responsibility requires every solicitor to thoroughly familiarise himself with the facts
, analyse the issues carefully, research the applicable law and then
. Professional incompetence and

consider how best to

indolence are no less a cause for concern as compared with cases of dishonesty.

18.

It was submitted that the Commentary on the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)
Rules 2015 at [05.047] summarised what professionalism encompasses in the context
of competence and diligence pursuant to rule 5 of the Legal Profession (Professional
LPPCR

5

Ms Fong noted that in the same commentary

at [05.041], it was said that the duty of reasonable diligence also involved completing
work for the client as soon as reasonably possible. It was said that this is also
prescribed in rule 17(2)(b) of the LPPCR.6

19.
Written Submissions, it was urged that we should make a finding that the

do, namely, to set aside the Statutory Demand. He was aware of the deadline as
evidenced by the correspondence. Yet, after the Complainant had provided the further
information on 4 November 2015 to address the

5
6

[19].
[20].

comments and

13
questions about the background facts relating to her case, there was simply no
response from or follow-up by him. It was the Complainant who followed up and
sought updates.7

20.
queries and requests in a manner that disclosed a lack of care and truthfulness. The
following are some instances:8

(i)

In his response on 9 November 2015, he said that he was studying [her]
case"".

(ii)

On 10 November 2015, he acknowledged that the deadline to set aside had
arrived but merely sought to assure the Complainant that an extension of
time could be sought so long as it is filed within a reasonable time

(iii)

While the Respondent told the Complainant in his email response on 2
December 2015 that he was applying for an extension of time to file the setting
aside application, no such step was in fact taken. The Respondent s written
explanation dated 26 February 2021 to the Inquiry Panel, had confirmed this
fact.

(iv)

Even up to 18 January 2016, when the Complainant realised that she had been
made a bankrupt, it was pointed out that the Respondent had continued to
string the Complainant along. There was no attempt on the Respondent
to explain the delay. Instead, he sought to pin the blame on the Complainant.

7
8

[22].

14
21.

It was contended that the Respondent was very much aware that the failure to set aside
the Statutory Demand could result ina bankruptcy application being taken out against
the Complainant. Notwithstanding this, he took no steps to advance the Complainant s
case nor to protect her interests beyond the initial enquiry for the chronology and
to study the
case
to have, at the very least, written to the creditor s solicitors to inform them that the
Complainant was disputing the debt and would be applying to set aside the Statutory
Demand or steps would be taken to apply for an extension of time.9 He was aware of
the need to set aside but had simply not made any attempt to prepare the application.10
Court searches were not even done to ascertain if the creditor had commenced
bankruptcy proceedings.11 It was argued that the draconian consequences resulting
from failure to set aside the Statutory Demand would have left the Complainant
irremediably prejudiced. In fact, she was adjudged bankrupt on 24 December 2015
and had to spend the next two and a half years or so instituting proceedings to set aside
the Statutory Demand and annul the bankruptcy order made against her.

22.

The Law Society also contended that given the scope of the retainer (which was to set
aside the Statutory Demand) it was incumbent on the Respondent to make the
application, and if necessary, to seek an extension of time to do so. The
initial inquiries to understand the case and subsequent silence (apart from furnishing
false assurances when pressed for updates) were not sufficient to discharge his
professional responsibility.12

9
10
11
12

[24].

15
23.

In respect of the Alternative 1st Charge, Counsel for the Law Society stated that the
the retainer (i.e. to set aside the
Statutory Demand within the prescribed time) and the gross delay in his management
of the case would clearly fall afoul of Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, given that an

LPA.13

24.

In respect of the Alternative 2nd Charge, the Law

case is that the Respondent

failed to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the application to set aside the

failure to apply for extension of time was patently unbefitting of an advocate and
solicitor under Section 83(2)(h). He was well aware of the avenue of applying for an
extension if he needed more time to understand the matter.14

25.

Counsel for the Law Society further noted that the present case bears striking
similarity to the cases of Law Society of Singapore v Ng Chee Sing [2000] 1 SLR(R)
466 Ng Chee Sing and Selena Chiong. In Ng Chee Sing, the Court of Three Judges
had found that the solicitor had failed to carry out what he had been instructed to do
under his retainer. In Selena Chiong, the respondent had made false representations as
to the status of the matter.15 In both cases, the solicitor was found guilty of grossly
improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Act and/or misconduct unbefitting of
an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(h) of the Act. 16 In our case, it was
submitted that the Alternative 2nd Charge was similarly made out.

13
14

[38].
[39].

15
16

Transcript for the Hearing, page 105 at lines 15-18.

16

26.

At the Hearing, the Tribunal informed counsel for the Law Society that we were
minded to hear arguments for sentencing at the same sitting. Counsel for the Law
Society stated that her instructions were to await the outcome before arguing on
sentencing. Nonetheless, should the Tribunal find that sanctions were necessary, she
submitted that there should at least be a fine, subject to instructions from the Law
Society.17

C.

27.

SUBMISSIONS

At the outset, Counsel for the Respondent stressed that the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt 18 It was argued that
if the Law Society was arguing that there was untruthfulness that elevated the various
communications into misconduct, the burden rested on it to prove its case. There
should be no adverse inference to be drawn against the Respondent.19

28.

It was noted that the necessity of adhering to the criminal standard was because
moral censure and professional disapprobation cast upon the solicitor [upon a finding
as
was stated in Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [2020] 4 SLR 736.20

17

Transcript for the Hearing, page 105 at lines 15-18.

18
19
20

Transcript for the Hearing, page 105 at lines 19-22.

17
29.

The case of Law Society of Singapore v Harjeet Singh

Harjeet

that:21

Singh

egregious than
s 83(2)(h) which was
described in Law Society of Singapore v Ng Chee Sing [2000] 1 SLR(R) 466

not fall within any of the other enumerated grounds but is nevertheless
considered

30.

Counsel for the Respondent also highlighted that mere negligence does not amount to
misconduct and does not warrant sanction under the Act. There are different degrees
of negligence. Whether or not a particular degree of negligence amounts to
misconduct must be determined by viewing the gravity of the negligent act in the
context of the matter whilst taking into account all the circumstances of the case. It
was observed in Law Society of Singapore v K Jayakumar [2012] 4 SLR 1232 that an

compensation but not censure. The professional lapse must be grave if it is to attract
disciplinary sanction (see [1] above). Plainly, several serious lapses in the course of
a professional engagement would invite serious consequences, including disciplinary
sanction(s). 22

21
22

-[34].

18
31.
does not amount to misconduct that warrants sanction pursuant to the Act. The
failure to file the Setting Aside Application and/or the EOT Application
was his one lapse and would, at worst, amount to a one-off act of innocent bungling
want of skill 23

32.

In this regard, the present case can be distinguished from Selena Chiong.24 It was also
noted that the respondent in Selena Chiong committed several lapses in her
engagement with the complainant. The lapses included providing the complainant
with inappropriate advice, failing to advice the client as well as misleading the
complainant. The Court of Three Judges had noted that there was a pattern of chronic

as a solicitor

33.

25

It was submitted that in contrast, the Respondent here had only committed one lapse,
i.e. his failure to file the setting aside application or the application to seek extension of
time to do so. Unlike in Selena Chiong, his conduct does not involve the failure to
properly advise the Complainant, or misleading her. He was not guilty of any pattern
of chronic irresponsibility or problem of attitude. The Respondent had also not
attempted to provide excuses for his conduct or justify his actions. He has admitted to
the factual averments of these charges. He initiated the filing of the ASOF to assist
with streamlining these proceedings so that the Complainant would not be subjected
to prolonged proceedings.26

23
24
25
26

s Closing Submissions at [55].
-[57].
[57].
[57].

19

34.

Counsel for the Respondent also submitted that while it is true the Respondent did not
do as he had promised, it did not make him dishonest. Counsel for the Respondent
specifically referred to an email communication dated 2 December 2015 where he told
the Complainant that

are applying for extension of time to file the setting aside

application. Should not be a problem. Yes, we will send a receipt at the same time
when we have prepared all the court papers which you have to sign at our offices on
a date to be fixed

27

It was submitted that this email clearly showed that there were

still things to be done.28

35.

As for the Alternative 2nd
the Alternative 1st Charge would apply.29

36.

In the circumstances, it was submitted that the Respondent should be acquitted of the
Proceeded Charges.

37.

In the alternative, should the Tribunal find that one or both of the Proceeded Charges
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Counsel for the Respondent submitted
that the appropriate punishment for each misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and
solicitor would have to depend on the circumstances of the case as a whole. In this
regard, Counsel for the Respondent cited several cases that stand for the proposition
cases involving grossly improper conduct without dishonesty or deceit will

27

Agreed Bundle of Documents at page 462.
Transcript for the Hearing, page 95 at line 8.
29
[66].
28

20
generally attract a monetary penalty

30

He also reserved his right to file a mitigation

plea at the appropriate juncture, if necessary.31

38.

Mr Sreenivasan SC urged the Tribunal to apply Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine
Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 SLR 390.32 He argued that no cause of sufficient
gravity exists, as the present case does not fall within the category of the
of complaints that should be referred to the Court of Three Judges.33

39.

Instead, it was submitted that a reprimand or a fine should be imposed. Notably, the
fine, if imposed, should be on the lower-end.34 The reasons for his submissions are as
follows:

(i)

The charges are closely connected and arise out of the same transaction;

(ii)

The Complainant terminated her engagement with the Respondent shortly
after she found out that a Bankruptcy Order had been made against the
Respondent. The Respondent therefore did not have the opportunity to remedy
the situation;

(iii)

The Respondent received no financial advantage. He returned to the
Complainant the Deposit paid and did not charge the Complainant for any
work done;

30
31
32

Respondent's Bundle of Authorities, Tab 11.

33
34

Transcript for the Hearing, page 99 at line 24.

21
(iv)

The Bankruptcy Order was eventually annulled and the Statutory Demand set
aside;

(v)

The motive of the Complainant is called into question. The Complaint was
filed more than two years after the Bankruptcy Order had been annulled and
the Statutory Demand set aside, and almost five years after the Bankruptcy
Application had been filed. The Complainant had not offered an explanation
as to why there was an inordinate delay in the filing of the Complaint. Any
complaint she wished to make ought to have been filed earlier;

(vi)

No allegations of dishonesty have been raised against the Respondent;

(vii)

The Respondent has no antecedents; and

(viii)

In admitting to the factual averments of the Proceeded Charges, the
Respondent has not unnecessarily prolonged these proceedings but has instead
shown remorse.

The main question before the Tribunal is whether the facts as adduced from the
documents in the ABOD and the ASOF are sufficient to establish that the Respondent
is guilty of misconduct unbefitting on advocate and solicitor as alleged in the
Proceeded Charges.

Burden of Proof

40.

At the outset, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that even if the evidence before
us would have established negligence on the part of the Respondent, they are

22
insufficient to find him guilty of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor
Act

41.

The burden of proof is on the Law Society to establish that the documents would prove
not merely negligent but
such that it would amount to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

42.

The Law Society on the other hand contended that the evidence is clear that the
Respondent was guilty of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor. He had
failed to apply to set aside the Statutory Demand made against his client and to apply
for an extension of time after the deadline to set aside the Statutory Demand had
passed. This resulted in a Bankruptcy Order being made against the Complainant.

43.

It is trite law that the standard of proof is to show that the Respondent was guilty of
the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 35 We would refer to the case of Public
Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 where it was held as
follows:36

conceptualised
in two ways. First, a reasonable doubt may arise from within the case mounted
by the Prosecution. As part of its own case, the Prosecution must adduce
sufficient evidence to establish the accused

guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt on at least a prima facie basis. Failure to do so may lead to a finding

35
36

Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James [2013] 3 SLR 221 at [50].
Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 at [149].

23
that the Prosecution has failed to mount a case to answer, or to an acquittal.
In those situations, the court must nevertheless particularise the specific

the threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

(f)

case,

not been able to discharge its overall legal burden.

(g)

The second way in which a reasonable doubt may arise is on an

assessment of the totality of the evidence. The inquiry here is intimately

preferred over the evidence put forth by the accused person where it is a case

(h)

The assessment of the

evidence under the

standard must be made with regard to the totality of the evidence,
which logically includes the case mounted by the Defence. The evaluative task
is not just internal to the

case, but also comparative in nature.

Where the evidential burden lies on the Defence and this has not been
discharged, the court may find that the Prosecution has discharged its burden

24
of proving its case against the accused person beyond a reasonable doubt. At

(i)

What the Defence needs to do to bring the

case below the requisite

threshold is to point to such evidence as would generate a reasonable doubt. That
evidence need not necessarily be raised by the Defence; what matters is that a

(emphasis added)

44.

Thus, the burden on the Law Society is to adduce sufficient evidence which must
establish the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on at least a prima facie basis and that
the Respondent has to show at the end of the trial that a reasonable doubt exists on the
evidence adduced.

Did the acts and/or omissions of the Respondent amount to misconduct unbefitting an advocate
and solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession?

45.

With that in mind, we proceed to examine and assess the facts and evidence before us
in order to arrive at our decision.

46.

The Proceeded Charges were both made under s 83(2)(h) of the Act. In this regard,
the Tribunal is mindful that in the case of The Law Society of Singapore v Harjeet
Singh [2016] SGDT 9, it was stated that s 83(2)(h) is a catch all provision which can

25
be invoked when the conduct does not fall within any of the other enumerated grounds
but is nevertheless considered unacceptable

47.

The Tribunal accepts the

37

contention that there are degrees of negligence

and whether a particular degree of negligence amounts to misconduct must be
determined by viewing the gravity of the negligent act in the context of the matter
whilst taking into account all the circumstances of the case. 38 Not all cases of
negligence support a finding of due cause.39 Innocent bungling which prejudices the
grave
nature. Several serious lapses would invite disciplinary sanction.

48.

We would therefore examine the undisputed material, correspondences and other
documents contained in the ABOD read with the ASOF to evaluate if the conduct was
just mere negligence or whether it was sufficiently grave to amount to misconduct on
the part of the Respondent in the discharge of his professional duty.

49.

On 31 October 2015, the Respondent had requested for documents, information and a
study, then to do legal
research and then draft affidavit. Fighting a case is not like making instant noidle. It
has to be carefully thought over and researched. 40

37
38

Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law Society of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 398 at [19].
Law Society of Singapore v K Jayakumar Naidu [2012] 4 SLR 1232 at [79].
40
ABOD at page 424.
39

26
50.

On 1 November 2015, the Complainant responded to the Respondent in an email,
providing whatever responses she could to the Respondent.41

51.

On 2 November 2015, the Respondent emailed the Complainant, raising further
questions on the chronology provided in the Compla
201542 and commented on the insufficiency of the chronology:43

Simply put, the chronology of facts you have given to me has too many
unexplained holes and lacks sufficient details. Accordingly, at the moment,
such a chronology is not very helpful in the preparation of your application to
set aside the statutory notice of demand in bankruptcy against you. You need
to work harder on the chronology, recall and remember important facts,
names, terms of discussion and dates otherwise the court will not believe what
you say as there is no credibility in what you say unless the said holes are
plugged and the details provided

52.

He further emphasised in the same email:44

ACCORDING TO YOU, YOU WERE SERVED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY
STATUTORY DEMAND ON 27 OCTOBER 2015, ACCORDING TO THE
LAW YOU HAVE 14 DAYS TO APPLY TO SET ASIDE THE STATUTORY
DEMAND IE. TO SET IT ASIDE BY 10 NOVEMBER 2015.

41

ABOD at page 426.
ABOD at page 431.
43
ABOD at page 432.
44
ABOD at page 432.
42

27
53.

On 4 November 2015 at 1.44pm, the Respondent sent an email to the Complainant,
proceed to do her best and reply

54.

45

On the same day, the Complainant replied to the Respondent in 2 emails, one at
1.51pm and the other at 11.22pm,46 which sought to provide the Respondent with the
further information he had requested for. In these emails, she notably stated that she
would provide the Respondent the slips and loan agreement between her and one
Sheraz in later emails.

55.

On 4 November 2015 at 11.53pm, the Complainant forwarded to the Respondent an
email she had previously received on 14 May 2015 from the law firm representing
Sheraz, which had forwarded a Supplementary Agreement for her comments.47 In the

for applying the credit line with bank of China

be

of help. It is unclear however whether a copy of the said company contract was in fact
forwarded to the Respondent at all as there was no record of such a document in the
ABOD.

56.

On 5 November 2015 at 11.15am, the Respondent asked the Complainant if the loan
agreement was connected to the loan given to the Complainant by ABKL.48

57.

On 9 November 2015, the Complainant sent a WhatsApp message to the Respondent
in relation to another matter unrelated to the case. At the same time, however, she

45

ABOD at page 435.
See ABOD at page 436-442.
47
ABOD at page 444.
48
ABOD at page 452.
46

28
enquired about her case. To this query, the Respondent specifically responded that he
studying your case

58.

49

Up to this point, we find that all the Complainant was told was that the Respondent
that neither the Setting
Aside Application nor the EOT Application was ever made.50 Further, no drafts of
either the Setting Aside Application or EOT Application were ever shown to have
been prepared during the period he was acting for her.

59.

It ought to be borne in mind that the Respondent was at all times fully aware that the
deadline was 10 November 2015. Yet, a day before the deadline, when the
And how about my case?

Studying

your case

60.

Thus far, the evidence had not shown any sign of concern or urgency on the

Studying your case
responsible lawyer faced with a situation where time will run out the next day. We
find that this conduct is not what is expected of an advocate and solicitor tasked with

consequence after time runs out. In the circumstances, we do not accept that the
the

49
50

ABOD at page 71
Agreed Statement of Facts at [15].

29
Respondent as submitted by Mr Sreenivasan, SC. We are satisfied that the conduct
was grave enough to amount to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

61.

Counsel for the Respondent had, in his submissions, also attempted to characterise the
Respondent as having [dropped] the ball only on 2 December 2015.51 We disagree.

viewed as a whole. We do not accept that he

the

only from 2 December

2015 onwards. In any case, we find that his conduct and attitude towards the
Comp
the queries of the Complainant on the status of the matter to the time the Complainant
terminated his services.

62.

On 10 November 2015 (i.e. the date of the deadline to set aside the Statutory Demand),
today is the last day for us
to file in and put aside right?

[correct] but not to

worry we can apply for extension of time so long as it is filed within a reasonable
period 52

63.

From this reply, we note that:

(i)

There was simply no urgency shown by the Respondent right up to 10
November 2015.

51
52

Transcript of the Hearing, page 92 at lines 13-26.
ABOD at page 454.

30
(ii)

His conduct throughout his engagement was to say the least, lackadaisical. In
particular, he told the Complainant not to worry as he could apply for an
extension of time giving the impression that such an extension would be
granted as a matter of course. This amounted to an assurance to the
Complainant that so long as an application to extend time is made within a
reasonable period of time, there is no cause to worry. We are unable to accept
this as mere negligence. As an experienced lawyer, the Respondent ought to
know that an extension of time is granted at the discretion of the Court and
that it would depend on the reasons given to convince the Court to exercise the
discretion in favour of the applicant.

(iii)
serious consequences that would follow if the extension of time was not
granted and the Statutory Demand not set aside. Furthermore, there was no
evidence adduced to show that the Respondent had even initiated a search to
determine if ABKL had taken steps after the expiry of the Statutory Demand
deadline to enforce it. There was not even a suggestion or an attempt made to
write to the solicitors acting for ABKL on the matter to state the
case or to ask for time to respond.

64.

The same pattern of conduct continued well after 10 November 2015. On 28
November 2015 (i.e. 18 days after the deadline to set aside the Statutory Demand had
expired), the Complainant sent a WhatsApp message to the Respondent as she had not

31
heard from him, to request for updates on her case. There was no response to this
message.53

65.

Morning Gregory, do you
response.54

have time to talk

66.

On 1 December 2015, the Complainant once again messaged the Respondent,
requesting an update regarding the Statutory Demand. This time, the Respondent
For your setting aside, not yet"".55 The Complainant thereafter
enquired if there wa

the setting aside

this

message.56

67.

On 2 December 2015 at 5.12pm, the Complainant sent an email to the Respondent,
requesting a receipt for her fee payment of $7,000.00 and again asked whether there
was a deadline for setting aside the Statutory Demand. 57 He responded to this email
on the same day at 5.51pm, stating that he was applying for an extension of time which
not be a problem

receipt

all the court papers which [she would] have to sign at [his] offices
on a date to be fixed

68.

all the court papers 58

We find that this response gave the impression that the Respondent was ready to
proceed with the matter and that the relevant court papers would soon be ready for the

53

ABOD at page 455.
ABOD at page 455.
55
ABOD at page 455.
56
ABOD at page 456.
57
ABOD at page 461.
58
ABOD at page 462.
54

32
Complainant to sign. However, as stated previously, the evidence before the Tribunal
has showed that in fact no court papers were prepared nor were they sent to the
Complainant even though the Respondent had stated he would have them at his office
for her to sign on a date to be fixed.

69.

After 2 December 2015, there appears to be no further communication between the
Complainant and the Respondent until 15 January 2016 when the Complainant
emailed the Respondent requesting him to set aside the Statutory Demand
immediately.59

70.

On 18 January 2016, by an email timestamped 12.50pm, the Complainant terminated

had her phone line cut off and her bank account suspended because of his negligence.
She also noted in the same email that:60

You have not even had the courtesy to respond to my email of 15 January and
my registered letter dated 16th January. I am most disappointed by your
derelict attitude.

71.
stated that it was defamatory of the Complainant to accuse him of negligence. He
accepted the termination of his services and agreed to return the $7,000.00 deposit
paid to him.61

59

ABOD at page 463.
ABOD at page 464.
61
ABOD at page 466.
60

33

72.
and unwavering. The Respondent was engaged to set aside the Statutory Demand.
This is shown from the

instructions from the time the Respondent was

first appointed to act for her62 and throughout the entire retainer period.63 Both the
EOT Application and Setting Aside Application are inextricably linked and the

whole.

73.

We find that while the Respondent was correct to seek further information from the
entirely coherent
thereby contributing to his inability to prepare the Court papers, it would still be the
Re
proceed in good time. We find instead that it was in fact the Complainant who was
making regular inquiries on the state of the application with no meaningful response
received from the Respondent. This was conceded by the Respondent. 64 He had
repeatedly assured the Complainant that he was in the midst of preparing the necessary
court papers, giving no impression that anything more was needed from the
Complainant.65 Therefore, on the assumption that the information provided by the

Application and the EOT Application forthwith on an urgent basis in view of the tight
timeline. On the evidence before us, it was clearly shown that he had taken absolutely
no action right up to the date his engagement was terminated.
62

ASOF at [4].
ASOF [11]64
ABOD at page 379-380.
65
ABOD at pages 453, 462 and 466.
63

34

74.

Furthermore, even if the Respondent was unaware of the bankruptcy proceedings filed
against the Complainant,66 it is clear that he had not even made an effort to establish
if a bankruptcy application had been filed after the deadline had passed. This was
admitted by Counsel for the Respondent.67 We are of the view that the Respondent
ought to have known that bankruptcy proceedings would be the next step to be taken
by ABKL (on 15 January 2016 at the latest) if they receive no response from the
Complainant. An urgent search would reveal the status of the matter at the material
time.68

75.

If negligence is involved, the Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that there is always
a need to discern and differentiate the various degrees of negligence, taking into
account all the facts of the case69 and that the degree of negligence must still be found
to be sufficiently grave for the purposes of a finding of misconduct under s 83(2)(h)
of the Act. Otherwise, every negligent act or omission would be tantamount to
misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor.

76.

The Court of Three Judges in Selena Chiong provided helpful guidance of the standard
required for a charge under s 83(2)(h) of the Act:

we do have some difficulties in relation to the misconduct complained of in
the first and second charges, which misconduct smacks more of incompetence,
disorganisation or lack of care on the part of Chiong rather than any deliberate
66
67

Transcript of the Hearing, page 58 at lines 12-13.

en Submissions at [25].
ABOD at page 466.
69
Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law Society of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 398 at [19].
68

35

would be more appropriate to regard the misconduct set out in the first and
second charges as

unbefitting of an advocate and

within

the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the

(emphasis added)

77.

In a similar vein, the High Court in Zhou Tong stated that professional incompetence
and indolence is a cause for concern. It is indeed a fundamental responsibility of the

conscientiously and conscionably.70 We are of the view that the Respondent had failed
the test in the present case.

78.

We also agree with Counsel for the Respondent that unlike the respondent in Selena
Chiong, the Proceeded Charges in our case do not involve any failure to advise the
Complainant, the failure to appropriately advise the Complainant or misleading the
Complainant.71 The irresponsibility displayed by the respondent in Selena Chiong
case

79.

However, this does not
amount to misconduct under the Proceeded Charges. As established in Selena Chiong,
a lack of care and incompetence, despite not being deliberate, can still amount to
misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(h)

70
71

Zhou Tong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 534 at [1].

36
of the Act. In this regard, we find that his failure in acting competently for the

negligence can be said to be relatively short as he was on retainer from 28 October
2015 to 18 January 2016, the point to emphasise is that he did fail to file the Setting

instructions knowing all along the consequences that would follow should he fail to
do so on time. For that, we find that the Respondent displayed a total lack of care

of time should not present a problem.72 The Respondent was irresponsible to give the
impression to the Complainant that an extension of time would be granted if it was
applied for within a reasonable time without advising her that it has to be on grounds
acceptable to the Court.

80.

Similarly, the Respondent had failed to keep the Complainant reasonably informed
about her case at least from on or around 6 November 2015 onwards. Notably, the
Respondent did not provide any updates to the Complainant after he replied to her
chaser on 10 November 2015 (i.e. the period from 11 November 2015 to 30 November
2015).73 This was in spite of the fact that there was a real possibility of bankruptcy
proceedings being commenced as the deadline for the Setting Aside Application was
due to expire on 10 November 2015. In our view, this period of silence from the
Respondent was inexcusably lengthy and puts the Complainant at risk of being made
a bankrupt.

72
73

ABOD at page 462.
ASOF at [11]-[12].

37

81.

For completeness, we note that Counsel for the Law Society appeared to be hinting at
an element of dishonesty specifically at the Hearing, and untruthfulness in relation to

Application.74 In response, Counsel for the Respondent pointed out that any
untruthfulness
all the court
papers

75

Similarly, he had sent a Whatsapp message

to the Complainant on 4 Dece

will complete drafting all

court papers and call [her] when [he was] ready 76

82.

We find that an allegation of untruthfulness is a grave accusation against a solicitor.
However, we are unable to make a finding of fact in respect of the

state

of mind relating to untruthfulness solely by reference to the documents and without
cross-examination of the Respondent. In any event, we find that it is unnecessary to
find untruthfulness against the Respondent for the purposes of the Alternative 2nd
Charge. The fact is that no such Court papers were produced and we are satisfied that
the Respondent had by his own admission no further excuse to allege that he needed
further information in order to draft the court papers.

83.

In the light of our findings, we are satisfied that the Proceeded Charges (i.e. the
Alternative 1st Charge and the Alternative 2nd Charge) have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the Respondent is guilty as charged.

74

Transcript for the Hearing, page 77-79 and 103.
Transcript for the Hearing, page 93-94.
76
ABOD at page 150.
75

38

APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

84.
determination under either s 93(1)(b) or (c) of the Act.

85.

Counsel for the Respondent helpfully drew our attention to the decision of the Court
of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010]
3 SLR 390 in which the function of a Disciplinary Tribunal was set out:

sorts, thereby ensuring that only the most serious complaints are referred to
the court of three Judges... the Disciplinary Tribunal may find that the conduct
of the advocate and solicitor concerned does fall within one or more of the
limbs of s 83(2).. but feels that the conduct itself, whilst technically within the
ambit of one or more of these limbs

sanction pursuant to s 93(1)(b) of the Act

86.

77

Here, we are of the view that even though we find that the Respondent is guilty as
charged, we would agree with Counsel for the Respondent that the present case does
not fall within the category of the most serious of complaints.78 Indeed, we accept that

Law Society.

77
78

Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 SLR 390 at [28] and [39].

39

87.

We have considered the mitigating factors raised by Counsel for the Respondent. The
Respondent did not gain financially from this incident. He had no prior antecedents.
We are mindful that any form of dishonesty and/or untruthfulness has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Plainly, in the short period of his retainer, the
Respondent was negligent and had displayed a lack of professionalism in the way he

expected of an advocate and solicitor.

88.

We also note that the

actions had caused the Complainant suffering and

inconvenience as she was adjudged a bankrupt. Bankruptcy is undoubtedly a traumatic
experience and the Complainant must have suffered during her period of bankruptcy.
However, to attribute the

lengthy period of suffering (approximately

2.5 years of bankruptcy) solely to the Respondent is unjustifiable. No evidence was
adduced to explain why it had taken approximately 2.5 years for the bankruptcy order
to be annulled.79

89.

In light of all our findings, and pursuant to s 93(1)(b)(i) of the Act, we determine that
while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the Act,
the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000.00, which in our view is
sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed

90.

Pursuant to s 93(2) of the Act, we award costs of $2,500.00 to be paid by the
Respondent to the Law Society.

79

Transcript for the Hearing, pages 99-100.

40

Dated this 27th day of June 2022

Mr Giam Chin Toon, SC
President

Mr Teo Weng Kie
Member

",2023-04-08T04:00:51+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-apr-2023/,"In the Matter of Ong Lian-Yi Gregory (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-apr-2023/",1049
4,f63bd052ac053b01ac1e75de9a98e66d380ac856,"In the Matter of Clarence Lun Yaodong (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Clarence Lun Yaodong (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

The Council of the Law Society referred information relating to the conduct of the Respondent pursuant to section 85(2) of the Legal Profession Act (LPA).


Between October 2019 and January 2020, the Respondent offered training contracts to two individuals, one Mr Lim Teng Jie (Mr Lim) and one Ms Trinisha Ann Sunil (Ms Sunil).

The Respondent was not, at any material time, qualified to act as a supervising solicitor pursuant to rule 18 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Siraj Omar SC and Mr Tan Jee Ming as DT member to investigate the complaint.

Five charges (and its alternatives for the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Charges) were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge (Alternative First Charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA), in that the Respondent had failed to ensure Mr Lim and Ms Sunil, who were practice trainees serving their respective practice training periods under separate practice training contracts with Foxwood LLC, were supervised by a supervising solicitor who had in force a practising certificate for a total of not less than five out of seven years immediately preceding the date of the supervision of each of the said practice trainees, in breach of Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR).

Second Charge (Alternative Second Charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA)

For contravening Rule 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, by being the supervising solicitor during the practice training periods of Mr Lim and Ms Sunil, who were practice trainees serving their respective practice training periods under separate practice training contracts with Foxwood LLC, while having in force a practising certificate of a period of less than five out of the seven years immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the Respondent’s supervision of Mr Lim and Ms Sunil, which warrants disciplinary action within the meaning of section 83(2)(j) of the LPA.

Amended Third Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, by behaving in a manner inconsistent with the public interest by being the supervising solicitor during the practice training periods of Mr Lim and Ms Sunil, who were practice trainees under separate practice training contracts with Foxwood LLC, when not having in force a practising certificate of a period of not less than five out of the seven years immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the Respondent’s supervision of Mr Lim and Ms Sunil as required under Rule 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011.

Fourth Charge (Alternative Fourth Charge for a Breach of Rule 8(3)(b) PCR)

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, by taking unfair advantage of Ms Sunil by demanding that she pay Foxwood LLC the sum of $2,000 when this sum was not recoverable by due process of law, in breach of Rule 8(3)(a) of the PCR.

Fifth Charge (Alternative Fifth Charge for Acting in a Manner Contrary to Position as a Member of an Honourable Profession in Breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR)

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, by acting in a manner which was deceitful by representing to Mr Lim, a practice trainee of Foxwood LLC, that by May 2020 the Respondent would meet the requirements under Rule 18(1) of the Legal Profession (Admissions) Rules 2011 to be Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor during his practice training period when the Respondent knew this to be false, in breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that the First Charge, Second Charge, Alternative First Charge, Alternative Second Charge and Third Charge, were made out.

The Fourth Charge, Alternative Fourth Charge, Fifth Charge, and Alternative Fifth Charge were not made out.

The DT cited the principle in Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2005] 4 SLR(R) 320 (Selena Chiong) whereby all solicitors ought to be familiar with the rules made under the LPA, and will be deemed to be aware of their existence and applicability. It followed that each advocate and solicitor bore personal responsibility to ensure that the applicable rules of practice are strictly adhered to in all areas of his/her practice.

The DT found that there was cause of sufficient gravity for the matter to be referred to the Court of Three Judges (C3J):

Under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in respect of the First Charge; Under section 83(2)(j) of the LPA in respect of the Second Charge; Under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in respect of the Alternative First Charge, Alternative Second Charge and the Third Charge.

The Respondent was further ordered by the DT to pay the Law Society’s costs.

Council accepted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly referred the matter to the C3J.

The C3J found that due cause was proved under section 83(2)(j) of the LPA on the Second Charge. The C3J “agreed with the DT that the respondent “simply did not care whether there were any rules and, if so, what they were.”

The Respondent was suspended for 18 months with effect from 7 November 2022, and it was ordered for costs of $10,000 to be paid by the Respondent.*

To access the full report, click here.

*The decision of the C3J can be found in Law Society of Singapore v Clarence Lun Yaodong [2022] SGHC 269.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/dtr_mar_2023_c.pdf,"DT 13 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF CLARENCE LUN YAODONG
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966

REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Disciplinary Tribunal:
Siraj Omar, S.C. – President
Tan Jee Ming – Advocate

Solicitors for
The Law Society of Singapore

Solicitors for the Respondent

Mr Sarbjit Singh Chopra /
Mr Roshan Singh Chopra
(Selvam LLC)

Mr Mark Seah / Mr Lau Wen Jin
(Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP)

Dated this 22nd day of March 2022

Introduction

1.

The Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”) brought five charges against Mr
Clarence Lun Yaodong (the “Respondent”)1, a solicitor of 8 years’ standing as at the
commencement of these proceedings in 2021.

2.

The Respondent admits that he had purported to act as the supervising solicitor for two
individuals, Mr Lim Teng Jie (“Mr Lim”) and Ms Trinisha Ann Sunil (“Ms Sunil”), at
different periods during their practice training at Foxwood LLC between October 2019
and January 2020.2 The Respondent admits that he was not qualified to act as a
supervising solicitor during the material time3 and the fact that he purported to do so is
a clear breach of Rule 18(1) of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 (the
“Admission Rules”). The charges levied against him in these proceedings arise from
those breaches as well as events which are alleged to have occurred after those
breaches were discovered.

3.

Having carefully considered the facts of the case, the evidence of the witnesses and the
parties’ respective submissions, we find that:

(a)

Cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists:

(i)

under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, Rev Ed 2009)
(the “Act”) in respect of the First Charge (as defined below);

1
2
3

The Law Society’s Closing Submissions (“LSCS”) [31].
The Respondent’s Closing Submissions (“RCS”) [1].
RCS [1].

1

(ii)

under Section 83(2)(j) of the Act in respect of the Second Charge (as defined
below); and

(iii)

under Section 83(2)(h) of the Act in respect of the Alternative First Charge,
the Alternative Second Charge and the Third Charge (all as defined below),
and

(b)

The Fourth, Alternative Fourth, Fifth and Alternative Fifth Charges (all as defined
below) were not made out.

4.

We set out our grounds below. We deal first with the Second Charge, which the Law
Society described as setting out “the crux of the misconduct of the Respondent”4. We
then deal with the First Charge and remaining three charges in numerical order.

The Second Charge and Alternative Second Charge

5.

The Second Charge alleges: 5

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of contravening Rule 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession
(Admission) Rules 2011, by being the supervising solicitor during the practice
training periods of [Mr Lim] and [Ms Sunil], who were practice trainees serving their
respective practice training periods under separate practice training contracts with
Foxwood LLC, while having in force a practicing certificate of a period of less than 5
out of the 7 years immediately preceding the date of the commencement of your
supervision of Mr Lim and [Ms Sunil] which warrants disciplinary action within the
meaning of Section 83(2)(j) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”

4
5

The Law Society’s Statement of Case (Amendment No. 2) (the “SOC”) page 8.
SOC page 13.

2

6.

The Law Society also alleged in the alternative that the conduct described in the Second
Charge amounted to “misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of
the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession” within the meaning of
Section 83(2)(h) of the Act (the “Alternative Second Charge”).6

7.

To succeed in these charges, the Law Society must establish that (a) Mr Lim and Ms
Sunil were practice trainees serving their respective practice training periods under
separate training contracts with Foxwood LLC, (b) the Respondent purported to act as
their supervising solicitor during their respective practice training periods, and (c) the
Respondent was not qualified to do so by reason of not having a valid practicing
certificate for at least five out of the seven years immediately preceding the respective
commencement dates of Mr Lim’s and Ms Sunil’s training contracts.

8.

Each of these facts are admitted. The Respondent admits that he acted as Mr Lim’s
supervising solicitor “with effect from 16 December 2019” and as Ms Sunil’s supervising
solicitor “with effect from 2 January 2020”.7 He also admits that he held a practicing
certificate for a total of only two years and 10 months as at 1 October 2019.8

9.

Rule 18(1) of the Admission Rules prohibits a solicitor from acting as a supervising
solicitor of a practice trainee unless (i) he is in active practice in a Singapore law practice,
and (ii) has had in force a practicing certificate for a total of “not less than 5 out of the 7
years immediately preceding the date of commencement of his supervision of the
practice trainee”.

6
7
8

SOC page 14.
Defence [10] read with SOC [15].
Defence [9] read with SOC [14].

3

10.

There is therefore no question that the Respondent has breached Rule 18(1) of the
Admission Rules.

The only question therefore is whether his conduct warrants

disciplinary action within the meaning of Section 83(2)(j) of the Act for the purposes of
the Second Charge and/or amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor
as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession for the
purposes of the Alternative Second Charge.

11.

The Respondent submits that both questions ought to be answered in the negative.9
We shall deal with each of his arguments in turn.

Alleged mitigating circumstances

12.

The Respondent points to what he describes as mitigating circumstances. First, he says
that he admitted to having acted as supervising solicitor for Mr Lim and Ms Sunil “even
though an alternative would have been to argue that they had in fact no Supervising
Solicitor”, and that his admission therefore “resolved this issue in [the Law Society’s]
favour, even though the position was ‘grey’, stepping up to shoulder the blame”.10

13.

During oral closing arguments, the Respondent’s counsel clarified that the Respondent’s
argument was simply that he could have argued that there was no supervising solicitor
in law – i.e. as defined under the Act.11 However, this argument also does not take him
very far. The fact there was no supervising solicitor for the purposes of the Act is
undeniable given that the Respondent did not satisfy the requirements under the Act.
The critical fact is that he admits to having acted as Mr Lim’s and Ms Sunil’s supervising

RCS [59].
RCS [46].
11 Transcript 7 Dec 2021, 42(9) to 44(6).
9

10

4

solicitor despite not having satisfied the requirements under the Act. This is the very
substance of the breach before us.

14.

The Respondent appeared to us to be seeking credit for admitting that he had acted as
supervising solicitor for Mr Lim and Ms Sunil – i.e. for telling the truth. Telling the truth
is not mitigatory – it is the absolute minimum expected of any advocate and solicitor. To
claim that he ought to be given credit for not arguing that Mr Lim and Ms Sunil had no
supervising solicitor (an argument that he must know to be false given his pleaded
admission) is an appalling submission, and one which we completely reject.

15.

Second, he argues that the responsibility for ensuring that the practice trainees taken in
by Foxwood LLC are properly supervised is shared between the Respondent and
Foxwood LLC’s sole director at that time Mr Goh Keng How (“Mr Goh”).12 He argues
that it would therefore be unfair to pin the effect of this “lapse” solely on him.

16.

Indeed, the Respondent appears to suggest that Mr Goh should bear most of the blame
for alleged systemic regulatory and compliance failures at Foxwood LLC.13 He argues
that Mr Goh was “responsible for regulatory and compliance matters”14 but (i) “did not
raise any concerns regarding regulatory compliance”15 despite the Respondent having
kept him in the loop on the hiring of practice trainees, and (ii) “failed to provide any form
of guidance or policy relating to the employment of trainees”16 by Foxwood LLC.

17.

Mr Goh testified on behalf of the Law Society. He admitted that he had not familiarized
himself with the Admission Rules and was not aware that the Respondent was not

RCS [47].
RCS [48].
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
12
13

5

qualified to act as supervising solicitor for Mr Lim and Ms Sunil. It was also patently
clear to us from Mr Goh’s testimony that he was not someone who placed a great deal
of importance on the need to comply strictly with the applicable rules and regulations
governing practice.

18.

However, Mr Goh’s conduct is not the subject of these proceedings. Even if Mr Goh’s
conduct had fallen below the standard expected of advocates and solicitors (on which
issue we make no finding), it does not mitigate the Respondent’s culpability.

19.

The Law Society correctly highlighted that all solicitors ought to be familiar with the rules
made under the Act and will at any rate be deemed to be aware of their existence and
applicability: Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena (“Selena Chiong”).17
It follows therefore that each advocate and solicitor bears personal responsibility to
ensure that the applicable rules of practice are strictly adhered to in all areas of his
practice.

20.

It was incumbent on the Respondent to familiarize himself with the relevant rules
governing his practice as an Advocate and Solicitor. In particular, he ought to have
familiarized himself with the rules governing the supervision of practice trainees before
hiring Mr Lim and Ms Sunil as practice trainees. He ought, at the very least, to have
satisfied himself that he met the statutory requirements for being a supervising solicitor.

21.

The Respondent patently failed to do so – he admits he failed to familiarize himself with
the relevant rules relating to being a supervising solicitor.18 Indeed, the evidence before
us suggests that he simply did not care whether there were any rules and, if so, what

17

[2005] 4 SLR(R) 320, referred to at LSCS [48].

18

Transcript 17 Dec 2021, 26(29) to 27(2).

6

they were. He claimed that he assumed that someone in the firm (presumably Mr Goh)
would have told him if what he proposed to do contravened any applicable rules. That
argument does not assist him. The onus was on him to ensure he complied with all
relevant rules and regulations governing his practice. His failure to do so is not mitigated
by any failing on the part of Mr Goh or anyone else in the firm.

22.

Third, he claims that he always believed that “he had a shield” on regulatory issues –
namely, that Mr Goh “would take care of regulatory and compliance issues”.19 This is
essentially the same argument as above and is rejected for the same reasons.

23.

Fourth, the Respondent claims that he did “all he could to rectify the mistake and
alleviate the situation for [Mr Lim]”20 by trying “to find solutions to [Mr Lim’s]
predicament”21. Mr Lim did not agree that the Respondent had been of much help in
resolving the predicament he found himself in. However, while we are prepared to
accept that the Respondent did take some steps to try and help, we do not think these
steps have much mitigatory value. Mr Lim eventually secured a training contract with
another firm through his own endeavors and not because of anything that the
Respondent did.

24.

We therefore find that none of the alleged mitigatory circumstances raised by the
Respondent are of any assistance to him in diminishing his culpability.

19
20
21

RCS [49].
The Respondent’s AEIC, at [51].
The Respondent’s AEIC, at [54].

7

The Respondent’s state of knowledge

25.

The Law Society argues that the Respondent was aware from “at least November
2019”22 that he did not meet the requirements to act as a supervising solicitor for
trainees. This is a serious allegation. If true, it would mean the Respondent knew he
did not satisfy the requirements under the Act before either Mr Lim or Ms Sunil
commenced their training period.

It would also mean that the Respondent had

deliberately ignored the provisions of the Admission Rules and then dishonestly alleged
in these disciplinary proceedings that the breach had been inadvertent.

26.

The Law Society relies on the evidence of Mr Tan Yong Xian, Selwyn (“Mr Tan”) and Mr
Giam Zhen Kai (“Mr Giam”). Both Mr Tan and Mr Giam are Advocates and Solicitors.
Mr Tan practiced at Foxwood LLC between September 2019 and April 2020. Mr Giam
practiced at Nair & Co. LLC with the Respondent from February 2019 before moving
with the Respondent to Foxwood LLC in July 2019 and practicing there until November
2019.

27.

Mr Tan’s evidence was that when he learnt that two practice trainees would be joining
Foxwood LLC’s dispute resolution team in December 2019, he “had some concern that
[the Respondent] would be the supervising solicitor for these [two] trainees” since he
was the only partner who handled litigation and dispute resolution at the firm.23

28.

Mr Tan said that these concerns prompted him to check the applicable rules and the
Respondent’s LinkedIn profile, and that he then concluded that “it was unlikely that [the
Respondent] would be able to meet the criteria” under the Rules. He said that during a
break in trial proceedings sometime in November 2019, he had highlighted the

22
23

LSCS [42].
Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Tan Yingxian, Selwyn (“Mr Tan’s AEIC”), at [8] and [9].

8

applicable rules to the Respondent and had “asked [the Respondent] directly if he had
sufficient years of practice with a practicing certificate in force to supervise trainees”. Mr
Tan said that Respondent had replied that “there would be ‘no issue’” and that Mr Goh
would be the trainees’ supervising solicitor. 24

29.

Mr Giam testified that soon after he joined Nair & Co. LLC in February 2019, he was told
that the reason Mr Suresh Nair was his supervising solicitor (and not the Respondent)
even though he spent “the vast majority of [his] practice training period assisting [the
Respondent]” was because the Respondent was not qualified to act as supervising
solicitor.25

30.

Mr Giam said that during the period when the Respondent was considering joining
various other firms, the Respondent had assured him that his practice training “would
not be affected as [the Respondent] would be able to assign qualified persons to be [his]
supervising solicitor in those firms”.26

31.

Mr Giam also said that he had accompanied the Respondent to interview Mr Lim
sometime in early October 2019, and that he had asked the Respondent shortly after
the interview whether the Respondent would be Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor. Mr Giam
said the Respondent replied that “he would not be Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor and that
one of the other partners of Foxwood LLC would be named as Mr Lim’s supervising
solicitor”.27

24
25
26
27

Mr Tan’s AEIC at [12] to [14].
Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Mr Giam Zhen Kai (“Mr Giam’s AEIC”) at [5] and [6].
Mr Giam’s AEIC at [7] and [8].
Mr Giam’s AEIC at [10] to [12].

9

32.

The Respondent objected to the admission of these portions of the evidence of Mr Tan
and Mr Giam and applied to strike them out on several grounds, namely (i) that these
conversations had taken him by surprise as they were material facts that ought to have
been, but were not, pleaded; (ii) that the evidence was not relevant, (iii) that he did not
know the specific charge(s) to which this evidence relates, and (iv) that the evidence
was being raised late in the day.

33.

Having heard parties, we dismissed these objections and allowed the evidence in. The
objection that the conversations were not pleaded was misconceived. The material
allegation was that the Respondent knew or ought to have known that he was not
sufficiently qualified. This was pleaded. The conversations referred to by Mr Tan and
Mr Giam formed part of the evidence tendered by the Law Society in support of that
material allegation. It is trite that evidence need not be pleaded.

34.

The objection as to the relevance of the evidence is equally unfounded. The issue of
whether the Respondent knew he was not qualified is pleaded and in issue. While the
Respondent admits that he was not qualified, the main plank of his mitigation is that his
breach of the relevant regulation had been purely inadvertent – i.e. he had not known
that he was not qualified. The conversations, if proved, would go towards undermining
that assertion of inadvertence and are therefore plainly relevant.

35.

As to the objection that the Respondent did not know which charge(s) the evidence
related to, there is no requirement for each piece of evidence to be tagged to a particular
charge. In any event, the nature of the conversations make it quite apparent which
charge(s) they relate to.

36.

Finally, the evidence was not adduced late in the day.

The evidence of the

conversations is contained in the affidavits of evidence-in-chief of Mr Tan and Mr Giam,
10

both of which were exchanged together with the affidavits of evidence-in-chief of all the
other witnesses.

The Respondent’s main complaint appears to be that the

conversations should have been raised at the pleading stage. For the reasons stated
above, we disagree.

37.

Having dismissed the Respondent’s objections, we nonetheless granted him leave to
address these alleged conversations either by way of a supplementary affidavit of
evidence-in-chief or via oral testimony. The Respondent chose to do so by way of oral
evidence. He claimed that his relationship with Mr Tan and Mr Giam had soured towards
the end of their time with Foxwood LLC and suggested that this soured relationship
tainted their evidence against him.

38.

Both Mr Tan and Mr Giam candidly admitted that their relationship with the Respondent
had soured. However, they steadfastly maintained that their evidence, particularly in
respect of the respective conversations with the Respondent, was true. We would also
be slow to find that two Advocates and Solicitors would lie under oath, especially when
they had absolutely nothing to gain from doing so and could face severe repercussions
if they did so and were found out.

39.

Critically, the Respondent did not deny the conversations with Mr Tan and Mr Giam but
said that he could not recall if they had taken place.28 At the hearing, the Respondent
did not directly challenge the evidence of Mr Tan and Mr Giam in respect of these
respective conversations. Instead, he sought to undermine their evidence on this issue
by challenging their evidence on the events that led to these alleged conversations.
Specifically, he challenged Mr Tan’s evidence on when and why he had searched the

28

RCS [82].

11

Respondent’s LinkedIn profile29 and Mr Giam’s evidence on how he had come to learn
that the Respondent was not qualified to act as supervising solicitor.30

40.

While we accept that they were some inconsistencies in the evidence of both Mr Tan
and Mr Giam, we find that these inconsistencies do not detract from their unchallenged
evidence on their respective conversations with the Respondent. Both Mr Tan and Mr
Giam were unwavering in their evidence that they had each, on separate occasions, had
conversations with the Respondent about whether he was qualified to act as a
supervising solicitor. Having reviewed all the evidence on this issue, we conclude that
the conversations alleged by Mr Tan and Mr Giam did take place.

41.

The Respondent also argued that the conversations had not registered in his mind even
if they had taken place.31 He points to certain concessions made by Mr Tan and Mr
Giam during cross-examination in support of this assertion. Mr Tan agreed that his
conversation with the Respondent had occurred during an intensive trial and the
Respondent could have been preoccupied with the trial.32 Mr Giam agreed that his
conversation with the Respondent was not an extended one and he could not provide
details of the conversation save that it had occurred shortly after the interview with Mr
Lim sometime in October 2019.33

42.

We are unable to conclude with the necessary degree of certainty that these
conversations had registered in the Respondent’s mind or that he was otherwise aware,
prior to 6 January 2020, that he was not qualified to act as a supervising solicitor for
practice trainees. We highlight several factors in this regard. First, the fact that the

29
30
31
32
33

RCS [82(g)] to [82(l)].
RCS [82(b)] to [82(f)].
RCS [83].
Transcript 28 Oct 2021 46(21) to 46(22).
Transcript 28 Oct 2021 7(5) to 8(18).

12

conversations were one-off, coupled with the concessions by Mr Tan and Giam, suggest
it is possible that the conversations had not in fact registered in the Respondent’s mind.

43.

Second, there is no other contemporaneous evidence (apart from the conversations)
that the Respondent was aware that he was not sufficiently qualified. As stated above,
the Respondent’s evidence is that he was not aware of the relevant regulations and had
not bothered to check. There is no evidence to suggest that this is untrue.

44.

Third, the Respondent informed Mr Lim that he was not qualified to be his supervising
solicitor on or around 14 January 2020, shortly after he says he discovered his lack of
qualifications on 6 January 2020. If the Respondent had in fact been aware all along
that he was not qualified, there is no reason why he should suddenly choose to admit
this fact to Mr Lim in January 2020. The fact that he did so is more consistent with him
only having discovered this fact shortly before, as he claimed.

Is Section 83(2)(j) of the Act satisfied?

45.

The Second Charge asserts a breach of Section 83(2)(j) of the Act, which relates to
contraventions of the provisions of the Act that warrant disciplinary action.

The

Respondent contends that his conduct did not cross the threshold to warrant disciplinary
action.34

46.

We make two observations. First, while the section refers to provisions of the Act, it
must necessarily extend to and encompass contraventions of subsidiary legislation and
regulations promulgated under the Act.

Second, a plain reading of the provision

suggests that some contraventions of provisions of the Act may not warrant disciplinary

34

RCS [59].

13

action. It follows that the mere fact that the Respondent may have contravened a
provision of the Act does not necessarily mean that his conduct warrants disciplinary
action.

This is not controversial and is consistent with the general tenor of the

disciplinary framework established under the Act.

47.

For the reasons set out below in our discussion in relation to the Alternative Second
Charge,35 we find the Respondent’s conduct in breaching Rule (1)(b) of the Admission
Rules to be of sufficient severity to warrant disciplinary action and that the Law Society
has therefore made out the Second Charge.

Is Section 83(2)(h) of the Act satisfied?

48.

The Alternative Second Charge asserts a breach of Section 83(2)(h) of the Act, which
relates to conduct that amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as
an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. The
Respondent contends that his actions do not amount to such misconduct.36

49.

The standard of unbefitting conduct is met if a solicitor’s conduct is such as would render
him unfit to remain as a member of an honourable profession, and the relevant test is
whether reasonable people, on hearing what the solicitor had done, would have said
without hesitation that as a solicitor he should not have done it: The Law Society of
Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer (“Ezekiel Peter”).37

35
36
37

Paragraphs 48 to 52 below.
RCS [59].
[2019] 4 SLR 92, [38].

14

50.

The Respondent describes his conduct as “a case of simple negligence”.38 He says he
made an honest mistake. During oral closing arguments, the Respondent’s counsel
explained that the mistake was “in failing to familiarize himself with the relevant rules
relating to … being a supervising solicitor”.39

51.

We disagree. This was not a case of a mistake or oversight. A mistake would have
been if (for example) the Respondent had incorrectly calculated the number of years he
had been in practice and thereby wrongly conclude that he was sufficiently qualified.
That was not what happened. The evidence clearly showed that the Respondent did
not know what the qualifying requirements were to be a supervising solicitor and did not
bother to check. In fact, he admitted as much.

52.

While the Respondent repeatedly claimed he had acted under a mistaken belief that he
was qualified to act as a supervising solicitor, he could not provide an answer when
asked what the basis of that belief was. Indeed, it would appear from his evidence that
the first time he familiarized himself with the relevant rules was sometime on 6 January
2020 while waiting for a flight back from Perth.40

53.

Applying the test set out in Ezekiel Peter, when asked whether an Advocate and Solicitor
should have taken on the role of supervising solicitor for practice trainees without first
familiarizing himself with the applicable rules and ensuring that he was qualified to take
on the role (which is what the Respondent admits happened in this case), we have no
doubt that a reasonable person would have said that he should not.

38
39
40

RCS [61].
Transcript 17 Dec 2021 26(30) to 27(2).
Respondent’s AEIC [36].

15

54.

We therefore find that the Respondent’s conduct as particularized in the Alternative
Second Charge amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an
officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession and that the
Law Society has made out the Alternative Second Charge.

The appropriate sanction

55.

The function of a Disciplinary Tribunal is to act as a filter to determine if there is ‘cause
of sufficient gravity’ that could, on a finding by the Court of Three Judges, be ascertained
to constitute ‘due cause’ that merited the imposition of one of the range of sanctions
prescribed in Section 83(1) of the Act: Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani
d/o Daniel (“Jasmine Daniel”).41

56.

It is not for us to determine whether ‘due cause’ has been established in this case – that
determination lies solely within the purview of the Court of Three Judges. Our role is to
decide whether ‘cause of sufficient gravity’ has been established, and for that we need
only be satisfied that there was a prima facie case on the relevant evidence that ‘due
cause’ might be present: Jasmine Daniel.42 There are three options open to us pursuant
to Section 93(1) of the Act:

(a)

Determine that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists;

(b)

Determine there while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists,
the legal practitioner should be reprimanded or ordered to pay a penalty sufficient
and appropriate to the misconduct committed; or

41

[2010] 3 SLR 390, at [37].

42

Ibid., at [31].

16

(c)

Determine that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists, in which
case the Law Society is obliged pursuant to Section 94 of the Act to make an
application under Section 98 of the Act to the Court of Three Judges.

57.

The Respondent submits that his conduct evinces no cause of sufficient gravity. He
argues that his conduct was merely a mistake or an oversight. We have explained above
why we disagree.

58.

The Respondent also refers to and relies on two cases (The Law Society of Singapore
v Anand K Thiagarajan43 and The Law Society of Singapore v Anand Kumar s/o Toofani
Beldar)44 which he submits are factually akin to the present case and where the
respective Disciplinary Tribunals found there to be no cause of sufficient gravity.

59.

We do not think these cases take the Respondent very far. Neither of these cases deal
with breaches of the Admission Rules. In any event, it is trite that whether cause of
sufficient gravity is made out in any given case must necessarily turn on the specific
facts and circumstances of that case.

60.

Turning to the appropriate sanction, we are acutely conscious of the importance of
ensuring that members of the public have access to quality legal advice. The framework
for the training of advocates and solicitors seeks to ensure the quality of persons being
called to Bar by way of the following three-pronged framework:

43

[2009] SGDT 2.

44

[2011] SGDT 12.

17

(a)

Stringent criteria for those wishing to become a ‘qualified person’ as defined in
Section 2(1) of the Act, including limiting the number of universities whose law
degrees are recognized in Singapore;

(b)

Requiring them to successfully complete the Preparatory Course leading to Part
B of the Singapore Bar Examinations, as well as Part A of the Singapore Bar
Examinations for those who obtained their law degree from a recognized foreign
university; and

(c)

Requiring them to undertake and complete six months of relevant legal training,
relevant legal practice or work. The Admission Rules specify that such relevant
legal training must be carried out under the supervision of suitably qualified
person. This includes a solicitor in active legal practice for “a total of not less than
5 out of the 7 years immediately preceding the date of commencement of his
supervision”.45

61.

The aim of these requirements is plainly to ensure that anyone granted the privilege of
admission to the Bar is equipped with the relevant skills to provide clients with legal
advice of the requisite standard. Rule 18(1) of the Admission Rule is therefore an
important pillar in the framework for ensuring the quality of advocates and solicitors
called to the Bar. This in turn helps ensure that the broader public interest of ensuring
the quality of legal advice available to clients is met.

62.

Viewed in this context, the Respondent’s breach of Rule 18(1) of the Admission Rule is
not simply one of “oversight in failing to familiarize himself with the applicable rules”.46

45

Rule 18(1) of the Admission Rules.

46

RCS [61].

18

The undisputed facts evince a complete disregard for and disinterest in the rules
governing his suitability to act as supervising solicitor. Not only did he not know the
applicable rules, he also did not (and could not be bothered to) check. Such conduct
imperiled the careful framework put in place to ensure the quality of advocates and
solicitors admitted to the Bar.

63.

We therefore find that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists in respect
of both the Second Charge and the Alternative Second Charge.

The First Charge and Alternative First Charge

64.

The First Charge alleges: 47

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of breaching rule 36(2)(a)(ii)

of the Legal Profession

(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 …, as part of the management of a Singapore
law practice known as Foxwood LLC, by failing to ensure that [Mr Lim] and [Ms
Sunil], who were practice trainees serving their respective practice training periods
under separate practice training contracts with Foxwood LLC, were supervised
during each of their practice training periods with Foxwood LLC by a supervising
solicitor who had in force a practicing certificate for a total of not less than 5 out of 7
years immediately preceding the date of the supervision of each of the said practice
trainees, which amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev Ed).”

65.

The Law Society also alleged in the alternative that the conduct described in the First
Charge amounted to “misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of

47

SOC page 8.

19

the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession” within the meaning of
Section 83(2)(h) of the Act (the “Alternative First Charge”).48

66.

The Responded raised a preliminary objection to the First Charge and Alternative First
Charge, arguing that they were unnecessarily duplicative given the Second Charge.49
He relied on Section 308(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (the “CPC”), which states:
“Limit of punishment for offence made up of several offences
308 – (1) Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which
parts is itself an offence, the person who committed the offence shall not be punished
with the punishment of more than one of such offences unless it is expressly
provided.
(2)

Where –
(a)

anything is an offence falling within 2 or more separate definitions of
any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or
punished; or

(b)

several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or
themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different
offence,

The person who committed the offence shall not be punished with a more severe
punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.”

67.

The objection is misconceived. A plain reading of Section 308(1) of the CPC clearly
shows that it does not prevent a person facing multiple charges arising from the same
set of facts. Rather, it is meant to regulate the punishment that can be meted out to
such an individual. There is therefore nothing improper with the First Charge and
Alternative First Charge arising from the same facts as the Second Charge.

68.

The First and Alternative First Charges assert a breach of Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) of the Legal
Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (the “PCR”), which states:

48
49

SOC page 12.
RCS [7] to [10].

20

“Responsibilities to practice trainees in law practice
36 – (2) The management of a law practice must ensure that all of the following
apply to each practice trainee who serves the practice training period under a
practice training contract with the law practice:
(a)

69.

The practice trainee is supervised by a supervising solicitor who –
(i)

is in active practice in the law practice; and

(ii)

has in force a practicing certificate for a total of not less than 5
out of the 7 years immediately preceding the date the supervision
of the practice trainee starts.”

Rule 36(2)(a) of the PCR imposes an obligation on the management of a law practice in
respect of the supervision of practice trainees. It is common ground that this obligation
was breached in relation to Mr Lim and Ms Sunil. The only issue therefore is whether
the Respondent was part of the management of Foxwood LLC at the material time.

70.

The Law Society argues that the Respondent was a “de-facto director of Foxwood [LLC]
or was in any event part of [its] management”.50

It argues that the fact that the

Respondent had not been formally appointed as a director of Foxwood LLC and had not
been notified as such to the Law Society was irrelevant, and that the substance of the
Respondent’s role must trump its form.

71.

The Respondent argues that he was neither a de facto director of Foxwood LLC nor
otherwise part of its management, but was at all times only a “high-level employee”.51
While he accepts that he effectively ran Foxwood LLC’s dispute resolution department,
he claims that Mr Goh retained overall control of the department and the rest of the firm
and that he did not have “visibility or access to Foxwood [LLC’s] bank accounts,
accounting information and clients outside of the [dispute resolution department]”.52

50
51
52

LSCS [60].
RCS [19].
RCS [20].

21

72.

Mr Goh’s evidence53 was that the Respondent ran the entire dispute resolution practice
of Foxwood LLC – hiring his own staff, taking on his own clients and running the practice
as he saw fit. Mr Goh explained that Foxwood LLC would supply back-end support (e.g.
software, payroll and human resource services) but would be compensated for these
services. The Respondent would be “entirely responsibly for the profit, losses and
sustainability of the dispute resolution practice”.54

73.

Mr Goh’s evidence is supported by a Partnership Agreement between Foxwood LLC
and the Respondent (the “Agreement”).55 While the copy of the Agreement in evidence
was undated and unsigned, the Respondent does not dispute that he entered into the
Agreement with Foxwood LLC. Indeed, the Respondent refers to and relies on some of
the terms of the Agreement in support of his argument that he was not part of the
management of Foxwood LLC56 - an argument we deal with below.57

74.

The Agreement expressly states that Foxwood LLC and the Respondent had entered
into the Agreement “in order to govern their relationship as stakeholders in [Foxwood
LLC] and the management and the affairs of [Foxwood LLC], in particular, the Dispute
Resolution Division”.58 Clause 2 of the Agreement states as follows:

“2.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIVISION

2.1

[The Respondent] shall be responsible for starting, heading and maintaining
the Dispute Resolution Division.

53

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Goh Keng Haw (“Goh’s AEIC”), at [14].

Ibid..
Exhibit GKH-2 of Goh’s AEIC.
56 See, for example, [15] and [16] of the Respondent’s AEIC.
57 See paragraphs __ to __.
58 Recital C, at page 16 of Goh’s AEIC.
54
55

22

2.2

[The Respondent] shall have authority to, and be responsible for:
(a)

Accepting and opening files from new clients and commencing work on
behalf of such clients, subject always to satisfactory client due diligence
and conflicts check;

(b)

Signing off on all correspondences (only with respect to the Dispute
Resolution Division) for and on behalf of [Foxwood LLC]; and

(c)

Hiring, employing and terminating [employees of the Dispute Resolution
Division].

2.3

In consideration of the above, [Foxwood LLC] shall pay [the Respondent] a
partnership fee, to be paid out from the office account … only, as and when
instructed by [the Respondent].

The amount of partnership fee shall be

determined solely by [the Respondent].”

75.

Clause 3.1 of the Agreement states that the Respondent would pay Foxwood LLC a
monthly Administrative Fee of S$1,500 for each fee-earner in the Dispute Resolution
Division. Clause 3.2 of the Agreement obliged the Respondent to pay Foxwood LLC a
refundable Deposit calculated by multiplying the gross monthly salary of each employee
of the Dispute Resolution Division by that employee’s notice period in months. In
consideration for the payment of the Administrative Fee and the Deposit, Foxwood LLC
was required pursuant to Clause 3.4 of the Agreement to provide the Respondent and
the Dispute Resolution Division with the following services:

“(a)

Costs and use of the following software:
(i)

Microsoft 365;

(ii)

Lawnet (two users);

(iii)

E-litigation;

(iv)

Waveapp;

(v)

Clio; and

(vi)

Nuance Power PDF.

23

76.

(b)

pay-roll and Human Resource services;

(c)

Stationaries, such as name cards, pens and papers;

(d)

Client onboarding and invoicing;

(e)

Marketing efforts through digital and traditional means;

(f)

General administrative work in relation to application for practicing
certification, professional indemnity insurance, employee benefit.”

The picture that emerges is that the Respondent was clearly responsible for the
management of Foxwood LLC’s dispute resolution department even if he had not been
formally appointed as a director of the firm. As part of this role, he made the hiring
decisions concerning lawyers and trainees for the dispute resolution department.

77.

This is apparent from the process by which both Mr Lim and Ms Sunil joined Foxwood
LLC as trainees in the dispute resolution department. Mr Lim’s evidence was that he
sent his application for a training contract directly to the Respondent and was eventually
interviewed by the Respondent and the offer to join the firm as a trainee was made by
way of a letter on the firm’s letterhead signed by the Respondent as “Head of Dispute
Resolution”.59 Ms Sunil went through the same process as well.60 Both Mr Lim and Ms
Sunil dealt with the Respondent. There is no evidence that Mr Goh or anyone else at
Foxwood other than the Respondent made the final decision on whether to offer them
training contracts.

78.

We agree with the Law Society that we must look at the substance and not the form of
the Respondent’s role at Foxwood LLC in determining whether he was part of its
management. Similarly, whether a solicitor is part of a firm’s management for the

59
60

Mr Lim’s AEIC, [9] to [14].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC, [10] to [21].

24

purposes of Rule 36 of the PCR cannot be determined by simply asking whether he held
the title of director or partner. One must look at the actual role he performed in the
running of the firm.

79.

In this case, it is clear to us that the Respondent was part of the firm’s management
insofar as he called the shots in the dispute resolution department. As we described
above, it was the Respondent who made the decision to offer Mr Lim and Ms Sunil
training contracts with the firm and it was he who put himself forward as their supervising
solicitor. It is not the Respondent’s case that Mr Goh or anyone else at Foxwood LLC
had made those decisions, and there is certainly no evidence that that was the case.

80.

The Respondent argues that the Agreement does not “give the Respondent control to
Goh’s exclusion”61 and that the Agreement did not state that Goh had no control over
the dispute resolution department. He contends that Mr Goh, as the sole director of
Foxwood LLC, always had the power to veto any decisions the Respondent made in
relation to the dispute resolution department.

81.

This may have been the case in theory, but the Respondent did not adduce any evidence
of specific occasions when Mr Goh had done so. All the evidence before us points to
the Respondent having been given a free hand to manage the dispute resolution
department in accordance with the arrangement set out in the Agreement. It bears
noting that the Respondent accepts that ensuring that practice trainees are properly
supervised is a shared responsibility by the management of the firm, and he admits that
he must take responsibility for his part.62

61
62

RCS [19].
RCS [47].

25

82.

We therefore find that the Respondent was part of the management of Foxwood LLC at
the material time and that Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) of the PCR was breached as pleaded in the
First Charge and the First Alternative Charge.

83.

We note that Rule 36 places the responsibility for providing supervised training on the
management of the law firm. While we have found that the Respondent was part of the
management of Foxwood LLC, he was certainly not the only person in management. Mr
Goh, as the sole director of the firm, was certainly part of management as well.
However, neither Mr Goh nor any other individuals are before us and we therefore make
no comment on their respective roles or potential culpability.

Has Section 83(2)(b) of the Act been satisfied?

84.

Section 83(2)(b) of the Act provides (among other things) that due cause may be shown
by proof that an advocate and solicitor has been guilty of such a breach of “any usage
or rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under section 71 or by the
Council under the provisions of [the] Act”63 as amounts to improper conduct or practice
as an advocate and solicitor.

85.

Given the seriousness of the breach (as we explained in dealing with the Second and
Alternative Second Charges above), we find that the Respondent’s conduct did amount
to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor and that the First Charge
has therefore been made out.

63

Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act.

26

Has Section 83(2)h) of the Act been satisfied?

86.

The Alternative First Charge asserts a breach of Section 83(2)(h) of the Act, which
relates to conduct that amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as
an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

87.

Applying the test in Ezekiel Peter, we find that the Respondent’s conduct as set out in
the Alternative Second Charge amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.
We repeat our remarks at paragraphs 48 to 52 above in relation to the Second and
Alternative Second Charges in this regard.

The Alternative Second Charge has

therefore been made out.

88.

The failure to ensure that Mr Lim and Ms Sunil were supervised during their respective
training contracts by a solicitor who was sufficiently qualified is a serious breach. We
find that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists in respect of both the
First and Alternative First Charges.

The Third Charge

89.

At the hearing for oral closing submissions on 17 December 2021, Counsel for the Law
Society highlighted that the Law Society was considering making amendments to the
Third Charge. Subsequently, on 31 December 2021, we allowed an amendment to the
Third Charge pursuant to an agreement between the parties. The amended Third
Charge alleges: 64

64

Law Society’s Further Submissions (“LCFS”) [7].

27

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore have behaved in a manner inconsistent with the public interest by being
the supervising solicitor during the practice training periods of [Mr Lim] and [Ms
Sunil], who were practice trainees under separate practice training contracts
contracts with Foxwood LLC, when you did not have in force a practicing certificate
of a period of not less than 5 out of the 7 years immediately preceding the date of
the commencement of your supervision of Mr Lim and [Ms Sunil] as required under
Rule 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 …, which amounts to
misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court
or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the
Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”

90.

The crux of the charge is that advocates and solicitors have “a duty to behave in a
manner consistent with the public interest” 65 and the Respondent had breached this
duty by purporting to act as the supervising solicitor for Mr Lim and Ms Sunil when he
was not qualified to do so.

91.

The Respondent does not appear to dispute the existence of such a duty. His argument
instead is that “the public interest is not engaged every time a lawyer makes a mistake”
66

and that the conduct complained of in the Third Charge did not amount to a breach of

that duty.

92.

The Respondent’s arguments in response to this Charge focus on his claim that he had
not held himself out to be a supervising solicitor in an advertisement published on the
Law Society’s practice training website on 18 November 2019 (the “Advertisement”).67
We are prepared to accept the Respondent’s argument on this issue. However, this
finding does not assist him.

65

Respondent’s Further Written Submissions (“RFWS”) [3].

66

SOC page 15.

67

RFWS [5] to [15].

28

93.

The Respondent’s focus on addressing the Advertisement appears to arise from the
pleaded particulars to the charge, the majority of which assert that the breach arose
because the Respondent held himself out to be a supervising solicitor in the
Advertisement. However, the Respondent has not addressed the body of the charge,
which asserts that he had purported to act as supervising solicitor for Mr Lim and Ms
Sunil while not qualified to do so – something the Respondent admits.

94.

As we explained above in dealing with the Second Charge and Alternative Second
Charge, the Respondent’s conduct imperiled the framework put in place to ensure the
quality of advocates and solicitors admitted to the Bar. Such conduct clearly offends the
public interest.

95.

We therefore find that the Third Charge has also been made out and that cause of
sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists in respect of this charge.

The Fourth Charge and Alternative Fourth Charge

96.

The Fourth Charge and Alternative Fourth Charge both relate to the Respondent having
allegedly demanded that Ms Sunil pay a sum of $2,000 pursuant to her practice training
contract with Foxwood LLC.

97.

The Fourth Charge alleges: 68

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of breaching Rule 8(3)(a) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 …, by taking unfair advantage of [Ms Sunil] by
demanding that she pay Foxwood LLC the sum of $2,000 when this sum was not
recoverable by due process of law, which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an

68

SOC page 17.

29

advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act
(Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”

98.

The Fourth Charge asserts a breach of Rule 8(3)(a) of the PCR, which requires a legal
practitioner to “not take unfair advantage of any person”. The Law Society alleges that
the Respondent took unfair advantage of Ms Sunil by demanding that she pay Foxwood
LLC a sum of $2,000 that was “not recoverable by due process of law”.

99.

The Alternative Fourth Charge reads:

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodaong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of breaching Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 by acting in a manner contrary to your position
as a member of an honourable profession by demanding that [Ms Ann] pay Foxwood
LLC the sum of $2,000 under the terms of a practice training contract under which
you agreed to be [Ms Sunil’s] supervising solicitor during her practice training period
when you knew or ought to have known that you did not meet the requirements to
be [Ms Sunil’s] supervising solicitor under rule 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession
(Admission) Rules … as of the commencement of your supervision of [Ms Sunil]
during her practice training period under the terms of that practice training contract,
which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of
the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning
of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”

100. The Alternative Fourth Charge asserts a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, which
requires a legal practitioner to “not act towards any person in a way which is fraudulent,
deceitful or otherwise contrary to the legal practitioner’s position as a member of an
honourable profession”. The Law Society alleges that the Respondent acted in a manner
contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession by allegedly
demanding that Ms Sunil make the $2,000 payment.

30

Did the Respondent demand payment from Ms Sunil?

101. The threshold question therefore is whether the Respondent had in fact demanded that
Ms Sunil pay a sum of $2,000 to Foxwood LLC.

102. Ms Sunil had signed a practice training contract with Foxwood LLC. The terms of this
contract were set out in the letter of offer dated 11 October 2019 which the Respondent
signed on behalf of Foxwood LLC and which Ms Sunil signed and accepted on 12
October 2019.69 Clause 2 of the contract stated her gross monthly salary as $2,000 and
Clause 3 permitted either party to terminate the contract “with 1 month prior notice in
writing”. 70

103. Ms Sunil officially started her employment with Foxwood LLC on 2 January 2020.71 On
4 January 2020, she decided to leave Foxwood LLC immediately for personal reasons
that had nothing to do with the Respondent. 72 She informed the Respondent of this
over a telephone conversation on 5 January 2020 – the Respondent being overseas at
that time. Ms Sunil’s evidence was that during this conversation, the Respondent asked
if she could serve the entire one-month notice period set out in her training contract. Ms
Sunil said she told the Respondent that she wanted to leave immediately,73 and that the
Respondent then told her that she would have to pay “1 month’s salary in lieu of notice
which would be $2,000.00 … within seven days of [her] last day at Foxwood LLC. 74

69
70
71
72
73
74

AB 33 & 34.
AB 33.
Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Ms Trinisha Ann Sunil (“Ms Sunil’s AEIC”) [30].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [33].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [35(c)].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [35(e)].

31

104. Ms Sunil said that she understood from her conversation with the Respondent that “she
would have to pay damages in lieu of notice if [she] could not serve the 1 month notice
period”.75 She explained that while she “had doubts on whether [she] was contractually
obliged to pay this money”, she believed the Respondent must be right as “he was a
lawyer, a partner at Foxwood LLC and [her boss]”. 76

105. Later that day, after having discussed the matter with her family, Ms Sunil sent the
Respondent a WhatsApp message stating that she had “decided that it would be best if
[she] terminate [her] contract here and pay the full month of salary in lieu of notice”.77
She was subsequently informed by one of the secretarial staff at Foxwood LLC that the
amount she had to transfer to Foxwood was $1,793.13,78 which she believed was
derived by deducting from $2,000 a sum of $86.95 for each of her three workings days
at Foxwood LLC.79

106. On 9 January 2020, the Respondent sent her a WhatsApp message asking her to
“please kindly make payment towards [her] notice period to clear up the remaining issue
on [her] employment”.80 She responded to say that would only be able to do so later in
the week but would do so with the seven-day period he had mentioned.81 Ms Sunil
eventually paid the sum of $1,793.13 on 11 January 2020.82

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Ms Sunil’s AEIC [35(f)].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [37].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [39]; AB 48.
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [47].
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [48].
AB 237.
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [52]; AB 50.
Ms Sunil’s AEIC [57].

32

107. The Respondent denies having made any demands. He says that given Ms Sunil’s
desire to leave immediately, he had merely given her the option of doing so by paying a
month’s salary in lieu of notice83 and she had voluntarily accepted this option. 84

108. It is therefore common ground that the Respondent had informed Ms Sunil that she
would have to pay one month’s salary in lieu of notice if she wanted to terminate her
employment immediately. Whether this is characterized as a demand or merely the
provision of an option is, in our view, irrelevant.

Did the Respondent take unfair advantage of Ms Sunil?

109. The material question insofar as the Fourth Charge is concerned is whether the
Respondent can be said to have taken unfair advantage of Ms Sunil by requiring her to
pay one month’s salary in lieu of notice to immediately terminate her employment with
Foxwood LLC.

110. The Respondent denied having taken advantage of Ms Sunil. He repeated his position
that all he had done was to offer her the option of immediately terminating her
employment with Foxwood LLC by paying one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

111. The Law Society asserts that the Respondent took unfair advantage of Ms Sunil by
“demanding the sum of $2,000 from her when this sum was not recoverable by due
process of law”.85 During oral closing submissions, Counsel for the Law Society clarified
that what was meant by the $2,000 not being “recoverable by due process of law” was
that there was no enforceable contract because the fact that none of the lawyers at

83
84
85

RCS [94].
Respondent’s AEIC [31].
LSCS [103].

33

Foxwood LLC were qualified to act as supervising solicitors for practice trainees meant
that the training contract could not be performed and was therefore a nullity.86

112. To show that the Respondent had taken unfair advantage of Ms Sunil by demanding
payment of the $2,000, the Law Society must establish that he knew at the material time
that the training contract was void. That in turn would require knowledge that none of
the directors of Foxwood LLC were able to act as Ms Sunil’s supervising solicitor. The
Law Society argued that it had cleared this threshold.

113. First, the Law Society relied on Selena Chiong for the proposition that each Advocate
and Solicitor is taken to know of the relevant Rules governing his practice, and argued
that the Respondent therefore must be taken to have known that he was not qualified to
act as Ms Sunil’s supervising solicitor.

114. We accept the principles set out in Selena Chiong – an Advocate and Solicitor cannot
rely on any alleged ignorance of the relevant regulations to avoid liability. However, we
do not think that fundamental principle is directly applicable for the purposes of this
charge. For the purposes of showing an unfair advantage, the Law Society must show
that the Respondent had actual (as opposed to imputed) knowledge of his lack of
qualifications to be Ms Sunil supervising solicitor and that the training contract was
therefore a nullity.

115. The evidence in this case does not go that far, certainly not enough to make the point
beyond a reasonable doubt.

86

We have explained above why we cannot say with

Transcript 17 Dec 2021 19(8) to 20(2).

34

sufficient certainty that the Respondent’s conversations with Mr Tan and Mr Giam were
sufficient to bring this fact to his attention.87

116. Second, the Law Society points out that even if we accept the Respondent’s evidence
that he only realized that he was not qualified on 6 January 2020, it would mean that the
Respondent had the requisite knowledge when he repeated his demand for the $2,000
in his 9 January 2020 WhatsApp message to Ms Sunil.

117. The Respondent says that the WhatsApp message was merely a reminder and the fact
that the training contract “does not hold and therefore there is no basis to … make a
reminder” was not operative on his mind at that time.88 Based on the totality of the
evidence, we cannot say with the requisite certainty that the Respondent’s version
cannot be believed.

118. Third, the Law Society referred to and relied on the case of Law Society of Singapore v
Ong Teck Ghee89 for the principle that “an advocate and solicitor has to be scrupulously
beyond reproach in terms of his integrity, honesty and fairness”.90

119. While we accept this statement of principle, we do not see how the case assists the Law
Society. The facts of Ong Teck Ghee bear no resemblance to the present case, the
respondent in that case having entered into prohibited borrowing transactions by
entering into loan agreements with his client.

120. We therefore find that the Fourth Charge has not been made out.

87
88
89
90

See paragraphs __ to __ above.
Transcript 28 Oct 2021 127(16) to 127(25).
[2014] SGDT 4.
LSCS [89].

35

Did the Respondent act in a manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable
profession?

121. For the Alternative Fourth Charge, the material question is whether the Respondent had
acted in a manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession in
requiring Ms Sunil to pay one month’s salary in lieu of notice to immediately terminate
her employment with Foxwood LLC.

122. For the reasons set out above in relation to the Fourth Charge, we accept the
Respondent’s explanation that he had merely provided Ms Sunil with an option and had
not sought to take advantage of her. We therefore find that the Alternative Fourth
Charge is also not made out.

The Fifth Charge and Alternative Fifth Charge

123. The Fifth Charge and Alternative Fifth Charge stems from the allegation that the
Respondent represented to Mr Lim that he would qualify to serve as Mr Lim’s supervising
solicitor by May 2020 (the “Alleged Representation”). Both charges assert that the
making of the Alleged Representation amounted to a breach of the requirement under
Rule 8(3)(b) of the Rules that a legal practitioner “not act towards any person in a way
which is fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to the legal practitioner’s position as
a member of an honourable profession”.

124. The Fifth Charge states: 91

91

SOC page 21.

36

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodaong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of breaching Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 …, by acting in a manner which is deceitful by
representing to [Mr Lim], a practice trainee of Foxwood LLC, that by May 2020 you
would meet the requirements under Rule 18(1) of the Legal Profession (Admissions)
Rules 2011 … to be Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor during his practice training period
when you knew this to be false, which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act
(Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”

125. The Fifth Charge therefore asserts that by making the Alleged Representation, the
Respondent had breached Rule 8(3)(b) of the Rules by acting in a manner that was
deceitful, and that this breach amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

126. The Alternative Fifth Charge states: 92

“That you, Clarence Lun Yaodaong, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of Singapore are guilty of breaching Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 … by acting towards [Mr Lim], a practice trainee
of Foxwood LLC, in a manner which is contrary to your position as a member of an
honourable profession by representing to Mr Lim that by May 2020 you would meet
the requirements under Rule 18(1) of the Legal Profession (Admissions) Rules 2011
… to be Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor during his practice training period when you
knew this to be false, which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable
profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161,
2009 Rev Ed).”

127. The Alternative Fifth Charge therefore asserts that by making the Alleged
Representation, the Respondent had breached Rule 8(3)(b) of the Rules by acting in a
manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession, and that this

92

SOC page 25.

37

breach amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the
Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Did the Respondent make the Alleged Representation?

128. The threshold question therefore is whether the Respondent had in fact made the
Alleged Representation.

129. Mr Lim’s evidence on this issue was as follows:93
“[The Respondent] told me that he would meet the requirements to be a supervising
solicitor by May 2020. [The Respondent] mentioned in passing that he would have
to ‘check’, but it was unclear what exactly he felt needed to ‘check’. He never said
that he would have to check to see if he would qualify by May 2020. I recall with
certainty that he did inform me that he would qualify by May 2020. The impression
that [the Respondent] gave me was that he would qualify in May 2020 even though
he may have been uncertain as to the actual date of qualification.”

130. This evidence is consistent with what Mr Lim had stated on two earlier occasions. The
first was in an email dated 16 January 2020 to Professor Eleanor Wong from the NUS
Law Faculty, where Mr Lim stated that the Respondent had told him on 14 January 2020
that “he will qualify as a supervising solicitor in May 2020”.94

131. The second occasion was in an affidavit dated 4 August 2020 that Mr Lim had deposed
in support of his application to abridge time for the filing of documents for admission to
the Bar, where he stated that “[the Respondent] further informed [him] that he would only
qualify as an supervising solicitor in May 2020.” 95

93

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Mr Lim Teng Jie (“Mr Lim’s AEIC”) [37(a)].

94

AB 249.

95

AB 88, at [9].

38

132. The Respondent’s evidence is that after he discovered that he was not qualified to act
as Mr Lim’s supervising solicitor, he had informed Mr Lim of this fact and had given him
the following options for moving forward. One of those options was to continue with
Foxwood LLC as a paralegal until May 2020, commence practice training with Foxwood
LLC in May 2020 and be called in November 2020. His evidence in this regard was as
follows:96

“[One option was to] offer Mr Lim the position of a paralegal and if I was to qualify as
a supervising solicitor in May 2020, to commence practice training with Foxwood
LLC and to be called to the [Bar] 6 months thereafter. I informed Mr Lim that I would
need to check with the Law Society and SILE on whether I would qualify as a
supervising solicitor in May 2020. That is because I did not have the exact dates for
which I was holding a practicing certificate and intended to check on those matters,
if this was proposal was to be advanced. I recall that I had also mentioned June or
July 2020 depending on how the SILE/Law Society would respond to me.
As I did not want Mr Lim to suffer financially from the mistake, I also mentioned that
if Mr Lim went with this proposal and proceed to become a paralegal, I would ensure
that he would not be financially worse off compared with his peers in major firms by
paying him the big firm rate, which I understood to be $5,600 per month.”

133. In short, the Respondent admits having mentioned being qualified in May 2020 but says
he qualified that by saying he would have to check with the Law Society and SILE.

134. Mr Lim struck us as an earnest and truthful witness, and we have no doubt that Mr Lim
genuinely believed that the Respondent had made the Alleged Representation to him
on 14 January 2020. His contemporaneous email to Professor Wong supports his
evidence to the Tribunal and we see no reason why he would say that the Respondent
had made the Alleged Representation if he did not believe it had been made. The only

96

Respondent’s AEIC [38(d)] and [38(e)].

39

question therefore is whether the Respondent had qualified the Alleged Representation
as he claims to have done.

135. On this issue, we note that Mr Lim accepts that the Respondent had mentioned that he
would have to ‘check’ and says that it was unclear exactly what the Respondent felt
needed to be checked. The Respondent maintains that he meant that he would have to
check with the Law Society and SILE. It is therefore quite possible on the evidence
before us that there had been a degree of miscommunication or misunderstanding
between Mr Lim and the Respondent as to whether the Respondent had given an
unqualified representation that he would be qualified to act as supervising solicitor from
May 2020.

136. In the circumstances, we are unable to conclude with sufficient certainty that the
Respondent had in fact made the Alleged Representation. We therefore find that the
Fifth Charge and the Alternative Fifth Charge are not made out.

Conclusion

137. We therefore find and determine pursuant to Section 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause of
sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists:

(a)

under Section 83(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the First Charge;

(b)

under Section 83(2)(j) of the Act in respect of the Second Charge; and

(c)

under Section 83(2)(h) of the Act in respect of the Alternative First Charge, the
Alternative Second Charge and the Third Charge.

40

138. We also find and determine that the Fourth Charge, the Alternative Fourth Charge, the
Fifth Charge and the Alternative Fifth Charge were not made out.

139. We order, pursuant to Section 93(2) of the Act, that the Respondent pays the Law
Society’s costs in relation to these proceedings, such costs to be taxed by the Registrar
if not agreed.

th
22nd
Dated this 17
day of March 2022

Siraj Omar, S.C.
President

Tan Jee Ming
Advocate

41

",2023-03-08T04:00:32+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-mar-2023/,"In the Matter of Clarence Lun Yaodong (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-mar-2023/",1049
5,c9cec5a41473d524bba2a51035f36486a2dbf7b2,"In the Matter of CNH (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of CNH (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of information referred by the Attorney-General to the Law Society on the Respondent’s conduct.


The Respondent pleaded guilty to, and was duly convicted of the following:

Section 509 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (PC) for intending to insult the modesty of a 23-year-old woman (Victim), and intruding upon her privacy, by using his handphone to take photographs of her chest and brassiere without her consent; and Section 509 of the PC for intending to insult the modesty of the Victim, and intruding upon her privacy, by using his handphone to take photographs of her panties without her consent.

The Respondent had also consented to the following to be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing:

Section 509 of the PC for intending to insult the modesty of the Victim, and intruding upon her privacy, by using his handphone to take photographs of her panties without her consent; and Section 354(1) of the PC for using criminal force on the Victim, by pressing his thigh against her upper arm, knowing it is likely that he would thereby outrage her modesty.

The Respondent was sentenced to a total of four weeks’ imprisonment by the State Courts.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Ms Kuah Boon Theng SC and Mr Philip Ling as DT member.

Two charges (Charges) were preferred against the Respondent:

1st Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (LPA) in that the Respondent had intentionally used his handphone to take photographs of the chest and brasserie of the Victim, who was his colleague in the law firm, without her consent.

2nd Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had intentionally used his handphone to take photographs of the panties of the Victim, who was his colleague in the law firm, without her consent, and pressed his thigh against her upper arm, knowing it is likely that he would outrage her modesty.

Findings and Determination of the DT

The Respondent was unrepresented, and failed to attend the DT Hearing, despite due notice being given to him. The DT proceeded to make a determination in the Respondent’s absence pursuant to Rule 16 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (Rules).

The DT noted that the Charges preferred against the Respondent were premised on his conduct culminating in him being charged and convicted of the criminal offences in the State Courts. As the Respondent pleaded guilty to, and has been convicted of his criminal charges, it was therefore taken that he had admitted to all the facts underlying and forming the basis of the criminal charges.

With reference to section 45A of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) as well as Rule 23 of the Rules, the DT was of the view that it was entitled to, and accepted as conclusive, the facts underlying and forming the basis of the criminal charges.

The DT found that the Respondent’s said conduct, taken as a whole, fell below the required standards of integrity and probity, and had brought grave dishonour to the profession.

The DT found that the Charges were made out, and was of the view that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the LPA, and recommended for the matter to be referred to the Court of Three Judges (C3J).

Council accepted the findings and recommendations of the DT. The C3J subsequently struck the Respondent off the Roll.*

*The decision of the C3J can be found in Law Society of Singapore v CNH [2022] SGHC 114.
",,,2023-02-01T02:00:22+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2023/,"In the Matter of CNH (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2023/",1049
6,78768b3ee4c6c45d6fb1e63efe8b0c7aa894ad51,"In the Matter of Sarindar Singh (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Sarindar Singh (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Ms Jain Alka @ Alka Salecha (the Complainant). The Complainant and her husband, one Mr Padam Kumar Jawerilal Salecha, were shareholders and directors of Swina International Pte Ltd (Swina) at all material times.


Swina engaged the Respondent to negotiate with Swina’s creditor banks in relation to outstanding loans of around S$16 million. The Complainant and her husband also engaged the Respondent also attend to the bankruptcy proceedings taken out against them on account they being guarantors of the loans taken out by Swina.

The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Roderick E Martin SC and Mdm Tan Gee Tuan as DT member.

One charge and two alternative charges were preferred against the Respondent:

Charges

1st Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA) in that the Respondent failed to provide advice to his clients, in relation to the legal proceedings commenced against them, in breach of Rule 5(2)(h) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR).

1st Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of legal services to his clients by failing to advise his clients in relation to the legal proceedings that had been commenced against them, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR.

2nd Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent failed to use all legal means to advance his clients’ interests to the extent that he may reasonably be expected to do so, by failing to advise his clients in relation to the legal proceedings that had been commenced against them, in breach of Rule 5(2)(j) of the PCR.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that the main charge, i.e. the 1st Charge, was made out on the facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The DT found that the Respondent did not advise his clients on the options available to the client in response to bankruptcy and winding up applications, i.e. the prospect of voluntary arrangements, schemes of arrangements and/or judicial managements. Further, the Respondent failed to advise his clients on the issue of balance sheet solvency.

The DT noted that Swina was balance sheet solvent at the material time, and this fact could have been relied on to either persuade creditor banks to grant more time for repayment, or at the very least, to seek an adjournment from the Court. The Respondent did not do that or advise the clients on the same.

Because of the Respondent’s omissions, his clients did not consider making a revised repayment proposal to Maybank to avoid the bankruptcy and winding up orders.

In addition, the DT found that the Respondent failed to advise his clients on their options moving forward after bankruptcy and winding up orders were made.

The DT concluded that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for a referral to the Court of Three Judges, cognisant of the fact that there was no element of dishonesty on the Respondent’s part, and that he was a candid witness. The DT was of the view that a financial penalty was appropriate to address the Respondent’s misconduct. There was no order as to costs as the Complainant’s counsel had taken on the case on a pro bono basis.

Council accepted the findings of the DT and imposed a financial penalty of S$10,000 on the Respondent.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/dtr_jan_2023-compressed.pdf,"17th

BACKGROUND FACTS.
‘The Complainant in these disciplinary proceedings is one Ms Jain Alka @ Alka
Salecha (the “Complainant.
The Complainant and her husband, Mr Padam Kumar Jawerlal Salecha, were at
all material times the shareholders and directors of Swina International Pte Ltd
('Swina’),
‘Tne Respondent is Mr Sarindar Singh, an Advocate and Solicitorof the Supreme
Court of Singapore, of 22 years’ standing (the “Respondent’). At all material
times, the Respondent was the sole proprietor of Mis Singh & Co,
‘The Respondent was engaged by Swina to negotiate with Swina’s creditor banks
In relation to outstanding loans of around SGD 16 million. The Respondent was
also engaged by the Complainant and her husband, being personal guarantors
of the loans taken out by Swina, for the same purpose
The Respondent wrote to the banks proposing repayment plans, but those
proposals were rejected
Consequently, on 11 December 2017, Swina was served by Maybank with the
winding up papers in HCICWU 247/2017 at its office and on 12 December 2017,
the Complainant and her husband were personally served with the bankruptey
papers in HC/B 2785/2017 and HC/B 2783/2017 respectively at their residence.
The bankruptcy and winding up applications were heard and granted on 11
January 2018 and 12 January
2018 respectively
(On 9 May 2019, the Complainant lodged a complaint against the Respondent,
alleging that the Respondent had breached his duties under the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules by- (2) falling o act with honesty, competence and

dligence; (b) disclosing information without the Claimant's instructions; and (c)
grossly overcharging for the work done""
9.

The complaint was referred
to an IC, which took the unanimous view that all three
heads of complaint disclosed no necessity for a formal investigation by @
Disciplinary Tribunal?

10, Boing dissatisfied with the IC's decision that there was no prima facie case for
referral tothe DT, the Complainant took out an application vide HC/OS 41/2024
(COS 41°) for an order to compel the Law Society to rofer her complaint to a DT.
The parties to OS 41 were the Complainant, as the applicant, and the Law
Society, as the respondent. At the hearing, the learned Justice Ang Cheng Hock
(the “Judge"") adopted the burden of proof applicable in an IC.? Le. whether there,
‘was a prima facie case for referral. In other words, the learned Judge placed
hhimsotf inthe position of the IC and. applying tho burden of proof applicable to
the IC, determined whether or not the IC should have referred the complaint to a
oT
11, The leamed Judge held as follows:
“1, Alter consideration of the affidavits and the submissions, | am of
the view that there is a necessity for a formal investigation by @
i
7
appticant's

Pte Ltdl (""Swina’)
Internationa
2.

That being the caso, | find that there is a prima facie basis for
investigation to be carried out into Mr Sit

‘AB 248 0250,
2AB 434
» See Notes of Hearing (22 Apri 202%) at paragraph [2], AB 443 to 4

Inhis {sie] regard. | find that the Council
of the Law Society
had erred
‘in not considering that the evidence disclosed a prime facie case of
‘professional misconduct that is of sufficient gravity as to warrant
2 formal investigation by a disciplinary tribunal
3 Onthe evidence before the Inquiry Committee (IC), did not agree
that the other complaints raised by the Applicant in relation to Mr
‘Singh's alleged professional misconduct are either made out on a
‘prima facie basis, or were of sufficient gravity as to warrant a format
investigation by a disciplinary tribunal. As such, do not think th
Counci of the Law Society erred in determining that the other matters
did not require a format investigation by a discipinary tribunal.

7. For the above reasons,
{ will thus grant OS 41/2021 in part. |
hereby direct the Respondent to apply tothe Chiot Justice for the
appointment of a disciplinary tribunal in respect of the following
charge against Mr Singh ~ breach of his duty of honesty,
competence and diligence under Rule 5 of the Legal Profession
rofessional Conduct) Rules 2015 by failing to advis
Applicant in relation to the legal proceedings that had been
commenced against her, her husband and Swina, and hence, that
Mr Singh is guity of misconduct unbefiting an advocate and solicitor
as an officer of the Supreme Court under s 83(2)(h) of the Lega!
Profession Act”
[emphasis added in bold and underine}
12. Pausing here, it ought to be stated that the burden of proof in the IC and before
the DT is diferent. At the IC, the IC determines whether. on the material supplied
to the IC, there exists a prima facie case for referral to a DT. Atthe DT. the burden

of proof notches up to a more “onerous” burden, that is, that the Complainant's
‘case hasto be proven beyond a reasonable doubt *
13. Italso ought to be stated that of the grounds relied on by the Complainant in OS
41, only one ground was successful, this being that the Respondent failed to
provide advice in relation to the legal proceedings in HC/B 2788/2017, HCIB
2783/2017 and HCICWU 247/2017 (the “Legal Proceedings’).
I

THE CHARGE

14, Its arising from this one ground that the following charge was preferred against
the Respondent in the DT. It had two alteratives

Charge
“You, Sarindar Singh, an Advocate and Sotto ofthe Supreme Court
of Singapore, are charged that you are guilt of misconduct unbefting
an advocate and solictor as an officer ofthe Supreme Court or as a
‘member of an honourable profession within the meening of section
83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act, to wit, by breaching Rule 5(2)(h)

ofthe Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, n that in
the course of your engagement as Jain Alka @ Alka Satocha, Padam
Kumar Jawonial Salecha and Swina Intematonal Pte Ltd's lawyer,
you had failed to provide advice to your clients, Jain Alka
@ Alka
Salecha, Padem Kumar Jawerilal Salecha and Swina
International Pte Lt, inproceedings
relation to the legal
that hod
eon
commenced
against them in HC/B 2785/2017, HC/B
2783/2017 and HC/CWU 247/2017 respectively.
[emphasis added in bold and undertine]

“You, Sarindar Singhan Advocate and Soictor ofthe Supreme Court

of Singapore, are charged
that you are quity of misconduct unbetitting

“Law Socay
of Singapare vAhmad Knais
tn Abt Ghani [2006]
4 SLR(R) 208 at 6)

an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a
‘member of an honourable profession within the moaning of section
£89(2}() ofthe Legal Profession Act, to wit, by breaching Rule 5(2Vc}
of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, n that in
the course of your engagement as Jain Alka @ Alka Safecho, Padom
Kumar Jawonlal Salocha and Swina International Pte Ltd's lawyer,
vou had failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence

‘in vour provision of legal services to your clients, Jain Alka @
‘Aika Salecha, Padam Kumar Jawerilal Salecha and Swina

International Pte Ltd, by failing to advise your clients in relation

{0 the legal proceedings that had been commenced against them
in HC/B 2785/2047, HC/B 27832017 and HC/CWU 247/2017
respectively
{emphasis added in bold and underline}

Second Alternative Charge
“You, Sarindar Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor
of the Supreme Court
of Singaporo, are charged that you are guilty of misconduct unbefiting
an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a
momber of an honourable profession within the meaning of section
{83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act, to wit, by breaching Rule 5(2)()
of the Lega! Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that i
the course of your engagement as Jain Aika @ Alka Salecha, Padam
Kumar Jaweriial Salecha and Swina International te Ltd's lawyer,
‘You had failed to use all legal means to advance your clients’
Jain Alka @ Alka Salecha, Padam Kumar Jawerilal Salecha and
‘Swina International Pte Ltd, interests to the extent that you may
in-relation to the legal proceedings that had been commenced
against them in HC/B 2785/2017, HC/B 2783/2017 and HC/CWU
1247/2017 respectively.
[emphasis added in bold and underline]
‘THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS.

a.

The Complainant's Account

15. The Complainants account is that over the course of several meetings from 12
December 2017 to 11 January 2018, the Respondent told her and her husband
‘not to be concerned with the Legal Proceedings, 2s it would be a matter of
formality to adjourn the hearings as negotiations with the respective credtor
banks were underway * In this regard, the Respondent assured the Complainant
that ne would attend the hearings on their behall to inform the Court that a
proposal had been made tothe creditor banks, and that the hearings would be
adjourned. The Respondent also stated that it would take about 6 10 9 months
forthe Legal Proceedings to be determined due tothe adjournments occasioned
by the banks needina time to consider the proposals.”
16. On 11 January 2018, the Respondent informed the Complainant and her
husband via WhatsApp that he was “in Court now’, then subsequently callod the
‘Complainant and her husband to inform them that the bankruptcy orders had
been made.* The Complainant was confused as this was contrary to what had
been discussed in the previous meetings with the Respondent. In response, the
Respondent stated that the orders had been made as Swina, the Complainant
‘and her husband had no money to repay the banks The Complainant later
earned that the Respondent did not attend the hearing, but Maybank’s solicitors
had instead mentioned on his behalf""
17. On 12 January 2018, the Respondent informed the Complainant and hor
‘husband via WhatsApp that the winding up application against Swina had been
granted. ** The Complainant was shocked and demanded an explanation as to
why the Respondent had not sought an adjournment, but the Respondent was

ComplainaAEC
nts=:3 |73)[73] (60] ano (26).
AEC
Complainant'
©Comp
s 3 (74)
2 lainant'AEC
s
Complainant'
AEICs3 [8an7](83)
a s(89)
AE(C 3 (88t'
Complain
"" Complanants AEC an
at
[92
* Complanants AEC at 93)

rot forthcoming with a response.""? The Complainant later leamed that the
Respondent did not represent Swina at the hearing.”
b.

The Respondent's Account

18. The Respondent's account is that he repeatedly advised the Complainant and
her husband that they needed to revise their proposals tothe creditor banks, and
that this was the best advice that he could give in the circumstances. As what
they had put forward was inadequate given the amounts that were owing, they
needed to devise new repayment plans that were acceptable to the creditor
banks.""

19. The Respondent had also taken the positon that it would be possible to adjoum
the bankruptcy hearings as Maybank had not yet rejected the existing proposal.
‘This position changed on 11 January 2018, the day of the bankruptey hearings,
‘when the Respondent was informed by Maybank’ solicitors before the hearings
that his clints' proposals were to be rejected. In the circumstances, he found
himseif without any grounds to justify an adjournment and accepted Maybank’s
solicitors offer to mention on his behalt""® He accordingly advised the
‘Complainant over the telephone that there were no grounds for any adjournment
cor resistance to the bankruptcy orders being made.""”
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
20. The Tribunal found that the main charge was made out on the facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. In other words, the Respondent had failed to give advice to
his clients on the Legal Proceedings that wore commenced against his clients

‘Complanant’s
AEIC atat 95)
>‘Responders
Comptanant’s
AEIC
92)
AEIC at 1926]
an [28
‘Respondent's
AEIC a [18 and (21)
°*Responcents
AEIC aat [21
""Respondent's
AEIC
28 (28) [20

21. The Trbunal's finding is based largely on the admissions of the Respondent in
‘ot having given advice in relation to the Legal Proceedings
22, In this regard, we refer to the following extracts from the Notes of Evidence
(NOE"")

soro

NOE 14 Decomber 2021, pago 56 line 23to page $7 line 31
0
Are you suggesting now that you advised Ms Alka, her
husband or Swina about the possibiliy of a scheme of
arrangement for Swana?
A
That—that was from day 1 that was told to her to come up
with the proposals. And other than-—
‘So when you say scheme of arrangement—
Yes
do you just mean better repayment proposals?
Yes, yes, !—J meant in that and not in the literal sense of a
Court-approved scheme of arrangements.
Q
So, to be clear, you've never advised Ms Alka, her
husband or Swina about possible schemes of
arrangement pursuant to Section 210 of the Companies
Act?
A
No, not in this case. No, Ididn't
Q
Thank you.
emphasis added in bold]

NOE 15 December 2021, page 15 line 27 to page 16 line 27
@
You also did not advice [sic] Ms Alka and her husband
‘on a voluntary arrangement under Section 45 of the
Bankruptcy Act and that that was the basis to stave off
the bankruptcy proceedings. Do you agree?
A
1 did not advise them on that voluntary arrangements
because
Thank you.
A
—May—

10
©
Bo,you agree with m
A
Maybank was just not replying and the frst time
President: if you want fo add on f0 your answer—
Witnoss: Yes. 1 mean:
President 4 wi give you loave.

soxo>m

Winess: Yes, so because Maybank had not responded, the counsel
has
President: Right
Witnass: come up to me and asked the--they are not going to allow
this because, Ihave strict instructions to proceed with &. Your
proposal
are rejected out of hand.” There's no basis left for me
{0 do anything olse. Now this suggestion of voluntary:
whatever he said earl
Prosident: Arrangement
What did you say? For—for the
A voluntary arrangement under Section 45,
Voluntary arrangement
0 you have something furthor to add, Mr Singh?
‘No, nothing. That--that's it
ymphasis added in bold)

o>

o>o>

NOE 15 December 2021, page 18 lines 3 to 12
°@
Now, similarly, you didn't advise your clients on @
Scheme of arrangement under Section 210 of the
Companies Act, correct?
bol did't
You did not, right?
Mm.
Now, I suggest to you that that's what a reasonably
competent and diligent lawyer would have done, agree?”
Disagree.
You also did not advise your client on judicial
‘management, agree?

""
A

Agree.
[emphasis added in bold]

23. Asis clear from the extracts, the Respondent simply did not advise his clients on
the options availabe to the cont in response to the bankruptcy and winding up
applications, ie. the prospect of voluntary arrangements, schemes of
arrangement andlor judicial management.
24. Further, the Respondent failed to advise his clientson the issue of balance sheet
solvency:
NOE 15 December 2021, Page 17 lines to7
""Q
So, tobe clear, you disagree with my statement that you did
‘not advise them about the balance sheet solvency. So is
‘your evidence that you did advise them about balance
sheet solvency?
A

No, I did not advise them on the balance sheet
insolvency [sic] because they didn't—because my
instructions were they didn't have the money.

25. This was notwithstanding the Respondent's acceptance that (a) Swina’s balance
sheet recorded an excess of total assets over liabilties and (b) a Cour, at the
time when the winding up applications were heard, would consider the issue of
balance sheet solvency before granting the applcation.""* In respect of the
former, the Tribunal noted that Swina’s total assets as at 31 December 2016
were valued at the amount of SGD 18,577.381.41.""* which would have been
large enough to settle or substantially settle Swina’s debts to the creditor banks,
26. This fact could have been relied on to either persuade the creditor banks (in
particular, Maybank) to grant mare time for repayment, of at the very least, to
NOE 14 Docemder 202%, page 25 ine 1910 page 27ine 13.
Aud Statement of Accounts fo"" year ended 31 December 2016, page8 (Ag 1s Bundle
""‘of Swra's
Documents, page °9),

seek an adjournment from the Court. However, this was not done. Nor did the
Respondent advise his clients on the same
27. In fact, it would appear that the Respondent never advised nis clients to
challenge the bankruptey and winding up proceedings by. for instance, fling a
reply affidavit exhibiting documents evidencing of Swina’s financial position
andior legal submissions, The Respondent made no mention of this in his
Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief or during the hearing, and did not produce any
documents evidencing that such advice had been given. In this regard, given the
absence of credible (or more accurately. any) contemporaneous records taken
by the Respondent, we found it appropriate to draw an adverse inference against
the Respondent
28. Perhaps mote shockingly, the Respondent did not even advise his clients on
Maybank’s position in respect of his clients’ repayment proposal, and the
Implications. of this position on the bankruptcy proceedings, until affer the
bankruptey orders had been granted by the Court:
smber 2021, page 15 lines 7 to 4
'@
So when did you actually inform Ms Alka and her
husband about what Maybank solicitors told you?
A
Alter ve boen informed ofthis, on that very same morning|
‘informed her
@
Was it before or after
Attor my cone
A
Q
=the bankruptcy orders were made?
A
‘tor my conversation with the.
Q
That's not my question, Mr Singh,
A
Okay. After the order was made.
[emphasis added in bold]

Law Societyof Srgaporev Tan Phy Khiang (20073 SLR(R) 477 at 82),

29. This is despite the fact that the Respondent had. by his own admission, told tho
‘Complainant that it would be a “matter of formality"" to adjourn the hearings on
the basis that negotiations with the creditor banks were underway."" and that
‘would take about 6 to 9 months before the applications would be determined by
the Court as a result of the creditor banks needing time to consider the
proposals.®?
30. AS a result, the Complainant, her husband and Swina were deprived of the
‘opportunity to consider whether a revised repayment proposal could be pul
forward to Maybank to avoid the bankruptcy and winding up orders being made.
31. Finally, after the bankruptcy and winding up orders had been made, the
Respondent failed to advise his clients on their options moving forward:
NOE 15 De

mber 2024
46 to24
Now, after the orders were made, you also did not
advise your clients on the possibility of appeals or
setting aside the bankruptcy or winding up orders,
agree?
A
Setting aside, you are agai
2
—_Sotting aside or appealing the bankruptcy or winding-up
orders,
A
The bankruptcy order, no, | did not advise them on it.
[emphasis added in bold]
32. Throughout the disciplinary proceedings, the Respondent took the position that
he had advised his clients by telling them to come up with improved repayment
proposals that would be acceptable to the banks In our view, this was not at
all sufficient.

2 NOE 15 December2027, page 10 ines 25 to 29
NOE 15 December 2027. poge
1 ines 1210 17
P Respenents AEIC st (26) NOE 1 December 2021, page S8 Ine 261 page $8 ine 18,

33. As the High Court held in Law Socioty
of Singapore v K Jayakumar Naidu {2012}
4SUR 1282
“Solicitors have a duty fo loyally advance their chints’ interests with
digence and competence. Among its muttioie facets, this duty
(0 be advised fal
i
faith of
‘issues peculiar to the matter at hand, .. ll solicitors also owe their
clients a fundamental duty of undivided loyalty to ethically advance
their cont’ interests
and not place themselves ina position of conflict
Advice to clients has to be prompt and commensurate with their
needs, and not perfunctory,A grave failure to adequately discharge
these duties of care and loyalty, whether resutting rom ignorance
or a
ack of conscientiousness, may expose
a solicitor fo disciplinary action
{and invito sanctions by the court, It is all the more troubling if in the
course of an engagement
the solicitor repeatediy abaicates from these
responsibilities to his client.""
emphasis added in bold and underline)
34. In teling his cients to do nothing more than to come up with better repayment
proposals, the Respondent's advice was plainly perfunctory. Tho very least the
Respondent would have been expected to do was to, upon learning of Maybank’s
rejection of his clents’ offer at the door of the Court, update his clients and seek
‘an adjournment ffom the Court on the basis that he had just been informed that
his clients’ offer was rejected. Seyond belief, he instead went as far as to accept
‘Maybank’s solicitors’ offer to mention on his bhatt
35, The Respondent's
otner answer to the charge was that his clients had no money
and therefore he would be misteading the court if he did anything in relation to
the Legal Proceedings. We do not accent this excuse because. as an Advocate
and Solicitor, he should have atleast raised the available options to his clients
(ie. challenging the applications, a voluntary arrangement, a scheme of
arrangement andior jucicial management), even though it may have been dificult
NOE 15 December 2023, 09017 ines 14 to 22 and page 17 ine 28:0 page 1B ine 2

17th

",2023-01-10T04:00:00+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2023/,"In the Matter of Sarindar Singh (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2023/",1049
7,f8a70a175a9d90c583a38fcf1362967307efc2c3,"In the Matter of Seow Theng Beng Samuel (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Seow Theng Beng Samuel (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose from information referred by the Council of the Law Society of Singapore (Law Society) in relation to the conduct of the Respondent, which stemmed from the following circumstances:


The initial lodging of a complaint against the Respondent by a former employee of the Respondent’s firm, Samuel Seow Law Corporation, who subsequently withdrew the complaint; and The publication of media reports on the Respondent’s abusive behaviour towards his employees;

Upon the application of Council, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT), presided by Mr Siraj Omar SC, and Mr Pradeep Pillai, as DT member.

Charges

Eight (8) principal charges were preferred against the Respondent with alternative charges pursuant to section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA) (collectively, the Charges).

After the hearing had commenced, the Respondent pleaded guilty to all of the Charges and Alternative Charges preferred against him.

1st Charge (Charge 1)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR), in that the Respondent conducted himself in an intemperate and boorish manner towards his employee by throwing files and boxes on the floor in her direction, screaming at her, and verbally abusing her.

2nd Charge (Charge 2)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in that the Respondent conducted himself in an intemperate and boorish manner towards his employee by throwing a metal stapler on the floor in her direction on 26 March 2018.

3rd Charge (Charge 3)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in that the Respondent conducted himself in an intemperate and boorish manner towards his employee by throwing a metal stapler on the floor in her direction on 28 March 2018.

4th Charge (Charge 4)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in that the Respondent conducted himself in an intemperate and boorish manner towards his employee by shouting and advancing towards her in an aggressive manner, such that she stumbled and fell.

5th Charge (Charge 5)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in that the Respondent conducted himself in an intemperate and boorish manner towards his employee by throwing his wallet in her direction, and threatening to kill her with a knife.

6th Charge (Charge 6)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in that the Respondent used criminal force against his employee.

7th Charge (Charge 7)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in which the Respondent verbally abused his employee and voluntarily caused hurt to her.

8th Charge (Charge 8)

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA through a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR, in which the Respondent verbally abused and used criminal force against his employee.

Findings and Determination of the DT

The DT found that the facts relating to the Respondent’s conduct were not disputed and painted a clear picture of physical and verbal abuse. The DT also found that the Respondent’s conduct towards his employees was an abuse of his position of authority over them.

The DT found that the seriousness of the Respondent’s misconduct, and the fact that it contravened both sections 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the LPA, sufficiently constituted cause of sufficient gravity within the meaning of section 93(1)(c) of the LPA in the absence of valid mitigating factors.

The DT considered the mitigating factors proffered by the Respondent and found that:

They did not assist in mitigating the seriousness of the Respondent’s conduct; The Respondent’s contemporaneous conduct did not reflect genuine remorse; and The arguments raised by the Respondent in mitigation were not sufficient in persuading the DT that the severity of the misconduct did not amount to “cause of sufficient gravity”.

The DT therefore found that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed and ordered that the Respondent pay the Law Society’s costs in relation to the proceedings.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and made the application pursuant to section 98 of the LPA for the Respondent to show cause.

Pursuant to an application by the Law Society for the Respondent to be sanctioned under section 83(1) of the LPA, the C3J* found that there was due cause for the Respondent to be sanctioned, and ordered that the Respondent be struck off the rolls on 18 May 2022.

To access the full report, click here.

*The decision of the C3J can be found in Law Society of Singapore v Seow Theng Beng Samuel [2022] SGHC 112.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/dtr_dec_22.pdf,"DT 5 OF 2019
IN THE MATTER OF SEOW THENG BENG SAMUEL
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CHAPTER 161)

REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Disciplinary Tribunal:
Siraj Omar, S.C. - President
Pradeep Pillai - Advocate

Solicitor for
The Law Society of Singapore

Solicitors for the Respondent

Mr Dinesh Dhillon / Mr Leong Tse Chuan /
Ms Alisa Toh Qian Wen
(Allen & Gledhill LLP)

Mr Eugene Thuraisingam /
Mr Chooi Jing Yen/ Mr Johannes Hadi
(Eugene Thuraisingam LLP)

,Jl
Dated this JO day of March 2020

.'
INTRODUCTION

1.

The Law Society of Singapore (the ""Law Society"") brought eight charges against Mr
Seow Theng Seng Samuel (the ""Respondent""). The specific charge·s were amended
several times, and (as we describe below) the Respondent eventually pleaded guilty to
each of the charges framed against him.

2.

Having carefully considered the facts of the case and the parties' respective
submissions, we find that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists:

(a)

under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 160, the ""Act"") in
respect of each of the Charges (as defined below); and

(b)

under Section 83(2)(h) of the Act in respect of each of the Alternative
Charges (as defined below).

3.

We set out our grounds below.

THE CHARGES

4.

The Law Society framed eight charges against the Respondent ( collectively, the
""Charges""), alleging that the conduct set out in each of these charges amounted to

""improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor"" within the meaning of ·
Section 83(2)(b) of the Act. 1

1

The Law Society's Statement of Case (Amendment No. 3) (the ""SOC""), at [21).

1

..

5.

The Law Society also framed alternative charges (collectively, the ""Alternative
Charges"") in respect of each of the Charges, asserting (in the alternative) that the

conduct described in each of the Charges also amounted to ""misconduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession"" within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Act. 2

6.

The Charges and Alternative Charges were set out in the Law Society's Statement of
Case, which was amended a total of four times. At the start of the hearing before us,
the iteration of the charges facing the Respondent was set out in the Law Society's
Statement of Case (Amendment No. 1).

The Respondent pleaded guilty to the

following part of the Fifth Charge and to the whole of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Charges:

""Fifth Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 3 April 2018, at about 8pm, at the office of
Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore, have
conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or practice as
an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Act by
breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (being
a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section 71 of
the Act), in that you:

(ij

(ii)

Threatened to take a knife to kill Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel.

Sixth Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 17 April 2018, at about 5:54pm, at the office
of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore,
2

SOC, at [21].

2

.'

hava conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the
Act by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(being a rule of.conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section
71 of the Act), in that you used criminal force against one Ms Kang Pei Shan
Rachel by using your finger to jab her forehead, and by pushing the files that Ms
Kang Pei Shan Rachel was holding against her chest.

Seventh Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 17 April 2018, at about 5:54pm, atthe office
of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore,
have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the
Act by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section
'71 of the Act), in that you:

(i)

Voluntarily causing hurt to one Ms Kong Shing Ying Brenda by grabbing her
arms, pushing her against a table, repeatedly slapping her, jabbing your
finger at Ms Kong's forehead and pushing Ms Kong with your shoulder such
that she lost balance and fell backwards; and/or

(iO

Verbally abused Ms Kong Shin Ying Brenda by aggressively berating her
and screaming at her.

Eighth Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 17 April 2018, at about 5:58pm, at the office
of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore,
have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the
Act by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) rules
(being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section
71 of the Act), in that you:

(i)

Used criminal force against one Ms Tan Tzuu Yen Serene by pushing her
with such force that she fell to the floor; and/or

3

.

'

(ii)

Verbally abused Ms Tan Tzuu Yen Serene by aggressively berating her and
screaming at her.

7.

The Respondent initially contested the First to Fourth Charges and the remaining part
of the Fifth Charge, as well as the alternatives to each of these charges.

We

proceeded to hear evidence from witness for both the Law Society and the
Respondent in two tranches, from 14 to 16 August 2019 and on 26 and 27 September
2019. We then directed parties to submit their respective closing submissions by 25
October 2019, and scheduled a hearing for oral closing submissions on 19 November
2019. 3

8.

On 1 November 2019, the Law Society sought leave to further amend their Statement
of Case, and informed us that the Respondent was prepared to plead guilty to the
remainder of the charges as set out in the proposed amendments. 4 The Respondent
5

confirmed this, and we allowed the proposed amendments. 6

9.

At the hearing on 19 November 2019, the Law Society sought, and was granted, leave
to file a further amended Statement of Case incorporating one minor amendment. The
Respondent subsequently pleaded guilty to the First to Four Charges and the
remainder of the Fifth Charge (and their alternatives) as set out in the Statement of
Case (Amendment No. 3). These Charges read:

""First Charge

3

4

The Tribunal's directions made at the end of the hearing on 26 September 2019.
Letter dated 1 November 2019 from The Law Society's solicitors Allen & Gledhill LLP to the
Secretariat.

5

6

Email dated 1 November 2019 from the Respondent's solicitors Eugene Thuraisingam LLP to the
Secretariat.
The Tribunal's directions dated 4 November 2019.
4

,

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 16 March 2018, at or about 7pm, at the
office of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01,
Singapore, have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper
conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section
- 83{2)(b) of the Act by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional
Conduct) Rules {being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council
under Section 71 of/he Act), in that you:

(i)

Conducted yourself in an intemperate and/or boorish manner towards one
Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by throwing files and boxes on the floor in her
general direction, and/or by screaming at her; and/or

(ii)

Verbally abused Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by screaming at her.

Second Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 26 March 2018, sometime in the afternoon,
at the office of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01,
Singapore, have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper
conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section
83(2)(b) of the Act by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional
Conduct) Rules {being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council
under Section 71 of the Act), in that you conducted yourself in an intemperate
and/or boorish manner towards one Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by throwing a metal
stapler on the floor in her general direction.

Third Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 28 March 2018, at about 3pm, at the office
of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore,
have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2){b) of the
Act by breaching rule 8(3){b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section
71 of the Act), in that you conducted yourself in an intemperate and/or boorish
manner towards one Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by throwing a metal stapler on the
floor in her general direction.

5

.

..

Fourth Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 28 March 2018, at about 9pm, at the office
of Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore,
have conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the
A_ct by breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
(being a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section
71 of the Act), in that you:

(ij

Conducted yourself in an intemperate and/or boorish manner towards one
Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by advancing towards her in an aggressive
and/or threatening manner such that she stumbled and fell to the floor,
and/or by shouting at her; and/or

(iij

Verbally abused Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by shouting at her.

Fifth Charge

That you, Seow Theng Beng Samuel, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Singapore, on 3 April 2018, at about 8pm, at the office of
Samuel Seow Law Corporation at 79 South Bridge Road, #01-01, Singapore, have
conducted yourself in a manner which amounts to improper conduct or practice as
an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Act by
breaching rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (being
a rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under Section 71 of

the Act), in that you:

(i)

Conducted yourself in an intemperate and/or ~?orish manner towards one
Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel by repeatedly throwing your wallet in her
general direction; and/or

(ii)

10.

The Respondent therefore admitted the facts as set out in the Statement of Case
(Amendment No. 3) and pleaded guilty to all of the Charges and Alternative Charges

6

..
proffered against him. The Respondent's admissions mean that it is common ground
between the parties that the Respondent's conduct as described in: 7

(a)

The Charges amounted to improper conduct under Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act;
and

(b)

The Alternative Charges amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor under Section 83(2)(h) of the Act.

THE FUNCTION OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

11.

The function of a Disciplinary Tribunal is to act as a filter in order to determine whether
or not there is 'cause of sufficient gravity' that could, on a finding by the Court of Three
Judges, be ascertained to constitute 'due cause' that merited the imposition of one of
the range of sanctions prescribed in Section 83(1) of the Act: Law Society of
Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani dlo Daniel (""Jasmine Danief'). 8

12.

It is not for us to determine whether or not 'due cause' has been established in this
case - that determination lies solely within the purview of the Court of Three Judges.
Our role is to decide whether 'cause of sufficient gravity' has been established, and for
that we need only be satisfied that there was a prima facie case on the relevant
evidence that 'due cause' might be present: Jasmine Danie/. 9 If we conclude that
'cause of sufficient gravity' has been established, the Law Society is obliged pursuant
to Se.ction 94 of the Act to make an application under Section 98 of the Act to the
Court of Three Judges.

7

See also the Agreed Statement of Facts (Amendment No. 1).

8

[201 OJ 3 SLR 390, at [37].

9

Ibid., at [31 ].

7

13.

We are also mindful that the fact that it is common ground that while the Respondent's
conduct fell within the ambit of limbs (b) and (h) of Section 83(2), this does not
necessarily mean that 'cause of sufficient gravity' had been established: Jasmine
Danie!. 10

14.

We turn to consider the parties' respective submissions in light of these principles.

THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE CASES

15.

The options available to us at the close of proceedings are set out in Section 93(1) of
the Act:

""93 (1)

After hearing and investigating any matter referred to it, a Disciplinary

Tribunal shall record its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to
those facts shall determine that -

(a)

no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under
section 83_ or 83A (as the case may be);

(b)

while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under
section 83 or 83A (as the case may be), the regulated legal
practitioner should be -

(i)

ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to
the misconduct committed;

(ii)

reprimanded;

(iii)

ordered to comply with one or more remedial measures; or

(iv)

subjected to the measure in sub-paragraph (iiij in addition to
the measure in sub-paragraph (ij or (iij; or

10

Ibid., at [39].

8

(c)

cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section
83 or 83A (as the case may be).""

16.

The Law Society submitted that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action, within
the meaning of section 93(1)(c) of the Act, had been shown to exist. Its grounds on
which it bases its case can broadly be summarized as follows:

(a)

11

The nature of the Respondent's conduct is sufficiently serious by itself to amount
to a prima facie case of ""due cause"" under Section 83 of the Act;

(b)

The Respondent was in a position of authority vis-a-vis the victims, who were his
employees;

(c)

The Respondent's conduct was part of a pattern of intemperate, boorish and
belligerent conduct, and were not isolated incidents; and

(d)

17.

The Respondent has not shown genuine remorse for his actions.

The Respondent argued that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action
existed, but that the circumstances nonetheless warranted him bein·g ordered to pay a
fine of S$20,000. He described such a fine as the ""most proportionate sanction in this
case"", 12 claiming in mitigation that:

(a)

""little if any harm was caused"" to the individual victims in this case;

11

The Law Society's Skeletal Submissions on Sanction (the ""LSS' Submissions""), at [42].

12

The Respondent's Submissions on Sentence (the ""Respondent's Submissions""), at [8].
9

18.

(b)

he was suffering from ""Adjustment Disorder"" at the relevant time;

(c)

he is ""deeply and genuinely remorseful for his behavior'; and

(d)

his conduct had caused little harm to the integrity of the legal profession.

The Law Society's arguments referred to in paragraphs 16(a) to (c) above and the
Respondent's argument referred to in paragraph 17(a) above all broadly relate to the
severity of the Respondent conduct. We shall therefore deal with this issue first.

THE TRIBUNAL'S FINDINGS

(a)

The severity of the Respondent's conduct

19.

The Law Society highlighted several facts which they claimed underscored the severity
of the Respondent's conduct. First, the Seventh and Eighth Charges relate to overt
acts of physical violence inflicted by the Respondent on Ms Kong Shin Ying Brenda

(""Ms Kong"") and Ms Tan Tzuu Yen Serene (""Ms Tan""). 13

20.

While Ms Tan did not seek medical treatment after the incident, Ms Kong did do so
and was assessed by the examining doctor at Parkway .East Hospital to have
sustained ""multiple soft tissue injuries as a result of the assaulf'.

The examining

doctor also noted tenderness, bruising and abrasions on various parts of Ms Kong's
head and body. 14

13

The Respondent's Submissions on Sentence (""Respondent's Submissions""), at [8].

14

LSS' Submissions, at [47].

10

, ,

21.

Second, it is plain from the video recording of the incident that the Respondent was
much larger than both Ms Kong and Ms Tan, and was clearly the aggressor in both
altercations. 15

It is also clear from the video that the Respondent would have

continued attacking Ms Kong and Ms Tan, and most likely have inflicted more severe
injuries on both of them, if not for the fact that he had been physically restrained by
other employees and thereby prevented from doing so.

22.

16

Third, the attacks had been triggered by a fairly trivial matter - namely, that the
Respondent had to meet a client with an associate from the firm but that associate was
apparently not in the office at that time. It had nothing to do with any act or omission
on the part of either Ms Kong or Ms Tan.

23.

17

Fourth, the Sixth Charge relates to physically aggressive conduct by the Respondent
against Ms Kang Pei Shan Rachel (""Ms Kang""). The Respondent has been charged
with an offence of using criminal force under Section 352 of the Penal Code for using
his finger to jab Ms Kang's forehead knowing that such action would illegally cause
annoyance to Ms Kang. 18

24.

Fifth, the First to Fifth Charges relate to intemperate and/or boorish conduct by the
Respondent directed towards Ms Kang on five separate occasions. These incidents
involved (i) throwing files, boxes, a metal stapler and his wallet in Ms Kang's general

direction, (ii) shouting at, and advancing towards, Ms Kang in an aggressive and/or
threatening manner, and (iii) threatening to take a knife to kill Ms Kang.

15

LSS' Submissions, at [50].

16

LSS' Submissions, at [59(a)].

17

LSS' Submissions, at [51].

18

LSS' Submissions, at [62].

19

LSS' Submissions, at [66].
11

19

25.

Sixth, the Respondent was charged under Section 3(1 )(a) of the Protection from
Harassment Act with using threatening words against Ms Kang with intent to cause
distress. This was in relation to the Respondent's threat to take a knife to kill Ms Kang,
which also forms part of the Fifth Charge.

26.

The Law Society referred to and relied on the decision of the Court of Three Judges in
Law Society of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee (""Wong Sin Yee""). 20 That case involved an

incident of what is commonly termed 'road rage'. and the respondent advocate and
solicitor in that case was charged and convicted in the State Courts under the then
Section 323 of the Penal Code for having voluntarily caused hurt to a member of the
public, as well as under Section 13A(1 )(a) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order
· and Nuisance) Amended Act for uttering insulting words to a member of the public.

27.

The Court of Three Judges in that case found that the respondent advocate and
solicitor's behavior ""constitute[d] a defect of character and render[ed] him unfit to be an
advocate and solicitor'. and that his conduct fell within the ambit of Section 83(2)(a) of

the Act. 21 He was consequently suspended from practice for two years.

28.

The Law Society relied on the decision in Wong Sin Yee to support its contention that
the Respondent's acts of physical violence and verbal abuse towards the various
individuals were sufficient to constitute 'cause of sufficient gravity'. The Law Society
submits that, as was the case with the respondent advocate and solicitor in Wong Sin
Yee, the Respondent here had also demonstrated a serious lack of self-restraint. 22

20

[2003] 3 SLR(R) 209.

21

Ibid., at [15].

22

LSS' Submissions, at [57].
12

, ,

29.

The Law Society also submitted that the Respondent's conduct had not been borne
out of mere frustration with Ms Kang's work performance.

They argued that the

severity and persistence of the Respondent's physical aggression towards Ms Kang
(by throwing objects in her general direction and advancing towards her in an
aggressive and threatening manner) was evidence of something more, and in fact
amounted to bullying. 23

30.

They also argued that the severity of the Respondent's scolding of Ms Kang (in terms
of volume, frequency and vituperation) was out of proportion to any perceived
shortcomings in her work performance, and that there were in any event more
appropriate options for dealing with any such shortcomings. 24

31.

These facts are not disputed. Taken as a whole, we agree with the Law Society that
they paint a clear picture of physical and verbal abuse by the Respondent.

32.

It is common ground that as their superior at work, the Respondent was in a position of
authority vis-a-vis each of Ms Kang, Ms Kong and Ms Tan.

The Respondent's

physically and verbally abusive conduct towards these individuals was therefore an
abuse of his position of authority over them.

33.

We also note that the conduct set out in the Charges (which Respondent admitted) did
not involve ""isolated incidents or momentary lapses"".

Instead, as the Law Society

argues, they appear to be indicative of a pattern of intemperate, boorish and
belligerent conduct on the Respondent's part. 25

23

LSS's Submissions, at [72(a)].

24

LSS's Submissions, at [72(b)].

25

LSS's Submissions, at [75].

13

' '

34.

When all these facts are considered together, the picture that appears is one that
shows the Respondent physically and verbally abusing his subordinates in a manner
that was not 'one-off' of the resulted of momentary lapses.

On any analysis, such

misconduct cannot be described as anything other than serious.

35.

The seriousness of the Respondent's misconduct and the fact that it contravened both
Section 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the Act would in our view suffice to constitute cause of
sufficient gravity within the meaning of Section 93(1 )(c) of the Act in the absence of
any valid mitigating factors. We therefore turn next to consider whether there are any
such mitigating factors.

(b)

Harm caused. and impact on. the victims

36.

The Respondent argues there was little, if any, harm caused to Ms Kang, Ms Kong
and Ms Tan. He points to the fact that Ms Tan did not suffer any injuries as a result of
the Respondent's conduct described in the Eighth Charge (which is the only Charge
that relates to her).

37.

He also relies on two statements from Ms Kang and Ms Kong dated 28 May 2019 26
and 26 June 2019

27

respectively (collectively, the ""Statements"").

In Ms Kang's

statement, she states that she ""did not suffer any injuries as a result of [the
Respondent's] actions on 17 April 2018"". 28

38.

Similarly, Ms Kong states that ""although the incident may have appeared violent, [she]
only suffered minor injuries such as a scratch and bruise"". She describes the incident

26

The Respondent's Bundle of Documents ""RBOD"") Tab 1.

27

RBOD Tab 2.

28

RBODTab1.

14

'I

as ""no more than a noisy and dramatic altercation caused by loud shrieking and some
shoving"". 29 The Respondent also relies on the fact that both Ms Kang and Ms Kong
""have wholeheartedly chosen to forgive the Respondent and continue to affirm him"". 30

39.

The Law Society objected to these Statements, arguing that they are inadmissible
because the Law Society did not have the opportunity of cross-examining the makers
of the Statements as they were only tendered as part of the Respondent's closing
arguments. The Law Society also argued that even if admissible, the Statements are
irrelevant to the question of whether or not sufficient cause of gravity exists.

40.

Having considered the parties' arguments and authorities on this issue, we find that
the Respondent is entitled to tender and refer to the Statements. However, having
considered the contents of the Statements, we find that they are of not much
assistance to the Respondent in mitigating the seriousness of his conduct.

41.

Taken at face value, the Statements simply set out the purported impact of the
Respondent's conduct on Ms Kang and Ms Kong, and that they have both forgiven the
Respondent. Two factors are relevant when considering these Statements. First, both
Ms Kong and Ms Kang may well have been motivated to speak out in support of the
Respondent in these proceedings because the former is his niece and the latter
remains an employee of his company.

42.

Second, the video of the 17 April 2018 incident clearly shows that the Respondent had
to be physically restrained from further attacking Ms Kong and Ms Tan. Had he not
been so restrained, he would very likely have inflected more serious injuries on them.
The fact that Ms Kong's injuries were relatively minor was likely purely fortuitous.

29

RBOD Tab 2.

30

Respondent's Submissions, at [12].

15

' '

43.

The relevance of the Statements is therefore (at best) minimal when considered in the
context of these factors.

(c)

'Adiustment Disorder'

44.

The Respondent argues that he has been ""diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder at the
time of the offences"" and that this ""contributed to the commission of the offences"". 31
He relies in this regard on two medical reports dated 21 August 2019 32 and 13
September 2019 33 (the ""Medical Reports"") from Dr Tan Chue Tin, a clinical
psychotherapist.

45.

Dr Tan states in his first report that the Respondent ""suffered from Adjustment
,--a-.-, ·-

Disorder at the time of the altercation recorded in the audio-video clips of April 2018 I
2019"". 34 He expands on this in his second report, saying that the Adjustment Disorder
""contributed to the commission of the offences as depicted'' in the video of the 17 April
2018 incident. 35

46.

The Law Society also objected to these Medical Reports on the same grounds as the
-

Statements. As with the Statements, we find that while the Respondent is entitled to
tender and refer to them as part of his mitigation, they do not assist him very much.

47.

We note that Dr Tan first saw· the Respondent only _in May 2019, more than a year
after the incidents that formed the subject of the charges. Yet the Medical Reports do

31

Respondent's Submissions, at [14].

32

RBOD Tab 3.

33

RBOD Tab 4.

34

RBOD Tab 3, at page 10.

35

RBOD Tab 4, at [3].

16

not contain any explanation as to how Dr Tan was able to ascertain that the
Respondent suffered from Adjustment Disorder at the time of the incidents.

More

importantly, Dr Tan does not explain exactly what Adjustment Disorder is and how it
purportedly contributed to the Respondent's behavior during the incidents.

We

therefore found the Medical Reports to be of very little assistance.

(d)

Remorse

48.

The Respondent claimed that he was ""deeply and genuinely remorsefuf' for his
behavior. In his affidavit of evidence-in-chief, he stated:

""Lastly, I acknowledge and take full responsibility for my inability to manage my
anger. I am also, by nature, a flamboyant and animated person. When I lose my
temper, I often scream and shout and throw things about. However, I wish to state
that despite my anger management problem, I have never intended to hurt anyone.

I regret and unreservedly apologise for my actions.

I am undergoing medical

treatment to ensure that this does not happen again."" [Respondent's emphasis]

49.

The Law Society. contends that the Respondent has not shown genuine remorse for
his actions, arguing that this is clear from his contemporaneous conduct. They point in
particular to the following:

(a)

When first confronted with the complaints, the Respondent did not admit any
wrongdoing but instead claimed that Ms Kang had been manipulated by one Mr
Robert Raj Joseph and Mr Lew Shaun Marc.

The Respondent's letter of 2

October 2018 to the Inquiry Committee36 sought to downplay the physical
altercation with Ms Kong on 17 April 2018 and sought to justify his conduct by
alleging that she had hit him first.
36

Law Society's Supplemental Bundle of Documents (""LS Supp BOD"") Tab 7, at [88] to [99].
17

(b)

In an interview with the Today newspaper published on 17 May 2018, 37 the
Respondent sought to downplay the incident which forms the subject of the
Seventh Charge, claiming that Ms Kong had ""shoved him first and he had then
slapped her for being rude"". He described the incident as a ""typical family type
of fighf' (Ms Kang being the Respondent's niece).

(c)

In that same interview, he claimed that he had not shoved Ms Tan to the ground
but had rather ""accidentally knocked her to the ground when he turned around'.
This is materially different from the facts set out in the Eighth Charge, which the
Respondent now admits. The Respondent admitted to the quotes attributed to
him in this interview.

(d)

In an interview with 8 Days magazine published on 31 May 2018, the
Respondent is quoted as having denied punching people, throwing things or
hurting people. His denial of having been physically violent is clearly untrue in
light of his admissions in these proceedings. The Respondent admitted to the
accuracy of the quotes attributed to him.

(e)

In posts on his Facebook page dated 26 April 2019 38 and 6 June 2019, 39 the
Respondent sought to downplay the events which are the subject of some of the
Charges. He admits having made these posts.

50.

The Respondent's conduct from the time of the incident is clearly relevant to
ascertaining whether he is truly remorseful for what happened.

37

Law Society's Bundle of Documents (""LSBOD"") Tab 14.

38

LS Supp BOD Tab 3.

39

LS Supp BOD Tab 4.

18

A review of the

Respondent's conduct reveals a clear difference in his conduct before and after April
2019, when the video of the 17 April 2018 incident was made public.

51.

The Respondent's correspondence with the Inquiry Committee and the interviews
referred to in paragraph 49(a) to (d} above all pre-dated the public disclosure of the
video.

Far from expressing remorse, the Respondent seeks to deflect blame and

responsibility. His approach changed once the video was made public, as evidenced
by the social media posts referred to in paragraph 49( e) above.

The Respondent

expressly referred to the video and sought to downplay the severity and significance of
the events. His conduct at the material time therefore does not reflect any degree of
remorse on his part.

52.

We therefore find that the Respondent's contemporaneous conduct does not support
his assertion that he is genuinely remorseful about the incidents that are the subject of
the complaints.

(e)

The Respondent's other arguments

53.

The Respondent also makes two broad arguments in support of his submission that no
cause of sufficient gravity exists and that a high fine would be the appropriate sanction
in this case.

First, he argues that he ""manifests a high potential for rehabilitation

because he demonstrates insight into his psychiatric condition"" 40 (his emphasis). He

relies on the fact that he voluntarily sought psychiatric help and ""is receiving help from
Dr Augustine Tan, an experienced psychotherapisf'.

40

Respondent's Submissions, at [19].
19

.

_,

54.

We find it self-serving for the Respondent to claim that he has a high potential for
rehabilitation. We note that while he relies on the fact that he sought medical help, he
did not do so until more than a year after the incidents and only after the video of the
incident had been made public. We also note that we do not have the benefit of Dr
Augustine Tan's views on this issue.

55.

In any event, we do not think that the Respondent's potential for rehabilitation is a
factor for us to consider in deciding whether 'cause of sufficient gravity' exists on the
facts of this case.

That may well be relevant for the Court of Three Judges'

considerations on the appropriate sentence should they find that 'due cause' has been
established. Even if we are wrong, and the potential for rehabilitation is a factor that
we should consider at this stage, there is no evidential basis for us to conclude that the
Respondent has a high potential for rehabilitation.

56.

Second, the Respondent refers to the judgment of the Court of Three Judges in Law
Society of Singapore v Ravi s/o Madasamy (""Ravi Madasamy''), where the Court
outlined the principles governing the imposition_ of sanctions in disciplinary proceedings
- namely (i) the need to protect members of the public, (ii) the need to uphold public
confidence in the integrity of the profession, (iii) the need to deter the same or other
solicitors from similar behavior, and (iv) the need to punish the particular solicitor
involved.

57.

The Respondent argues that these factors, when considered in the context of the facts
of this case, support his submission that the imposition of a fine would suffice.

58.

We do not agree. In our view, the Respondent's reference to and reliance on Ravi
Madasamy is misplaced. The Court of Three Judges in that case set out the principles
governing the sentencing of advocates and solicitors where 'due cause' is found to

20

\

have been established. That is plainly evident from the principles themselves, which
include considering the impact on members of the public as well as the legal
profession as a whole.

59.

Such considerations are not within our remit. Our role is limited to deciding whether
'cause of sufficient gravity' has been established to warrant the referral of this matter to
the Court of Three Judges. If we answer that question in the affirmative, it would then
be for the Court of Three Judges to decide whether 'due cause' has been established,
and if so to impose the appropriate sentence having considered the various principles
discussed in Ravi Madasamy.

60.

We therefore find that the arguments raised by the Respondent in mitigation are not
sufficient to persuade us that the severity of his misconduct does not amount to 'cause
of sufficient gravity'.

CONCLUSION

61.

We therefore find and determine, within the meaning of Section 93(1 )(c) of the Act,
that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83(2)(b) of
the Act in respect of each of the First to Eighth Charges.

62.

We also find and determine, within the meaning of Section 93(1)(c) of the Act, that
cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83(2)(h) of the
Act in respect of each of the Alternative First to Eighth Charges.

21

63.

We also order, pursuant to Section 93(2) of the Act, that the Respondent pays the Law
Society's costs in relation to these proceedings, such costs to be taxed by the
Registrar if not agreed.

fl,

Dated this

/0

Siraj Omar, C
President

day of March 2020

Pradeep Pillai
Advocate

22

",2022-12-05T02:00:23+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-dec-2022/,"In the Matter of Seow Theng Beng Samuel (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-dec-2022/",1049
8,357637d761bd59dd8243306e8e4ecdbf814b4c19,"In the Matter of Yeo Poh Tiang [Yang Baozhen] (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Yeo Poh Tiang [Yang Baozhen] (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose from a complaint lodged by one Mdm Koh Hwee Miem (Complainant).


On 12 February 2020, the Complainant paid Yeo & Associates LLC (the Firm) a sum of fees to utilise the services offered on an online portal developed by the Respondent to facilitate and expedite uncontested divorces (the Portal).

On 5 March 2020, the Complainant requested for a full refund of fees paid as there had been no communication with either the Firm or the Respondent following the payment made on 12 February 2020. The Firm rejected the Complainant’s request on the following grounds:

Payment made was non-refundable; and Payment was considered “fully utilised” upon access to the Portal pages.

In the absence of an amicable resolution, the Complainant lodged a complaint against the Respondent by way of a letter to the Law Society of Singapore (the Law Society).

Upon the application of Council, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Andre Yeap SC and Mr Anand Nalachandran as DT member.

Charges

Two (2) charges and two (2) alternative charges (collectively, the Charges) were preferred against the Respondent.

First Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA), in which the Respondent breached Rule 17(3) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR), having failed to inform the Complainant that the fees paid were charged on a non-refundable basis.

Alternative First Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, in that the Respondent failed to inform the Complainant that fees paid were charged on a non-refundable basis.

Second Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA, in which the Respondent breached Rules 5(2)(c) and (h) of the PCR, having failed to provide and/or initiate the timely provision of services paid for by the Complainant, despite representations that services were fast and expedient.

Alternative Second Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, in that the Respondent failed to provide and/or initiate the timely provision of services paid for by the Complainant, despite representations that services were fast and expedient.

Findings and Determination of the DT

First Charge

The DT found that the First Charge was made out.

The DT found that the Complainant had become a client of the Respondent and the Firm from the time the Complainant utilised the Portal and made payment of the fees on 12 February 2020. The DT found that the disclaimers on the Portal did not negate the presence of a retainer, noting that the disclaimers on the Portal referred to registered users as “clients”.

The DT also found that the disclaimers on the Portal did not inform users that their payments were non-refundable. The DT did not accept the Respondent’s explanation that the phrase set out in the Portal being, “your payment is considered fully utilized when you access the subsequent pages for the paid service” adequately conveyed that fees were paid on a non-refundable basis as a “fully utilized” payment could still be refunded.

Second Charge

The DT found that the Second Charge was not made out.

The DT did not find that the Respondent had failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in providing timely advice to the Complainant, as the Portal provided users with 30 days to edit the online forms submitted. The DT therefore concluded that the Respondent had not acted unreasonably in waiting for the Complainant to edit the forms.

DT’s Recommendations

Having made their findings on the Charges, the DT determined that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be reprimanded.

Pursuant to section 93(2) of the LPA, the DT ordered that costs fixed at $8,000 (plus reasonable disbursements) be paid to the Law Society.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/dtr_nov_22.pdf,"1

DTlr5l202l

In the Matter of Yeo Poh Tiang (Yang Baozhen) an
Advocate & Solicitor

And

In the Matter of the Legal Profession Act 1966

REPORT OF THE DISCPLINARY TRIBUNAL

DISCPLINARY TRIBUNAL

PRESIDENT:
ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR:

MR ANDRE YEAP, SC
MR ANAND NALACHANDRAN

COUNSEL FOR LAW SOCIETY
OF SINGAPORE:

MS. SHUMIN LIN/
MR BENJAMIN TAN ZHI XIONG

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:

MR N. SREENIVASAN S.C./
MS RANITA YOGEESWARAN

DATED THIS

4th

DAY OF MAY 2022

-2Introduction

The Honourable the Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon in exercise of his powers under
Section 90 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (""LPA"") appointed the Disciplinary
Tribunal (""Tribunal"") on 5 July 2021to hear and investigate the matter against Ms Yeo
Poh Tiang (""Respondent"") and submit its findings to the Chief Justice.

2

The Respondent is an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court who was admitted to
the roll on 12 July 2006.

a

J

These disciplinary proceedings arise from a complaint by Mdm Koh Hwee Miem

(""Complainant"") against the Respondent, who was at all material times the Managing
Director of Yeo & Associates LLC (""Firm"").
4

By a Notice of Disciplinary Tribunal Proceedings dated 7 July 2021, the Respondent was
informed that Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings have been commenced against her and
she was required to answer the allegations in the complaint and the statement of case

which accompanied the said Notice.

5

The Law Society of Singapore (""Law Society"") was represented by Shumin Lin from
M/s Drew & Napier LLC whilst the Respondent was represented by N. Sreenivasan SC,
and Ranita Yogeeswaran from M/s Straits Law Practice LLC.

Procedural History

6

These proceedings involve 2 charges for breaches of Rule 17(3) as well as Rule 5(2) of

the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (""Rules""), which amount to
improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2Xb) of the

LPA, with 2 altemative charges for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor
under Section S3(2)(h) of the LPA. In essence, the l't Charge under Rule 17(3) of the

Rules alleges that the Respondent failed to inform the Complainant that fees paid for
services were charged on a non-refundable basis, while the 2nd Charge under Rule 5(2)(c)

and (h) of the Rules alleges that the Respondent failed to provide/contact/instruct the

a
J

Complainant in respect of the services after 22 days even though the services were
represented as

7

oofast

and expedient"".

Pursuanl tu the tlircul.iurrs of this Triburral, the Defenus was filcd ul 1 1 August 2021, tlte

Lists of Documents were filed on26 August 2021, the Affidavits of Evidence in Chiel
Bundles of Documents and Bundles of Authorities were filed on 28 September 202I,the

Opening Statements were filed on 14 October 2011 and the matter was scheduled for
hearing from 20 to 22 October 2021. On the 1't day of the hearing, Counsel for the Law

Society sought leave to amend the Statement of Case and in particular, to clarifir the
elements of the 2 charges, and to separate the altemative charges. Counsel for the
Respondent had no objections. The Tribunal granted leave for the amendments and the

hearing was completed on the 2""d day after receiving testimony from the Complainant
and the Respondent. Following the hearing and as directed by the Tribunal in consultation

with the parties, the parties submitted and exchanged their respective written closing
submissions on 2 December 2021 as well as written reply closing submissions on 23
December 2021.

Background

8

The Firm owns and operates ""DivorceBureau@"" a

website

(WUirUdjyr:Ioelglgglf.gQ.n.sg) described as a ""Do-It-Yourself (DIY) Portal"" (o'Portal"")
developed by the Respondent to facilitate and expedite uncontested divorces at lower

cost. DivorceBureau@ Service (""DBS"") was the basic service to assist users with
generating the necessary Court documents. The Portal offered the ""PLUS Service"" (also

referred to as ""PLUSS"") to assist users with filing the Court papers and the ""Legal

Advice Service"" (also referred to as ""LAS"") to provide a consultation with a ""senior
family lawyer"". DBS costs 5$599, PLUSS costs 5$380 and LAS costs S$150.

9

On 12 February 2020, the Complainant opted for the DBS, PLUSS and LAS and paid the
sum of S$1,129 to the Firm through the Portal. Thereafter, the Complainant did not

complete the online forms and had no communication with the Firm and/or the

-4Respondent until the Complainant requested a full refund on 5 March 2020, ie,22 days
later.

10. On 6 March 2020, the Firm's staff replied to reject this request and despite the
Complainant's appeal, the Firm maintained that the payment was ""non-refundable"". On
11 March 2020, there was further communication with the Complainant and the Firm's

staff highlighted the disclaimer that the payment was ""considered fully utilised"" with
access to the subsequent pages and extended this position beyond DBS to include PLUSS

and LAS as well.

l1

On 1 I March 2020, the Complainant attempted to contact the Respondent to no avail and
replied to the Firm and Respondent via email. The Complainant called the Firm, but the

staff was unwilling to discuss the matter fuither. On 12 March 2020, the Complainant
and Respondent communicated via email. However, there was no amicable solution or

resolution to this issue.

12. On 15 March 2020, the Complainant informed the Firm to stop work (if any) and the
Respondent reiterated the previous position and the ""terms and conditions"" of the Portal.

The Complaint

13. By way of a letter to the Law Society of Singapore dated 13 May 2020, the Complainant
lodged the Complaint against the Respondent for:

(a) acting in a way which was contrary to a legal practitioner's position by using
intimidating language and accusing her of harassment when she repeated her
request for a refund of fees for services which, from her point of view, had not been

provided;

(b) lacking honesty about the services covered by the fees which the Complainant had
paid for, and for refusing to provide services which the Complainant had already
paid for; and

-5-

(c) failing to act with reasonable diligence in the provision of services, as no
documents were prepared and no appointment had been made for legal
consultationo and the services were not completed by the time the Respondent
requested a refund on 5 March 2020, which was 22 days after she paid for the
services through the Portal.

Law Society's Case

14. The Law Society took the position that the Complainant became a client of the Firm and
the Respondent upon making payment for legal services (DBS, PLUSS and LAS) on 12

February 2020. The Law Society submitted that the purported disclaimers relied on by

the Respondent: (i) did not negate the solicitor-client relationship, and (ii) did not
adequately inform the Complainant that the legal fees were paid on a

oonon-refundable""

basis. The Law Society further submitted there was a failure to act with reasonable
diligence and competence and to provide timely advice since the Respondent did not
contact the Complainant for 22 days and the Portal represented that the process would be
'ofast and easy"". The Tribunal notes that the Law Society has not proposed a particular

sanction but highlighted relevant precedents that supported a reprimand for breach of

Rule 17(3) and a fine for breach of Rule 5(2) of the Rules. The Tribunal understood the

Law Society's position to be that there was no dishonesty and no cause of sufficient
gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83 of the LPA.

Respondent's Case

15. The Respondent contends there was no solicitor-client relationship with the Complainant
because the Portal provided ""DIY services"" and sought to separate the distinct services.

The Respondent further contends that the Complainant was a litigantin-person and that
the purported disclaimers highlighted: (i) there was no solicitor-client relationship, and

(ii) the payments were ""fully utilized"" upon access to the Portal pages. The Respondent
explained that the Complainant would have been contacted after 30 days if the forms had
not been submitted because the Portal allowed users to ""edit the online form for the next

30 days"" and that the Complainant did not request for PLUSS and LAS. The Tribunal

6notes that the Respondent has proposed a fine or reprimand if one or both charges are
established.

Tribunal's Determination

16. During the hearing, the Tribunal heard the testimony of the Complainant and the
Respondent and after the hearing, the Tribunal has considered the written submissions
and written reply submissions of the parties in arriving at its findings on the pertinent
issues. From the outset, the Tribunal notes that the Charges do not include DBS and relate

to PLUSS and LAS only. The Charges (as amended) are set out below.

FIRST CHARGE

T'hat you, YEO POH TIANG (YANG BAOZHEN), an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, whilst practicing with the firm of Yeo & Associates LLC

(""the Firm"") Iocated at I0lA Upper Cross Street #12-13, People's Park Centre,
Singapore 058358, are charged that you had, on or around I 2 February 2020, breached
Rule l7(3) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, in that you hadfailed

to inform Koh Hutee Miem that the fees which she paid on 12 February 2020 for the
""PLUS Service"" and ""Legal Advice Service"" were being charged on a non-refundable
basis, such breach amounting to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and

solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.

ALTERNATIVE FIRST CHARGE
That you, YEO POH TIANG (YANG BAOZHEN), an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore, whilst practicing with the firm of Yeo & Associates LLC

(""the Firm"") located at l0lA Upper Cross Street #12-13, People's Park Centre,
Singapore 058358, are cltarged that you had, on or around l2 February 2020, failed to
inform Koh Hwee Miem that thefees which she paid on 12 February 2020for the ""PLUS

Service"" and ""Legal Advice Service"" were being charged on a non-refundable basis,
and are thereby guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an

-7 -

fficer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the
meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act.

SECOND CHARGE
That you, YEO POH TIANG (YANG BAOZHEN), an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore, whilst practicing with the firm of Yeo & Associates LLC

(""the Firm"") located at I0lA Upper Cross Street #12-13, People's Park Centre,
Singapore 058358, are charged thatyouhad, between I2 February 2020 and 5 March
2020, breached Rule 5(2)(c) and (h) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)
Rules, in that you hadfailed to provide tlte services which Koh Hwee Miem had paid.for

on l2 February 2020, includingfiling of court documents in Court under the ""PLUS
Service"", and providing legal advice under the ""Legal Advice Service"", ond that no
document had beenfiled and no appointment had beenfixed with Koh Hwee Miem even

after a period of 22 days had passed, despite the fact that the aforesaid services were
stated to be fost and expedient; further, that you had failed to contact Koh Hwee Miem

in respect of the services that had beenpaidfor on 12 February 2020 or instruct Koh
Hwee Miem on how to avail herself of the qforesaid services, such breach amounting to

improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section
83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.

ALTERNATIVE SECOND CHARGE
That you, YEO POH TIANG (YANG BAOZHEN), an Advocate and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Singapore, whilst practicing with the firm of Yeo & Associates LLC

(""the Firm"") located at I0lA Upper Cross Street #12-13, People.'s Park Centre,
Singapore 058358, are charged thatyouhad, between 12 February 2020 and 5 March
2020, failed to provide the services which Koh Hwee Miem had paidfor on I2 February

2020, including /iling of court documents in Court under the ""PLUS Service"", and
providing legal advice under the "" Legal Advice Service "" , and that no document had been

filed and no appointment had beenfixed with Koh Hwee Miem even after a period of 22
days had passed, despite the foct that the aforesaid services were stated to be fast and

-8expedient; .further, that you had failed to contact Koh Hwee Miem in respect of the
services that had been paidfor on I2 February 2020 or instruct Koh Hwee Miem on how

to avail herself of the aforesaid services, and are thereby guilty of such misconduct
unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an fficer of the Supreme Court or as a member

of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section S3(2)(h) of the Legal
Profession Act.

17. Based on the Portal and the available evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that a solicitorclient relationship was established between the Complainant and the Respondent upon
payment being made on 12 February 2020. There is no dispute that the DBS service was

provided by and that the payment was received by the Firm, as a consequence of which
these payments would constitute legal fees for legal services. On the facts, the Tribunal

finds that the purported disclaimers do not negate the presence of a retainer and that the
Complainant engaged the Firm and the Respondent via the Portal and paid for legal
services. The Tribunal notes that the legal fees for PLUSS and LAS have not been
refunded.

1't Charge - Rule 17(3) of the Rules

18. Rule 17(3)(a) of the Rules provides as follows:
(3) A legal practitioner must

-

(a) inform his or her client of the basis on whichfees for professional services will be
charged, and of the manner in which those fees and disbursements (f any) are to be

paid by the client;

19. The Respondent places heavy reliance on 2 disclaimers, the first of which is referred to
as ""the Page 180 Disclaimer"", which stated:

""... Clients are able to take as much time as they need to complete the forms. Thus,
your payment is considered fully utilized when you access the subsequent pages for
the paid service.""

9-

The Page 180 Disclaimer can be found in Exhibit YPT-4 to the Respondent's affidavit

of evidence-in-chief (""AEIC "") at p180.

20. The Page 180 Disclaimer, which is set out right before the Payment section on the
oolnformations

[sic] & Payment"" page, stated as follows:

""Divorcebureau.com.sg seel<s to provide assistance to the best of our ability to help users

prepare and generate the legal document necessary to .file for divorce in the Family
Justice Courts of Singapore but is not responsible.for the content of the legal document
generated from our website, neither are we responsible for the rejecting of the said
documents by the Singapore Courts due to inaccurate input or false information, or qny

reasons whatsoever. By clicking ""Continue"", lou are agreeing to the terms and
conditions governing the usage of divorceburea.com.sg.

DivorceBureau.com.sg is an online Do-IrYourself (DIY) service which enables our
clients to use our online service at their own convenience 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Clients are able to take as muclt time as they need to complete the forms. Thus, your
payment is considered fully utilized when you qccess the subsequent pages for the paid
service.

Due to Private and Confidentiality issues and to protect all our clients' information, we

will strictly not entertain any questions from non-registered users. All correspondence
by registered users will have to be via email only.""

2L The Page 180 Disclaimer did not state that no solicitor-client relationship was formed
between the Firm and users of the Portal. This was acknowledged by the Respondent

under cross-examination. In fact, the Page 180 Disclaimer, as highlighted above,
suggested that a solicitor-client relationship was formed, as it referred to registered users
as ""clients"" on three occasions. In a similar vein, there were numerous references to users

being ""clients"" elsewhere on the Portal:

- 10-

(a) The header of every page of the Portal stated: ""Contact our client care specialist
at +65 8588 8824for 24 hr/weekends support"".

(b) The link to access the DivorceBureau@ Service, which was included in the header
of every page of the Portal, was titled ""Client Login"".

(c) The 'oContact Us"" Page of the Portal stated: ""Complete the [Client SupportJ form
below and afamily lawyer will contact you within lworking day"".

22. Thus, the Page 180 Disclaimer did not negate a solicitor-client relationship between the
Firm and users of the Portal; to the contrary, it indicated that users are clients of the Firm.

23. The second disclaimer relied on by the Respondent is referred to as oothe Page 135
Disclaimer"", which essentially provided that there was no solicitor and client relationship
for the DBS, and which stated as follows:

"" DivorceBureau. com. s g Dis claimer

DivorceBureau.com.sg seeks to provide assistance to the best of our ability to help users

prepare and generate the document necessary to file for divorce in the Family Justice
Courts of Singapore but is not responsible for the content of the document generated

from our website, neither are we responsible for the rejection of the said documents by
the Singapore Courts due to inaccurate input or folse information, or any reqsons
whatsoever. By clicking ""Next"", you ore agreeing to the terms and conditions governing
the us age o.f DivorceB ur eau. com. s g.

DivorceBurequ.com.sg is an information service provider. We do not provide legal
advice and no solicitor-client relationship is established in any form with anyone using
the service provided by our website. The contents in DivorceBureau.com.sg are for the

purposes of providing general information only.

The contents in DivorceBureau.com.sg are not intended to be legal or an exhaustive
statement of the Law. The contents in DivorceBureau.com.sg may fail to meet all your

- 11-

necessary needs and are not intended to replace professional legal advice. You should
consult a lawyer for legal advice for your specffic situation.

Divorcebut'eau.cont.sB and l'eu & Assuciules LLC ure nut respunsiblelor uny loss which
may arisefrom the usage of the contents or services provided by our website by any user.

DivorceBureau.com.sg does not have any fee-sharing arrangements with any law firms

or lawyers.""

The Page 135 Disclaimer can be found in Exhibit YPT-4 to the Respondent's AEIC at
p1 35.

24. However, there was no contemporaneous evidence before the Tribunal to show that the
Page 135 Disclaimer was in fact incorporated into the Portal when the Complainant
accessed it on 12 February 2020. Furthermore, the Page 135 Disclaimer was never

brought to the attention of users like the Complainant.

25. Unlike the Page 180 Disclaimer, which was set out in full before the Payment section on
the ""Informations [sic] & Payment"" page on Page 180 of the Respondent's AEIC, the

Page 135 Disclaimer was purportedly accessible only when users clicked on a
""Disclaimer Details"" link which was hidden in the footer of each page of the Portal. In
short, taking the Respondent's argument at its highest, not only was the Page 135
Disclaimer not highlighted on each page of the Portal, it was also hidden and buried in
the ""Disclaimer Details"" link in the footer of each page of the Portal.

26. As the Tribunal sees it, there are two possible reasons why the second paragraphof the
Page 135 Disclaimer, which informed users that no solicitor-client relationship was
established, was not reflected in the Page 180 Disclaimer:

(a) the Page 135 Disclaimer did not exist on 12 February 2020 v,rhenthe Complainant
accessed the Portal; or

-t2(b) the Respondent did not want to highlight to users, immediately before they made
payment on the 'olnformations [sic] & Payment'o page on Page 180 of the
Respondent's AEIC, that it was intended that no solicitor-client relationship exist

in respect of the Divorce Bureau Service.

27. The Tribunal is not convinced that the Page 135 Disclaimer existed as of 12 February
2020, when the Respondent accessed the Portal as the provision therein for the absence

of a solicitor- client relationship would be contrary to the language in the Page 180
Disclaimer which referred to users of the Divorce Bureau Service as clients of the Firm.
Even if it existed then, the Tribunal would not give effect to the Page 135 Disclaimer as

it was not brought to the attention of users such as the Respondent prior to the making of
any payment for the Divorce Bureau Service. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the

Complainant had become a client of the Respondent and the Firm from the time she
accessed and used the Portal and made payment on 12 February 2020.

28. The Tribunal also notes that the Page 180 Disclaimer did not inform users that their
payments were non-refundable. Stating that a payment was ""considered fully utilized""

did not mean that the payment would be non-refundable.

29. As the Respondent had admitted under cross-examination, even monies which the
Respondent considered to be ""fully utilized"" could still be refunded by the Firm on a

goodwill basis. In fact, the Respondent's evidence was that she and the Firm would have
been willing to consider a partial refund, if the Complainant had requested for a refund

in respect of the PLUS Service and the Legal Advice Service, as demonstrated in
paragraph 34 below. Thus, even if the Respondent was entitled to treat any payment as

fully utilised, it did not follow that such payment was non-refundable.

30. Moreover, the Respondent's reasoning that the payment was considered fully utilised
because ""fc]lients are able to take as much time as they need to complete the forms""

could at best only apply to the DBS, which involved users accessing the Portal and
completing the forms. The reasoning could not apply to the PLUSS and the LAS, which

did not entail accessing the Portal and filling in forms. Moreover, as the Respondent

-13admitted, nowhere in the text of the Page 180 Disclaimer does it refer to the PLUSS or
the LAS.

31

On thc stand, the Respondent tried tu uxplain LhaL the Page 180 Disclaimer extended to
the PLUSS and the LAS because, immediately below the Page 180 Disclaimer, users
were given the option of selecting the PLUSS and the LAS.

32. However, this explanation/argument by the Respondent is untenable. Whether users had
the option of selecting the PLUSS and LAS has no bearing on and does not alter the
meaning conveyed by the clear words of the Page 180 Disclaimer, which clearly stated,

for the DBS, with no reference to the PLUSS and LAS, that""your payment is considered

fully utilized when you access the subsequent pages for the paid service.""

33. The Tribunal also noted that, even when the Respondent was questioned by the Tribunal
about the logic behind payment for the PLUS Service being utilised when no filing
services was provided, the Respondent was unable to provide any logical justification for

this. The relevant extract from the transcript of the hearing on 21 October 2021reads as

follows:

'oPresident

sorry, can we then go to page 180? I am struggling to understand how you say or
logically iustify a position that payment of the PLUS Service could be utilised if no
service has been done and tlte user has simply accessed the subsequent pages of the

portal. How do you justify that?

.. My question was simply this: IIow do you justify saying or taking the position, right,

that the paymentfor the PLUS Service is utilised if a user has accessed the subsequent
pages on the paid service, but no service---no filing has been done?

Witness

-14Yes, because in---as l---as I mentioned, is to make it hassle free for them. At the time

when they complete the generation of their documents, the next logical step is to file it.
So when---we want them to be responsible when they use our services. ll/hen they click

onto this PLUS Service, then they already decide that they want someone else to file it

for you because they want to save the hassle to file your own divorce papers, they click
on it. So tf they click on it, it means that it is fully utilised, and it's not refundable
because users have to be responsible, in a way, on the segment that they cltoose.

President:

--for the.filing service. Your position is still the same, ""Once you've opted for it, it's
considered utilised, even though nothing is done in relation to the service""?

Witness

Yes, at that time, it was the concept that everything is based on the---the responsibility

of the users as well on what they think they want. So eventually, it didn't materialise
due to many reasons, For our website, it's considered as utilised, no refunds. But as

I

said, I always said, there's always a better practice, and I'm constantly looking at
improving it because it is reallyfor the benefit of myself; there's no reason that I don't
improve it, I'm happy to improve it. And I also said before, on the hindsight, if, at the
time, Ms Koh has askedfor the refund of these two parts, I might have considered.""

34. Clearly, the Page 180 Disclaimer did not inform users that their payment was nonrefundable. Apart from the Page 180 Disclaimer, the Respondent does not assert that any
other part of the Portal informed users that their payments were non-refundable.

35. With respect, the Tribunal does not accept the Respondent's explanation that the phrase
in the Portal (""your payment is consideredfully utilized when you access the subsequent
pages for the paid service"") adequately conveys that the legal fees were paid on a non-

refundable basis because a ""fully utilized"" payment can still be refunded. Even if the

-15phrase ""fully utilized"" could be equated with ""non-refundable"", the Tribunal finds that
the Page 180 Disclaimer would refer and relate to DBS only and not to PLUSS and LAS.

36. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the 1't Charge has been made out.
2nd Charee

- Rule 5(2) of the Rules

31. Rule 5(2)(c) and (h) of the Rules provide as follows:
(2) A legal practitioner must

-

(c) act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to the
client;

(h) provide timely advice to the client;

38. With respect, the Tribunal does not accept the Law Society's position that the Respondent
failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence and to provide timely advice to
the Complainant. There was no dispute that the Complainant did not complete the forms
and that the Portal allowed users to ""edit the online forms for the next 30 days"". There

is also no dispute that the Complainant did not reach out to the Firm or the Respondent

to request specifically for the LAS during this 30-day period. If the forms had been
completed, PLUSS could have been available. If advice had been requested, LAS could
have been provided. The Tribunal accepts that the Respondent did not act unreasonably

in waiting 30 days for the Complainant to edit the forms and there was no impediment
for the Complainant to contact the Firm and Respondent during this period. Accordingly,
Tribunal finds that the 2""d Charge has not been made out.

Appropriate Sanction

39. In The Law Society of Singapore v. Huang Lui IDT 11120201, the regulated practitioner
pleaded guilty to a charge under Rule 17(3) of the Rules and the Tribunal determined that

-t6the regulated practitioner should be reprimanded and ordered to pay the Law Society's
costs of those proceedings fixed at 5$5,000 plus reasonable disbursements. In that case,

counsel for the Law Society directed the tribunal's attention to two cases: The Law
Society of Singapore v Anand K Thiagarajan [2009] SGDT 2 and The Law Society of

Singapore v Chung Kok Soon 120021SGDSC 2. In both those cases, a breach of the
obligation to inform a client of the basis on which fees for professional services would
be charged attracted a reprimand and an order that the Respondent pay the Law Society's

costs of the Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings.

40. Considering all the relevant facts of the case, the findings made by the Tribunal and the
relevant precedents, Tribunal recommends that the Respondent be reprimanded.

41. Further, given the materials filed, the duration of the hearing, the extent of the written
submissions and the fact that the Law Society had made out the 1't Charge but not the 2nd

Charge, the Tribunal considers that cost in the sum of $8,000, plus reasonable
disbursements, to be fair and reasonable and should be paid by the Respondent to the

Law Society.

42. In conclusion, the Tribunal makes the following determination that:
(a) pursuant to Section 93(1Xb) of the LPA, while no cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action exists under Section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be
reprimanded; and

(b) pursuant to Section 93(2) of the LPA, the Respondent is ordered to pay the Law
Society's costs of these proceedings fixed at 5$8,000 plus reasonable
disbursements.

Dated this

Mr Andre Yeap S.C
President

4th

day of May 2022

Mr Anand Nalachandran
Member

",2022-11-08T04:00:17+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-nov-2022/,"In the Matter of Yeo Poh Tiang [Yang Baozhen] (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-nov-2022/",1049
9,6dae43fb821769eb625c81f364b0c3d2ef96f7fa,"In the Matter of Ooi Oon Tat (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Ooi Oon Tat (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Mr Lim See Meng (the Complainant).


The Complainant was a taxi driver who was involved in an accident with one Mr Chong Chun Siong (Mr Chong). The Complainant suffered some physical injuries. The Complainant, through his then solicitor, commenced DC Suit 2679/2015 (the Suit). The Respondent formally took over conduct of the Suit on 2 May 2016. United Legal Alliance LLC (ULA) represented Mr Chong.

ULA wrote to the Respondent on 15 June 2016, and had requested for certain documents in relation to the Complainant’s case (Discovery Request). About two weeks later, the Complainant went to the Respondent’s office, and provided some documents to enable the Respondent to reply in part to the Discovery Request.

On 30 June 2016, the Complainant sent a reminder to the Respondent via e-mail to respond to the Discovery Request. As the Complainant did not receive any update from the Respondent, he engaged a different solicitor in January 2017, who did a search of the Court’s file and informed the Complainant that the Suit was struck out.

The Complainant’s claim for personal injury, if commenced in a fresh suit at the time it was struck out on 20 January 2017, would have potentially been time-barred. The Complainant eventually commenced civil proceedings against the Respondent for professional negligence, and the Respondent was found liable to pay the Complainant’s costs and disbursements, as well as $72,879.03 in damages.

In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Jimmy Yim Wing Kuen, SC and Mr Andrew Chan Chee Yin as DT member.

Three charges (and its alternatives) were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent was aware of information that would reasonably affect the Complainant’s interests in the Suit, but failed to reasonably inform the Complainant of such information and/or the progress of the Suit, in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) and/or Rule 5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Rules).

First Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent was aware of information that would reasonably affect the Complainant’s interests in the Suit, but failed to reasonably inform the Complainant of such information and/or the progress of the Suit.

Second Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of legal services; provide timely advice and/or use all legal means to advance the Complainant’s interests to the extent that the Respondent may reasonably be expected to do so, in breach of Rule 5(2)(c), Rule 5(2)(h) and/or Rule 5(2)(j) of the Rules.

Second Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of legal services; provide timely advice and/or use all legal means to advance the Complainant’s interests to the extent that the Respondent may reasonably be expected to do so.

Third Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent had failed to follow the lawful, proper and reasonable instructions that the Complainant was competent to give, which included failing to follow the Complainant’s instructions in his email to the Respondent dated 30 June 2016, in breach of Rule 5(2)(i) of the Rules.

Third Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that whilst acting for the Complainant in the Suit, the Respondent failed to follow the lawful, proper and reasonable instructions that the Complainant was competent to give, which included failing to follow the Complainant’s instructions in his e-mail to the Respondent dated 30 June 2016.

Findings and Determination of the DT; Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that all three main charges (and its alternatives) were proven beyond reasonable doubt. There appeared to be no mitigating factors, while aggravating factors were present in this case.

The DT was of the view that the Respondent could have complied with the Discovery Request but simply failed to, eventually causing the Suit to be struck out while leaving the Complainant in the dark.

The DT emphasised that the Respondent’s conduct was egregious, and sounded its strong disapprobation of the same. Further, the DT also expressed its displeasure at the Respondent who failed and/or refused to file his Defence, List of Documents, and his Affidavit of Evidence-In-Chief despite several reminders and extensions given by the DT.

After considering the cases of The Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2019] SGDT 4 and The Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar S/O Sethuraju [2012] SGDT 4, the DT was of the view that this present case was more egregious than the 2 precedents above due to the Respondent’s contumelious and repeated failure to reasonably inform Mr Lim of his discovery obligations which ultimately led to the Suit being struck out.

The DT found that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed, with the Respondent to be referred to the Court of 3 Judges (C3J). The DT had also awarded costs amounting to $8,000 (inclusive of disbursements) to the Law Society.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and on 1 July 2022, the C3J ordered the Respondent to be suspended from practice for a period of five (5) years commencing 1 July 2022, and to pay the Law Society’s costs of $18,000 (inclusive of disbursements) with the costs orders made by the DT to remain.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Oct_22_DT_Ooi_Oon_Tat.pdf,"DT 10 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF OOI OON TAT,
AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
(CHAPTER 161)

DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Disciplinary Tribunal
Mr Jimmy Yim Wing Kuen, SC President
Mr Andrew Chan Chee Yin Member

Counsel for the Law Society

Counsel for the Respondent

Mr Adrian Wong Soon Peng
Mr Wayne Yeo (Yang Weien)

Respondent acting in person

Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP
9 Straits View
#06-07 Marine One West Tower
Singapore 018937
Dated this 20th day of December 2021

DT 10/2021

Between

THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE
(No ID Exists)

And

OOI OON TAT

Introduction

1.

On 18 June 2020, Mr Lim See Meng

Mr Lim

a taxi driver lodged his complaint1

against his former solicitor Mr Ooi Oon Tat the Respondent practising as a sole proprietor
under the law firm name of M/s Judy Cheng & Co J&C . The Respondent is an Advocate
and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore of some 27 years standing at the material
time in 2016, having been called to the Singapore Bar in August 1989.2

2.

On 10 May 2021, the present Disciplinary Tribunal was appointed. The Law Society of
LSS

3 charges against the Respondent. The 3 charges are

reproduced below:3

1 2PB at p. 818
2

Statement of Case dated 29 April 2021 at [1]

3

The First Charge was amended by consent on the day of the oral closing submissions on 1 November 2021 by

2

First Charge
[The Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in DC Suit No. 2679
of 2015 ( the Suit ), [he was] aware of information that would reasonably affect
interests in the Suit, which included:(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The letter fr
17 August 2016;
DC/SUM 2793/2016 dated 29 August 2016;
DC/ORC 3529/2016 dated 4 October 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 31 October 2016;
DC/SUM 3586/2016 dated 8 November 2016;
DC/ORC 94/2017 dated 13 December 2016; and/or
That the Suit was struck out on 20 January 2017,

but failed to reasonably inform [Mr Lim] of such information and/or the progress
of the Suit in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) and/or Rule 5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (S 706/2015) and as such, [he is] guilty of
improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of
section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).
Alternatively, [the Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in the
Suit, [he was] aware of information that would reasonably affect [Mr Lim s]
interests in the Suit, which included:(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The letter from ULA to J&C dated 17 August 2016;
DC/SUM 2793/2016 dated 29 August 2016;
DC/ORC 3529/2016 dated 4 October 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 31 October 2016;
DC/SUM 3586/2016 dated 8 November 2016;
DC/ORC 94/2017 dated 13 December 2016; and/or
That the Suit was struck out on 20 January 2017,

but failed to reasonably inform [Mr Lim] of such information and/or the progress
of the Suit, such acts amounting to conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor
in the discharge of [his] professional duty as an officer of the Supreme Court or
as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h)
of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).

Second Charge
[The Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in DC Suit No. 2679
of 2015 ( the Suit ), [he] failed to:- (a) act with reasonable diligence and
competence in the provision of legal services; (b) provide timely advice; and/or
(c) use all legal means to advance [Mr Lim's] interests to the extent that [he] may
reasonably be expected to do so in relation, but not limited to:(1)
(2)

The letter fro
15 June 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 17 August 2016;

Judy Cheng & Co

deleting the 1st letter itemized as the letter from ULA to J&C dated 17 August 2016, see Transcript of oral closing
NE 1 Nov

-27)

3

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

DC/SUM 2793/2016 dated 29 August 2016;
DC/ORC 3529/2016 dated 4 October 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 31 October 2016;
DC/SUM 3586/2016 dated 8 November 2016;
DC/ORC 94/2017 dated 13 December 2016; and/or
The striking out of the Suit on 20 January 2017,

in breach of Rule 5(2)(c), Rule 5(2)(h) and/or Rule 5(2)(j) of the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (S 706/2015) and as such, he is guilty of
improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of
section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).
Alternatively, [the Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in the
Suit, [he] failed to:- (a) act with reasonable diligence and competence in the
provision of legal services; (b) provide timely advice; and/or (c) use all legal
means to advance [Mr Lim's] interests to the extent that [he] may reasonably be
expected to do so in relation, but not limited to:(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

The letter from ULA to J&C dated 15 June 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 17 August 2016;
DC/SUM 2793/2016 dated 29 August 2016;
DC/ORC 3529/2016 dated 4 October 2016;
The letter from ULA to J&C dated 31 October 2016;
DC/SUM 3586/2016 dated 8 November 2016;
DC/ORC 94/2017 dated 13 December 2016; and/or
The striking out of the Suit on 20 January 2017,

such acts amounting to conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor in the
discharge of [his] professional duty as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a
member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of
the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).

Third Charge
[The Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in DC Suit No. 2679
of 2015
[he] had failed to follow the lawful, proper and reasonable
instructions that [Mr Lim] was competent to give, which included failing to follow
[Mr Lim's] instructions in his email to [the Respondent] dated 30 June 2016 in
breach of Rule 5(2)(i) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules
2015 (S 706/2015) and as such, you are guilty of improper conduct or practice
as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the
Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).
Alternatively, [the Respondent is] charged that whilst acting for [Mr Lim] in the
Suit, [ he] had failed to follow the lawful, proper and reasonable instructions
that [Mr Lim] was competent to give, which included failing to follow [Mr Lim's]
instructions in his email to [the Respondent] dated 30 June 2016, such act(s)
amounting to conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor in the discharge of
[his] professional duty as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal
Profession Act (Chapter 161).

4

Background facts

3.

On 12 November 2012, Mr Lim was involved in an accident with one Mr Chong Chun

Siong

Mr Chong

.4 Mr Lim suffered some

who

physical harm ranging from neck pain, chest discomfort, right ribs pain to whiplash.

4.

On 9 September 2015, his then solicitor M/s Hin Tat Augustine & Partners commenced

DC Suit 2679/2015 the Suit against the defendant Mr Chong, who instructed United Legal
Alliance

ULA to defend.

5.

On 30 September 2015, Mr Lim changed his solicitor to M/s Goh JP & Wong LLC.5

6.

On 25 November 2015, Mr Lim obtained an interlocutory judgment against Mr Chong,
favour, with damages to be assessed.6

by consent, with liability fixed at 100% in

7.

On 12 January 2016, M/s Goh JP & Wong LLC obtained a hearing date of 5 February

2016 for an assessment of damages in the Suit.7 By that point, Mr Lim had filed his affidavit
of evidence-in-chief, list of documents and affidavit verifying list of documents in the Suit.
However, the assessment of damages did not proceed on 5 February 2016 as ULA raised

8.

On 17 March 2016, Mr Chong through ULA served a list of interrogatories on Mr Lim

seeking to discover, among other things, if Mr Lim was involved in any other road accidents

4

1PB at pp. 98-105

5 1PB at p. 106
6

1PB at p. 108

7

1PB at p. 209

5

apart from the accident on 12 November 2012.8

9.

On 19 March 2016, Mr Lim changed his solicitor again when he signed a Warrant to

A

J&C.9 The Respondent prepared this Warrant to Act

himself. The Warrant to Act engaged the Respondent to act for Mr Lim in 2 Suits:

a)

MC 228 , which was filed by Mr Lim in relation to
another accident he was involved in on 9 March 2012; and

b)

The Suit (i.e. DC Suit No. 2679 of 2015) which was filed by Mr Lim in relation
to the 12 November 2012 accident referred to above.

10.

On 2 May 2016, the Respondent filed a Notice of Change of Solicitor to formally take

over the Suit from the former solicitor M/s Goh JP & Wong LLC.10

Request for documents from Mr Lim

11.

By letter dated 15 June 2016, Mr Chong through ULA requested the Respondent for

the following documents from Mr Lim, namely

Discovery

Request :11

8

a)

Medical report of [Mr Lim] issued by Sata Comm Health dated 28 June 2012 ;

b)

Medical report of [Mr Lim] issued by Dr Benedict Peng of Island Orthopaedic

1PB at pp. 211-214

9 2PB at pp. 577-578
10

1PB at pp. 215-216

11

2PB at pp. 598-601

6

Consultants Pte Ltd dated 29 August 2012 ;

c)

Medical reports in relation to

accident on 29 July 2014 ;

d)

All relevant documents pertaining to any claim(s) and / or legal proceeding(s)
commenced by [Mr Lim] in relation to the accident on 26 June 2013, if any ;

e)

All relevant documents pertaining to any claim(s) and / or legal proceeding(s)
commenced by [Mr Lim] in relation to the accident on 29 July 2014, if any ;

f)

All relevant documents pertaining to MC Suit no. 21307 / 2010 including but
not limited to the following: (i) Copies of the pleadings; (ii) Copies of all
Affidavit(s) of Evidence-in-Chief, if any; (iii) Copies of the Interlocutory
Judgement and Final Judgement, if any; and (iv) All other relevant documents
in relation to the Suit ;

g)

(a) Copies of the pleadings; (b) Copies of all Affidavit(s)
of Evidence-in-Chief, if any; (c) Copies of the Interlocutory Judgement and Final
Judgement, if any; (d) All other relevant documents in relation to the Suit; and
(e) The particulars / information relating to the personal injury claim that your
client intends to consolidate with DC Suit no. 2679 of 2015, ... ;

h)

i)

;

[Mr Lim's] IRAS notice of assessment for the following assessment years
(financial years): i. 2011 (2010); ii. 2012 (2011); iii. 2013 (2012); iv. 2014 (2013);
v. 2015 (2014); and vi. 2016 (2015)
[J&C]
7

when the same is made available to

j)

Documents sub
capacity at $15,000.00

k)
and

l)

12.

Other documents in support of

s] claim.

In the same letter, ULA also requested Mr Lim to provide a signed clinical abstract form
-existing injuries

prior to the accident on 12 November 2012.

13.

On the same day on 15 June 2016, Ms Cheng Su Yin Judy Ms Cheng , who was

assisting the Respondent with the Suit at J&C, sent the Discovery Request to Mr Lim by way
of an email (copying the Respondent)

[w]e will let you know if we cannot find the

documents in our file and the documents we need from you 12 There were apparently
have
been relevant to the Discovery Request.13

14.

About 2 weeks later, on or around 27 June 2016,

office and provided the Respondent with his CPF statements for January 2012 to May 2016,
his IRAS notices of assessments for the financial years of 2010 to 2015 and the signed clinical
abstract form, to enable the Respondent to reply, in part, to the Discovery Request.14

12 2PB at p. 602
13

2PB at p. 563, [15]

14

AEIC of Mr Lim at [11]

8

15.

On 30 June 2016, Mr Lim followed up with an email to the Respondent pertaining to

the Discovery Request.15 M

email stated, inter alia:

1) Kindly refer to the letter from m/s United Legal Alliance dated 15th June 2016.
2) As a reminder, i have delivered the CPF Statements, IR8A and clinical abstract
application form which has been signed by me and delivered over to yourself &
Mr Ooi Oon Tat dated 27th June 2016.
3) I will appreciate if you could cc me a copy of your reply letter to United Legal
Alliance and also cc copy of the affidavit to consolidate DC Suit No. 2679 of 2015
and MC Suit No. 228 of 2014 for my reference.

16.

Mr Lim ended his email by stating: I hereby appreciate if you can kindly expedite my

matters asap (emphasis added by the Tribunal).

17.

Mr Lim claimed that he did not receive any update from the Respondent in relation to

the Discovery Request or any advice in relation to the progress of the Suit.16 As he was
dissatisfied with the dilatory manner in which the Respondent was handling the Suit, he went
sometime in or around January 2017

Mr Lee

Cheonghoh Law Corporation to take over conduct of the Suit. Mr Lee did a search on the
.17 Mr Lim claimed he was
shocked. Mr Lee also wrote 2 letters to the Respondent on 26 January 2017 and 8 February
2017 complaining that he found the files very poorly kept, the former in the following terms:18

We are in receipt of your 2 bundles handed by your Mr Ooi personally at our office
this morning We note that there is no schedule of documents listing out all the
documents in the 2 bundles. We have perused the 2 bundles and we are unable
to sort out which are the documents that belong to MC/MC 228/2014 and DC/DC
2679/2015 as they are not listed out in chronological order.
For the avoidance of doubt, our taking over conduct of these 2 matters will be
15 2PB at p. 604
16

AEIC of Mr Lim at [13]-

NE 15 Sep

15-22), p. 65 (ln 3-9), p. 148 (ln 8-30), p. 150 (ln 21-28), p. 151 (ln 31-32), p. 152 (ln 1 to 21), p. 160 (ln 3-18) and
p. 163 (ln 13-29)
17

NE 15 Sep at p. 160 (ln 11-14) and p. 161 (ln 6-11)

18

2PB at pp. 699-700

9

subject to the availability of the complete set of documents, i e. correspondence
and cause papers as the suits are in the advance stage of the proceedings.

18.

Eventually, Mr Lee did not take over conduct of the Suit as he was not comfortable

with the organisation of the documents handed over by the Respondent to him.19

19.

On 9 January 2019, M/s Andrew Goh Chambers filed a Notice of Change of Solicitors

to take over conduct of the Suit from

20.

W

. The Suit was never restored.

for personal injury if commenced in a fresh suit at the time

it was struck out on 20 January 2017 would have potentially been time-barred.

21.

On 22 March 2019, Mr Lim filed DC Suit No. 873/2019

DC 873

against the

Respondent for professional negligence, suing the Respondent
negligent handling of the Suit leading to the Suit being struck out.20

22.

On 9 January 2020, in

in DC 873, which the Respondent appeared in person to contest, interlocutory judgment was
entered against the Respondent for damages and costs to be assessed, and judgment for
certain liquidated sums.21
2020.22

23.

On 18 June 2020,

Mr Lim made his present

complaint to the LSS against the Respondent.23

19

2PB at p. 700

20

2PB at pp. 513-521

21 2PB at p. 753
22

2PB at p. 775

23

2PB at p. 818

10

24.

On 14 September 2021, a day before the evidential hearing of this matter began, the

District Court adjudged the Respondent as liable to pay Mr Lim damages of $72,879.03 with
costs fixed at $15,000 and disbursements to be agreed or taxed.24

The charges

25.

Essentially, the LSS 3 charges against the Respondent relate to his failure to perform

his professional duties to his client in respect of discovery requests and orders, which repeated
failure ultimately led to the Suit being struck out. The First Charge was amended by consent
on the day of the oral closing submissions on 1 November 2021 by deleting the first letter
itemised twice, first

The letter fr
and second as

. Each of the 3 charges relate to one obligation or another in the professional conduct
rules of informing a client timeously on the progress of their matters, advising the client,
advancing the cl

26.

We shall not repeat the details of the 3 charges as they have been reproduced in the

Introduction above. Suffice to say that they all engage various sub-rules under Rule 5 of the
Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (S 706/2015) PCR
the following principles in Rule 5(1) in the interpretation of the rules which follow:

24

(a)

The relationship between a legal practitioner and his or her client imports
a duty to be honest in all dealings with the client.

(b)

A legal practitioner must have the requisite knowledge, skill and
experience to provide competent advice and representation to his or her
client.

(c)

A legal practitioner has a duty to be diligent in the advice and information

NE 15 Jan at p. 11 (ln 7-15); Transcript of Evidential

NE 16 Sep at p. 173

(ln 8-16); 2PB at p. 960-965 (introduced as an exhibit during oral closing submissions on 1 November 2021)

11

given to his or her client, and in the manner the legal practitioner
represents the client.
27.

Specific to each of the 3 charges, the following sub-rules under Rule 5 of the PCR are

engaged in respect of what a legal practitioner is expected to do:
a)

For the First Charge, Rules 5(2)(b) and 5(2)(e) of the PCR:
(b)
when advising the client, inform the client of all information
known to the legal practitioner that may reasonably affect the
interests of the client in the matter, other than
(i)
any information that the legal practitioner is
precluded, by any overriding duty of confidentiality, from
disclosing to the client; and
(ii)
any information that the client has agreed in writing
need not be disclosed to the client;
(e)

b)

keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the
:

For the Second Charge, Rules 5(2)(c), 5(2)(h) and 5(2)(j) of the PCR:
(c)
act with reasonable diligence and competence in the
provision of services to the client;
(h)

provide timely advice to the client;

(j)
extent that the legal practitioner may reasonably be expected to
do so;
c)

For the Third Charge, Rule 5(2)(i) of the PCR:
(i)
follow all lawful, proper and reasonable instructions that
the client is competent to give;

The Respondent

28.

pre-hearing conduct

As the 3 charges relate primarily to a

dilatory

and lackadaisical conduct in attending to his professional duties, it was very surprising to the
Tribunal that the Respondent failed and/or refused to file his defence, list of documents, and
his affidavit of evidence-in-chief, despite several reminders and extensions given by the
Tribunal.
12

29.

By letter dated 17 May 2021, pursuant to Rules 8, 9 and 10 of the Legal Profession
DT Rules , the Respondent was directed

to file his defence by 25 May 2021, and both parties were directed to file their list of documents
by 8 June 2021, and

30.

affidavits of evidence-in-

AEIC

The Respondent failed to comply with the deadline for all 3 filings. In his email dated

1 June 2021 to the Secretariat, the Respondent requested more time as he claimed that his
personal computer had crashed some time ago and he had difficulty retrieving documents. By
email dated 8 June 2021 from the Secretariat to the Respondent, the Tribunal asked the
Respondent to provide his proposed deadlines to meet all filing obligations before the Tribunal
decided on whether to grant the appropriate extensions of time for the 3 filings.

31.

By email dated 21 June 2021, the LSS requested the Respondent to reply to the
email dated 8 June 2021 on the deadlines the Respondent would be proposing

in complying with the filing obligations. It was a generous and conciliatory act on the part of
the LSS in writing this email, and yet, the Respondent did not give any reply thereto, nor to
the Secretariat

32.

earlier email.

Then, by letter dated 28 June 2021,

Rule 22

of the DT Rules for extensions of time, the Tribunal directed that the

efence

be filed by 6 July 2021, the list of documents of parties be filed by 30 July 2021, and the AEICs,
Bundle of Authorities BA and B

BD be filed by 10 September 2021.

The Tribunal warned that if the

was not filed by 6 July 2021, the

Tribunal would nonetheless advance the proceedings and might take into account the conduct
of the Respondent for any defence filed late.

33.

A pre-hearing conference took place on 13 July 2021. At that hearing, the Tribunal
13

expressed its displeasure to the Respondent for again failing to file his defence, and gave yet
a further opportunity to the Respondent to file his defence, this time by 19 July 2021. The
Tribunal also directed parties to file their list of documents by 30 July 2021, and AEICs, BA
and BD by 20 August 2021, and fixed the evidential hearing on 15 and 16 September 2021.
By letter dated 14 July 2021, the Tribunal also directed the opening statements of both parties
to be filed by 8 September 2021.

34.

Whilst the LSS duly fulfilled all its filing obligations in time, the Respondent did not at

all. When the matter came up for the evidential hearing on 15 September 2021, the Tribunal
again expressed its displeasure that the Respondent had failed and ignored his filing
obligations of his defence, list of documents, AEIC and opening statement. The Tribunal
sought an explanation. The Respondent apologised profusely saying: I really have no good
excuse other than I just have difficulty getting the whole out (sic).25 The Tribunal was unsure
whether it was a case where the Respondent was mentally unable to conduct the defence of
his own case or was simply not revealing his case to the LSS until the hearing. For whatever
reason, the directions of the Tribunal were not complied with.

35.

In its Closing Submissions dated 18 October 2021, the LSS pointed to an earlier

prosecution against the Respondent in The Law Society of Singapore v Ooi Oon Tat [2018]
SGDT,26 in which he was charged with causing

of $138,148.11 to be deposited

into the office account of J&C (of which he was the sole proprietor
account. There, he was held to be in breach of Rule 3(1) of the
Accounts) Rules. The Court of Three Judges suspended the Respondent from practice for 1
year with effect from 9 September 2019. However, that is not the reason why we have referred
to that earlier prosecution against him.

25

NE 15 Sep at p. 3 (ln 1-2)

14

36.

What is relevant to this Tribunal is that the earlier Tribunal had similarly expressed
did not comply with any of the timelines and failed to file any

defence, provide any documents or evidence

chosen not to comply

with the procedures prescribed in the rules which govern disciplinary proceedings or accept
the latitude the DT has offered him to properly defend himself given the serious nature of these
proceedings
hearing and gave further directions for the Respondent to file his defence and AEIC by an
extended date. And again, the Respondent chose to ignore those directions and the hearing
proceeded without the proper filing. Thus, it was disturbing to this Tribunal that in these
proceedings, the Respondent likewise ignored

several directions to file his

defence, list of documents, AEICs and opening statement. The Respondent also did not file
any written closing submissions by 18 October 2021 as directed by the Tribunal at the close
of the evidential hearing, saying during oral closing submissions I have no real excuse 27

Evidential hearing on 15 and 16 September 2021

37.

On the first day of the evidential hearing on 15 September 2021, the Respondent

tendered a bundle of documents RB which he had apparently produced earlier before the
Inquiry Committee. The Tribunal asked why those documents could not have been tendered
timeously as the documents before the Inquiry Committee would not be before this Tribunal.
No sensible explanation was given. The documents comprised WhatsApp and SMS
messages from

handphone, and emails from his personal computer which

had allegedly crashed.

38.

27

As the Respondent did not file his defence nor his AEIC, the counsel of the LSS rightly

NE 1 Nov at p. 6 (ln 17-19)

15

objected to the manner in which the Respondent started to make various allegations in the
course of cross-examining Mr Lim.

any prior notice of his

case also obliged the Tribunal to take greater effort to understand the Respondent defences
to the charges. Be that as it may, the Tribunal proceeded to hear the evidence.

39.

Mr Lim provided an AEIC dated 27 August 2021. The Respondent cross-examined Mr

Lim at length on issues, the relevance of which was at times difficult to understand and, at
other times, clearly irrelevant to the charges against the Respondent.

40.

In essence, the Respondent claimed that he had orally informed Mr Lim of the progress

of the Suit and the orders made against him.28 Mr Lim denied that strenuously. The only
relevant admission Mr Lim

to J&C

of 17 August 2016, which admission led to the
deleting reference to this letter (see [25] above). The Respondent also sought to prove that
Mr Lim and he had reached an agreement on the reinstatement of the Suit at a meeting
sometime in February 2017. In that regard, he cast blame on Mr Lim for having a bad case in
the Suit on the basis that the injuries Mr Lim suffered in the November 2012 accident were
similar to the injuries he suffered in the March 2012 accident and Mr Lim had provided very
poor testimony in relation to the same in MC 228. He had given Mr Lim written advice on this
after the Suit was struck out and claimed that Mr Lim had agreed with him to reinstate the Suit
only after more progress was made in the assessment of damages in MC 228.29

41.

We however do not see how this is relevant to the charges of the Respondent failure

to inform and advise his client Mr Lim timeously of the Discovery Request and subsequent
orders made in relation thereto.

28

NE 16 Sep at p. 89 (ln 17-32) and p. 125 (ln 1-9)

29

NE 1 Nov at p. 9 (ln 17-19)

16

42.

What instead is clear to the Tribunal is that Mr Lim as the client was very keen to make

sure that the Suit was prosecuted properly and expeditiously. This is shown by his visit to the
R

office on 27 June 2016 when he handed over to the Respondent his IRAS

notices of assessment, CPF statements and signed clinical abstract form. This was followed
reminder email on 30 June 2016 that the Respondent expedite matters and reply
to ULA and copy him in the process. This evidence is undisputed, and the Respondent
. Whilst the Tribunal
gave the Respondent ample opportunity to explain why he did not send out those documents
to ULA to fulfil the Discovery Request, he had no real answer.30

43.

It is undisputed that the Respondent failure to provide ULA with any of the documents
Discovery Request led to a discovery application in DC/SUM 2793/2016 on 29 August

2016,31 which in turn led to an order for discovery against Mr Lim in DC/ORC 3529/2016 on 4
October 2016

Discovery Order .32 The Respondent admitted to having attended the

hearing and receiving the Discovery Order on 4 October 2016.33 Yet, he appeared to have
done nothing about it.

44.

In oral closing submissions and in his evidence, the Respondent admitted that he had

most if not all of the documents requested by ULA and ordered by the court.34 This admission
made it more incomprehensible as to why the Respondent did not comply with the Discovery
Request and later the Discovery Order. When probed on this, the Respondent said he could

30

NE 16 Sep at p. 70 (ln 9-32), p. 71 (ln 1-18), p. 72 (ln 22-32), p. 73 (ln 1-2), p. 83 (ln 7-30), p. 84 (ln 31-32) and

p. 85 (ln 1-30)
31

2PB at p. 609

32

2PB at pp. 640-642

33 NE 16 Sep at p. 89 (ln 15-21)
34

NE 16 Sep at p. 70 (ln 9-32), p. 71 (ln 1-18), p. 72 (ln 22-32), p. 73 (ln 1-2) and p. 83 (ln 7-30); NE 1 Nov at p.

40 (ln 18-32) and p. 41 (ln 5-16)

17

not think of any reason and that
(sic).35 He also chose to ignore

31 October 2016 which then

led to an application for an unless order against Mr Lim in DC/SUM 3586/2016 filed on 8
November 2016.36 The unless order was made on 13 December 2016 in DC/ORC 94/2017
Unless Order .37 The Respondent attended that critical hearing.

45.

The Unless Order gave Mr Lim up to 10 January 2017 to comply with the Discovery

Order failing which his claim in the Suit would be struck out. But nothing seemed to have been
done by the Respondent to comply with the strict terms of the Unless Order, let alone inform
Mr Lim of the same.

46.

On 20 January 2017, the Suit was struck out.38

commenced in a fresh suit at that time would have potentially been time-barred.39

47.

Thus, a prima facie case of breaches of professional obligations was made out by the

LSS on all 3 charges against the Respondent.

48.

The LSS drew our attention to the case of Vijayalakshmi Sivaprakasapillai v Mrinalini

Ponnambalam [2009] SGHC 183, a case in which the respondent was then practising in M/s
Salem & Ibrahim & Partners as counsel for the plaintiff. There, the r

had

failed to comply with an unless order. The High Court held that in order for the action to be
restored, the plaintiff must give a proper explanation to establish good reasons for failure to

35

NE 1 Nov at p. 41 (ln 9-16)

36

2PB at p. 644-645

37 2PB at p. 655

38 2PB at p. 658-659
39 Under Section 24A(2) of the Limitation Act (Cap. 163), an action for damages in respect of personal injuries
cannot be brought after the later of 3 years from the date the cause of action accrued or 3 years from the earliest
date on which the plaintiff has the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the
relevant injury.

18

comply with a peremptory order and that no further breach of a court order would occur again.
The LSS drew our attention to this case to show that the Respondent ought to have known
the seriousness of any unless order.

49.

Whilst that case is instructive, even without it, it must be obvious to every advocate

and solicitor that he must help a client to comply with discovery orders, even more so where
there is an unless order against the client, as failing to comply with it carries very serious
consequences for the client. And

Certainly for a lawyer of the

standing with some 27 years experience at the material time, his failure to
comply with the Discovery Order and Unless Order was incomprehensible to the Tribunal,
particularly when considered in the light of his admission that he had the documents in his
office all the while and could have complied to avert the consequence of the Unless Order.40

50.

In Law Society of Singapore vs Mahtani Bhagwandas [2021] SGHC 170, the Court of

Three Judges clarified that whilst the LSS bears the burden to proof the elements of a charge
legal burden (at [79(a)]).
Where the LSS has proven a prima facie case that the Respondent has failed in his duties to
his client based on the facts

evidential burden

ondent to prove

otherwise. Thus, in this case, the LSS has indeed proven a prima facie case that the various
letters, applications and court orders had not been advised to Mr Lim timeously and properly,
and that the Respondent had not properly advised and assisted Mr Lim in complying with the
Orders of Court. The evidential burden therefore shifts to the Respondent. He has to satisfy
the Tribunal that he has given notice of these documents to his client and advised his client
on the progress of the Suit, additionally advising and assisting his client to meet the Discovery
Order and related Unless Order, among other things.

40

NE 1 Nov at p. 42 (ln 11-21)

19

51.

The LSS rightly complained that given

failure to file a defence, list of

documents and AEIC, he should not be permitted to assert a positive case against Mr Lim
complaint forming the crux of the charges. However, the Tribunal gave the Respondent much
leeway given that these proceedings were very serious in nature such that, if the LSS could
not proceed, we would consider whether giving the LSS an adjournment of the proceedings
at the cost of the Respondent would be appropriate. The LSS was however able to deal with
all the evidence, arguments and assertions put forward by the Respondent in his defence and
did not seek any adjournment. This defence (which was never tendered) is based on what the
h

Tribunal could deduce from (i) the

cross-examination of Mr Lim, (ii) the evidence

given by the Respondent when he was cross-examined, (iii) and his oral closing submissions,
which is as follows:

a)

He had orally advised Mr Lim on the letters, applications and orders of court;41

b)

He claimed that there were no attendance notes to verify this because at
times, he did not record a note, and on other occasions, when he did, he had
lost them when allegedly his personal computer crashed in around July
2018;42

c)

He believed that there might have been written advice to his client through
emails but they were lost in the computer crash.43 He claimed that he did not
have back-up copies of the emails in his server; and

41 NE 16 Sep at p. 89 (ln 17-32), p. 125 (ln 1-9); NE 1 Nov at p. 30 (ln 1-10)
42

NE 15 Sep at p. 83 (ln 25-30); NE 16 Sep at p. 11 (ln 2-14); NE 1 Nov at p. 30 (ln 11-30)

43

NE 16 Sep at p. 69 (ln 13-24), p. 77 (ln 26-32) and p. 90 (ln 1-28); NE 1 Nov at p. 31 (ln 1-7)

20

d)

As for the hard copy documents, he had destroyed the correspondence file in
2018 (though the file was less than 6 years old).44 Yet, he claimed that he kept
the cause papers and documents files of the Suit45. He further claimed that
despite knowing Mr Lim was going to commence a civil claim against him, he
nevertheless proceeded to destroy the correspondence file.46

52.
credible at all. We much preferred the clean and consistent evidence of Mr Lim that he had
received no updates or advice despite his email reminder on 30 June 2016, up to the time he
found out about the Suit being struck out when he instructed another lawyer (Mr Lee) to take
over the file from J&C in around January 2017.

53.

We now deal with the RB which the Respondent tendered at the opening day of the

evidential hearing on 15 September 2021. It comprised SMS messages between the
Respondent and Mr Lim in 2 periods, between August 2016 to March 2017 and between June
2017 to April 2018; emails between them in 2 periods, between November 2016 to December
2016 and September 2017 to April 2018; and finally WhatsApp messages between them from
April 2017 to September 2019.

54.

A perusal of the SMS messages, since they cover the relevant period of August 2016

to January 2017, shows that there were various messages from Mr Lim asking the Respondent
RB relates more
to MC 228 with only passing reference to the subject Suit, and it does not speak to the Suit
and the charges.47

44

NE 16 Sep at p. 16 (ln 1-18) and p. 22 (ln 20-24)

45 NE 16 Sep at p. 151 (ln 17-20)
46

NE 16 Sep at p. 23 (ln 1-4)

47

NE 15 Sep at p. 4 (ln 20-32)

21

55.

We think otherwise. It in fact throws more light on how Mr Lim continued to press the

Respondent for updates on the progress of his Suit and that there was written advice on
occasions from the Respondent on other matters, except that they do not support the

compliance with the discovery related matters.

56.

In one such SMS dated 13 September 2016 where Mr Lim asked: Hi Mr Ooi this is

Lim See Ming..can you update me the hearing today to consolidate tq (sic), the answer from
the Respondent was: Later follow up. Adjourned (sic). Another was on 7 November 2016
when Mr Lim asked: Hi mr.Ooi this peter can I call you to tele to discuss the AFFIDAVIT from
defendant now? (sic), to which the Respondent replied: Busy. Later in the afternoon (sic).
Neither party referred to this in much detail at the evidential hearing and we will not presume
what happened.

57.

In an email dated 16 December 2016 from Mr Lim to the Respondent, there was further
pursuit of the Respondent to attend to his case. This email was sent 3

days after the Respondent attended the hearing where the Unless Order was made against
Mr Lim, and is helpful to reproduce:
Dear Mr Ooi,
1. I have sent you 2 text message on 15th Dec 2016. I wonder if you have receive.
2. I would like to hold a meeting with you with regards to my 2 cases.
3. Kindly update me of the latest developments to my 2 cases.
4. As I have been discharged from hospital, I would like to send you the bills of
my accident claim to be sent to the defendant.
Thank you.
58.

The Respondent provided no document to evidence how the concerns of Mr Lim were

met and whether his requests for a meeting were acceded to. There was also no document
showing that the Respondent informed Mr Lim of any Unless Order. No attendance notes exist
of any meeting. There was written advice from the Respondent on the issue of consolidation
of MC 228 and the Suit in an email on 7 December 2016, but the issue of advice on
22

consolidation does not speak to the present 3 charges.

59.

The WhatsApp messages pertained to a later period of April 2017 to September 2019.

Again, a perusal of those messages suggests a recurring theme of Mr Lim chasing the
Respondent for a meeting to discuss his matters. On 31 July 2017, we see one such message
where Mr Lim states Hi Mr. Ooi can I know when can we meet to discuss about the matter
of two cases? Please reply thank you (sic).

60.

In the course of the evidential hearing, the Respondent produced a further document

(marked RB85 ), containing an undated exchange of messages apparently between a
computer technician and the Respondent over the crash of his personal computer which he
claimed happened and resulted in the loss of most if not all of his relevant documents. But a
plain reading of the messages does not suggest that. For instance, in the message at 1:34 pm
(undated), the person (unidentified) wrote: Those which r kept on mail server is there. If not
wrong, last time ur system was using POP3, so technically, all emails are on that hard disk
(sic). The Tribunal asked why the Respondent did not call the relevant technician to testify on
the crash and loss of documents. He had no good answer.

anations as

to why records which would have exculpated him could not be found elsewhere, for example
on a server, physical files or carbon copied to Ms Cheng, are also difficult to believe and were
riddled with inconsistencies. For instance, the Respondent admitted that there could have

computer despite the Respondent offering to purchase the computer from Ms Cheng. It is also
to be noted that the alleged sale of the computer by Ms Cheng took place well after the
Respondent alleged he lost information due to his computer crash.

61.

The Respondent also sought to suggest, without basis, that the LSS might not have

obtained all relevant evidence from Mr Lim. The LSS strenuously objected to the casting of
aspersion on the LSS of improper conduct. This objection was rightly made by the LSS.
23

62.

Lastly

ample opportunities to do so, coupled with his convenient assertion that he was unable to
produce any exculpatory documents as he lost them to a computer crash (although still being
able to produce certain emails in his RB), leads us to draw an adverse inference against the
Respondent pursuant to Rule 20 of the DT Rules, specifically that he has no real defence to
the 3 charges, whereas the prima facie evidence is wholly against him.

The decision of the Tribunal

63.

Under Section 93(1) of the

LPA , the Tribunal shall

record its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts shall
determine that:

a)

There is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83
of the LPA;

b)

While no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section
83 of the LPA, the legal practitioner should be: (i) ordered to pay a penalty
that is sufficient and appropriate; (ii) reprimanded; or (iii) ordered to comply
with one or more remedial measures. The Tribunal may administer the
sanction in (iii) in addition to the sanctions in (i) or (ii); or

c)

There is cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83 of
the LPA.

64.

The Tribunal is guided by the

submission that in the case of The Law Society of

Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2019] SGDT 4, where there was a failure to attend a single
24

, it constituted an occasion of being
a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action

upheld by the

Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2020] 4 SLR 1173
which sentenced that lawyer to a 2 year

65.

suspension ([6]).

In a less serious case of The Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar S/O Sethuraju
his client and to keep the client

informed was also a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action which led the Court of
Three Judges to sentence the lawyer to a 3 months suspension.

66.

In this case, quite clearly, the Respondent

contumelious and repeated failure to

reasonably inform Mr Lim of his discovery obligations which ultimately led to the Suit being
struck out, seemed far worse than the above 2 precedents. In our view, all 3 charges have
been made out on the evidence.

67.

T

and lackadaisical conduct is seen over a prolonged period

between August 2016 to January 2017, when there were several occasions the Discovery
Request, Discovery Order and finally the Unless Order could have been complied with. The
conduct regrettably brings dishonour to the profession and falls far below the
conduct expected of an advocate and solicitor.

68.

In our view, all 3 main charges of improper conduct in the discharge of the
amounting to improper conduct or practice as an advocate

and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA have been proven against
the Respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. There appeared to be no mitigating factor, and
there were aggravating factors in this case.

69.

The Tribunal also finds in the alternative that the alternative framing of the 3 charges,
25

as amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor in the discharge of his
professional duty as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable
profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, has also been made out. The

stated above and it would no doubt constitute misconduct that is unbefitting. We would sound
strong disapprobation of such conduct. It bears repeating the disturbing fact that the
Respondent could have complied with the Discovery Request and several orders but simply
failed to, eventually causing the clien

all this while leaving the client

in the dark.

70.

The Tribunal is aware that where a Respondent pleads guilty to charges, it is good

practice that alternative charges be withdrawn. In Law Society of Singapore v Chan Chun
Hwee Allan [2018] 4 SLR 859, the Honourable

the

result of the Resp
charges fell away as a matter of course

She

the practice of

withdrawing alternative charges based on the same conduct as those to which a solicitorrespondent has pleaded guilty, is to be encouraged . However, as this is not a case of a plea
of guilt, the Tribunal also finds that the alternative charges as framed are made out.

71.

The Tribunal thus determines, pursuant to Section 93(1)(c) of the LPA, that that there

are obvious causes of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83 of the LPA on
all 3 main and alternative charges.

Costs

72.

Under section 93(2) of the LPA, the Tribunal has the power to make an order for the

payment of costs where it finds cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action:
Where a Disciplinary Tribunal makes a determination under subsection (1)(b)(i),
26

(ii) or (iv) or (c), the Disciplinary Tribunal may make an order for payment by any
party of costs, and may, in such order, specify the amount of those costs or direct
that the amount be taxed by the Registrar.
73.

The LSS sought a sum of S$8,000 inclusive of disbursements which the Tribunal thinks

is fair and reasonable. The Respondent did not challenge the sum but asked the Tribunal to
be lenient. The Tribunal does not think the sum is in any way unfair to Respondent. The matter
involved a 2 day

hearing and a half day of oral closing submissions. Further regard

is also had to

contumelious disregard

filing orders which

resulted in a greater task for the LSS to

Dated this 20th day of December 2021

Mr Jimmy Yim Wing Kuen, SC

Mr Andrew Chan Chee Yin

(President)

(Member)

27

",2022-10-08T04:00:58+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2022/,"In the Matter of Ooi Oon Tat (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2022/",1049
10,1abf76c6d76ae813bd9ecc173a818fc4adcf4a6c,"In the Matter of Mohammad Nizam Bin Ismail (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Mohammad Nizam Bin Ismail (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose from a complaint filed by RHTLaw Taylor Wessing LLP (now known as RHTLaw Asia LLP), a limited liability partnership (RHTLaw or Complainant). The Respondent was a partner with RHTLaw at the material time. The complaint was that the Respondent had practised as a solicitor on his own account while being a partner with RHTLaw.


In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Dr Michael Hwang SC and Mr Mr Teo Weng Kie as DT member.

Charges

One main charge, with an alternative charge, was preferred against the Respondent. The Respondent pleaded guilty to the main charge. The Charge was:

Charge

For contravening a provision of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.161, 2009 Rev Ed) (the Act) which warranted disciplinary action under section 83(2)(j) of the Act, namely section 142(3)(d) of the Act, as the Respondent practised as a solicitor on his own account while a partner of a limited liability law partnership, in that he had, between 2016 to 2019, did agree to/or did act as a legal advisor and render legal services on his own account to six named clients.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT was of the view that there was neither available evidence nor suggestion that the Respondent had behaved with dishonesty or lacked the trustworthiness expected of an advocate and solicitor. There was also neither evidence nor suggestion that the Respondent had caused material harm to any of the clients.

However, the DT observed that the quantum of remuneration that the Respondent received was not insignificant (approximate value of $50,000), and that the Respondent’s conduct did infringe on the objective of protecting the public in a situation whereby a solicitor practises without insurance coverage.

The DT was of the view that the main charge was made out, though there was no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.

Council adopted the DT’s findings, and the Respondent was reprimanded. There was no order as to costs.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/Mohammad+Nizam+DT+report.pdf,"16th

16th

",2022-09-10T04:00:11+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-sep-2022/,"In the Matter of Mohammad Nizam Bin Ismail (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-sep-2022/",1049
11,ef02bbc505905b4b64b0a9d46e4aa1d96b77db1a,In the Matter of Tan Teik Yu Mark (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Tan Teik Yu Mark (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor


These proceedings arose from information referred by the Attorney-General pursuant to section 85(3)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev. Ed.) (LPA) whereby the Respondent had pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of five charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (MDA). The Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a total of 21 months with effect from 19 October 2020.

In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Tan Tee Jim SC and Mrs Christine Sekhon as DT member.

Charges

Five (5) Charges were preferred against the Respondent and pleaded guilty to, with the second, third and fourth Charges being proceeded with, and the remaining charges being taken into consideration:

First Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had, on 17 March 2018, in his possession a Class C Controlled Drug nimetazepam without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations made thereunder, for which the Respondent was convicted on 12 October 2020, under section 8(a) of the MDA.

Second Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had, on 17 March 2018, in his possession a Class A Controlled Drug methamphetamine without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations made thereunder, for which the Respondent was convicted on 12 October 2020, under section 8(a) of the MDA.

Third Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had, on or before 17 March 2018, consumed a Class A Controlled Drug methamphetamine outside of Singapore, without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations made thereunder, for which the Respondent was convicted on 12 October 2020, under section 8(b)(ii) read with section 8A(1) of the MDA.

Fourth Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had, on 18 March 2018, in his possession a Class A Controlled Drug methamphetamine without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations made thereunder, for which the Respondent was convicted on 12 October 2020, under section 8(a) of the MDA.

Fifth Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had, on 17 March 2018, in his possession utensils intended for consumption of a Controlled Drug, i.e. one glass tube, two improvised glass apparatus, two glass apparatus, one rubber tube and four coloured straws, without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations made thereunder, for which the Respondent was convicted on 12 October 2020, under section 9 of the MDA.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT found that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the LPA as:

The Respondent was not a drug addict or trafficker; He committed the criminal offences due to his major depressive disorder; The offences did not involve dishonesty or deception and had no connection with his professional duties as an advocate and solicitor. They were not committed in the course of such duties; The impact of the offences was limited to the Respondent himself and his family; The Respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges as well as the three charges proceeded with by the Law Society and agreed to have two other charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. It showed that he was remorseful and contrite; The Respondent promptly agreed to the conditions imposed by the Attorney-General’s Chambers in relation to his application for a practising certificate; He also made diligent efforts to ensure that he did not relapse into drug use and hence the likelihood of re-offending is low.

The DT found that the Respondent had already been punished with imprisonment and pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(ii) of the LPA, determined that a reprimand would serve the ends of justice in this case.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT, and the Respondent was reprimanded. Disbursements (to be agreed or taxed) were also ordered by the DT to be payable by the Respondent to the Law Society.

To access the full report, click here.


",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/DT_Report_Mark_Tan.pdf,"DT/22/2021

IN THE MATTER OF TAN TEIK YU MARK

AN ADVOCATE

& SOLICTOR

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev. Ed.)

Report of the Disciplinary Tribunal

Disciplinary Tribunal

President:

Mr. Tan Tee Jim, SC

Advocate & Solicitor:

Mrs Christine Sekhon

Mr. S Suressh and Mr Marcus Ng (Harry Elias Partnership LLP) for the Law Society
Mr. Nicholas Narayanan (Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP) for the Respondent

Introduction

1.

This case arose from a request by the Attorney-General to the Law

Society to refer to a

Disciplinary Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) a matter concerning the conduct of Tan Teik Yu Mark
(“Respondent”). The request was made pursuant to section 85(3)(b) of the Legal Profession

Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev. Ed.) (“LPA”).
2s

The Respondent is an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore. He was called
to the Bar on 28 May 2005. He is currently practising at Mark Tan LLC.

Law Society’s Case

3:

The Law Society submitted a Statement of Case. In it, it set out the following facts and charges:

(1)

On 12 October 2020, the Respondent was convicted in the State Courts of Singapore of
the following charges which he had earlier pleaded guilty to: -

(a)

On 17 March 2018 at about 10:45 pm at 21 Woodlands Crossing, Woodlands
Checkpoint,

Car

Arrival

Green

Channel

Counter

Respondent had in his possession nimetazepam,

18,

Singapore,

the

a Class C Controlled Drug

listed in the First Schedule to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (“MDA”) without
authorisation under the MDA

or the Regulations made thereunder, and had

thereby committed an offence under section 8(a) punishable under section 33(1)
of the MDA (“First Criminal Charge’).

(b)

On 17 March 2018 at about 10:45 pm at 21 Woodlands Crossing, Woodlands
Checkpoint,

Car

Arrival

Green

Channel

Counter

18,

Singapore,

the

Respondent had in his possession 2 packets of crystalline substance which were
analysed and found to contain not less than 8.78 grams of methamphetamine, a
Class A Controlled Drug listed in the First Schedule to the MDA
authorization under the MDA

without

or the Regulations made thereunder, and had

thereby committed an offence under section 8(a) punishable under section 33(1)

of the MDA (“Second Criminal Charge’’).

(c)

The Respondent, being a citizen of Singapore, on or before 17 March 2018
outside Singapore, consumed methamphetamine, a Specified Drug listed in the
Fourth Schedule to the MDA

without authorisation under the MDA

or the

Regulations made thereunder, and had thereby committed an offence under
section 8(b)(ii) read with section 8A (1) punishable under section 33(1) of the
MDA (“Third Criminal Charge”).

(d)

On 18 March 2018 at about 5:50 am at 20 Paterson Road, #17-01, Singapore,

the Respondent had in his possession a packet of crystalline substance which
was

analysed

and

found

to

contain

not

less

than

4.39

grams

of

methamphetamine, a Class A Controlled Drug listed in the First Schedule to
the MDA
thereunder,

without authorization under the MDA
and

had

thereby

committed

punishable under section 33(1) of the MDA

(e)

an

or the Regulations made

offence

under

section

8(a)

(“Fourth Criminal Charge’’).

On 17 March 2018 at about 10:45 pm at 21 Woodlands Crossing, Woodlands
Checkpoint,

Car

Arrival

Green

2

Channel

Counter

18,

Singapore,

the

Respondent

had in his possession

one

glass

tube, two

improvised

glass

apparatus, two glass apparatus, one rubber tube and four coloured straws which
are utensils intended for consumption of a Controlled Drug listed in the First
Schedule to the MDA without authorisation under the MDA or the Regulations
made

thereunder,

and had

thereby

committed

an offence

under

section

9

punishable under section 33(1) of the MDA (“Fifth Criminal Charge’’).

(2)

As mentioned, the Respondent pleaded guilty to these charges and was convicted. He
was sentenced to imprisonment for a total period of 21 months with effect from 19
October 2020. The sentence for each of the criminal charges was as follows:

(a)

First Criminal Charge — Twelve (12) months’ imprisonment;

(b)

Second Criminal Charge — Nine (9) months’ imprisonment;

(c)

Third Criminal Charge — Six (6) months’ imprisonment;

(d)

Fourth Criminal Charge — Six (6) months’ imprisonment; and

(e)

Fifth Criminal Charge - Three (3) months’ imprisonment.

The

sentences

for the First and

Second

Criminal

Charges

were

ordered

to run

consecutively.

(3)

In the premises, the Law Society formulated the following five charges against the
Respondent:

First Charge

“That you, Tan Teik Yu Mark (SXXXX667A),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rey. Ed.) in that, on 17 March 2018, you had in your possession a Class C Controlled
Drug nimetazepam without authorisation under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap. 185,
2008

Rev.

Ed.)

or the Regulations

made

thereunder,

for which

you

have been

subsequently convicted on 12 October 2020, under Section 8(a) of the Misuse of Drugs
Act.”

Second Charge

“That you, Tan Teik Yu Mark

(SXXXX667A),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev. Ed.) in that, on 17 March 2018, you had in your possession a Class A Controlled

Drug methamphetamine without authorisation under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap.
185, 2008 Rev. Ed.) or the Regulations made thereunder, for which you have been
subsequently convicted on 12 October 2020, under Section 8(a) of the Misuse of Drugs
Act.”

Third Charge

“That you, Tan Teik Yu Mark (SXXXX667A),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.

161, 2009

Rev. Ed.) in that you, being a citizen of Singapore, had consumed a Class A Controlled
Drug methamphetamine

on or before

authorisation under the Misuse

17 March

of Drugs

2018

Act (Cap.

outside Singapore, without
185, 2008

Rev.

Ed.) or the

Regulations made thereunder, for which you have been subsequently convicted on 12
October 2020, under Section 8(b)(ii) read with Section 8A(1) of the Misuse of Drugs

Act.”

Fourth Charge

“That you, Tan Teik Yu Mark

(SXXXX667A),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev. Ed.) in that, on 18 March 2018, you had in your possession a Class A Controlled
Drug methamphetamine without authorisation under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap.
185, 2008 Rev. Ed.) or the Regulations made thereunder, for which you have been
subsequently convicted on 12 October 2020, under Section 8(a) of the Misuse of Drugs

Act.”

Fifth Charge

“That you, Tan Teik Yu Mark (SXXXX667A),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the

Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev. Ed.) in that, on 17 March 2018, you had in your possession utensils intended for
consumption of a Controlled Drug, i.e. one glass tube, two improvised glass apparatus,
two glass apparatus, one rubber tube and four coloured straws, without authorisation

under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap. 185, 2008 Rev. Ed.) or the Regulations made
thereunder, for which you have been subsequently convicted on 12 October 2020, under
Section 9 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.”

4.

At the hearing on 11 January 2022 (the “Hearing”), Mr. Suressh, counsel for the Law Society,
informed us that the Law Society was not proceeding with the First Charge and the Fifth Charge
and asked for these charges to be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing.

5.

The Respondent pleaded guilty to all the three charges that were proceeded with and agreed to
have the First Charge and the Fifth Charge taken into consideration for the purposes of
sentencing.

6.

At the Hearing, Mr. Suressh submitted that the Law Society did not consider the case to be one

of sufficient gravity to warrant being referred to the Court of Three Judges and that it was a
case that could be sent to the Council of the Law Society for them to decide whether to impose
a reprimand or a penalty under section 93(1)(b) of the LPA.

The Respondent’s plea in mitigation

7.

Mr. Narayanan, counsel for the Respondent, tendered a written mitigation plea on behalf of the
Respondent to the Tribunal. In the mitigation plea, the Respondent urged the Tribunal to find
that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed against him and that he should
be reprimanded pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(ii) of the LPA.

8.

We highlight some of the mitigation factors which were included in the mitigation plea and
submitted during the Hearing:

(1)

The Respondent was suffering from a major depressive disorder which had a direct
causal link to the commission of the criminal offences. He was clinically depressed at
the time of the criminal offences, and his depressed mood, poor emotional regulation
and inadequate coping skills were likely to have contributed significantly to his poor
judgment and lack of self-control at the material time.

(2)

To ensure that he did not relapse into drug use, he attended numerous psychiatric
consultations, counselling sessions, pastoral sessions and recovery support meetings.
Consequently, he has fully recovered from the disorder and did not require any antidepressant medication for a year. He has also been abstinent from drugs for almost four
years. The risk of relapse is low.

(3)

The Respondent fully cooperated with the Law Society and the Attorney-General’s
Chambers.

In particular, in October 2021, he promptly

imposed by the Attorney-General’s

Chambers

agreed to the conditions

in relation to his application for a

practicing certificate.

(4)

Prior to the commission of the criminal offences, the Respondent had no antecedents.
The offences were not committed in the course of his duties as an advocate and solicitor.
There was no dishonesty or deception involved in his professional capacity as an
advocate and solicitor.

(5)

The Respondent has good personal character and exemplary conduct. The criminal
offences committed were highly uncharacteristic of him. They were caused by his
depressed mental condition.

Our Finding

9.

Having considered the Law Society’s Statement of Case and the Respondent’s mitigation plea,
we are of the view that in the present case, no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action
exists under section 83 of the LPA. Our reasons are as follow:

(1)

The Respondent was not a drug addict or trafficker.

(2)

It was due to a major depressive disorder that he committed the criminal offences.

(3)

The offences had no connection with his professional duties as an advocate and solicitor;
they were not committed in the course of such duties. In fact, he was not practising at
the time of the criminal offences in March 2018.

(4)

The impact of the offences was limited to the Respondent himself and his family, but
not any third party.

(5)

There was no dishonesty or deception involved’in his professional capacity as an
advocate and solicitor.

(6)

He pleaded guilty to the criminal charges as well as the three charges formulated by the
Law Society and agreed to have two other charges taken into consideration for the
purpose of sentencing) — this shows that he was remorseful and contrite.

(7)

He promptly agreed to the conditions imposed by the Attorney-General’s Chambers in
relation to his application for a practising certificate.

(8)

He made diligent efforts to ensure that he did not relapse into drug use by attending
numerous

psychiatric

consultations,

counselling

sessions,

pastoral

sessions

and

recovery support meetings. The likelihood of re-offending is low.

(9)

The offences and the surrounding circumstances of the case did not imply a defect of
character which makes the Respondent unfit for the profession within the meaning of
section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

10.

For the above reasons also, and given that the Respondent has already been punished with
imprisonment,

we

find that a reprimand

would

serve the ends

of justice in this case.

Consequently, and pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(ii) of the LPA, we determine that while no cause
of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent
should be reprimanded.
11.

At the Hearing, Mr. Suressh asked us to award disbursements to the Law Society. Pursuant to

section 93(2) of the LPA, we make an order for disbursements to be paid to the Law Society.
The amount of the disbursements is to be agreed by the parties, failing which the amount is to
be taxed by the Registrar.

14th

",2022-07-09T02:00:31+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2022/,In the Matter of Tan Teik Yu Mark (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2022/,1049
12,584ddaf68af360af53169ee828aa5d2ae52c3620,In the Matter of Naidu Priyalatha (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Naidu Priyalatha (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Ms Wong Siew Lan (the Complainant).

The Complainant was an employee and shareholder of a company, which operated a wanton mee stall (the Company). The Company’s cash takings were deposited into the Company’s bank account. The Complainant and the two other shareholders of the Company (Two Shareholders) got into a dispute over cheques issued from the Company’s bank account without the knowledge or consent of the Complainant. The Complainant then stopped depositing the Company’s cash takings into the Company’s bank account.

The Respondent was engaged to represent the Two Shareholders in this dispute. On 28 February 2017, the Complainant’s solicitors proposed a settlement on behalf of the Complainant which included a term that they would pay the cash takings amounting to the sum of $26,896.45 by way of a cashier’s order in favour of the Company (the Cashier’s Order).

The parties agreed to hand the Cashier’s Order over to the Respondent subject to an undertaking that she would not release the Cashier’s Order to her clients, the Two Shareholders, until a comprehensive agreement was reached by the parties in full and final settlement of all issues and claims between them (the Undertaking). On 30 March 2017, the Respondent stated by way of letter that she would not release the Cashier’s Order to her clients.

On 24 April 2017, the Two Shareholders commenced legal proceedings against the Complainant, and the Complainant, through her solicitors, asked for the return of the Cashier’s Order given that the Two Shareholders commenced legal proceedings. The Respondent stated that she had held the Cashier’s Order until 18 April 2017 and the Cashier’s Order was then deposited by the Two Shareholders into the Company’s bank account to pay for the Company’s overheads.

The above release of the Cashier’s Order by the Respondent to her clients when there was no comprehensive agreement reached by the parties in full and final settlement of all issues and claims between them amounted to a breach of undertaking by the Respondent. The Complainant thus filed a complaint accordingly.

In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Kenneth Michael Tan Wee Kheng SC and Ms Audrey Chiang Ju Hua as DT member.

One main charge and one alternative charge were preferred against the Respondent, with the Respondent pleading guilty to the main charge:

Charge

For grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in that, on 18 April 2017, the Respondent released the Cashier’s Order to her clients despite having given a solicitor’s undertaking not to release the Cashier’s Order until a comprehensive agreement had been reached between the parties in full and final settlement of all issues and claims between them.

Alternative Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that, on 18 April 2017, the Respondent released the Cashier’s Order to her clients despite having given a solicitor’s undertaking not to release the Cashier’s Order until a comprehensive agreement had been reached between the parties in full and final settlement of all issues and claims between them.

On 7 June 2021, the Respondent pleaded guilty to the main charge of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT accepted that the Respondent did not act dishonestly and did not benefit personally when she breached her solicitor’s undertaking.

Citing the Court of Three Judges in Lim Kiap Kee, the DT drew a distinction between a breach that was an oversight and one that was deliberate, and found that the Respondent deliberately disregarded the trust reposed in her and released the Cashier’s Order to her clients.

The DT emphasised that “it is the foundation of an honourable profession that a member abides by her undertaking” and that “a deliberate breach by a member will seriously undermine the integrity of the profession”.

The DT found that the Respondent was guilty of the main charge, and that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed, with the Respondent to be referred to the Court of Three Judges (C3J). The DT had also awarded costs amounting to $6,000 (inclusive of disbursements), to the Law Society.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and on 9 May 2022, the C3J ordered the Respondent to be suspended from practice for a period of three (3) months commencing 1 June 2022, and to pay the Law Society for disbursements incurred in the C3J action (to be agreed or taxed) with the costs orders made by the DT to remain.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/DT_Report_Priyalatha_Naidu_1.pdf,"1 October 2021

DT/1/2021

Between

THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE
Applicant
And

NAIDU

PRIYALATHA

..-Respondent

THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

4.

Ms Wong Siew Lan (the Complainant”) lodged a complaint against the Respondent
with the Law Society on 29 November 2019, on the ground that the Respondent had
breached an undertaking given by her (“the Complaint”).

2.

The

Respondent

is a senior

member

advocate and solicitor of the Supreme

of the

profession:

she

was

admitted

as

an

Court of Singapore on 8 October 1980, and at

the material time, was a sole proprietor of the firm Messrs P. Naidu.

3

As a consequence

of the Complaint, the Law Society brought the following charges

against the Respondent:

Charge

That you,

Naidu

Priyalatha,

are guilty of grossly

improper

conduct

in the

discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of
2

the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) to wit, that, on 18 April 2017, despite
having given your solicitor's undertaking not to release a cashier's order for
the sum of $26,896.45

made

in favour of Balestier Hui Kee Pte Ltd to your

clients (Ng Kar Kui and Chang
had been reached between

Lien Siang) until a comprehensive

your clients, and Wong

agreement

Siew Lan and Seah Sai

Hong, in full and final settlement of all issues and claims between them, you
in breach of your solicitor's undertaking

released the said cashier's order to

your clients when no such agreement had been reached between your clients,

and Wong Siew Lan and Seah Sai Hong.

Alternative Charge

That you, Naidu Priyalatha, are guilty of misconduct

unbefitting an advocate

and

or as

solicitor

as

an

officer

honourable

profession

Profession

Act (Chapter

of the

Supreme

within the meaning

Court

of section

a

member

of an

83(2){h) of the Legal

161) in that you, on 18 April 2017,

despite having

given your solicitor’s undertaking not to release a cashier's order for the sum
of $26,896.45 made in favour of Balestier Hui Kee Pte Ltd to your clients (Ng
Kar Kui and Chang

Lien Siang) until a comprehensive

agreement

had been

reached between your clients, and Wong Siew Lan and Seah Sai Hong, in full
and final settlement of all issues and claims between them,
your solicitor’s undertaking

you in breach of

released the said cashier's order to your clients

when no such agreement had been reached between your clients, and Wong
Siew Lan and Seah Sai Hong.

On

7 June 2021, the Respondent

conduct

in the discharge

pleaded

of her professional

the Legal Profession Act (the LPA"").

guilty to the Charge of grossly improper
duty within the meaning

ofs 83(2)(b)

of

Agreed Statement of Facts

5.

The parties signed an Agreed Statement of Facts on 4 June 2021, which was tendered
at the hearing on 7 June 2021. The following are the undisputed

facts forming the

background to the Charge, as stated in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

The

Complainant,

shareholders

Ng

Kar Kui (""Ng""), and

Chang

and directors of Balestier Hui Kee

Lien

Siang

(“Chang”) were

Pte Ltd (“the Company”).

the

Ng and

Chang (who were married to each other) each held 30% of the shares of the Company,
and the Complainant

held 40%

of the shares of the Company.

Subsequent to the incorporation of the Company,
the Company

as a cook.

The Complainant

assistant to be employed

by the Company.

the Complainant

engaged

Seah

Sai

was employed

Hong

by

(“Seah”)
as an

Factual Background

The Company operated a wanton mee stall, and the Complainant and Seah worked at
the stall.

Initially, the Company's cash takings from the stalt were deposited into the Company's.
bank account.

However,

the

Complainant

Company's

Complainant
made

and

allegations

Seah
that

Ng

had

a dispute

and

Chang

bank account without the knowledge

had

with

Ng

issued

and

Chang.

cheques

The

from

the

or consent of the Complainant.

The

Complainant
Company's

stopped depositing the Company's

cash takings from the stall into the

bank account.

The Respondent

acted for Ng and Chang.

Messrs Linus Law Chambers initially acted for the Complainant and Seah.

By their without
Messrs

prejudice

letter dated

Linus Law Chambers

28

proposed

February

a settlement

2017

to the

Respondent's

firm,

on behalf of the Complainant

and

Seah which included a term that they would pay the cash takings from the stal| for the
period

19 December

2016 to 11 February 2017 amounting

by way of a cashier's order in favour of the Company
provide a detailed

statement

By her letter dated 29 March

to the sum of $26,896.45

(‘the Cashier’s Order’), and

of accounts for that period.

2017 to Messrs

Linus Law

Chambers,

asked for, inter alia, the Cashier's Order by 6 pm that cay,

the Respondent

failing which legal action

would be commenced.

The Undertaking

By their letter dated 29 March 2017 to the Respondent,

Messrs Linus Law Chambers

stated that the Cashier's Order was being handed over to the Respondent
an undertaking

by the Respondent

until a comprehensive

subject to

not to release the Cashier's Order to her clients

agreement was reached by the

parties in full and final settlement

of all issues and claims between them (""the Undertaking’).

In her letter dated 30 March
stated that she would

2017 to Messrs

Linus

Law

Cambers,

the Respondent

not release the cashier's order to her clients. The Undertaking
5

was given by the Respondent,

as the sole proprietor of her firm, in her capacity as

solicitor.

On

24

April

2017,

Ng

and

Chang

commenced

legal

proceedings

against

the

Complainant and Seah in DC/DC 1100/2017 (‘the DC Suit’).

On

2

May

2017,

Messrs

Allen

&

Gledhill

LLP

entered

an

Appearance

for

the

Complainant and Seah in the DC Suit.

Breach of Undertaking

By their letter dated 4 May 2017 to the Respondent, Messrs Allen & Gledhill LLP asked
for the return of the Cashier's Order given that Ng and Chang

had commenced

the

said legal proceedings.

By her letter dated 9 May 2017 to Messrs Allen & Gledhill, the Respondent stated that
she had held the Cashier's Order until 18 April 2017, and that the Cashier's Order was
then

deposited

Company's

by

her

clients

into

the

Company's

bank

account

to pay

for the

overheads that have fallen due.

The above release of the Cashier's Order by the Respondent to her clients when there
was no comprehensive

agreement reached by the parties in full and final settlement of

all issues and claims between them amounted

to a breach of the Undertaking by the

Respondent.

It was

about

1 year

and

7 months

later in April

2018

during

the Court

Dispute

Resolution Process in the State Courts before a District Judge that a settlement was
reached between the Respondent's clients and the Complainant and Seah.
6

The Parties’ Submissions

6.

The parties filed their respective submissions

and further submissions

on sanction on

10 June 2021 and 25 June 2021, with both parties taking the position that (a) no cause
of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the LPA, and (b) a penalty
(or in the alternative a reprimand, as submitted by the Respondent) be imposed in this
case.

Te

The Applicant submits that there is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action
in this case for the following reasons:

a.

The

Cashier's

Order,

which

the

Respondent

had

undertaken

not to release

clients, did not represent monies that belonged to the Complainant,
belonged to the Company.

Reference

was

made

Committee

that she

to

Cashier's

Order to them.

was

rather, the monies

When the Respondent released the Cashier's Order to her

clients in breach of the Undertaking,

b.

to her

the

the monies were paid to the Company.

Respondent's

response

under a lot of pressure

from

submitted

to

the

Inquiry

her clients to release

There does not appear to be any dishonesty

the

on the part of

the Respondent.

c.

When the Complainant subsequently settled her dispute with the Respondent's clients,
it was the Complainant

who had to pay a further sum of $18,703 to the Respondent's

clients, as agreed.

8.

The Applicant in its first submissions

directed

attention to three cases as reference

points as to whether the Respondent's breach of the Undertaking should be regarded
7

as a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action: Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law Society
of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 398 (“Lim Kiap Kee""); Law Society of
Singapore

v Tham Kok Leong Thomas [2006] 1 SLR(R) 775 (“Thomas

Law Society of Singapore v Chan Chun Hwee Allan {2016] SGDT

In Lim Kiap

Kee,

the

respondent

solicitor, who

acted

Tham’) and

3 (""Allan Chan’).

for the sub-purchaser

of a

property, gave an undertaking to hold 13% of the purchase price as stakeholder, and
to release 8% and 5% of the purchase price to the developer on certain dates. The
respondent solicitor failed to release the 8% and the 5% of the purchase price on the
specified dates. He released the 8% only after considerable delay and reminders.
teleased the 5% only after enforcement

He

action had been taken out by the developer

(including the institution of bankruptcy proceedings).

The disciplinary tribunal found the

that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against the respondent
solicitor.

10.

In

Thomas

Tham,

the

complainant

needed

banking

facilities

to import

cars

into

Thailand. The complainant approached the respondent solicitor's client, Dr Wang, who
represented

a company

which

could

parties agreed that the complainant

assist opening
would

letters of credit for a fee. The

deposit US$60,000

solicitor to be released to Dr Wang's company

with the respondent

upon the issue of a

the import of cars. The respondent solicitor confirmed

letter of credit for

to the complainant's

solicitors

that his law firm would hold the US$60,000 and release it only when the letter of credit
was issued. After the sum was deposited with tne company,

Dr Wang

requested that

the respondent solicitor release US$54,000 to him that very same day. The respondent

solicitor relented

on the condition

that Dr Wang

give

US$54,000

an

favour

respondent

Subsequently,

and

indemnity

in

of the

him

the respondent solicitor released the remaining

a personal
solicitor's

cheque

for

law

firm.

US$6,000 to Dr Wang

with a similar requirement ofa cheque and indemnity from Dr Wang. The respondent
8

solicitor had breached his undertaking

by releasing the US$54,000

and USS6,000

to

Dr Wang. The disciplinary trinunal found that there was cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action.

1.

In contrast, in Alfan Chan, the disciplinary tribunal found that the breach of undertaking
by the respondent solicitor was nat cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action. In
Allan Chan,

the

respondent

solicitor provided

undertakings

to the complainant

to

provide security for costs in the total sum of $35,000 in an appeal, when his client had
not put him in funds. His client thereafter changed

lawyers and withdrew the appeal

The Court ordered his former client to pay costs of $30,000
respondent

solicitor only paid costs of $5,000.

respondent

paid

the

balance

$25,000

committee;

After the complaint was

interest

at the inquiry

ensued.

The

improper

conduct in the discharge

of his professional

83(2)(b)

of the LPA for his breach

of undertaking,

tribunal

investigation

before

hearing

disciplinary

an

with

found

the

to the complainant.

the

matter

by the disciplinary

respondent

solicitor

The

made,
came

the

up

tribunal

guilty

later

of grossly

duty within the meaning

but determined

for

of s

that there was

no

cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action; the respondent solicitor was ordered

to pay a penalty of $15,000 and costs of $5,000

12

The

Applicant

in its further

submissions

.

referred

to another

disciplinary tribunal had found that a breach of undertaking
was not cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action.

instance

In Law Society of Singapore

[1988] SGDSC

14 (‘Shanmugam’),

the complainant

the

solicitor did

not

that

pay

respondent solicitor. The respondent
chairman

of the inquiry committee

him

$2,500

the

by a respondent solicitor

v Shanmugam
respondent

where

he

had

complained

deposited

that

with

solicitor had given a written undertaking

the

to the

that he would pay the $2,500 to the complainant.

As a result of the undertaking,

the inquiry committee

complaint did not merit formal

investigation by a disciplinary triounal. The respondent
3

reported to the Council that the

solicitor however

breached

his undertaking

and did not pay the complainant

till after a

complaint by the Law Society for the respondent solicitor's breach of undertaking was
before the disciplinary tribunal.

13.

The respondent solicitor explained that he had taken steps to pay the $2,500. He was
resident in London

and had

asked

Ms Irene Tan who

was resident

in Singapore

and

was holding some monies for the respondent solicitor to pay the $2,500 on his behalf.
Ms Tan

however

had

a nervous

breakdown

and did not

make

the payment.

The

respondent solicitor did not receive notice of the Law Society's complaint of his breach
of undertaking till after it had been referred to the disciplinary tribunal for investigation;
he made

14.

payment

thereafter.

The Applicant in essence submits that the Respondent's breach of the Undertaking is
less serious than the breaches

in Lim Kiap Kee and

culpable than the respondent

solicitors

Thomas

in those two cases.

Tham,

and

she is less

In the two cases,

the

monies that the respondent solicitors held belonged to the complainants. In the present
case, the cashier's
belonged

15.

to the

order that the Respondent

Complainant;

rather they

held did not represent

belonged

to the

released the cashier's order to her clients in breach

the monies

were paid to the Company.

therefore

submits

that the Respondent

should

When

the

of her undertaking,

be ordered

penalty of $15,000 and costs of $6,000 (inclusive of disbursements)
The Applicant appears

that

Company.

Respondent

The Applicant

monies

to pay a

to the Applicant.

to be using Allan Chan as a reference point: there the penalty

was stated as $15,000 and costs of $5,000 {inclusive of disbursements).

16.

The Respondent's

reasons

for her submission

that there is no cause for sufficient

gravity for disciplinary action in her case are as follows:
10

The breach of the Undertaking was not deliberate. It was essentially a bare breach or
a technical breach, which did not cause “any turmoil in anyone [sic] lives, the standing
of the Law Society, or that of the Bar or that of anyone of us”.

The Respondent contended that in determining whether there has been a breach of
undertaking

the

court

will

put

itself

in the

position

of the

parties

in the

exact

circumstances at the time the undertaking was given and accepted.

In this regard, the Cashier's Order which was the subject of the Undertaking was made
in favour

of the

Company,

and

not the Respondent

or her firm.

There

prolonged

delay of any sort"". The delay was that of the Complainant

was

“no

in levying the

Complaint.

The Respondent

did not benefit from the funds as these belonged

to the Company.

There was no loss suffered by anyone.

Although the Cashier's Order was not to be released until a comprehensive settlement
was reached by the parties, no settlement was forthcoming.

“...[W]hat other alternative

does the Respondent have but to give the [cashier's order to her clients] since the very
purpose of the undertaking

was to have a meeting

for a ‘comprehensive

agreement’

that was never achieved given ... the Complainant was prevaricating”.

When Allen & Gledhill LLP wrote to the Respondent on 4 May 2017 for the return of
the Cashier's Order, the Respondent replied in writing on 9 May 2017 stating that the
Cashier's Order had since been deposited

into the Company's

was no surreptitiousness in this case, unlike the facts of Thomas

bank account. There
Tham.

The

performance

of the

Undertaking

by the

Respondent

was

Cashier's Order had already been deposited into the Company's

impossible

as the

bank account.

The Respondent's conduct in releasing the Cashier's Order was not so egregious as
to bring dishonour to the profession. Her conduct was also not such that it lacked the
qualities of character and trustworthiness which are necessary attributes of a person
entrusted

with the responsibilities ofa legal practitioner.

The Respondent,

like the Applicant,

referred to A/lan Chan,

as a reference point, and

contended that there was no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action.

The Respondent in her further submission also referred to Shanmugam and contended
that as in the case

of Shanmugam,

there

was

no dishonesty

on the

part of the

Respondent in her breach of the Undertaking.

The Tribunal’s Determination

17.

A solicitor's

word

is her bond;

all the

more

so when

the solicitor gives

a formal

undertaking.

18.

As the Court of Three Judges in Lim Kiap Khee made

clear at [21]: *..It is of utmost

importance that a solicitor should abide by the undertaking he formally gives. It is the
very foundation
deliberately

of an honourable

breach

an

undertaking

profession

that its members

solemnly

given

would

act honourably.

seriously

undermine

To
the

integrity of the profession and bring it into disrepute...""

The Court of Three Judges in Thomas Tham at [29] repeated the above passage from
Lim Kiap Kee.

12

20.

In determining

whether there is sufficient cause for disciplinary action, the evidence

before us was confined to the Agreed Statement of facts. Although the parties had filed
Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chief,

21.

On the evidence

they were

not admitted

before us, the Respondent

in evidence

gave the Undertaking

facilitating the resolution of the dispute between

in the context of

her clients on the one

hand, and the

Complainant and Seah on the other.

22,

The Complainant

and Seah

did not want to deposit the cash takings of $26,896.45

earned

stall

the

from

the

into

Company’s

bank

account

as they

Respondent's

clients were issuing cheques from the Company's

the

or consent

knowledge

of the Complainant.

The

alleged

that

the

bank account without

Respondent

held

the Cashier's

Order, which embodied the cash takings of $26,896.45, as a stakeholder; she was not
to release the Cashier's Order to her clients until a comprehensive settlement had been
teached by the parties.

23.

The Respondent however released the Cashier's Order to her clients on 18 April 2017,

and her clients deposited it into the Company's bank account to pay for the Company’s
overheads that had fallen due.

24.

The Respondent admits that the release of the Cashier's Order by her when there was
no comprehensive

agreement

reached

by the parties in full and settlement

of all the

issues and claims between them amounts to a breach of the Undertaking by her.

25.

We

accept

Undertaking.

that the

Respondent

did

not act dishonestly

when

she

breached

the

She was forthright in telling Allen & Gledhill, when they requested the

return of the Cashier's Order, that she had released the Cashier's Order to her clients.

13

The Respondent did not benefit personally from her release of the Cashier's Order: it
was made

out in the name of the Company

and deposited into the Company's

bank

account.

26.

We

do not accept the Respondent’s

not deliberate. The Agreed Statement
part of the Respondent,
Her handing

submission

that her breach of undertaking

of Facts do not refer to any uncertainty on the

or any dispute by her as to the meaning

over the Cashier's

was

of the Undertaking.

Order to her clients was a deliberate act, as opposed

to an accidental or inadvertent act.

27.

We also do not accept the Respondent's submission

that any breach was a bare or

technical breach as there was no settlement forthcoming, and she had no alternative
but to give the Cashier's Order to her clients as the purpose of the Undertaking to have
a meeting for the comprehensive

28.

agreement, was not achieved.

First, it is not correct that the Respondent

had no alternative but to give the Cashier's

Order to her clients. She could have continued to hold on to the Cashier's Order to
maintain
could

the contemplated

have simply

Instead,

returned

platform for the parties to resolve their disputes,
the

Cashier's

Order to Messrs

Linus

Law

or she

Chambers.

she chose to release the Cashier's Order to her clients on 18 April 2017, less

than a month after the Cashier's Order had been given to her.

29.

Secondly, of the alternatives she had, the choice to release the Cashier's Order to her
clients was

not open

to her; the very purpose of the Undertaking

was to ensure that

the Respondent would not release the Cashier's Order to her clients if there was no
comprehensive

agreement.

30.

We

further do not accept the

to perform the Undertaking
the Company’s

Respondent's

submission

that it was

impossible

for her

as the Cashier's Order had already been deposited

bank account.

With respect,

this submission

into

has no merit whatsoever

Such impossibility was created by the Respondent's act of handing over the Cashier's
Order to her clients in breach of the Undertaking.

31.

We now address the submission made by both the Applicant and the Respondent that
in the present case no loss was suffered

by the breach

of the Undertaking

as the

Cashier's Order did not represent monies that belonged to the Complainant (or Seah);
rather

the

monies

Company's

belonged

to the

Company,

and

the

bank account. The Applicant also submitted

monies

were

paid

into the

that when the parties finally

agreed to a settlement, it was the Complainant who had to pay a further sum of $18,703
to the Respondent's clients.

32.

In our view, the fact that Cashier's Order did not represent monies that belonged to the
Complainant or Seah is not central to the culpability of the Respondent's breach of the
Undertaking.

The dispute among

the parties was whether the Respondent's

were

to

from

entitled

Complainant’s

issue

cheques

knowledge

the

Company's

and

account

without

the

Seah

accordingly did not

want to deposit the cash takings of $26,896.45 into the Company's

bank account until

there was a comprehensive

or consent. The Complainant

bank

clients

agreement of all issues and claims between them and the

Respondent's clients. The Undertaking therefore required the Respondent to hold the
Cashier's

Order which embodied

Undertaking,
Company's

the Respondent

the $26,896.45

as stakeholder.

facilitated her clients paying

By breaching

the $26,896.45

bank account which was precisely what the Complainant

objected to in the absence of a resolution of the disputes.

15

the

into the

and Seah had

33.

Save

that a settlement

among

the

parties was

reached

during

the Court

Dispute

Resolution Process in the State Courts before the District Judge in April 2018 — about
a year after proceedings were started — no details of the settlement were provided in
the Agreed

Statement of Facts. We however take into consideration the Applicant's

admission in its submissions that at the settlement, the Complainant agreed to pay the
Respondents
2018

$18,703. The context of the negotiations which led to the settlement in

has however changed from the context of any negotiations

in 2017 when the

$26,896.45 had not been paid into the Company's bank account. Any settlement may
well have taken a different form or contained different terms if the Cashier's Order had
not been released by the Respondent in breach of the Undertaking.

34.

The Complainant had entrusted the Respondent
accordance with the Undertaking.

to hold on to the Cashier's Order in

However, the Complainant lost any benefit she may

have had in being able to negotiate a settlement while the Cashier's Order remained
unbanked

into the

Company's

bank

account

when

the

Respondent

breached

the

Undertaking.

35.

The Court of Three Judges in Lim Kiap Kee at [26] drew a distinction between a breach
that was an oversight and one that was deliberate. In our view, the Respondent in the
present case had deliberately breached the Undertaking.

36.

The Court of Three Judges in Thomas Tham made clear that even in that case where
the

respondent

undertaking

solicitor

but wanted

did

not

intend

to

benefit

to facilitate the performance

personally

of the transaction

cannot be lost sight of that the respondent solicitor “had disregarded
in him” by the party to whom

he had given his undertaking

16

from

(at [29]).

a

breach

of

(at [32]), it

the trust reposed

37.

Although the Applicant and the Respondent

present case and Alian Chan,

and

invited us to draw similarities

Shanmugam

between the

(especially the former),

in our view

both cases can be distinguished from the present case.

38.

In Allan Chan the respondent

solicitor had furnished

an undertaking

for security for

costs for an appeal to prevent his erstwhile client's case from being struck out by an
unless order as the client was overseas

at the time,

on the faith of his client’s promise

to put him in funds in due course (at [13]). He has given his undertaking due to the
urgency of the appeal timeline. There was no such urgency or Court deadline to meet
in the present case.

39

The

respondent

complainant

solicitor had ultimately

made

good

on his undertaking

with interest (at [6(8)] and [16]), and the Complainant

withdraw her complaint (at [18]). The Respondent

by paying

the

was prepared

to

in the present case has not made

good on the Undertaking, and indeed cannot make good on the Undertaking because,
by her own

act of handing

over the Cashier's Order to her clients in breach

of the

Undertaking, she has rendered any compliance by her with the Undertaking impossible.

40.

The Disciplinary Tribunal in Allan Chan found that the respondent solicitor had through
his own misjudgement

or foolishness extended

his undertaking on costs without first

securing from his client the funds necessary to make

good on the undertaking

in the

event it was called on. He was unfortunately placed in a position where he was obliged
to honour his undertaking without any assurance of repayment from his client (at [29]).
This is not the case in the present matter: there is nothing in the Agreed Statement of
Facts or any assertion by the Respondent that she had breached the Undertaking out
of misjudgement

or foolishness.

i

41.

As for Shanmugam,
undertaken

to

the respondent solicitor had taken steps to pay the $2,500 he had

pay,

but

intervening circumstances;
amount.

the

amount

remained

because,

because

of

unexpected

he did eventually make good his undertaking and paid the

In the present case, the Respondent

the Undertaking,

unpaid

has not taken any step to make good

as stated previously,

by her own act of handing

Cashier's Order to her clients in breach of the Undertaking,

over the

she rendered compliance

of the Undertaking by her impossible.

42.

It bears repeating that it is the foundation

of an honourable profession

that a member

abides by her undertaking. A deliberate breach by a member will seriously undermine
the integrity of the profession.

43.

The Respondent was entrusted to hold on to the Cashier's Order in accordance with
the

Undertaking.

She

disregarded

the trust reposed

in her as she

breached

the

Undertaking.

44.

In the

circumstances

of the

present

case,

notwithstanding

the

submissions

of the

Applicant and the Respondent to the contrary, we find that on the scale of culpability,
there is cause

of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under s 83 of the LPA

in

relation to the Charge.

Conclusion

45.

For the reasons set out above, and based on the Respondent's acceptance that she
is guilty of the Charge, the Tribunal determines,

pursuant to s 93(1)(c) of the LPA, that

cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the LPA.

18

1 October 2021

",2022-07-09T02:00:31+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2022/,In the Matter of Naidu Priyalatha (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2022/,1049
13,df9e0daae149d92b538b40ce08e6fb1815017c11,"In the Matter of Zheng Shengyang Harry (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Zheng Shengyang Harry (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose from a complaint lodged by one Lee Kuan Fung (Complainant). The complaint pertained to the Respondent’s conduct in which the Respondent’s law firm, Ark Law Corporation, had issued a letter of demand to the Complainant and one Chua Chim Kang, and the Respondent had caused the said letter of demand to be openly posted on a wall beside the main door of the Complainant’s flat in plain view of the public on 9 October 2020.


In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a DT presided by Mr Narayanan Sreenivasan SC and Mr Seah Seow Kang Steven as DT member.

Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as a member of an honourable profession under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (LPA) in which the Respondent had caused a letter of demand, addressed to the Complainant and another, which was prepared for his client, to be openly posted on 9 October 2020 at 7.37pm, on a wall beside the main door of Lee’s flat in plain view of the public without an envelope, when the Respondent knew or ought to have known that there was no necessity or legal basis to do so, in a way which is contrary to the Respondent’s position as a member of an honourable profession in breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR).

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) found the Respondent guilty of the Charge.

The DT was of the view that the interpretation of the phrase “contrary to the legal practitioner’s position as a member of an honourable profession” in Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR did not require a finding of culpability akin to fraud or deceit, as it would be inconsistent with the guiding principles in Rule 4 of the PCR and the specific guiding principles in Rule 8(1) of the PCR.

Further, the DT, in its analysis of whether the actions of an advocate and solicitor should be viewed objectively or whether the subjective intentions of the advocate and solicitor should be considered, was of the view that the test should be one from the view of an objective observer.

After considering all the evidence, the DT found that the Respondent did not intentionally cause embarrassment to Lee or intentionally indulge in unfair conduct but that the Respondent had breached Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR.

The DT noted that openly posting the letter of demand in public view without an envelope was unfair as letters of demand are assertions by one party against the other, and there was no reason in law for publication. The letter of demand in question contained both personal details and matters in dispute that had to be resolved between the parties, and a public display of its contents would clearly embarrass and put pressure on the Complainant.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and the Respondent was reprimanded. Costs fixed at $5,000 (exclusive of disbursements) were also ordered by the DT to be payable by the Respondent to the Law Society.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/DT_Report_PDF_Harry_Zheng_Jun2022.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

DT/17/2021
In the Matter of ZHENG SHENGYANG,
HARRY
(NRIC
No:
SXXXX809G)
an
Advocate & Solicitor

And
In the Matter
(Chapter 161)

of the

Legal

Profession

Act

REPORT

PRESIDENT:

MR NARAYANAN

ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR:

MR SEAH SEOW KANG STEVEN

MS KOH EN YING
MS GLORIA TAN

FOR THE LAW SOCIETY

MR SARBJIT SINGH CHOPRA
MR ROSHAN SINGH CHOPRA

FOR THE RESPONENT

Dated this

19

day of Jan 2022

SREENIVASAN SC

Introduction

1.

This

Disciplinary

Tribunal

was

appointed

on

3

August

2021.

The

Respondent solicitor is Zheng Shengyang, Harry (NRIC No. SXXXX809G)
(the “Respondent’),

an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme

Court of

Singapore. He was called to the Singapore Bar in 2015.""

2.

The primary facts in this matter are not in dispute. We must commend both
counsel

for the Law

Society

and

counsel

for the

Respondent

for the

focussed, concise and fair manner in which they conducted their respective
cases. This has greatly assisted us in dealing with the issues in this case.

Background

3.

Facts to the Complaint

The complainant,

Lee Kuan

Fung

(the “Complainant’),

is an individual

resident in a Housing Development Board flat at 18 Joo Seng Road, #08-

159, Singapore 360018 (the “Complainant's Flat’).

4.

On

or

about

Corporation,

7

October

2020,

the

Respondent’s

law

firm,

Ark

Law

issued a letter (the “7 October Letter’) to the Complainant

and Chua Chim Kang.° The 7 October Letter contained:

(1)

the Complainant’s name and address;

(2)

Chua Chim Kang’s name and address; and

1 Statement of Case at [1] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [2]
2 Statement of Case at [2] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [3]
3 Statement of Case at [3] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [5]
2

(3)

information relating to the company known as Homing Holdings Pte
Ltd (a company ostensibly incorporated for the purposes of a joint
venture
Chua

between
Chim

the

Kang),

Respondent’s
and

client, the Complainant

the dispute

between

the

and

Respondent’s

client, the Complainant and Chua Chim Kang.

5.

On 7 October 2020 at 1218h, the Respondent sent a copy of the 7 October
Letter

to the

Complainant,

as

an

attachment

to

an

email

from

the

Respondent to the Complainant (the “Respondent’s Email’).4

6.

The Respondent also caused a process server to attempt to serve the 7
October Letter on the Complainant personally, at the Complainant's Flat, on
7 October

2020

at 1959h.

The

process

server was

informed

that the

On 7 October 2020 at 2115h, the Complainant acknowledged

receipt of

Complainant was not around.

7.

Respondent’s

Email

by way

of an email from

the Complainant

to the

Respondent.®

8.

Although the Complainant had, by this time, acknowledged receipt of the
Respondent’s Email:

(1)

The

Respondent

attempt

to

serve

caused
the

7

a process

server

October

Letter

to make
on

the

a second

Complainant

personally, at the Complainant’s Flat, on 8 October 2020 at 1958h.

(2)

The Respondent instructed a process server to, on 9 October 2020

4 Statement of Case at [4] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [8]
5 Statement of Case at [6] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [9]
3

at 1937h,

to post the

7 October

Letter on

the

main

door

of the

Complainant’s Flat. Upon the instruction, the 7 October Letter was
pasted, without an envelope on the wall beside the main door. .°

9.

The Complainant
October 2020

lodged a complaint against the Respondent

(the “Complaint’).

dated

The Complaint states (amongst

29

other

things) that the conduct of the Respondent, in exposing the 7 October Letter
to

the

public,

caused

the

Complainant

to feel

humiliated,

disturbed,

annoyed and intimidated.

The Charge

10.

The Law Society formulated the following charge against the Respondent:

CHARGE
That you, Zheng Shengyang,
Corporation
068809,

of 6 Shenton

are charged

Harry (NRIC No. SXXXX809G), of Ark Law

Way

#22-08,

OUE

Downtown

that you, on or about 9 October 2020,

2, Singapore
did cause a

letter of demand, addressed to one Lee Kuan Fung and one Chua Chim
Kang prepared by Ark Law Corporation on behalf of its client, to be openly
posted at 7:37 pm on 9 October 2020,

on a wall beside the main door of

the said Lee Kuan Fung’s flat at 18 Joo Seng Road, #08-159, Singapore
360018, in plain view of the public, when you knew or ought to have known
that there was no necessity or legal basis to do so, and have acted towards

6 Statement of Case at [7] and Defence (Amendment No. 1) at [10]
4

Lee Kuan Fung in a way which is contrary to your position as a member of an
honourable

profession

(Professional

Conduct)

in

breach

Rules

of

Rule

8(3)(b)

of the

2015,

and

you

thereby

are

Legal

Profession

guilty

of such

misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as a member of an honourable
profession under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).
(The Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, shall hereinafter be
referred

to as

“the

PCR”

and

the

Legal

Profession

Act

(Cap.

161)

shall

hereinafter be referred to as “the LPA”.)

11.

The Law Society identified the factual and legal elements that it had to prove
as follows:

(i)

That the 7 October Letter was a Letter of Demand;

(ii)

That it had been openly posted in plain view of the public;

(iii)

That the Respondent

knew or ought to have

known

that there was

no

necessity or legal basis to do so;

(iv)

| That the Respondent had acted towards the Complainant in a way that
was contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession in
breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR; and

was therefore guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as a
member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.’

7 Law Society Closing Submissions (“LSCS’) at [4]

12.

The

Respondent

has defined the elements

in a similar way, with the added

submission that the mens rea element was the intention of the Respondent in
posting the 7 October Letter in plain view of the public when he knew that there
was

no necessity or legal basis to do so.® We

note that neither the charge

nor

the mens rea that the Respondent has distilled from the charge has specifically
set out an intention to cause embarrassment or harm or the knowledge of the
possibility of embarrassment

or harm

to the Complainant

as an

ingredient.

However, the intention to post in plain public view is accepted by the Law Society
and the Respondent as the necessary mental element in the charge.

13.

It is trite law and there is no dispute between the parties that the burden of proof
rested with the Law Society and that the standard of proof for factual issues was
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Contentions of the Parties

14.

In summary, the Law Society’s position was as follows, namely that:

(i)

The 7 October Letter was clearly a letter of demand
allegations,

required the addressees

because it set out

to carry out certain actions and

threatened legal proceedings if there was no compliance.°

(ii)

The 7 October Letter was openly posted in plain view of the public in that
it was taped to a wall (without an envelope) beside the main door of the

Complainant.""°

8 Respondent's Closing Submissions (“RCS”) at [4]
3 LSCS at [5] to [9]
10 LSCS at [10] to [13]

(iii)

There was no factual necessity to deliver the physical copy by posting,
especially as the Complainant had already acknowledged

receipt of a

copy sent by e-mail.""

{iv) | There was no legal basis to serve by posting and that there was no law
permitting such posting. In this regard, the Law Society accepts that the
absence of a legal basis or a law permitting posting would

not make

posting of a letter of demand, in itself, a breach of the PCR; however, the

Law Society asserts that such absence will constitute a breach in the
particular circumstances of the present case. '2

15.

In summary, the Respondent's position is as follows, namely that:

(i)

The 7 October Letter was not a letter of demand,

but a proposal for

settlement.'?

(ii)

Although the 7 October Letter was posted openly, there was no harm to
the Complainant and that the complaint did not arise from a genuine
grievance

but was

motivated

by the Complainant

to get back

at the

Respondent for his actions in acting for his client (the counter party to

the Complainant).""4

(iii) | There was no evidence of harm to the Complainant.'®

1 LSCS at [14] to [17]
12 LSCS at [18] to [26]
13 RCS [12] to [15]
14 RCS [17] to [19]
15 RCS [21]

(iv)

| The

Respondent

had

no

intention

to expose

the

7 October

Letter

publicly.""®

(v)

The Law Society has not proved that there was no necessity or legal

basis to post the 7 October Letter.""

(vi)

| Onthe facts, there was no breach of the PCR which amounted to conduct
unbefitting an advocate and solicitor.

Factual Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal

16.

Some of the issues in this matter can be determined easily, while others are
certainly more nuanced. This is particularly so as both Rule 8 (3) (b) of the PCR
and section 83(2)(h) of the LPA do not precisely set out the types of elements of
the behaviour that is to be sanctioned.

In this regard, both counsels

have very

helpfully set out the authorities and commentaries, which will be considered in
detail further below. The state of mind of the Respondent is also an important
issue in this case.

17.

We shall deal with the factual issues first. We find as follows:

(i)

The question of whether the 7 October Letter’® is or is not a letter of
demand

can and

should

be determined

from

an examination

of the 7

October Letter itself and from its contents. We find that it is clearly a letter

168 RCS [27] to [30]
17 RCS [35] to [41]
18 The 7 October Letter is exhibited at pages 34 to 38 of the Complainant's affidavit

of demand as it requires action on the part of addressee and threatens
legal

proceedings

demanded.

The

as

a consequence

7 October

of failure

to take

Letter sets out the alleged

the

action

breaches,

the

assertion ofa right to wind up the company in question and the proposed
relief of a buy out, which is the statutorily provided alternative relief to a
winding up. All letters of demand, if complied with, will resolve matters
and the distinction that the Respondent has attempted to make, between
a letter of demand

and an attempt to settle, in this case,

is somewhat

farfetched. In this regard, we also note that the 7 October Letter was not

marked “Without Prejudice” and the intention of service was to use the
fact of service and delivery in subsequent proceedings.

(ii)

During the hearing, some

attempts were made

by the Respondent to

show that the posting was not in a public place as the main door of the
Complainant’s flat was not in a common

corridor, but in a stairwell with

just two units. We accept the factual assertions made, that is that the
Complainant’s flat was in a stairwell with only one other unit at that level.
However, we find that the posting was in a public place as the stairwell
was open to and intended for public access, not just to the opposite unit
but also to members of the public using that set of stairs.

(iii)

The Complainant gave evidence that she was distressed and humiliated
and embarrassed’? However, we accept the Respondent's submissions
that the harm done, if any, was limited by the location of the main door
in a stairwell and we accept that there is no evidence that the openly
posted 7 October Letter was actually seen by any member of the public

19 Complainant’s affidavit at [20], [21] and [23]

or even the Complainant’s family members.”° Whether this goes towards
culpability in the context of an adverse finding of guilt on the charge itself,
or towards culpability and harm in relation to the appropriate sanction if
the Respondent is found guilty, is dealt with further below. In this regard,
it is apposite

to

note

that

the

Respondent,

at the

time

he

gave

instructions, did not know the precise location of the unit and main door,
and how “public” that location was.

(iv)

On the questions of necessity to post, the legal basis for posting, if any,
and whether the law permitted such posting, we find that there is no legal
requirement for posting the 7 October Letter, even if the fact of delivery
of the letter was to be relied upon in subsequent proceedings. The 7
October Letter was not an originating process or statutory notice. It is
noted that while there was no legal requirement to post, and there is no
law expressly permitting such posting, the Law Society did not adduce
evidence or make submissions that such a posting is prohibited. In any
event, we find the question of whether there was a legal basis or law
permitting such posting to be a moot point in the present case. If posting
was required, which it was not, that would be a defence. If posting was
prohibited, which it was not, that would make out the Law Society’s case.
The

real

issue

circumstances

is whether
of this case

the

posting

breached

on

Rule

the

wall

8(3)(b)

in the

of the

factual

PCR

and

whether such breach amounted to conduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor contrary to section 83(2)((h) of the LPA.

20 RCS at [21], [23] and [24]

10

Peripheral Issue

18.

The Respondent has made extensive submissions that the Law Society had put
a case beyond what is set out in the Charge and in the Statement of Case. The
Respondent

submits*',

with relevant and well-researched

authorities, that a

conviction on a basis other than the Charge and Statement of Case should not
be allowed. We accept the legal principles put forward by the Respondent as
correct and applicable.

19.

However, we do not find that the four iterations in relation to the Respondent’s

state of mind that was put to him by counsel for the Law Society go beyond the
Charge or Statement of Case. They were questions put in cross-examination to
test the state of mind of the Respondent to ascertain his intentions in giving
instructions for the 7 October Letter to be posted. We note that the Respondent

denied

each

of the four iterations put to him. We

are mindful that the Law

Society’s case in the Charge and in the Statement of Case is pitched at the lower
level of culpability, in that the intention to openly post the 7 October Letter in
public view is in itself sufficient to make out the offence, because the Law Society

has taken the position that the gravamen of the charge is the unfairness to the
Complainant by the public posting of the 7 October Letter.?¢

Analysis of Section 83(2)(h)

20.

of the LPA and Rule 8(3)(b)

the PCR

Section 83(2) of the LPA sets out the conduct and acts that render an advocate
and solicitor liable for the sanctions set out in section 83(1) of the LPA. Specific
reference to breaches of the PCR is made in section 83(2)(b) of the LPA where
such

breach

amounts

to improper

conduct

21 RCS [5] to [11]

22 LSCS [38] and [39]

11

or practice

as

an

advocate

and

solicitor. However, this is not the section that the Respondent is being dealt with.

The Charge is pursuant to section 83(2)(h) of the LPA under which the charge
is made out if the Respondent has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an
advocate

and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme

Court of member

of an

honourable position. Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA does not make reference to a
breach of the PCR.

21.

Counsel for the Law Society and the Respondent made extensive submissions
on the application of the test laid out in section 83(2)(h) of the LPA. We do not
need to consider these submissions extensively as both counsel submitted that
the test is the test laid down by the Court of Three Judges in Wong Sin Yee.”
We set out the test:

Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA is broader than section 83(2)(b). It is a ‘catch all
provision’ operating when a Solicitor’s conduct does not fall within any of the
other subsections of s 83(2) but is nonetheless considered unacceptable (Law
Society of Singapore v Ng Chee Sing [2001] 1 SLR(R) 466 (“Ng Chee Sing”) at
[40]).

The standard of ‘unbefitting conduct’ is less strict, and a solicitor only

needs to be shown to have been guilty of such conduct as would render him
unfit to remain as a member of an honourable profession. As a practical guide,
it may be asked whether reasonable people, on hearing what the solicitor had
done,

would have said without hesitation that as a solicitor he should not have

done it. (Ng Chee Sing at [41], citing Wong Kok Chin v Singapore Society of
Accountants [1989] 2 SLR (R) 633 at [17]). It is sufficient that if his misconduct
brings him discredit as a lawyer or brings discredit to the legal profession as a
whole.

23 [2018] 5 SLR 1216at [24] cited by Law Society at LSCS at [44] and by the Respondent at RCS at

[61]

12

22.

At first blush, the first part of the test set out by the Court of Three Judges
appears to set a very high bar for section 83(2)(h) of the LPA to be made out that the conduct renders the advocate and solicitor unfit to remain as a member
of an honourable profession, suggesting conduct so reprehensible that striking
out may

be called for. However,

the Court of Three

Judges

had

described

a

breach of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA as being less serious than breaches of
other sub-sections of section 83(2) of the LPA. In the latter part of the passage
cited and set out above, the Court of 3 Judges has given us the practical test,
which we will apply. The practical test has two elements. The first is whether
reasonable

people,

on

hearing

what

the solicitor had

without hesitation that as a solicitor he should

done,

would

have

said

not have done it. The second

element is whether his misconduct brings him discredit as a lawyer or brings
discredit to the legal profession as a whole. (emphasis added)

23.

We note that the charge is not one pursuant to section 83(2)(b) of the LPA, even
though that sub-section specifically refers to breaches of the PCR. We note that
section 83(2)(b) of the LPA does not sanction every breach of the PCR, but only
such breaches which amount to improper conduct or practice. By not proceeding
under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA, the Law Society has pitched the alleged
breach in this case at the lower level of culpability of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA,
that is of unbefitting conduct, rather than a breach of a higher level of culpability
that is improper conduct or practice.

24.

One

issue that has

not been

raised

by parties,

but which

we

address

for

completeness, is whether a breach of the PCR can be dealt with under section
83(2)(h) of the LPA, where the PCR is not expressly mentioned, even though
such breaches are expressly addressed under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. We

13

are of the view that section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, as a catch-all clause, would
cover PCR breaches that show unbefitting behaviour which does not amount to
improper conduct or practice. We are mindful that the Law Society has chosen,
in the Charge and in the Statement of case to narrowly state the unbefitting
behaviour to be the breach

of a specific rule, that is Rule 8(3) of the PCR.

Accordingly, in considering whether the Respondent’s conduct is unbefitting, we
will not consider whether it is unbefitting conduct even if the specific rule is not
breached.

25.

Following upon the above analysis, the Law Society has to satisfy us that:

(a) On the facts, the Respondent breached Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR.

(b) On the facts, the breach is such that reasonable people, on hearing what the
Respondent had done, would have said without hesitation that as a solicitor
he should not have done it, and that his conduct had brought him discredit
as a lawyer or brings discredit to the legal profession as a whole.

26.

We

now consider Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR.

The starting point is the general

guiding principles set out in Rule 4 that apply to the entire PCR. We set out the
salient portions of Rule 4:
(c) A legal practitioner has a duty to discharge honourably and with integrity all
of the legal practitioner’s responsibilities to any tribunal before which the
legal practitioner appears, the legal practitioner's clients, the public and other
members of the legal profession.

(f)

A legal practitioner must be fair and courteous towards every person in
respect of the legal practitioner's professional conduct.

14

27.

Rule 8 of the PCR sets out a further set of guiding principles, specific to Rule 8.
The salient portions are:
(a) A legal practitioner who deals with any person must, regardless of whether
that person

is involved in any matter with which the legal practitioner is

concerned,

be honest and courteous, and behave in a manner befitting the

legal practitioner's professional standing.

(b) oon:

28.

Rule 8(3)(b) provides that:
3) A legal practitioner
—
(a) ....
(b)

must not act towards any person in a way which is fraudulent,

deceitful or

otherwise contrary to the legal practitioner's position as a member of an honourable
profession.

Determination

29.

We now frame the question that we need to address:

Was the Respondent’s conduct in giving instructions to post the 7 October
Letter openly in public

view contrary to his position as a member

of an

honourable profession such that that reasonable people, on hearing what the
Respondent had done, would have said without hesitation that as a solicitor

he should not have done it, and that his conduct had brought him discredit
as a lawyer or brings discredit to the legal profession as a whole.

30.

The Respondent has submitted that the meaning of “otherwise contrary to the legal

15

practitioner's

position

as

a member

of an

honourable

interpreted in the context of the earlier words,

profession”

should

be

that refer to fraudulent or deceitful

conduct.”4 On this argument, a breach is only constituted if the extent of departure
from the practitioner's position as a member of an honourable position is akin to
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.

31.

The Law Society has submitted that the guiding principles in Rule 4 and Rule 8(1)
of the

PCR

should

be applied

in interpreting

Rule

8(3)(b) of the

PCR,

citing

extensively from the commentary by Pins/er.*° The Law Society has also cited the
case of Law Society v Seow

Theng Beng Samuel where

physical and verbal

abuse amounted to a breach of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA and the case of Law
Society v Carolyn Tan-Au, where exerting unfair pressure by failing to consider
the ethical propriety of her conduct resulted in the advocate and solicitor being

reprimanded.”

32.

We

are of the view that an

interpretation

of the phrase

“contrary to the legal

practitioner's position as a member of an honourable profession” in Rule 8(3)(b) of
the

PCR

does

not

require

a

finding

notwithstanding the use of these words

of culpability

akin

to

fraud

or

deceit,

in the earlier part of the Rule. Such an

approach will be inconsistent with both the general guiding principles in Rule 4 of
the PCR and the specific guiding principles in Rule 8(1) of the PCR.
specific

use

of the words

“or otherwise

contrary”

clearly

intend

Further, the
to indicate

a

departure from the earlier parts of the rule and to distinguish this third limb from the
earlier limbs of fraud and deceit.

24 RCS at [44] to [49]
25 LSCS at [29] and [30]

26 LSCS at [32] and [36]

16

33.

The Law Society has submitted that the gravamen of the Charge is unfairness to
the Complainant in that unfair pressure was being brought to bear upon her, and
that this was sufficient to make out the charge. We find that the instruction to post
the 7 October

Letter would

have

the effect of putting

unfair

pressure

on

the

Complainant, whether this was intended or otherwise. However, this in itself does
not dispose of the matter. It is a necessary condition, given the reliance on Rule
8(3)(b) of the PCR, but it is not sufficient in itself. The test set out for a breach of
section 83(2)(h) of the LPA must also be satisfied.

34.

The crucial argument upon which the Respondent has rested his case is the failure
of the Law Society to show that he had the intention to be unfair to the Complainant
or to embarrass

her. The Respondent’s evidence

is that he did not think of the

consequences of giving the instruction to post and that his omission is one of simple
neglect. The crux of the argument is that a mistake does not bring discredit to the
profession and therefore cannot be misconduct.2” The Respondent submits that in
the present case, his instruction to post the 7 October Letter arose from his failure
to apply his mind to the issue of whether the 7 October Letter was placed in an
envelope, stating “if / had applied my mind to it if | had thought about it, | would not
have posted if openly because for me it’s not regular to send letters without an
envelope

... “. The

short point made

by the Respondent

is that he made

an

unthinking mistake and that not all mistakes amount to professional misconduct.
The Respondent submits that the current situation is akin to simple negligence and
relies on the Law Society v Iskander bin Rahmat® for the proposition that simple
negligence or want of skill does not amount to misconduct under section 83(2) of
the LPA.?°

27 RCS at [63]
28 Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] SGCA 107

29 RCS at [62]

17

35.

The Law Society argues that the gravity of the act must be viewed in the context of
the circumstances of the case and that it is in the public interest to adopt a standard
which would encourage members of the profession to maintain a high degree of
diligence and professionalism at all times*°, citing Iskandar and Law Society of
Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee.

36.

The issue is, in essence, whether the actions of an advocate and solicitor should

be viewed

objectively or whether the subjective intentions of the advocate

and

solicitor should be considered. We are of the view that the test should be one from
the view of the objective observer. First, the law is clear that what reasonable people
would make of the conduct is the primary criterion. This clearly points to an objective
test and not the state of mind of the solicitor concerned.

Second,

the question of

bringing discredit to the profession or the potential risk of such discredit is a question
that must be answered objectively. Third, the question of whether third parties have
been dealt with fairly must be answered

with reference to the act alleged to be

misconduct and the effect of that act, not the intent behind it.

37.

After considering all the evidence, we find that the Respondent did not intentionally
cause embarrassment to the Complainant or intentionally indulge in unfair conduct.
We appreciate that the Complainant does feel very strongly that the Respondent
did have such an intention and sees the open posting in public view as a deliberate
step in the Respondent's efforts on behalf of his client. However, having seen and
heard the Respondent’s evidence and having considered his explanation, we are
not satisfied that the Complainant’s position on the Respondent's subjective intent
is made out. However, for the reasons set out in [36] above, that is not the end of

30 Law Society Reply Closing Submissions (LSRCS) at [18]

18

the inquiry.

38.

The

Respondent has submitted that the precedents relate to cases which were

more egregious, that is cases where letters of demand were copied to bankers and
auditors or to immediate supervisors.*' We agree that the present case is certainly
less

serious,

but the question

still remains

as to whether the line of unbefitting

conduct has nonetheless been crossed.

39.

We find that the Respondent did breach

Rule 8(3)(b) of the PCR

in that openly

posting the 7 October Letter in public view was unfair to the Complainant and was
in breach of the duty of fairness and courtesy and that the breach was contrary to
the Respondent's

position as a member of an honourable profession. Letters of

demand are assertions by one party against the other, and there was no reason in
law for publication. Although there was no applicable prohibition in the present case,
on the facts, there was no reason to post the 7 October Letter in the manner that it
was done. The 7 October Letter contained both personal details and matters in
dispute that had to be resolved

between the parties and a public display of its

contents would clearly embarrass and put pressure on the Complainant. While we
accept that intent to cause such pressure and embarrassment has not been proven,

the very act of public display is clearly likely to cause such a consequence.

40.

| We further find, on the facts of the present case, that the breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of
the PCR amounts to unbefitting conduct contrary to section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.
The Respondent knowingly gave instructions for posting of the 7 October Letter.
Posting on the door (or beside the door) would inevitably mean that the contents of
the 7 October Letter would

be and could be seen by any member

31 RCS at [56] and RCS Annex A

19

of the public

passing by. The assertion by the Respondent that it did not occur to him that the
letter would be posted outside of any envelope does not excuse the Respondent.
The Respondent did not address his mind to this possibility and did not cast his
mind on the manner of posting. A reasonable person considering the conduct of the
Respondent, and the consequences of his failure to address his mind to what his
direction to post would result in, would unhesitatingly say that he should not have
done it and that he fell short of the standards of an honourable profession. Legal
matters and disputes are serious matters and usually not a matter of routine for
parties. Having a letter of demand

posted openly is a drastic measure and using

such a measure without thought brings discredit to the profession. In the present
case,

the

absence

acknowledgment

of

any

legal

requirement

to

do

so

and

the

express

by the Complainant of receipt of the 7 October Letter by email

dispels any lingering doubt that we have that the Respondent’s conduct crossed
the line into unbefitting conduct contrary to section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

41.

We accordingly find that the Respondent is guilty of the charge.

Appropriate sanction

42.

We now consider the appropriate action to be taken upon our finding, as provided
for in section 93 of the LPA. We note that the Law Society has taken the position
that no cause of sufficient gravity exists for reference to the Court of Three Judges
and that the Respondent should be reprimanded.

43.

We agree with the position taken by the Law Society. We have been referred to
precedents where a reprimand has been ordered. We find that the culpability in the
present

case

is lower

than

the

precedents.

We

also find that that the

harm

occasioned by the breach is at the lowest end of the scale, as no direct harm to the

20

Complainant has been shown. The harm in the present case is the discredit brought
to the profession. That harm is sufficiently addressed by the fact of prosecution and
conviction,

which

serves

as

a

deterrent

to

the

Respondent

and

sends

the

appropriate message to others - that we as lawyers have to constantly bear in mind
that the way we go about our duties requires us to consciously apply the PCR and
its guiding principles. In this respect we take note of the Respondent's submission
that he has been subject to the disciplinary process for more than a year, with the
attendant

stress

and

personal

embarrassment.*?

We

also

note

that

the

Respondent's conduct is one-off and that he is a fairly junior practitioner.

44,

In

the

premises,

this

Tribunal,

having

heard

and

investigated

this

matter,

determines that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists
under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be reprimanded pursuant to
section 93(b)(ii) of the LPA.

45.

Costs of Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings normally would follow upon a finding of
guilt and there are no reasons in the present case to depart from this norm. We
have considered the nature of the offence and the circumstances

of the case.

Pursuant to section 93(2) of the LPA, we order the Respondent to pay the Law
Society's costs fixed at $5,000 (inclusive of GST) and also to pay the Law Society's
reasonable disbursements, to be taxed if not agreed.

tw
Dated this! Pday of January, 20:

Narayanah

Seah Seow

Sreenivasan SC

Chairman

Member

32 RCS at [64]

21

",2022-06-08T04:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2022/,"In the Matter of Zheng Shengyang Harry (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2022/",1049
14,4e5846eab3453415a55b04f417b4bc2792cee11d,"In the Matter of Gabriel Peter (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Gabriel Peter (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Victor Lim in relation to events that occurred on 26 March 2014 that resulted in Victor Lim signing a Declaration of Trust (DOT). The DOT was ultimately set aside by the High Court after Victor Lim brought an action for the same. Following the findings or remarks of the High Court in BOK v BOL [2017] SGHC 316 (BOK v BOL), Victor Lim lodged a complaint against the Respondent.


In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Roderick E Martin SC and Mr Chan Hock Keng as DT member.

Charges

Three main charges were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge

For conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (LPA), and a breach of Rule 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR), in which the Respondent had aided the misrepresentation of his daughter, Calista Marella Peter, to her then husband, Victor Lim, in that the Deed of Trust would only take effect upon his death, until which time he was free to deal with his assets, which were acts that took unfair advantage of Victor Lim or was fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to his position as an advocate and solicitor or officer of the Court.

Second Charge

For conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, and a breach of Rule 53A of the PCR, in which the Respondent had exerted undue influence upon Victor Lim or aided Calista Marella Peter to exert undue influence upon Victor Lim, thereby inducing Victor Lim into signing the Deed of Trust, which were acts that took unfair advantage of Victor Lim or was fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to his position as an advocate and solicitor or officer of the Court.

Third Charge

For conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, and a breach of Rule 53A of the PCR, in which the Respondent had failed, refused and/or neglected to advise Victor Lim to seek independent legal advice in circumstances where he was or ought to have been aware of his daughter’s misrepresentation as to the legal effect of the Deed of Trust and of the vulnerability and impairment of Victor Lim’s mental state at the material time when he was suffering from acute grief due to his mother’s death, which were acts that took unfair advantage of Victor Lim or was fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to his position as an advocate and solicitor or officer of the Court.

Findings and Determination of the DT

The DT noted that for the three charges against the Respondent to be made out, it was incumbent on the Law Society to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had followed Calista Marella Peter back into her bedroom.

This resulted in a face-off between what Victor Lim said had occurred, i.e. that the Respondent entered the bedroom, and what the Respondent said had occurred, i.e. that the Respondent did not enter the bedroom. This face-off called into operation the test propounded in paragraphs 87 to 89 of Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 (PP v GCK) in which the Court of Appeal required “unusually convincing” circumstances in order to rely on a sole eyewitness’ testimony in convicting an accused.

The DT found that Victor Lim’s account of the events, including the Respondent having entered the bedroom, did not satisfy the “unusually convincing” standard due to a number of internal and external inconsistencies in Victor Lim’s testimony as well as his demeanour during cross-examination.

Determination of the DT

The DT determined that all three charges were not made out and, pursuant to section 93(1)(a) of the LPA, that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against the Respondent existed under section 83 of the LPA.

Council subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and decided pursuant to section 94(2) of the Act that no further action be taken against the Respondent.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/DT-law_gazette.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
DT/12/2020

In the Matter of Gabriel Peter
An Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court
And
In the Matter of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161)

___________________________________________________________________
REPORT
___________________________________________________________________

President:

Mr Roderick E Martin SC

Advocate & Solicitor:

Mr Chan Hock Keng

Mr Wee Heng Yi Adrian, Mr Darius Lee, Ms Lynette Chang (Characterist LLP) for
the Law Society
Mr Gabriel Peter, Ms Nicolette Tan, Ms Perveen Kaur (Gabriel Law Corporation)
for the Respondent

Dated this

20th day of February 2022

2

I.

BACKGROUND FACTS

1.

The facts leading to the complaint

Peter are narrated at

[1] to [6

DT 2 and DT 2A/2020 DT 2A .

DT 2 arises from a complaint by the Attorney General against Calista Peter
Calista
lodged by

arises from a similar complaint being
Victor

-in-

law. This Report deals with the complaint against Peter in DT 12/2020.

2.

The complaint against Peter was lodged by Victor in relation to events that
occurred on 26 March 2014 that resulted in Victor signing a Declaration of Trust
DOT

3.

The DOT was ultimately set aside by the High Court after Victor brought an action
to court for the same. Following the findings or remarks of the High Court from [59]
to [65] in BOK v BOL [2017] SGHC 316

BOK v BOL , Victor lodged his

complaint against Peter resulting in DT 12.

II.

THE CHARGES IN DT 12

4.

The same Tribunal in DT 2 and 2A was appointed to hear the complaint against
Peter in DT 12. In DT 12, the following charges were preferred against Peter, which
in their amended form reads as follows:

3

FIRST CHARGE
You, Gabriel Peter, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore, are charged that on or about 26 March 2014, you:

aided the misrepresentation of your daughter, Calista
Marella Peter, to her then husband, Lim Wei De Victor, that
the Deed of Trust would only take effect upon his death, until
which time he was free to deal with his assets,

which were acts that took unfair advantage of Lim Wei De Victor or was
fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to your position as an advocate
and solicitor or officer of the Court, and you are thereby guilty of a breach
of Rule 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161,
R 1, 2010 Rev Ed), and such breach amounts to conduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal
Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed).
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

SECOND CHARGE
You, Gabriel Peter, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore, are charged that on or about 26 March 2014, you:

exerted undue influence upon Lim Wei De Victor or aided
Calista Marella Peter to exert undue influence upon Lim Wei
De Victor, thereby inducing the said Lim Wei De Victor into
signing the Deed of Trust;

4

which were acts that took unfair advantage of Lim Wei De Victor or was
fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to your position as an advocate
and solicitor or officer of the Court, and you are thereby guilty of a breach
of Rule 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161,
R 1, 2010 Rev Ed), and such breach amounts to conduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal
Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed).
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

THIRD CHARGE
You, Gabriel Peter, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore, are charged that on or about 26 March 2014, you:

failed, refused and/or neglected to advise Lim Wei De Victor
to seek independent legal advice in circumstances where

misrepresentation as to the legal effect of the Deed of Trust
and of the vulnerability and impairment of the said Lim Wei
at the material time when he was

which were acts that took unfair advantage of Lim Wei De Victor or was
fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to your position as an advocate
and solicitor or officer of the Court, and you are thereby guilty of a breach
of Rule 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161,
R 1, 2010 Rev Ed), and such breach amounts to conduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal
Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed).

5

(emphasis added in bold and underline)

III.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON 26 MARCH 2014

5.

As far as it relates to the complaint against Peter,

account of the events

on 26 March 2014 are that while Victor and Calista were arguing in
1, Peter came home

bedroom whilst staying in

from work and Calista went to Peter in his bedroom to show him the DOT.2 Victor
overheard Calista complaining to Peter that Victor refused to sign the DOT and

DOT.3 Victor asked Peter if he would do the same if Peter were in his shoes and
Peter replied yes.4 Victor understood this to mean that the DOT was a standard,
normal document which is commonly executed.5

6.

In the presence of Peter, Calista stated that the DOT
son S

S

6

Calista stated that Victor would in the meantime be free to deal with all of his assets
as he deemed fit.7 Peter also stated that he himself did not own anything (which
Victor understood to mean immovable properties) and that everything Peter had

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

6

belonged to his wife and children.8 Victor felt intimidated by Peter (being his fatherin-law and senior lawyer)9 and pressured by Calista to sign the DOT, which he
did.10

7.
in the evening, playing with his grandson with his wife in their bedroom.11 Calista
entered her parents bedroom to tell them that Victor was leaving the house to stay
elsewhere.12 Peter recalled that there had been an issue between Victor and

the couple to resolve the issue.13
and did not enter Calista

8.

bedroom.14

The linchpin of the three Charges against Peter was that he had followed Calista
back to her bedroom and it was there that the events giving rise to the three
Charges took place.

and no other date. A fortiori, if the Law Society failed to prove that Peter did follow
Calista back to her bedroom, the three Charges would fail.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14 DT 12 Transcripts 30 September 2021, page 86 line 18 to page 87 line 29

7

IV.

9.
hear and investigate
the matter

Section 89(1) of the Legal Profession Act

emphasis added

LPA ,

clarify doubts arising

from the evidence given. For example, in paragraph [40] of

AEIC, he

affirmed the following:

fter I refused to sign the Declaration of Trust Calista became agitated
and started raising her voice. We argued. During the course of our
argument, Calista told me that the Declaration of Trust was just a
it was not meant to take effect until my death, and that

that effect) until then. Calista said that the Declaration of Trust was just

of Trust, in the event of my death, all my assets would be left to [S] and until
then, I was free to deal with my money and assets as I deemed fit. Calista
was only interested and insistent in getting me to sign the Declaration of
Trust.
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

10.

Calista said it was not meant to take effect until [his] death
gave rise to a doubt as to whether Calista did in fact represent to him that in law,
the DOT was to take effect only upon his death. When someone describes a

8

it was not meant to
of the document in law was otherwise. Obviously because while the effect of a
document in law may be one thing, the understanding between parties as to how
and when the document is be used is another. Otherwise, it makes no sense (on
it was not meant to take effect until [his]
death

11. The Tribunal was therefore compelled to clarify this doubt with Victor during his
cross-

V.

hear and investigate the matter

UNUSUALLY CONVINCING STANDARD

12. For the three charges against Peter to be made out, it was incumbent on the Law
Society to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Peter followed Calista back
into her bedroom.

13. This resulted in a face-off between what Victor said had occurred (Peter entered
the bedroom) and what Peter said had occurred (he did not enter the bedroom) as
neither the Law Society or Peter had called Calista as a witness in DT 12.

14. This face-off called into operation the test propounded in Public Prosecutor v GCK
and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 PP v GCK in which the Court of Appeal
unusually convincing
in convicting an accused, at [87] to [89]:

9

87

We agree with the parties that

standard is the only standard to be
uncorroborated testimony forms the sole basis for a conviction

88

case [is] proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of the

Mamat v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2016] 5 SLR 636 at [28],
this court considered that (citing Mohammed Liton at [39]):

available facts and circumstances, contains that ring of truth
which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists
in

demeanour, and the internal and external consistencies of the

89
nothing to do with the status of the witness concerned (namely,
whether he or she is an alleged victim or an eyewitness), and

Prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
XP ([72] supra) at [31]. In the absence of any other corroborative
evidence, the testimony of a witness, whether an eyewitness or an

10

entire case will rest. Such evidence can sustain a conviction only if it is

arising from the lack of corroboration and the fact that such evidence will
typically be controverted by that of the accused person.

(emphasis added in bold and underline)

15.

unusually convincing
Disciplinary Tribunals (see, The Law Society of Singapore v Lim Kien Thye [2002]
SGDSC 6 at [12]), and the Tribunal sees fit to apply it in this circumstance.

16. The Tribunal finds
entered the bedroom,

unusually convincing

for a

number of reasons.
Internal and external inconsistencies
17.

as beset with internal inconsistencies. The most
glaring of which was his allegation that Calista had misrepresented to him when
the DOT took effect in law. Upon questioning by the Tribunal, Victor admitted that
there was no such misrepresentation as to when the DOT took effect in law, but
only what and when the DOT was meant or intended to be used for:

DT 12 Transcripts 28 September 2021, page 84 line 13 to page 85 line 9

the High Court what you say here---no, to be fair to

11

misrepresentation about the effect of the DOT was? So that we are fair to you.
A I disagree.
Q No, no. What are you saying then?
President: What are you saying? Yes.

President: No. No, no. Okay. Let me give you two scenarios so you can
understand, right? One is a misrepresentation that this DOT would only take
effect on your death, correct?
Advocate: As a matter of law.
President: As a matter of law. The other [interpretation] is I made no

document until you die
Witness: Your Honour, CMP represented the second one.
President: The second one. Okay.
Respondent: Okay.
President:

Witness: Yes.
President:
you die. Alright. In law, as my colleague said. You see? So it was really what they call - security. Security. Alright. That you behave yourself.
Alright. And you come back, you start a family, you know? I think that is
what you agree she meant, yes?
Witness: Yes, Your Honour.
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

DT 12 Transcripts 28 September 2021, page 85 line 25 to page 86 line 18

12

Q So Mr Lim, I put it---sorry, I suggest to you that Callista did not make a
misrepresentation to you about the legal effect of the DOT, taking---in that it
took effect legally upon your death. Do you agree?
t fact, law.
A I disagree.
Advocate: No, you said you were not willing to sign it, right--Witness: Yes, Your Honour.
Advocate: ---

Witness: Yes.
Advocate: And it was because she said that look, this is---as you say in

Witness: Yes.
Advocate:
--Witness: Yes.
Advocate: ---and---so that seems to be more about intention rather than
--Or

in

And maybe then can---one can

understand why is it you go and do whatever you want to do with the property.
Witness: Your Honour, it was the second one.
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

DT 12 Transcripts 28 September 2021, page 87 line 4 to 8

13

Callista did not tell
you, right, that this document which you signed would take effect in law
only upon your death. Did she make that representation?
Witness:

Your Honour---

President: Yes.
Witness: ---but she--President: So she made what representation? She made the representation
that this is only to avoid probate and all that other things, and in case you
give your property away to a Chinese [whore]15, I would [leave] this in the

---that really is the
--Witness: It is the second point

---

President: Yes, the second, yes. Alright, alright.
Witness: ---the kind to think about too much.

Respondent: Yes. Your Honour, it saves a lot of
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

18. In fact, this admission by Victor was not just an internal inconsistency as to his
account of the events, but it shows that he was not truthful about
misrepresentation altogether. Further, if there was no misrepresentation by
Calista, why would there be a need for Peter to follow Calista back to her bedroom
and persuade Victor? This in and of itself raised a reasonable doubt as to whether

15

Chinese [whore]
[S] would end up getting

14

Peter did in fact follow Calista back to her bedroom. Without Peter doing so, all
three Charges against Peter fail.

19. As for the First and Third Charges in particular, they fail also because they are
specifically predicated on Calista having allegedly misrepresented when the DOT
took effect in law. The First Charge against Peter is for aiding Calista in her alleged
misrepresentation, and the Third Charge is in failing to advise Victor to seek

misrepresentation. Both predicated on the alleged misrepresentation.

20. Counsel for the Law Society attempted to remedy this clear admission in reexamination by asking Victor what he understood when he signed the DOT:
DT 12 Transcript 29 September 2021 page 7 lines 10 to 13
On the evening of the 26th of March 2014 when you signed the
DOT, as far as you understood at that time, when would the DOT
take effect?
A

After CMP made her statements, I was led to believe that would

21. Read plainly, this answer by Victor in re-examination
admission in cross-examination that the DOT was not meant to be used until
given that that was what Calista had told him as part of a family
arrangement.

15

22.

-examination were
contradicting his answers in cross-

credibility would be put in

further doubt as there would be no way to reconcile his two contradictory accounts.

inconsistency.

23.

also suffered the internal inconsistency between what he says he
understood the DOT to mean at two different portions of his AEIC.

24. First, at [43] of his AEIC, Victor alleges that when he asked Peter whether he would

alleges that Peter told him that he himself did not own anything and that everything
he had belonged to his wife and children. Victor says he understood this to mean
that Peter did not own any property. Taking these two statements together, Victor
must have understood that signing the DOT would be akin to putting himself in
of his own. Victor said as much in [9] of
his complaint to the Law Society dated 31 May 201916:
When I asked Peter Gabriel, whom I knew and respect to be a senior
lawyer, whether he would sign the DOT if he was in my shoes, Peter Gabriel

own anything and that everything belonged to his wife and children.

25. Yet later at [55] of his AEIC, Victor says that he honestly believed that under the
DOT, all of his assets would be to left to S only when he died, and he would

16

16

continue to own and be free to deal with his assets as he deemed fit without any
reference to S. This was clearly not the position that Victor understood Peter to be
in. Obviously because Peter was still alive and yet his wife and children owned the
property.
how could Peter have aided any misrepresentation as to when the DOT took effect
in law?

26. This was picked up by Peter and the Tribunal in the cross-examination of Victor:
DT 12 Transcripts 28 September 2021, page 74 line 1 to page 72 line 2
Q Now, I would like you to---just to finish off, just one question on paragraph

Paragraph 9.

So, Mr Lim, what you had done in this paragraph 9 is effectively try to
summarise the various points you have raised in your affidavit, and your

that I was---if I was in your shoes, I would do it and that everything I own

from those words, I didn't say it, but all you gathered from those words is
that you were being unreasonable for not signing the DOT, correct?
A I'm not just unreasonable but yah.

Q I said, after reading---

17

those words was that you were being unreasonable for not signing the DOT.

A
Q And nowhere did you get that impression that you had stated earlier that
somehow I had given you the impression that by these words I could

President: I have difficulty, Mr Lim, with paragraph 9. Because if you read
the first

1, 2, 3, 4, 5

6 lines, right, basically your complaint there is that

take effect upon death, correct? And if you objectively look at the lines after
that:
was a
standard document. When I asked Peter Gabriel, whom I knew
and respect to be a senior lawyer, whether he would sign the
--and this is where he may be said to have corrected Calista--at one point, Peter Gabriel even remarked that he did not own

did the same. I don't own anything. It belongs to my
But by making that
remark, and you are a intelligent man, you come to the conclusion
whatever Calista said was not really true because look at Peter
Gabriel, he owns nothing. And he is saying so. So, I'm sharing with you
and reading his paragraph 9, it is not as clear-cut as you think it is, yes? So
Mr Peter, you want to carry on this line?

18

---his defence
is an all-orBut even assuming he did, this paragraph 9 has an inherent
inconsistency.
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

27. There was neither a correction by Victor nor a re-examination by the Law Society
in this regard.

28. T

in his AEIC at [43], he
standard

document However, Victor resiled from this point during cross-examination and
admitted to the Tribunal that the description of the DOT
came from himself and not Peter:
DT 12 Transcripts 27 September 2021, page 59 line 24 to page 60 line 17
Q
this event of which you have produced even quotations purportedly
about events that transpired. So try to remember, Mr Lim. Answer the
question. What clarification did you seek from me or my daughter on the
26th about this trust deed?
A To you specifically, I asked whether this was a standard document,
to which you said it is. I asked for illustrations, you told me that this was
something that was acceptable to you and that also you were not

19

holding any assets under your name, and that most if not all your assets
were held by your wife and your children.
Q Can you point out in your affidavit you have said that you asked me
whether it was a standard document? Can you point out in your affidavit
where you said you asked me whether it was a standard document and
that I replied to you?

A Paragraph 43.

Q I can read that. Where is it that you say that you had asked me
and I replied you?
A It is not stated explicitly inside that paragraph.
DT 12 Transcripts 27 September 2021, page 69 line 1 to page 70 line 6

Q Now, coming back to you---what you said this morning. You said that
you had asked me whether it was a standard document and that I replied
to you that it was. So can you tell the Tribunal what is it that you meant

...
A Your Honour, I was coming from a perspective of a layperson where
I was not familiar with all these documents. I was asking him as a very
senior figure in legal matters whether this is commonly executed,
whether this would have any detrimental effects to myself and whether
there were any significant ramifications that I was unaware of. So what-

20

-was thinking about.
President: So the provenance of this--Advocate: Phrase.
President: ---phras
was whose?
Witness: I asked. I asked PG about it.
President:
mouth?
Witness: Yes.

your mouth, did you communicate to me at any point as to what you

a detrimental effect on you and whether---what significant
ramifications were there, did you ask these questions of me? Yes
or no?
A I did not.
(emphasis added in bold and underline)

29.

standard
document

he says in his AEIC. In his

AEIC, it comes across as though Peter was the one who of his own initiative,
standard document If that were the case, it
would be easy to discern the inducement by Peter. But if the truth was that Victor
standard document

was merely

21

responding to it, where is the inducement? As Victor admitted, he did not further
ask questions about whether it was commonly executed, whether there was a
yes
from Peter could not encapsulate all of those concerns.

30. The Tribunal also found

was externally inconsistent with the

objective evidence. Victor says in his AEIC (at [42]) that while he was in
bedroom, he could hear Calista and

very

clearly as the bedroom door was open. The floor plan of the house and the two
bedrooms was exhibited to the Tribunal, and it was clear that the distance between
the two bedrooms was approximately 7.5 metres diagonally across (with walls in
between). This is assuming that Peter and Calista were standing at the doorway
of one room and Victor was listening in from the other. Even then, it would be
difficult to accept that at that distance, Victor could hear the conversation very
clearly.
Law Society.

31. That said, the Tribunal recognises that nothing turns on this in that no allegations
are being raised in relation to what was said between Calista and Peter while they
The Tribunal, however, takes this to be an external
satisfying the standard
unusually convincing.

32.

Given these internal and external inconsistencies, it could not be said that
evidence

unusually convincing

22

Demeanour of the witness
33.

-examination in
DT 12 by Peter, his former father-in-law, was also telling. During the crossexamination, Victor turned away from Peter with his back facing him and faced the
Tribunal with his eyes shut most of the time. The Tribunal can only surmise that
he felt some sort of shame or remorse and was uncomfortable facing his former
father-in-law.

be

unusually convincing

ring of truth

in PP v GCK.

34. In any event

unusually convincing

evidence does not place a burden on the accused to call corroborative eye-witness

discharge their burden before there is a shift to the accused (see, PP v GCK at
[140]). The Tribunal therefore could not agree with Mr Adrian Wee, Counsel for the
Law Society, in his submission that Calista ought to have been called by Peter.

35.

unusually convincing
given the internal and external inconsistencies of his evidence, as well as his
demeanour. There

Covert recordings

unusually convincing

23

36. For completeness, the Tribunal considered the

reliance on the covert

recording by Victor of his conversation with Calista and her Mother at [64] of BOK
v BOL:

bedroom on the evening of 26 March 2014 comes from the transcript of
the confrontation of 12 February 2015. During the confrontation, the

She is

know why you keep saying someone force you. How can any of us

to read the DOT. Indeed, she appeared to accept, by her use of the

.

37.

, however, the covert recordings were unsafe to rely on given
that Victor had sole control of what was being recorded and was directing the
conversation to suit his purposes. Indeed, the transcript of the covert recording
makes it clear that Victor was the one who prompted the mention of

alleged

involvement:
[Calista]: Victor, you have already signed it. I d
to force you?
[Victor]: You even got your dad to read through it and to force me to sign
it.

24

[Calista]:
one force you. How can any of us force you?
[Victor]: You just told me to get lost, and you a[Calista]:

38. This was the same concern expressed by the court in Re A (a child) (Hague
Convention: wrongful retention) [2021] EWHC 1204 (Fam), in which the Court
gave very little weight to covert recordings made by a father of his conversation
with his child. The Court held:

recordings as evidence at the hearing. I did so because they had been
made covertly and the father had sole control over what was recorded
and could have steered recorded conversations with his child to suit
his purposes. Hence, the evidence would be of very little weight.

39. Notwithstanding the above, even if the Tribunal were to place the utmost weight
on what Calista said in this covert recording, it cannot prove that Peter was in the
room. Giving the words their natural meaning, all she is saying is that no one in
her family could have forced Victor to sign the DOT. It cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Peter

40. In view of the above, all three charges against Peter are not made out on the
evidence. Further, as far as the First and Third Charges are concerned, as stated
above at [19], Victor has admitted that there was no misrepresentation by Calista
as regards when the DOT was to take effect in law. The Third Charge also fails to

25

satisfy the conjunctive requirement that Peter was aware that Victor was suffering
from vulnerability and impairment of his mental state, for the reasons stated in DT
2 and 2A at [30] to [39].

VI.

CONCLUSION

41. In view of the findings in [40] above, the Tribunal determines pursuant to Section
93(1)(a) of the LPA that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against
Peter exists under Section 83 of the LPA.

Dated this the

20th

day of February 2022.

_________________________________________
Mr Roderick E Martin SC
President

_________________________________________
Mr Chan Hock Keng
Member

",2022-04-08T04:00:27+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-may-2022/,"In the Matter of Gabriel Peter (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-may-2022/",1049
15,50515b1cf9045df884f38e4044a53c34191b9c92,"In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Lim Beng Heng Bernard (Complainant). The Complainant had engaged the Respondent to make a claim for personal injuries that he sustained in a road traffic accident on 28 September 2017.


The Respondent had issued a letter of demand to India International Insurance Pte Ltd (III Pte Ltd), the insurers of the motor vehicle that was involved in the road traffic accident. Proposals were exchanged between the Respondent and III Pte Ltd. However, it was alleged that the Respondent had failed to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the progress of his matter by failing to inform the Complainant when she negotiated a higher global settlement sum with III Pte Ltd and by failing to explain the breakdown of the settlement sum.

In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Andre Yeap SC and Mr G Radakrishnan as DT member.

Charges

One main charge and two alternative charges were preferred against the Respondent:

Charge

For the improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in which the Respondent had breached Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR) in that she renegotiated and accepted a higher global settlement sum for the Complainant without informing or obtaining his authorization for the same after he had instructed her to accept the offer of a lower sum and she purported to keep the difference as her fee without the Complainant’s authorisation or instruction.

Alternative 1st Charge

For misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that she renegotiated and accepted a higher global settlement sum for the Complainant without informing or obtaining his authorization for the same after he had instructed her to accept the offer of a lower sum and she purported to keep the difference as her fee without the Complainant’s authorisation or instruction.

Further Alternative 1st Charge

For the improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in which the Respondent had breached Rule 17 of the PCR in that she failed to act in the best interests of the Complainant by renegotiating and accepting a higher global settlement sum for the Complainant without informing or obtaining his authorisation of the same after he had instructed her to accept the offer for a lower sum and she purported to keep the difference as her fees without the Complainant‘s authorisation or instruction.

Findings and Determination of the DT

The 1st Charge, which the Respondent subsequently pleaded guilty to, was amended by the Law Society based on representations from the Respondent with the main charge under Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR being amended to a charge under Rule 5(2)(e).

The DT was concerned that the amended 1st Charge appeared not to give adequate weight to the possible severity of the actions of the Respondent which was clearly detrimental to her client and the amended 1st Charge appeared to trivialise the complaint.

The DT had also noted that the Respondent seemed to have a recent antecedent in The Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2019] SGDT 11 (DT 8/2019) and invited submissions from parties as to whether the DT was at liberty to consider the antecedent for purposes of arriving at the appropriate sanction in view of the guilty plea to the amended 1st charge.

Having regard to only the facts of this case, the DT determined that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the LPA. Further, the DT observed that it would be useful if a Court of Three Judges could clarify for the benefit of future DTs whether a tribunal is empowered and be at liberty to consider and give weight to a respondent’s antecedent misconduct in arriving at a decision and/or determining the appropriate sanction for the misconduct that is before the DT.

Having determined under section 93(1)(c) of the LPA that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action, the DT was permitted under section 93(2) of the LPA to make a costs order and ordered for the Respondent to pay costs to the Law Society amounting to $4,000.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT that there exists cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action and that the Respondent to be referred to the Court of Three Judges* and for the Respondent to pay costs for the proceedings, amounting to $4,000 (inclusive of disbursements), to the Law Society.

Further Findings and Determination of the DT

After having decided that a respondent’s antecedents may be considered for the purposes of sentencing, the case was subsequently remitted to the DT by the Court of Three Judges where the DT directed parties to make further submissions in relation to the appropriate order to be made by the Tribunal.

Council subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and the Respondent was reprimanded for a breach of Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR.

To access the full reports, click here and here.

*The decision of the Court of Three Judges can be found in Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2021] SGHC 27.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/DT-Report-18-86.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
DT/11/2019

In the Matter of CONSTANCE MARGREAT
PAGLAR (NRIC NO. SXXXX694J) an Advocate &
Solicitor

And

In the Matter of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter
161)

REPORT
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS
PRESIDENT:

MR ANDRE YEAP, SC

ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR:

MR G. RADAKRISHNAN

PARTIES
COUNSEL FOR LAW SOCIETY
OF SINGAPORE:

MR. SHASHI NATHAN/MISS J
JAYALETCHUMI

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:

MR. K ANPARASAN/MISS AUDREY
WONG

DATED THIS

12th

DAY OF MAY 2020

-1-

INTRODUCTION
1.

Constance Margreat Paglar (“Respondent”) was admitted to the roll of advocates and
solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore on 21 March 1998 and was, at all material
times, the sole proprietor of C Paglar & Co (“CPC”).

2.

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made by way of a letter dated 7 August 2018
against the Respondent by one Lim Beng Heng Bernard (“Complainant”).

3.

In the Statement of Case filed by the Law Society against the Respondent dated 5
November 2019, the original charges preferred were as follows:

i)

The main charge was that the Respondent was guilty of a breach of rule 5(2)(a)
of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act
(Chapter 161) (“PCR“) in that she renegotiated and accepted a higher global
settlement sum for the Complainant without informing or obtaining his
authorization for the same after he had instructed her to accept the offer of a lower
sum and she purported to keep the difference as her fee without the Complainant’s
authorization or instruction and this breach of Rule 5(2)(a) amounted to improper
conduct or practice within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal
Profession Act (Chapter 161) (“LPA”).

ii)

The first alternative charge was that the same conduct as in the main charge also
amounted to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of
the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section
83(2)(h) of the LPA.

iii)

The second alternative charge was that the Respondent was guilty of a breach of
Rule 17 of the PCR in that she failed to act in the best interests of the Complainant,
to wit, by renegotiating and accepting a higher global settlement sum for the
Complainant without informing or obtaining his authorisation of the same after he
had instructed her to accept the offer for a lower sum and she purported to keep the
difference as her fees without the Complainant‘s authorisation or instruction and

-2-

such breach of Rule 17 amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate
and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

4.

By a letter dated 4 March 2020 from the solicitors for the Law Society, the Tribunal was
informed that based on representations from the Respondent’s solicitors, the Law Society
was amending the main charge under rule 5(2)(a) to a charge under rule 5(2)(e) of the
PCR, and that the Respondent was willing to plead guilty to the amended charge which
was that:

i)

the Respondent was guilty of a breach of Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR in that she failed
to inform the Complainant of the progress of the matter by failing to inform him
when she negotiated a higher settlement sum with the insurance company and by
failing to explain the breakdown of the settlement sum to him and such breach of
Rule 5(2)(e) amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor
within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

5.

By separate emails dated 18 March 2020, the solicitors for the Law Society provided the
Agreed Statements of Facts (“ASOF”) whilst the solicitors for the Respondent submitted
the Mitigation Plea (“MP”). The facts as agreed between the parties are set out below
from [7] to [16].

6.

A hearing was fixed for 23 March 2020 but at the start of the hearing the Tribunal was
informed that the Respondent was denied entry to the Supreme Court due to certain
answers made in the Heath Declaration Form required by the Supreme Court. The
hearing was accordingly adjourned and re-fixed for 2 April 2020. At this hearing, the
amended charge was duly read to the Respondent and she pleaded guilty.

THE ASOF

7.

The Complainant had engaged CPC to make a claim for personal injuries that he
sustained in a road traffic accident on 28 September 2017 (“Accident”).

-3-

8.

On 21 March 2018, CPC issued a letter of demand to India International Insurance Pte
Ltd (“III Pte Ltd”), the insurers of the motor vehicle that was involved in the
Accident. CPC, on the Complainant’s instructions, demanded a sum of S$9,418.05
inclusive of S$2,996.00 as costs.

9.

Thereafter, the following proposals were exchanged between CPC and III Pte Ltd, as full
and final settlement of the Complainant’s claim:

(1)

by way of an email dated 20 April 2018, at 3.31 pm, III Pte Ltd offered the sum of
S$3,041.35, inclusive of S$1,605.00 as costs and disbursements;

(2)

by way of an email dated 7 June 2018, at 2.38 pm, CPC counter-proposed the sum
of S$5,540.65, inclusive of S$2,140.00 as costs; and

(3)

by way of an email dated 7 June 2018, at 4.39 pm, III Pte Ltd offered the sum of
S$3,281.35, inclusive of S$1,605.00 as costs and disbursements (“7 June
Proposal”).

10.

By way of a letter dated 11 June 2018 (“11 June Letter”), CPC informed the
Complainant of the 7 June Proposal and enclosed a copy of the email from III Pte Ltd,
which stated that the settlement sum was S$3,281.35. In the 11 June Letter, the
Respondent explained that the sum the Complainant would get was S$1,552.00, derived
as follows:

Breakdown

Amount (S$)

General Damages

1,800

Medical Expenses

120

Transport Expenses

20

At 80% liability

1,552

-4-

11.

The 11 June Letter further stated that after deduction of the sum of S$535.00, being the
legal costs incurred by CPC, from the compensation sum of S$1,552.00, the Complainant
would get S$1,017.00. The 11 June Letter also contained the Respondent’s advice to the
Complainant to accept the 7 June Proposal.

12.

On 13 June 2018, the Complainant instructed the Respondent to accept the 7 June
Proposal. However, the Respondent did not write to III Pte Ltd to communicate the
Complainant’s acceptance of the 7 June Proposal.

13.

Instead, the following proposals were subsequently exchanged between CPC and III Pte
Ltd without the Complainant’s knowledge or instructions:

(1)

By way of an email dated 21 June 2018, at 2.40 pm, CPC made a revised global
settlement offer to III Pte Ltd of S$4,000.00 (“21 June Offer”).

(2)

By way of an email dated 21 June 2018, at 4.29 pm, III Pte Ltd counter-proposed
the sum of S$3,800.00 as global settlement of the Complainant’s claim (“21 June
Proposal”).

14.

By way of an email dated 26 June 2018, at 11.25 am, CPC accepted the 21 June
Proposal. By way of an email dated 27 June 2018, at 11.05 am, III Pte Ltd sent CPC a
Discharge Voucher for the sum of S$3,800.00.

15.

On 29 June 2018, the Complainant received a Discharge Voucher issued by III Pte Ltd,
which stated that the settlement sum was S$3,800.00 and not S$3,281.35, as stated in the
7 June Proposal, which was annexed to the 11 June Letter. The Complainant did not
receive an explanation or breakdown of the sum of S$3,800.00.

16.

By reason of the foregoing, the Respondent has breached Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR in
failing to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the progress of his matter, by
failing to inform the Complainant when she negotiated a higher global settlement sum
with III Pte Ltd, and by failing to explain the breakdown of the $3,800 settlement sum.

-5-

THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

17.

The Respondent submitted that having regard to the matters submitted in the MP, the
Tribunal should impose only a reprimand for the misconduct which may bring the legal
profession into disrepute.

18.

Essentially, the Respondent’s main arguments in mitigation were as follows:

(1)

She was remorseful and had acknowledged that there were shortcomings in her
conduct, had made representations at an early stage and had agreed to plead guilty
at the earliest possible opportunity following the reply to her representations,
thereby saving time and cost for the parties.

(2)

No prejudice was caused to the Complainant. His interest has not been prejudiced
or compromised as she had managed to secure the amount of damages which the
Complainant was prepared to accept in settlement of his claim. Furthermore, no
issue was raised by the Complainant as to the reasonableness of the amount of
damages which she had advised the Complainant to accept in full and final
settlement of his claim in the 7 June Proposal.

(3)

Her conduct was not motivated by personal interest or dishonesty and did not seek
to unfairly benefit herself over the Complainant’s interest. The lapses in
communication with the Complainant was not malicious or motivated by personal
interest or dishonesty but stemmed from a genuine belief that the Complainant did
not have any interest in the party and party cost component of any offer from III
Pte Ltd because of the structure of the solicitor-and-client cost agreed between the
Complainant and CPC. She genuinely believed that the 7 June Proposal was
reasonable and had advised the Complainant to accept it. Furthermore, the party
and party cost which CPC had sought to negotiate with III Pte Ltd was also in line
with the Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims in Appendix E of the State
Court Practice Directions.

-6-

THE LAW SOCIETY’S ARGUMENTS

19.

The Law Society, however, argued that the Respondent should be ordered to pay a
penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct in the sum of $$6,000.

20.

The Law Society submitted that relevant precedents show that where a legal practitioner
is charged and found liable for breach of Rule 5(2) of the PCR (or its predecessor
equivalent, Rule 17), absent aggravating factors, a monetary penalty is appropriate.

21.

In The Law Society of Singapore v Sham Chee Keat [2018] SGDT 55 (""Sham""), the legal
practitioner there was found guilty of one charge under Rule 5(2)(c) for
failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in his provision of services to
the client by including or causing to be included in an affidavit deposed to by the client
statements which he ought to have known were inaccurate and false. The legal
practitioner had attended a Pre-Trial Conference (""PTC”) on behalf of his client, where
the bifurcation of the client's case was discussed. The legal practitioner claimed that he
misunderstood the outcome of the PTC and subsequently provided inaccurate
information to his client about the PTC. Thereafter, the client deposed to an affidavit
prepared by the legal practitioner, which contained statements that were inaccurate or
false, based on the legal practitioner's misunderstanding of the outcome of the PTC. The
Disciplinary Tribunal found that the legal practitioner had ""acted carelessly with
insufficient professional diligence and competence"", and was ordered to pay a penalty of
$5,000.

22.

Although the legal practitioner in Sham was sanctioned for a breach of a different rule
under Rule 5 [i.e. 5(2)(c)], the Law Society submitted that the case is nevertheless
instructive, given that Rule 5(2)(c) (which relates to the duty to act with reasonable
competence) and the Rule under which the Respondent here was charged, namely Rule
5(2)(e) (which relates to the duty to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress
of the client's matter), both fall under the broad category of duties of honesty, competence
and diligence under Rule 5. The duty of reasonable diligence necessarily entails keeping
the client reasonably informed of the progress of his case (Legal Profession (Professional
Conduct) Rules 2015 Commentary (Academy Publishing 2016) at para 05-041).

-7-

23.

Accordingly, Law Society's position was that, based on the sanction in Sham, a penalty
of S$5,000, as a starting point, is appropriate in the present case.

24.

The Law Society went on to submit that the Respondent's seniority is a significant
aggravating factor. As stated by the High Court in Law Society of Singapore v Nathan
Edmund [1998] 2 SLR(R) 905, it is trite that the more senior an advocate, the more
damage he does to the integrity of the legal profession (at [33]). This was acknowledged
recently by the High Court in Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and
another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369, where the legal practitioner having been in practice
for 29 years was found to have warranted a more onerous sentence (at [88]). Likewise,
in the present case, the Respondent being a senior practitioner of about 22 years’ standing
justified a more serious sanction, warranting an uplift of the penalty from $5,000 to
$6,000.

25.

The Law Society also submitted that the mitigating factors relied on by the Respondent
in the MP should be treated with circumspection and not viewed charitably. As
acknowledged by the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Kurubalan
s/o Manickam Rengaraju [2013] 4 SLR 91, mitigating factors should be viewed in a
qualitatively different light in disciplinary proceedings as opposed to in a criminal case
(at [48]- [49]):

“48. A court that exercises disciplinary jurisdiction is likely to view mitigating factors
in a different light than would a court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction: see Law
Society of Singapore v Tham Yu Xian Rick [1999] 3 SLR(R) 68 at [22]:

Because orders made by a disciplinary tribunal are not primarily punitive,
considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less
effect on the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction than on sentences imposed in
criminal cases: Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486 at 492. To state the matter
another way, whatever might have been the appropriate sentence in the criminal
proceedings, the objective there was rather different from that in show cause
proceedings, which are civil and not punitive in nature.

-8-

49. The point simply is that even if a mitigating circumstance might be found that could
weaken the case for punishment in a criminal case, this circumstance may often not avail
an Advocate and Solicitor in proceedings because an equally, if not more, important
consideration is the protection of public confidence in the administration of justice. This
interest can legitimately trump the individual offender's interest in having his punishment
finely calibrated according to his precise degree of culpability. Where aggravating factors
are concerned, there is usually less need to draw this distinction since a factor that
aggravates the offender's particular culpability would generally tend also to aggravate the
adverse impact on confidence in the administration of justice, although there may be
exceptions to this.""

26.

The Law Society's position is that the mitigating factors relied on by the Respondent
should be disregarded in the present proceedings, for the following reasons:

(1)

The Respondent's assertion that no prejudice was caused to the Complainant, and
that her conduct was not motivated by personal interest or dishonesty, is of no help
to the Respondent. A similar line of argument was pursued in Law Society of
Singapore v Tham Yu Xian Rick [1999] 3 SLR(R) 68, where the High Court found
that the legal practitioner not having benefitted from his misdeeds apart from
earning the usual conveyancing fees ""was beside the point"", given that ""because
orders made by a disciplinary tribunal are not primarily punitive, considerations
which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the
exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction than on sentences imposed in criminal
cases"". The mitigating factors highlighted by the Respondent should therefore not
be relied on.

(2)

Further, and in any event, the Respondent's ""remorse and plea of guilt at the earliest
opportunity"" was a mischaracterization of the events that transpired in the present
proceedings. The Respondent did not plead guilty at the earliest possible
opportunity, and her conduct cannot be said to have saved costs and time for all
parties involved. Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chief were exchanged on 25 February
2020, and the matter was fixed for 2 days of trial, on 10 and 11 March. It was only
6 days before the hearing on 4 March 2020 that the Respondent agreed to plead

-9-

guilty. Therefore, the Respondent's plea of guilt was not timeous, and should not
be considered a mitigating circumstance.

MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE TRIBUNAL

27.

The Tribunal struggled to understand the position of the Law Society in amending the
original charges to the amended charge as it appeared not to give adequate weight to the
possible severity of the actions of the Respondent which was clearly detrimental to her
client, the Complainant. The amended charges appeared to trivialise the Complaint and
do disservice to the Complainant and any other client who was in a position similar to
that of the Complainant.

28.

However, the Tribunal felt it had no option but to respect the prosecutorial discretion of
the Law Society when it chose to prefer the amended charge instead of the original
charges. Furthermore, it was not apparent whether the relevant representatives of the Law
Society who made the decision to prefer the amended charge were aware of the
Respondent’s antecedent misconduct referred to later in this report.

29.

In particular, the Tribunal noted the facts set out below.

30.

In CPC’s letter dated 11 June 2018 to the Complainant, which attached the 7 June
Proposal which had provided for an offer aggregating $3281.35 comprising, inter alia,
“Cost and Disbursements including GST-$1605”, CPC had also informed the
Complainant that:

(1)

“Pursuant to the Warrant to Act, the sum of $535, inclusive of GST, will be
deducted from the compensation amount”;

(2)

“Given the injuries diagnosed, we would advise you that the offer made thereon is
reasonable and can be seriously considered for acceptance”; and

- 10 -

(3)

“ you may be required to sign a Discharge Voucher for an amount that is higher
than what is stated herein as that amount will include our legal costs and
disbursements incurred for this file”.

31.

The 11 June 2018 letter contemplated that the cost of $535 pursuant to the Warrant to
Act was in addition to the costs of $1605 payable by III Pte Ltd and this appears to have
been so understood and accepted by the Complainant in the Complaint. The Warrant to
Act, dated 5 October 2017, provided that the Respondent could deduct from any
settlement sum received party and party costs, described as “costs paid by the third party
on [the client’s] behalf” as well as the solicitor and client costs, the minimum of which
was stated to be $500 plus GST. It appears that in accepting the 7 June Proposal for a
total of $3,281.35, the Complainant was aware and agreed that the Respondent would
charge as her cost a sum of $535 plus $1,605, totalling $2,140, which amounted to 65.2%
of the proposed settlement sum.

32.

Instead of acting in accordance with the Complainant’s instructions to accept the 7 June
Proposal, the Respondent without authorization or instruction from the Complainant,
made an increased offer by way of CPC’s 21 June Offer to III Pte Ltd for a global
settlement sum of $4,000. In the 21 June Offer, the Respondent had stated “Purely to
facilitate an amicable settlement, we counter proposed global sum of $4,000 all-in and
no less”. This was a counter offer which in law rejected the 7 June Offer, including the
offer to pay party and party costs of $1605, and was totally opposite and contrary to the
Complainant’s instructions to accept the 7 June Proposal which the Respondent had
advised the Complainant to accept. Indeed, had III Pte Ltd rejected the 21 June Offer and
sought to reduce its proposal to an amount less than that in the 7 June Proposal, it would
have been legally entitled to do so.

33.

As it turned out, III Pte Ltd made an increased global settlement offer of $3,800 vide its
21 June Proposal which was accepted vide CPC’s email response dated 26 June 2018.

34.

Clearly, the Respondent knew from experience that it was very unlikely that III Pte Ltd
would reject her counter offer and seek to reduce its offer to an amount less than the 7
June Proposal and that it was a safe gamble for her to seek a higher global settlement,
which leads to the question: whose benefit was this for? Given that the Respondent had

- 11 -

in the 11 June Letter to the Complainant advised the Complainant to accept the 7 June
Proposal and the Complainant agreed to accept the 7 June Proposal, it meant also that the
Respondent was prepared to and agreed to accept the party and party costs of $1605 from
III Pte Ltd and that the Complainant likewise agreed to this. As such, the counter offer
by the Respondent for a global settlement amount larger than the 7 June Proposal, even
where made without the Complainant’s instructions, which resulted in a global settlement
for an amount larger than the 7 June Proposal, would result in the entire
final global settlement amount of $3,800, including the increased differential, being held
by the Respondent on behalf of and to the benefit of the Complainant, given that the
Respondent was at all relevant times an agent and solicitor for the Complainant for which
there was a duty on the Respondent’s part to account to the Complainant. The Respondent
had likely sought a larger “global settlement” from III Pte Ltd, instead of merely seeking
an increased amount of “party and party costs“, for her own benefit because she wanted
to give III Pte Ltd the impression that it was the Complainant who wanted a larger amount
of damages to achieve a settlement, which III Pte Ltd obviously believed. If the
Respondent truly believed that III Pte Ltd would have agreed to pay a larger amount of
“party and party costs“, whilst the amount of damages payable to the Complainant
remained as per the 7 June Proposal, she could have simply stated that a larger amount
of “party and party costs“ was required to achieve a settlement.

35.

Under cover of an email dated 27 June 2018, III Pte Ltd forwarded to CPC a discharge
voucher for the settlement sum of $3,800 and asked that it be signed by the Complainant
and returned to them before they issued the cheque for $3,800. As it turned out, the need
for the signing of the discharge voucher for the settlement sum of $3,800 became the
trigger for the Complaint.

36.

As admitted by the Respondent, she did not keep the Respondent informed nor obtained
his instructions in making the 21 June Offer or in accepting the final $3,800 global
settlement amount. In the Complaint, the Complainant stated that he had been asked to
sign a discharge voucher for $3,800 instead of the $3281.35 under the 7 June Proposal
and he was concerned that the 7 June Proposal might have been “fabricated“ and that
“there [was] an unaccounted sum of $581.65 and the issue is whether there [was] an
attempt to misappropriate it“. In the Complaint, he also stated that he relied on the
Respondent’s advice in the 11 June Letter (which forwarded the 7 June Proposal) which

- 12 -

he understood to mean that “there was no possibility of getting a higher settlement“ as a
result of which he accepted the 7 June Proposal under which he was to receive $1,552
(being damages of $1,940 X 80%, accepting 20% contributory negligence on his part),
which after deducting the solicitor and client cost of $535 inclusive of GST, meant that
he would receive a nett sum of only $1,017. Further, if there had been an uplift in the
settlement sum to $3,800, he would have wanted to participate in it.

37.

The Respondent has placed emphasis on the argument that the 7 June Proposal which she
advised the Complainant to accept was reasonable. As the Tribunal sees it, whether or
not the 7 June Proposal was reasonable is not the issue. The issue is whether having
advised that the 7 June Proposal was reasonable, and having caused the Complainant to
accept that offer for his damages, the Respondent could act in a manner which was not
only totally contrary to the Complainant’s instructions to accept the 7 June Proposal but
amounted to a rejection of the 7 June Proposal, by going back to III Pte Ltd to give the
false impression that her client was not agreeable to the 7 June Proposal and to counter
offer a larger global settlement without first informing the client and obtaining his
authorisation, with the increased differential amount in the counter offer to be attributed
to the “party and party costs” at the expense of any potential increase in the amount of
damages payable to the Complainant and whether in the absence of any such further
agreement or instruction from the client, the Respondent was obliged to account to the
Complainant for any increase in the global settlement sum eventually secured and paid.
To the Tribunal, the answer to the first issue is in the negative, whilst the answer to the
second issue is in the positive.

38.

As it turned out, following the Respondent’s acceptance of the final global settlement
sum of $3,800, the Respondent expected to receive a total cost of $2,658.65, comprising
of the solicitor and client cost of $535 plus “party and party costs” of $2,123.65. In short,
the Respondent’s cost component increased from 65.2% to 70% of the settlement
amount, whilst the Complainant’s recovery component fell from 34.8% to 30% of the
settlement amount.

39.

The statement in CPC’s 11 June Letter to the Complainant “Please note that you may be
required to sign a Discharge Voucher for an amount that is higher than what is stated
herein as that amount will include our legal cost and disbursements incurred for this

- 13 -

file“ (“the Higher DV Clause”), which has been relied on by the Respondent to justify
her self-proclaimed entitlement to negotiate and retain the additional “party and party
costs“, is really of no assistance to the Respondent because:

(1)

by advising the Complainant to accept the 7 June Proposal and by the
Complainant’s acceptance of the proposal, there was effectively a separate
agreement between the Respondent and the Complainant whereby the Respondent
agreed to charge and the Complainant agreed for the Respondent/CPC to charge
the solicitor and client costs of $535 as well as party and party costs of $1,605,
notwithstanding any further work which may need to be done as well as further
disbursements to be incurred by CPC to bring about the settlement;

(2)

if the aforesaid separate agreement did not extend to any further cost and
disbursements incurred by CPC to facilitate the settlement, then the application of
the Higher DV Clause should be limited to any additional cost and disbursements
payable as the party and party cost after the acceptance of the offer and certainly
not to an upward variation of the party and party cost already agreed to be paid by
III Pte Ltd. As is common knowledge, there is always a reasonable range or
estimate of damages for personal injury. It should not be the case that a legal
practitioner should advice his client to accept a lower reasonable offer when there
is still room to negotiate a higher reasonable figure and then use that headroom to
negotiate a higher party and party cost for himself after the client had accepted the
lower reasonable offer based on the legal practitioner’s advice. Otherwise, it
wrongly encourages the acceptance of lower reasonable offers for the benefit of the
legal practitioner. If any provision in any letter of engagement or warrant to act is
intended

to

achieve

such

a

purpose,

it

needs

to

be

spelled

out

clearly and in no uncertain terms. The reality is that one rarely finds any clearly
agreed provision to this effect as most, if not all, reasonable clients would not agree
to its insertion as the client would realize that he would be giving the legal
practitioner a licence to advise him to accept a lower reasonable offer and then go
on to negotiate and secure a higher offer with the upward differential to be kept for
the benefit of the legal practitioner’s own cost, which would otherwise have been
for the benefit of the client.

- 14 -

40.

In the Respondent’s explanatory letter dated 30 November 2018 to the Inquiry
Committee, it was stated that the counter proposal of the global settlement amount of
$4,000 which CPC made on 21 June 2018 “was to take into account disbursements not
previously offered as well as to renegotiate costs”. It was clearly not for any party and
party cost or disbursements incurred after the acceptance of the 7 June Proposal.

41.

More importantly, given that the Respondent’s counter-offer by way of the 21 June Offer
to III Pte Ltd was for a global settlement of $4,000, and this eventually led to a full and
final global settlement of $3,800:

(1)

III Pte Ltd never agreed to pay any part of the said $3,800 as party and party costs.
The party and party costs of $1,605 under the 7 June Proposal was no longer
operative as it had been rejected by the counter-offer. As such, there was really no
basis for the Respondent to claim that any part of it was being paid as “party and
party costs” to which she was entitled; and

(2)

strictly speaking, this global settlement overrode the terms of the 7 June
Proposal (which had been rejected) so that the entire sum of $3,800 or failing that,
the increased differential of $518.65 (being the difference between $3,800 and
$3281.35), is for the benefit of the Complainant and the Respondent is duty bound
to account to the Complainant for the same. This means that the Respondent has to
agree with the Complainant as to her total fees instead of unilaterally seeking to
gazump $2,123.65 or the increased differential by self-proclaiming it as “party and
party costs”.

42.

Clearly, the Respondent well knew that had she sought the Complainant’s instructions to
make the 21 June Offer, or indeed any larger offer, she would have to explain why she
had previously advised the Complainant to accept the 7 June Offer in the first place and
the Complainant would very likely have wanted all or a substantial part of any increased
amount for himself.

43.

As such, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent’s failure to inform
the Complainant and obtain the Complainant’s instructions and authorisation before (a)
making the 21 June Offer and (b) accepting the final global settlement offer of $3,800

- 15 -

was not due to any oversight on the Respondent’s part, or any misguided belief as to her
entitlement to renegotiate the “party and party costs“ after the Complainant had accepted
the 7 June Proposal, but was instead part of a deliberate approach designed by the
Respondent to benefit herself at the expense of the Complainant.

44.

Furthermore, in response to the Tribunal’s query to the Respondent to clarify whether
she was still intending to charge the Complainant for legal fees, and if so, the amount
thereof, the Respondent stated that she was intending to recover her “party and party
costs” of $2,123.65 pursuant to the $3,800 global settlement but she was still undecided
as to whether she would charge the Complainant for the sum of $535 which was the
solicitor and client costs which the Complainant had agreed to pay. The Respondent had
also explained that her firm was discharged before the settlement monies were paid to
her firm, but that she still intended to write to the Complainant’s present solicitors to
follow up on the recovery of her fees.

45.

The Tribunal raised the aforesaid query as it wanted to clarify the Respondent’s statement
in mitigation to the effect that there was no prejudice to the Complainant and that no
financial benefit was received or intended to be received from the matters complained
off. Indeed, given the Respondent’s response as set out in the preceding paragraph, the
Tribunal considered her statement to the effect that there was no prejudice to the
Complainant and that no financial benefit was received or intended to be received, to be
wholly inaccurate and misleading. The solicitors for the Respondent sought to clarify by
saying that the Respondent was receiving no financial benefit beyond what she was
entitled to. The Tribunal found this explanation to be lacking in substance and that her
statement in mitigation, to the effect that there was no prejudice to the Complainant and
no financial benefit was received or intended to be received from the matters complained
of, was intended to pull wool over the eyes of the Tribunal. In any event, as stated earlier
in this report, the entire final global settlement amount of $3,800 or failing that, the
increased differential amount of $518.65 was rightfully for the benefit of and belonged
to the Complainant and the Respondent was under a duty to account to the Complainant
for the same, and her actions were analogous to or, arguably, even constituted potential
breaches of trust.

- 16 -

ANTECEDENT

46.

The Tribunal had enquired before the hearing on 23 March 2020 whether the Respondent
had any antecedents of misconduct and was notified by the Law Society that the
Respondent had a recent antecedent in The Law Society of Singapore v Constance
Margreat Paglar [2019] SGDT 11 (DT 8/2019) (“Antecedent”). A copy of the same
was provided to the Tribunal before the 23 March hearing.

47.

In that case, the Respondent’s firm CPC was engaged by various owners of vehicles
involved in traffic accidents to claim for losses and/or damages arising therefrom. These
various owners, who were her clients, had appointed the complainant there, JKS Motor
Works (Accident Claims) Pte Ltd (“JKS”) as their agent vis-a-vis the Respondent’s firm
which was to take instructions from JKS and keep JKS informed. Nineteen (19) charges
were originally preferred against the Respondent, but following representations made on
her behalf, the Law Society proceeded only with 4 charges, one in relation to each of 4
separate clients, under which the Respondent had failed to provide an update of the case
to the client from various dates ranging from 24 December 2015 to 22 July 2016, up to
various later dates, and was guilty of having breached Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR as
amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section
83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA. The Respondent pleaded guilty to the 4 charges and the tribunal
imposed a penalty of $4,000.

48.

The Tribunal invited submissions from the parties as to whether the Tribunal was at
liberty to consider the Antecedent for purposes of arriving at the appropriate sanction in
view of the guilty plea to the amended charge.

49.

The Law Society submitted that it was not its practice to rely on antecedents but was of
the view that for purposes of determining the appropriate sanction after the issue of
liability had been determined, as in the present case where the Respondent had pleaded
guilty, the Tribunal was at liberty to give consideration and weight to the Antecedent,
should it choose to do so.

- 17 -

50.

The Respondent, however, objected to the Tribunal considering the Antecedent for
purposes of determining the appropriate sanction. The Respondent’s arguments may be
summarised as follows:

(1)

The legislative framework only permitted the Court of Three Judges (“court”) to
take into account the past conduct of a respondent to determine what order should
be made under section 83(1) of the LPA as provided for in section 83(5) of the LPA
which reads: “In any proceedings under this Part, the court may in addition to
the facts of the case take into account the past conduct of the person concerned
in order to determine what order should be made.”

(2)

Section 82B(5) of the LPA, which concerns disciplinary proceedings of regulated
non-practitioners, and section 83A(3) of the LPA, which concerns disciplinary
proceedings of regulated foreign lawyers, also provide that only the court can take
into account a respondent's past conduct when determining what orders should be
made.

(3)

Under section 91(2) of the LPA, there is no provision for a disciplinary tribunal to
request for and take into consideration for purposes of determining the appropriate
order a respondent’s past conduct. Instead, a disciplinary tribunal is only
empowered to administer oaths and ""sue out subpoenas to testify or to produce
documents"".

(4)

Under section 93(1) of the LPA, a disciplinary tribunal “shall record its findings in
relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts” (emphasis ours) make
the determination prescribed under that section. This implies that a disciplinary
tribunal can only look at the facts of the specific misconduct that was before it and
decide the appropriate order and not have regard to any antecedent past conduct.

(5)

Section 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is encapsulated under the
Criminal Procedure Code's Plead Guilty Procedures, permits the Court to consider
an accused's criminal records and any relevant factors which may affect the
sentence.

- 18 -

51.

The thrust of the Respondent’s submission was that absent a similar express provision
enabling a disciplinary tribunal to consider the past conduct of a respondent, the Tribunal
was simply not empowered to consider the Antecedent for the purpose of determining
the appropriate order where liability has already been established.

52.

The Respondent submitted that given the potentially serious ramifications faced under
section 83(1) of the LPA, Parliament had enacted section 83(5) of the LPA empowering
only the court to ensure that sufficient checks and balances were in place to ensure fair
process of the proceedings.

53.

The consequences of the submission are that no matter how bad a past misconduct was
or how many acts of past misconduct there were, a disciplinary tribunal simply had to
ignore them and deal only with the facts of the misconduct that were before it.

54.

It would also mean that where there is antecedent misconduct, it would be better to leave
it to the court to decide on the appropriate order for the present misconduct so that the
order to be made is reflective of the object of disciplining the errant advocate. In a
situation like that, a disciplinary tribunal may have no choice but to send the matter up
for the appropriate order to be made by the court.

55.

By way of illustration, in the Antecedent the Respondent asked for a fine and was given
a fine for the past conduct. In the present proceedings, the Respondent asks only for a
reprimand, a lower form of punishment. If the Tribunal had not on its own volition asked
for antecedents, it would not have known of the Respondent’s past conduct and could
have resulted in it making a wrong order.

56.

Given the above situation, the Tribunal at the conclusion of the hearing invited the
Respondent to consider whether the Tribunal could look into the Antecedent in deciding
the appropriate sanction for the present misconduct, with the caveat that if she did not
agree there was the possibility that the Tribunal may feel constrained to refer the matter
to the Court of Three Judges. The Respondent maintained her position that the Tribunal
should not consider the Antecedent.

- 19 -

DECISION OF TRIBUNAL

57.

Section 93 of the LPA provides as follows:

“93.— (1) After hearing and investigating any matter referred to it, a Disciplinary
Tribunal shall record its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according
to those facts shall determine that —

(a)

no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83
or 83A (as the case may be);

(b)

while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under
section 83 or 83A (as the case may be), the regulated legal practitioner should
be —
(i)

ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the
misconduct committed;

(ii)

reprimanded;

(iii) ordered to comply with one or more remedial measures; or
(iv) subjected to the measure in sub-paragraph (iii) in addition to the
measure in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii); or

(c)

cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or
83A (as the case may be).”

58.

Having regard to only the facts of the case, the Tribunal determines that cause of
sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83. The Tribunal wishes to
clarify that in arriving at this decision, it has not given weight to the Antecedent.

- 20 -

59.

Nevertheless, it would be useful if a Court of Three Judges could clarify for the benefit
of future disciplinary tribunals whether a tribunal is empowered and be at liberty to
consider and give weight to a respondent’s antecedent misconduct in arriving at a
decision and/or determining the appropriate sanction for the misconduct that is before
the tribunal.
COSTS

60.

Having determined under s 93(1)(c) that there is cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action, the Tribunal is permitted under section 93(2) of the LPA to make a
costs order. The Law Society submitted that the Respondent should pay costs of $8,000
(all in) for, inter alia, the following reasons:

(1)

based on the documents given by the Complainant, the Law Society prepared a
Statement of Case and framed charges against the Respondent;

(2)

the Law Society prepared a List of Documents;

(3)

the Law Society reviewed the Respondent's Defence and subsequent
Representations, and engaged in negotiations with the Respondent;

(4)

the Law Society had to consider and respond to the Respondent’s Mitigation Plea;

(5)

the Law Society had to amend the initial charges that were preferred against the
Respondent;

(6)

the Law Society prepared a substantive affidavit of evidence in chief for the
Complainant, and a Bundle of Documents for the Disciplinary Tribunal;

(7)

the Law Society prepared Submissions on Sanction for the Disciplinary Tribunal.

- 21 -

61.

The Respondent submitted that costs should be about $2,000. Having heard the parties
in relation to costs, and taking into account also that the Respondent pleaded guilty to the
amended charge, the Tribunal orders that the Respondent pay costs to the Law Society
of $4,000 (all in).

Dated this

12th

day of May 2020

______________________________________
President: Mr Andre Yeap, SC

_________________________________
Member: Mr G. Radakrishnan

",2021-12-06T04:00:45+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-dec-2021/,"In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-dec-2021/",1049
16,d20a19dafbb8cede37145481541f65eda71f363c,"In the Matter of Huang Lui (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Huang Lui (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor

These proceedings arose from a complaint made by Mdm Lim Lay Choo, Mdm Lim Lay Pheng and Mr Lim Teck Guan (the Complainants) against Mdm Huang Lui. The Complainants were amongst the nine beneficiaries to the Estate of Mdm Tan Bee Eng, who was the Complainants’ mother. Mdm Lim Lay Choo and one Mr Lim Teck Seng, another beneficiary to the Estate, were named as Joint Executors of the Estate pursuant to the will. The Complaint alleged that the Respondent had grossly overcharged them for the probate matter, had failed to provide full particulars or details of the work done despite repeated requests and queries, had refused to respond to repeated requests to tax her bill and had delayed providing the breakdown of her bill for nine months. In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Cavinder Bull SC and Mr Ian Lim as DT member.


Charges

One main charge and one alternative charge were preferred against the Respondent:

1st Charge

For committing an act amounting to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty as an advocate and solicitor in breach of Rule 17(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, contrary to section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act for failing to inform or sufficiently inform her clients of the basis on which her professional services will be charged.

Alternative 1st Charge

For committing an act of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act in which she had failed to inform, or sufficiently inform, her clients of the basis on which her professional services will be charged, in breach of Rule 17(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015.

Amendment of Charge and Findings and Determination of the DT

The 1st Charge, which the Respondent subsequently pleaded guilty to, was amended by the Law Society to reflect that the Respondent had committed an act amounting to “improper conduct” rather than “grossly improper conduct” to reflect the appropriate level of the Respondent’s culpability.

The DT found the Respondent guilty of the amended 1st Charge with the Alternative 1st Charge against the Respondent dismissed.

With the precedent cases of The Law Society of Singapore v Anand K Thiagarajan [2009] SGDT 2 and The Law Society of Singapore v Chung Kok Soon [2002] SGDSC 2 in mind, the Tribunal found that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and the Respondent was reprimanded and ordered to pay the Law Society’s costs fixed at S$5,000 plus reasonable disbursements.

To access the full report click here.




",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/DT_Rept_(19-55)_-_Huang_Lui.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL SECRETARIAT
1 SUPREME COURT LANE, SINGAPORE 178879

TEL: 6332 4040, 6332 4060, FAX: 6332 4061
DT/SEC/11/2020
24 February 2021
BY EMAIL
Director, Conduct Department
The Law Society of Singapore
28 Maxwell Road
#01-03 Maxwell Chambers Suite
Singapore 069120
Dear Sir
PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF HUANG LUI
AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR
Pursuant to section 93(4)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed),
I submit a copy of the Report of the Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of Madam Huang
Lui.

Yours faithfully

EDWIN SAN
SECRETARY
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

C:DT/11/2020.(18D) - ES/PT/AC

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui
Case Number

:

DT 11/2020

Decision Date

:

24 February 2021

Tribunal / Court

:

Disciplinary Tribunal

Coram

:

Cavinder Bull, S.C.; Ian Lim

Counsel Name(s)

:

Leong Kah Wah and Alyssa Leong for the Law
Society of Singapore; Chelva R. Rajah SC
(Tan

Rajah

&

Cheah

LLC)

for

the

Respondent
Introduction
1

These disciplinary proceedings arise from a complaint made by Mdm

Lim Lay Choo, Mdm Lim Lay Pheng and Mr Lim Teck Guan (“the
Complainants”) against Mdm Huang Lui (“the Respondent”). The
Respondent is a practicing advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Singapore who was admitted to the roll on 14 February 1968. At the material
time, she was practicing at M/s Wee Swee Teow LLP.
2

The charge against the Respondent is that in breach of Rule 17(3)(a) of

the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (the “Rules”), she
failed to inform or sufficiently inform her clients of the basis on which fees for
professional services will be charged, and she has thereby committed an act
amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty as an

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court, contrary to Section 83(2)(b) of the
Legal Profession Act (the “LPA”).1
3

The Respondent pleads guilty to the charge preferred against her by the

Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”).
4

The Respondent having pleaded guilty, the main issue before this

Tribunal is whether there is cause of sufficient gravity for the Respondent to be
referred to the Court of Three Judges for disciplinary action under Section 83
of the LPA, or whether the Respondent should be reprimanded and/or ordered
to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct, pursuant to
Section 93(1)(b) of the LPA.
The background facts
5

The Complainants are amongst the 9 beneficiaries to the Estate of Mdm

Tan Bee Eng, deceased, the mother of the Complainants.
6

The aforementioned Mdm Lim Lay Choo and Mr Lim Teck Seng,

another beneficiary to the Estate, were named in the will dated 11 October 2007,
and were appointed as Joint Executors of the Estate (“Joint Executors”)
pursuant to the will.2
7

On 20 April 2016, the 9 beneficiaries attended a meeting with the

Respondent at the Respondent’s office to seek advice on the will. During this
meeting, the Joint Executors agreed to appoint the Respondent and her firm,

1

Respondent’s Opening Statement dated 3 February 2021 at page 4

2

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 4

2

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

M/s Wee Swee Teow LLP as the solicitors in the matter of the probate of Mdm
Tan Bee Eng, deceased, with the Respondent taking up principal conduct of the
matter.3
8

During this meeting, the Joint Executors signed a Warrant to Act with 2

enclosures: Information on Costs and Information on Disclosure of Documents.
Notably, both the Warrant to Act and the Information on Costs did not contain
any provision on the hourly rate of the Respondent or any other fee earner
applicable for the handling of this matter.4
9

A fee deposit of S$2000.00 was duly paid into the Respondent’s firm’s

client account.5
10

From the outset, there were disputes among the 9 beneficiaries over the

actual value of the Estate and their share entitlements under the will. These
disputes were resolved at a mediation and the beneficiaries entered into a
Settlement Agreement dated 25 April 2018. Neither the Respondent nor her firm
represented any of the parties at the mediation.6
11

On 15 May 2018, the Respondent obtained the Grant of Probate.7

12

On 24 May 2018, the Respondent issued tax invoice no. 783/2018 for

the sum of S$162,897.32. This sum comprised her professional fees of

3

Statement of Case at paragraph 3

4 Statement of Case at paragraphs 3-5
5 Statement of Case at paragraph 3
6

Statement of Case at paragraph 6

7

Statement of Case at paragraph 6

3

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

S$150,000, as well as disbursements and taxes. The tax invoice contained a
general description of the professional services rendered. However, it did not
give a breakdown of the work done, time spent, the fee earners involved, and
the rates charged.8
13

Sometime in July 2018, Mr Lim Teck Seng paid a sum of S$1,300,000

to the Respondent’s office to be distributed to the beneficiaries in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.9
14

On 17 July 2018 at 10.13am, the Respondent sent an email to the Joint

Executors seeking confirmation that the sum of S$974,102.68 was payable to
the beneficiaries after deducting her bill, as set out in the issued tax invoice,
from the original amount of S$1,300,000.10
15

Mdm Lim Lay Pheng replied to the Respondent on the same day at

2.15pm, objecting to this deduction and requesting that the Respondent release
the full sum of S$1,300,000 to the beneficiaries of the Estate. In this same email,
Mdm Lim Lay Pheng also assured the Respondent that there would be sufficient
money to settle her bill, and that her bill could be settled separately to the
distribution of the S$1,300,000.11
16

However, the Respondent continued to assert that she was entitled to

deduct her bill before paying out the distribution to the beneficiaries.
Specifically, in her reply email to Mdm Lim Lay Pheng on the same day at

8 Statement of Case at paragraphs 7-9
9 Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 16
10

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 18

11

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 19

4

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

3.18pm, the Respondent stated that under Clause 3 of the Settlement
Agreement, her bill had to be paid before the distributions were paid out to the
beneficiaries.12
17

Following this, still on 17 July 2018 but at 8.32pm, Mdm Lim Lay Pheng

emailed the Respondent on behalf of the Complainants, informing her that the
tax invoice issued was unclear as to how the professional fees of S$150,000 had
been derived and requesting for a detailed breakdown of the fees. In particular,
she requested for: (a) the amount of time spent on each piece of work done (with
a description of the work done), (b) the date on which the work was done, and
(c) who had done the work together with his/her hourly rate.13
18

Having received no reply from the Respondent to the request made on

17 July 2018 for a detailed breakdown of the Respondent’s professional fees,
Mdm Lim Lay Choo emailed the Respondent twice more, on 20 July 2018 and
29 July 2018, requesting a response to Mdm Lim Lay Pheng’s 17 July 2018
email.14
19

On 30 July 2018, the Respondent replied to Mdm Lim Lay Choo, stating

that she was in the course of preparing the breakdown of the bill. However, by
January 2019, the Respondent still had not provided the Complainants with such
a breakdown.15

12

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 20

13

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 28

14

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 29

15

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraphs 30-31

5

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

20

On 24 January 2019, Mdm Lim Lay Choo forwarded an email (sent to

her by Mdm Lim Lay Pheng) to the Respondent, asking the Respondent to have
her bill taxed by the court. However, the Respondent did not respond to this
email either.16
21

On 10 February 2019, Mdm Lim Lay Choo sent the Respondent a further

email. In this further email, Mdm Lim Lay Choo noted the Respondent’s failure
to reply to the earlier 24 January email and requested the Respondent to respond
within the next 7 days. Mdm Lim Lay Choo also informed the Respondent that
if she failed to respond within the next 7 days, steps would be taken as may be
necessary to tax the Respondent’s bill.17
22

On 15 February 2019, the Respondent responded to inform Mdm Lim

Lay Choo that she was still in the course of finishing the detailed bill and that
she would require an additional week before she could present the detailed bill.
The Respondent also explained that this delay in presenting the detailed bill was
caused by the fact that a large portion of the work done towards finishing the
detailed bill had been accidentally deleted, and had to be re-done.18
23

On 5 April 2019, the Complainants wrote to the Law Society to make a

complaint (“the Complaint”) against the Respondent. At this time, they had
still not received a breakdown of the tax invoice or a response from the
Respondent in relation to the earlier requests for the bill to be taxed. This was

16

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 32

17

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 33

18

Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on 30 December 2020 at paragraph 34

6

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

more than 8 months since the Complainants had first requested the Respondent
to provide a breakdown of her bill.19
24

In the Complaint, the Complainants alleged that, inter alia, the

Respondent had grossly over-charged them for the probate matter, had failed to
provide full particulars or details of the work done despite repeated requests and
queries, had refused to respond to repeated requests to tax her bill, and had
delayed providing the breakdown of her bill for 9 months.20
25

Following the lodging of the Complaint, on 11 April 2019, the

Respondent finally provided a breakdown of the tax invoice. In the details, the
Respondent outlined the dates and items of work done. However, the
Respondent did not provide the time spent, the fee earners involved and their
hourly rates.21
Procedural history and amendment of the charge
26

Sometime on or around 1 October 2020, the Law Society’s Statement of

Claim was served on the Disciplinary Tribunal Secretariat.
27

The Statement of Claim set out two charges against the Respondent. The

1st charge was that the Respondent had breached Rule 17(3)(a) of the Rules for
failing to inform or sufficiently inform her clients of the basis on which her
professional services had been charged, and had thereby committed an act
amounting to “grossly improper conduct” in the discharge of her professional

19

Statement of Case at paragraph 12 and Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Lim Lay Pheng filed on
30 December 2020 at paragraphs 35-36

20

Bundle of Documents of the Law Society of Singapore, Tab 16, at paragraph 2

21

Statement of Case at paragraph 13

7

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

duty as an advocate and solicitor contrary to Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA
(emphasis added). The alternative first charge was that by her breach of Rule
17(3)(a), the Respondent had committed an act of misconduct unbefitting of an
advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA. 22
28

This Disciplinary Tribunal was subsequently appointed by the

Honourable The Chief Justice on 16 October 2020.
29

On 11 November 2020, the Respondent’s Statement of Defence was

served on the Tribunal and the Secretariat.
30

On 19 November 2020, the Law Society filed their List of Documents.

The Respondent filed her List of Documents the next day on 20 November
2020.
31

On 30 December 2020, pursuant to the timelines set by the Tribunal, the

Respondent and the Law Society filed affidavits of evidence-in-chief, and the
Law Society filed their bundles of documents and bundles of authorities.
32

On 2 February 2021, the Law Society filed its Opening Statement

together with supplementary bundles of authorities and documents. The
Respondent filed her Opening Statement the next day on 3 February 2021.
Notably, in her Opening Statement, the Respondent invited the Law Society to
amend the 1st charge against her by deleting the word “grossly” from the
expression “grossly improper conduct” in the 1st charge.23 The Respondent

22

Statement of Case at paragraph 21

23

Respondent’s Opening Statement at paragraph 1

8

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

further stated that if the requested amendment to the 1st charge was made, she
would re-assess her position in relation to her denial of the charges.24
33

On 4 February 2021, during the hearing, the Law Society requested for

leave from the Tribunal to amend the 1st charge against the Respondent to
remove the word “grossly” from the expression “grossly improper conduct”.
The Tribunal granted the Law Society leave to make such an amendment.
Following this amendment, the Respondent changed her position to plead guilty
to the amended 1st charge, with the result that the alternative 1st charge against
the Respondent also fell away.
34

The Respondent having pleaded guilty to the amended charge, the only

issue for the Tribunal to decide concerned the sanction to be issued against the
Respondent, if any. Accordingly, the Tribunal heard submissions from both
parties regarding what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances.
The parties’ respective positions
35

Counsel for the Law Society directed the Tribunal’s attention to two

cases: The Law Society of Singapore v Anand K Thiagarajan [2009] SGDT 2
(“Anand”) and The Law Society of Singapore v Chung Kok Soon [2002]
SGDSC 2 (“Chung Kok Soon”).
36

In Anand, the respondent admitted to his failure to comply with Rule

35(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161, R1, 2000
Rev Ed), which stated that “[a]n advocate and solicitor shall inform the client
of the basis on which fees for professional services will be charged and the

24

Respondent’s Opening Statement at paragraph 7

9

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

manner in which it is expected that those fees and disbursements, if any, shall
be paid by the client”. This provision was a precursor to Rule 17(3)(a) of the
Rules. The Tribunal in that case ruled that a reprimand pursuant to s.93(1)(b) of
the LPA would be appropriate bearing in mind that the respondent had still
provided the complainant with a bill for the work. The Tribunal also ordered the
respondent to pay the costs incurred by the Law Society in those proceedings.25
37

In Chung Kok Soon, the respondent was charged, inter alia, with grossly

improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within the meaning
of Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA, for failing to comply with the provisions of
Rule 35(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 1998. The
Tribunal found that the respondent had breached Rule 35(a) and, in light of this
breach, ordered the respondent to be reprimanded for this conduct and to pay
the costs of the Law Society.26
38

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the present case was not one

of sufficient gravity to be referred to the Court of Three Judges. Instead, it was
submitted that a reprimand and an order to pay the Law Society’s costs would
not be inappropriate sanctions for the Respondent’s misconduct.
The Tribunal’s determination
39

The two cases which Counsel for the Law Society brought to the

Tribunal’s attention concerned Rule 35(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional
Conduct) Rules 1998. That Rule is substantively identical to Rule 17(3)(a) of
the Rules which provides that “[a] legal practitioner must inform his or her client

25

The Law Society of Singapore v Anand K Thiagarajan [2009] SGDT 2 at [28] and [31]

26

The Law Society of Singapore v Chung Kok Soon [2002] SGDSC 2

10

The Law Society of Singapore v Huang Lui

of the basis on which fees for professional services will be charged, and of the
manner in which those fees and disbursements (if any) are to be paid by the
client”.
40

In both those cases, a breach of the obligation to inform a client of the

basis on which fees for professional services would be charged, attracted a
reprimand and an order that the Respondent pay the Law Society’s costs of the
Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings. Bearing these precedents in mind, and
considering all the facts of this case, the Tribunal finds that pursuant to Section
93(1)(b)(ii) of the LPA, while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary
action exists under section 83, the Respondent should be reprimanded.
41

The Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent should be reprimanded

and ordered to pay the Law Society’s costs fixed at S$5,000 plus reasonable
disbursements.

24th day
February 2021
Dated ________________
of ______________

Mr Cavinder Bull, S.C.

Mr Ian Lim

President

Advocate & Solicitor

11

",2021-10-06T06:00:51+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/,"In the Matter of Huang Lui (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/",1049
17,5118d0f740e79161ad00d6528fc7219e7ddb882f,"In the Matter of Koh Tien Hua (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Koh Tien Hua (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor

These proceedings arose from information referred by the Attorney-General pursuant to section 85(3)(b) of the LPA and as such Council is required to refer the matter to a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) for formal investigation. The complaint pertained to the Respondent’s conduct in relation to Originating Summons (Adoption) No. 355 of 2014 and his subsequent correspondence with the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC). In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empaneled a DT presided by Ms Molly Lim SC and Mr Teo Weng Kie as DT member.

Charges

Three main and alternative charges were preferred against the Respondent:

1st Charge

For improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (LPA) in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR) (Cap 161, S 706/2015) regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to assist in the administration of justice were breached due to the Respondent providing copies of the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to persons who were not party to the proceedings without having obtained the court’s permission to do so, thus breaching Rule 671 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (FJR) (No 27 of 2014, S 813/2014).

Alternative 1st Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the PCR regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to assist in the administration of justice were breached due to the Respondent providing copies of the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to persons who were not party to the proceedings without having obtained the Court’s permission to do so, thus breaching Rule 671 of the FJR.

2nd Charge

For improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the PCR regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to always be truthful and accurate in his communications with any person involved in or associated with any proceedings before a court were breached due to the Respondent’s dishonest conduct in falsely claiming by way of a letter dated 28 December 2017, addressed to the AGC, that he had expressly sought the leave of the Court during the hearing to release the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to the client’s friends and relatives when in fact no such request was made by the Court.

Alternative 2nd Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the PCR regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to always be truthful and accurate in his communications with any person involved in or associated with any proceedings before a court were breached due to the Respondent’s dishonest conduct in falsely claiming by way of a letter dated 28 December 2017, addressed to the AGC, that he had expressly sought the leave of the court during the hearing to release the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to the client’s friends and relatives when in fact no such request was made by the Court.

3rd Charge

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the PCR regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to always be truthful and accurate in his communications with any person involved in or associated with any proceedings before a court were breached due to the Respondent’s dishonest conduct in omitting to mention in his letter dated 28 December 2017 addressed to the AGC that he had, on or around 26 December 2017, disseminated the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to persons who were not party to the proceedings, despite a direct query from the AGC on the same in its letter dated 28 December 2017, thus conveying an inaccurate impression that he and/or his firm were not involved in and/or responsible for the dissemination of the brief grounds to the members of the media.

Alternative 3rd Charge

For improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the LPA in which the principles set out in Rule 9(1) of the PCR regarding a legal practitioner’s duty to always be truthful and accurate in his communications with any person involved in or associated with any proceedings before a court were breached due to the Respondent’s dishonest conduct in omitting to mention in his letter dated 28 December 2017 addressed to the AGC that he had, on or around 26 December 2017, disseminated the brief grounds of decision dated 26 December 2017, issued by District Judge Shobha G Nair, to persons who were not party to the proceedings, despite a direct query from the AGC on the same in its letter dated 28 December 2017, thus conveying an inaccurate impression that he and/or his firm were not involved in and/or responsible for the dissemination of the brief grounds to the members of the media.

Findings and Determination of the DT; Council’s Sanctions

The DT found the Respondent guilty of the Alternative 1st Charge with the other charges against the Respondent dismissed.

No cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the LPA as the DT determined that there was an absence of any dishonesty and deceit. However, should there be dishonesty and deceit under different circumstances, the DT may be minded to find otherwise that, there may be sufficient gravity for disciplinary action.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and the Respondent was subsequently imposed with a penalty of $10,000. Costs (to be agreed or taxed) were also ordered by the DT to be payable by the Respondent to the Law Society.

To access the full report, click here.




",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/DT_Report_Koh_Tien_Hua.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL SECRETARIAT
1 SUPREME COURT LANE, SINGAPORE 178879

TEL: 6332 4040, 6332 4060, FAX: 6332 4061
DT/SEC/13/2019
28 May 2020
BY EMAIL
Director, Conduct Department
The Law Society of Singapore
28 Maxwell Road
#01-03 Maxwell Chambers Suite
Singapore 069120
Dear Sir
PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF KOH TIEN HUA
AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR
Pursuant to section 93(4)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed),
I submit a copy of the Report of the Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of Mr Koh Tien
Hua.
Yours faithfully

EDWIN SAN
SECRETARY
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

C:DT/13/2019.(18D) - ES/AC

28th

May

28th

May

",2021-10-06T06:00:51+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/,"In the Matter of Koh Tien Hua (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/",1049
18,b1e1cf48cd16217801dad267c66360ee142840e4,"In the Matter of Lee Teck Leng Robson (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Lee Teck Leng Robson (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor

These proceedings arose from a complaint made by one Mr Tan Ng Kuang (Mr Tan) and one Ms Lim Siew Soo (Ms Lim) (jointly, the Complainants), who were insolvency practitioners with nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd (nTan), against the Respondent as well as one Mr Jai Swarup Pathak (Mr Pathak) of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Gibson Dunn).

The complaint stemmed from the circumstances leading to and following the Complainants’ appointment as judicial managers (JMs) of Punj Lloyd Pte Ltd (PLPL) and Sembawang Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd (SEC) (jointly, the Companies).

The complaint was that the Complainants had agreed with PLL, through the Respondent and Mr Pathak (who were acting for PLL), to be appointed the JMs for the Companies on condition that PLL would make a cash deposit of $2 million, either with nTan or Gibson Dunn, in escrow. The Complainants’ judicial management fees, billed at an hourly rate, would be paid out of the said cash deposit and that Gibson Dunn had received and held $500,000 as part of the said deposit for the JMs’ fees.

The Complainants had (through a letter issued by the Complainants’ then-solicitors, Tan Kok Quan Partnership) requested for payment of the said $500,000 to the Complainants’ account. Contrary to the agreement, in response to the Complainants’ said request, the Respondent had informed them that Gibson Dunn were not holding any fee deposit for the Complainants. Consequently, the sum of $500,000 was not paid out to the Complainants.

In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a DT presided by Ms Molly Lim SC and Mr Tan Kheng Ann Alvin as DT member.

Charges

Two main and four alternative charges (collectively, the Six Charges) were preferred against the Respondent:

1st Charge (Charge 1)

For fraudulent or grossly improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (LPA) in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for Punj Lloyd Limited (PLL), knowing that PLL had agreed to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing Punj Lloyd Pte Ltd and Sembawang Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd (the Companies) whilst under judicial management, and having received two tranches of S$250,000 on or between 17 August 2016 and 8 September 2016 as part of that deposit, assisted or permitted PLL, in a manner the Respondent considered dishonest or ought to have considered dishonest, to wit, in not paying each of the tranches to the Judicial Managers when the Judicial Managers made a written demand for them through solicitors on 2 September 2016 for S$250,000, and again on 22 September 2016 for S$500,000 after the Respondent indicated that he had ceased to act for PLL in its dealings with the Judicial Managers and is therefore guilty of a breach of Rule 10(6)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR).

Alternative 1st Charge (Charge 1A)

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for PLL, knowing that PLL had agreed to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management, and having received two tranches of S$250,000 on or between 17 August 2016 and 8 September 2016 as part of that deposit, assisted or permitted PLL, in a manner the Respondent considered dishonest or ought to have considered dishonest, to wit, in not paying each of the tranches to the Judicial Managers when the Judicial Managers made a written demand for them through solicitors on 2 September 2016 for S$250,000, and again on 22 September 2016 for S$500,000 after the Respondent indicated that he had ceased to act for PLL in its dealings with the Judicial Managers.

2nd Charge (Charge 2A)

For fraudulent or grossly improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for PLL, assisted or permitted PLL to mislead the Judicial Managers of the Companies in a manner the Respondent knew or ought to have known was dishonest, to wit, when knowing that the Judicial Managers of the Companies believed that PLL had agreed prior to their appointment to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management, caused the Judicial Managers to continue to believe that PLL had agreed to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management by sending emails that confirmed that such deposit had been made in part, and is therefore guilty of a breach of Rule 10(6)(b) of the PCR.

Alternative 2nd Charge (Charge 2B)

For fraudulent or grossly improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for PLL, assisted or permitted PLL to mislead the Judicial Managers of the Companies in a manner the Respondent knew or ought to have known was dishonest, to wit, when knowing that the Judicial Managers of the Companies believed that PLL had agreed prior to their appointment to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management, did not while acting for PLL clarify PLL’s position that it had not agreed to so fund the judicial management and is therefore guilty of a breach of Rule 10(6)(b) of the PCR.

Further Alternative 2nd Charge (Charge 2AA)

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for PLL, assisted or permitted PLL to mislead the Judicial Managers of the Companies in a manner the Respondent knew or ought to have known was dishonest, to wit, when knowing that the Judicial Managers of the Companies believed that PLL had agreed prior to their appointment to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management, caused the Judicial Managers to continue to believe that PLL had agreed to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management by sending emails that confirmed that such deposit had been made in part.

Further Alternative 2nd Charge (Charge 2BB)

For misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in which the Respondent, while he and Jai Swarup Pathak were acting for PLL, assisted or permitted PLL to mislead the Judicial Managers of the Companies in a manner the Respondent knew or ought to have known was dishonest, to wit, when knowing that the Judicial Managers of the Companies believed that PLL had agreed prior to their appointment to deposit S$2 million towards the costs of managing the Companies whilst under judicial management, did not while acting for PLL clarify PLL’s position that it had not agreed to so fund the judicial management.

Findings and Determination of the DT; Council’s Sanctions

The DT first found that they had jurisdiction to deal with the Six Charges.

The DT then subsequently found that Rule 10(6)(b) of the PCR was not applicable to the facts of the complaint as it was intended to apply to Court proceedings. As such, Charges 1, 2A and 2B which involved a breach of Rule 10(6)(b) of the PCR could not be maintained against the Respondent and were dismissed.

The DT also found that although there was a Deposit Agreement made between PLL and the Complainants, Charge 1A was not made out against the Respondent as the totality of the evidence before the DT did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had assisted or permitted PLL, in a manner which the Respondent considered dishonest or ought to have considered dishonest, in not paying the $500,000 for the Judicial Managers’ fees.

As for Charges 2AA and 2BB, these were alternative charges to Charge 1A proffered against the Respondent on the basis that there was no Deposit Agreement and, in light of the DT’s finding that there was a Deposit Agreement, it was unnecessary for the DT to deal with Charges 2AA and 2BB.

The DT thus found that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the LPA.

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT with the Respondent and the Complainants bearing their respective costs.

To access the full report, click here.
",https://lawsoc-mc-assets.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/DT_Report_Lee_Teck_Leng_Robson_(DT_4)_20-25.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL SECRETARIAT
1 SUPREME COURT LANE, SINGAPORE 178879

TEL: 6332 4040, 6332 4060, FAX: 6332 4061
DT/SEC/04/2020
1 February 2021
BY EMAIL
Director, Conduct Department
The Law Society of Singapore
39 South Bridge Road
Singapore 058673
Mr Tan Chuan Thye, SC
Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP
9 Straits View
Marina One West Tower
#06-07
Singapore 018937
Dear Sirs
PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF LEE TECK LENG ROBSON
AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR
Pursuant to section 93(4)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed),
I submit a copy of the Report of the Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of Mr Lee Teck
Leng Robson

Yours faithfully

EDWIN SAN
SECRETARY
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
C:DT/04/2020.(18D) - ES/NA/AC

61

was not guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as
an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession
under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA;

as Charges 2AA and 2BB were alternative charges to Charge 1A proffered
against the Respondent on the basis that there was no Deposit Agreement, in
light of the DT’s

finding

that there was

a Deposit

Agreement,

it was

unnecessary for the DT to deal with Charges 2AA and 2BB;

pursuant to Section 93(1)(a) of the LPA, the DT determined that no cause of
sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83 of the LPA;
and

the DT ordered that the Respondent and the Complainants shall each bear
his or their respective costs.

Dated this

1st

day of February 2021.

President

Advocate & Solicitor

Ms Molly Lim, SC

Mr Tan Kheng Ann Alvin

",2021-10-06T06:00:51+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/,"In the Matter of Lee Teck Leng Robson (Respondent), Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2021/",1049
19,8595363e1671db737c12cf873d7b211dc540052e,"In the Matter of Looi Wan Hui, Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Looi Wan Hui, Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $8,000.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of a complaint lodged against him by a fellow Director of the Respondent’s former law practice. The Respondent was a Director of the said law practice until 31 August 2016 and was an associate of the law practice from 1 to 30 September 2016.

The Complainant alleged that the Respondent had:


continued his unauthorised practice under the name and style of the law practice after 30 September 2016; and failed to produce his accounting records and supporting documents pertaining to his legal practice with the law practice.

The following charges were preferred against the Respondent at the onset of the proceedings:

1st Charge

“That you, Looi Wan Hui, have been:

guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate and Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession (under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)); and/or guilty of a breach of Rule 7(1) and 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (being a breach of your obligation as a legal practitioner to accord another legal practitioner due respect to the latter as a member of a noble and honourable profession, and to treat the latter with courtesy and fairness) pursuant to Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)

in that you had continued to practice under the name and style of M/s JLim Law Corporation without the necessary permissions to do so after 30 September 2016, causing M/s JLim Law Corporation and the Complainant to have to take up a formal application in Court to rectify the undesirable circumstances caused by your conduct.”

2nd Charge

“That you, Looi Wan Hui, have been:

guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate and Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession (under section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)); and/or guilty of a breach of Rule 7(1) and 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (your obligation as a legal practitioner to accord another legal practitioner due respect to the latter as a member of a noble and honourable profession, and to treat the latter with courtesy and fairness) pursuant to section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161)

in that you had failed to do what was reasonably necessary to finalise and complete your exit from M/s JLim Law Corporation, causing M/s JLim Law Corporation and the Complainant to have to take up a formal application in Court to rectify the undesirable circumstances caused by your conduct.”

Findings by the DT

In relation to the 1st Charge, the DT noted that the Complainant had agreed to the Respondent’s request to be made JLim Law Corporation’s Associate for the month of September 2016, as a favour, to enable the Respondent to set up his own law practice. However, the Respondent did not facilitate the transfer of files and carried on with some matters in the name of the Complainant’s firm. The DT found that the Respondent’s actions were most discourteous and unfair to the Complainant and gave a totally false impression that the Complainant’s firm were still the solicitors on record when this was not the case. It was noted that the Respondent’s actions necessitated the Complainant resorting to legal action. Accordingly, the DT found that the Respondent had contravened Rule 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR 2015) and was guilty of improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act.

As for the 2nd Charge, the DT noted that the Respondent had an obligation to handover the relevant documents to the firm for filing of GST and annual returns and his failure to do so was to the detriment of the Complainant/Complainant’s law practice and lacked courtesy and that the law practice would be in breach of regulatory obligations. Further, this necessitated the Complainant to make an application to the Court in MC 22724/2016 to compel the Respondent to do so. Accordingly, the DT found that the Respondent had contravened Rule 7(2) of the PCR 2015 and was guilty of improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) the Act.

The DT also noted that the Respondent went bankrupt in February 2017.

Given the said circumstances, the DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $8,000. Further, the DT ordered that costs of the proceedings to be fixed at $2,000.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the findings of the DT and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $8,000.


",,,2020-07-06T06:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/,"In the Matter of Looi Wan Hui, Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/",1049
20,225a87fe268f473c8edcf9402353ecdcb882b94f,"In the Matter of Sham Chee Keat, Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Sham Chee Keat, Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000.

The complaint concerned a statement in the Affidavit of the Respondent’s client, in which the said client, who was the Plaintiff of the suit, deposed and attested that the Respondent did not inform the Court (during the Pre-Trial Conference or PTC on 2 March 2016) that they would make the application for bifurcation of the Suit by 16 March 2016 and that the Defendant involved in the suit had “misquoted and twisted the words of my solicitor…”.

However, the Notes of Evidence of the Assistant Registrar (AR) in relation to the PTC indicated that there was an agreement by both parties that the Suit was suitable for bifurcation. Woo Bih Li, J noted the inconsistencies between the Affidavit and the AR’s Notes of Evidence and referred the matter to the Society pursuant to section 85(3) of the Act.

The DT subsequently granted leave to the Society’s Counsel to amend its charges as the Statement of Case submitted to the DT alluded to carelessness or lack of diligence on the Respondent’s part rather than dishonesty. Accordingly, the amended charges preferred against the Respondent were read as follows:

1st Charge

“You, Sham Chee Keat, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed), to wit, by breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in that, sometime between 2 March 2016 and 11 June 2016, you had failed to be honest in all your dealings with your client, Ms Tan Chin Lay Evelyn, by providing information to her, to the effect that-

(a) you did not inform the court at the pre-trial conference on 2 March 2016 that you or your client, Ms Tan Chin Lay Evelyn (plaintiff in Suit No. 661 of 2015) would make the application for bifurcation by 16 March 2016; and

(b) the defendant in Suit No. 661 of 2015, Cheng Soo Many Stacy, had in paragraph 13 of her affidavit dated 23 May 2016 misquoted and twisted your words in stating that you informed the court that you or your client, Ms Tan Chin Lay Evelyn, would make the application for bifurcation by 16 March 2016 which statement is false,

which information you knew was false.”

An alternative charge to the 1st Charge was also tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

2nd Charge

“You, Sham Chee Keat, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed), to wit, by breaching Rule 9(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in that, sometime on or about 7 July 2016, you included or caused to be included in an affidavit deposed to by your client, Ms Tan Chin Lay Evelyn, the following statements of fact contained in paragraph 25 therein which you knew were inaccurate and false,

‘My solicitor did not inform this court that they would make an application for bifurcation by 16 March 2016. The Defendant has misquoted and twisted the words of my solicitor in paragraph 13 of the affidavit dated 23rd May 2016 in stating that my solicitor informed the court that they would make the application for bifurcation by 16 March 2016 which statement is false.’”

An alternative charge to the 2nd Charge was also tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. This was followed by a further alternative 2nd Charge referencing a breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR 2015) for the Respondent’s failure to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to the client by including or causing to be included the Affidavit deposed by his client the statement which formed the basis of the 2nd Charge.

Findings by the DT

The DT, inter alia, made the following findings:

The Respondent misunderstood the outcome of the PTC and his attendance notes were inaccurately recorded; Notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the Respondent’s Attendance Notes, he was not dishonest in providing information to the client about the PTC on 2 March 2016 when it seemed unlikely that he would have any motive to knowingly cause the Affidavit to contain an untruthful statement. It was more likely that he misunderstood the outcome of the PTC and thereafter relayed the incorrect position to the client; The Respondent was not dishonest in causing or allowing the Statement to appear in the Affidavit even if he was badgered or pressured by the client to include the inaccurate statement; and The Respondent breached his duty of reasonable diligence and competence in allowing the statement, which was false and/or inaccurate, to be in the Affidavit, and therefore he was only guilty of the alternative 2nd Charge referencing a breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of PCR 2015. Further, he ought to have referred to the AR’s Notes of Evidence as soon as the issue of the PTC arose in the course of drafting the Affidavit, and set the record straight before the client incorporated the untruthful statement back into the draft of her affidavit. Thus, the Respondent had acted carelessly with insufficient professional diligence and competence.

The DT found that the Respondent acted unprofessionally without diligence and competence. However, in the absence of dishonesty, the DT’s view was that such carelessness was not egregious enough to warrant the sternest sanction available under the Act.

Given the said circumstances, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000. Further, the DT ordered that costs of the proceedings to be fixed at $7,000 of the proceedings plus reasonable disbursements in favour of Law Society.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the findings of the DT, considered the Respondent’s oral and written mitigation and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $3,000.


",,,2020-07-06T06:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/,"In the Matter of Sham Chee Keat, Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/",1049
21,2c70261b7a8002d3fe7829ad8a3f7cc7ee345564,"In the Matter of Wong Sin Yee, Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Wong Sin Yee, Advocate and Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $6,000.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of a complaint by the Singapore Police Force that alleged that the Respondent had, on two separate occasions during his conversations with two different Investigation Officers (IOs), used offensive, insulting and threatening language against the two officers who were discharging their duties.

The Respondent had in his conversation with an IO threatened to lodge a complaint to his superiors as well as ‘Ministers’, challenged the IO to prefer criminal charges against his client and said that he will “drag the case against the client for one whole year” and the client would be made to “sell her body and earn money to pay [the Respondent’s] lawyer fees”.

In a separate conversation with another IO, he shouted at the IO that he “will be applying for hearing for the case”, accused the IO of being “cocky” and shouted “sure my balls, you are an idiot”.

Two charges were preferred against the Respondent.

The 1st Charge referenced his misconduct in the first conversation with one of the IOs, which was a breach Rule 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (PCR) 2010 amounting to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty under section 83(2)(b) of the Act.

The 2nd Charge referenced his misconduct in the second conversation with the other IO, which was a breach of Rule 8(3)(b) of PCR 2015 amounting to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty under section 83(2)(b) of the Act.

Additionally, two alternative charges were tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Findings of the DT

The Respondent pleaded guilty to the two alternative charges referencing section 83(2)(h) of the Act.

The DT agreed with the Society’s submissions that a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed would suffice. With reference to Law Society of Singapore v Ravi s/o Madasamy [2012] SGDT 12, the DT found that a penalty of $3,000 for each of the two charges (totalling $6,000) would be sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct.

For the foregoing reasons, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act, a penalty of $6,000 (S$3,000 per charge) should be imposed on the Respondent. Further, the DT determined the costs of the proceedings to be fixed at $3,000 plus reasonable disbursements.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the determination of the DT and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $6,000.


",,,2020-07-06T06:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/,"In the Matter of Wong Sin Yee, Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/",1049
22,62b222786466df55d18b0940fedad4aa775dce3f,"In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar, Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar, Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $2,000.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of a complaint in respect of some of the Respondent’s clients’ claims made by JKS Motorworks (Accident Claims) Pte Ltd, an agent engaged by various owners of vehicles which were involved in traffic accidents to claim for losses and/or damages arising therefrom.

The Respondent’s firm was engaged by these clients to claim for losses and/or damages arising from traffic accidents. The gist of the Complaint against the Respondent was that she had failed to act with reasonable diligence in the provision of her services to the clients, as she had failed to keep her clients (through the Complainant) informed of the progress of their respective cases.

Before the DT hearings, the DT was notified that the Law Society would proceed only on four charges (Charges No. 1, 3, 7 and 9) out of the initial 19 charges based on an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASOF) and the Respondent would be taking a certain course of action in relation to the four charges. The four charges which referred to breaches of Rule 5(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR 2015) for not keeping her clients informed of the progress of their respective claims, which amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act, were as follows:

Charge No. Dates between which no updates were provided to the client     1 24/12/15 – No updates as of formulation of ASOF dated 02/10/19   3 15/01/16 – 20/06/18   7 22/07/16 – 11/07/18   9 05/04/16 – 22/05/18

Findings by the DT

The Respondent pleaded guilty to the aforementioned four charges citing section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act at the onset of the proceedings.

The DT accepted the Respondent’s submissions that her misconduct did not involve any dishonesty or constitute grossly improper conduct and that instead it arose out of lapses in her management of the clients’ files. The DT found that no prejudice was caused to the clients. Whilst the Respondent’s misconduct undoubtedly and unfortunately fell short of the standards befitting an advocate and solicitor, there was no deliberate omission or intention to cause harm to the clients on her part.

Given the said circumstances, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the Act against the Respondent but she be ordered to pay a penalty of $4,000. The DT further determined that costs for the proceedings, which the Respondent agreed to bear, be fixed at $6,000.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the findings of the DT, considered the Respondent’s mitigation plea and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $2,000.


",,,2020-07-06T06:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/,"In the Matter of Constance Margreat Paglar, Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/",1049
23,367e0a29f2224b218367c8abb472e5e432371c26,"In the Matter of L. F. Violet Netto, Advocate & Solicitor","In the Matter of L. F. Violet Netto, Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of a complaint by the Attorney-General, in relation to two Personal Costs Orders (PCOs) that had been made against the Respondent. The Respondent had failed to comply with the PCOs within reasonable time and without reasonable explanation for such delay, and she had also failed to accord the respective State Counsel of the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) the courtesy of responding to their letters (specifically, a final reminder from the AGC) in connection with the PCOs. In addition, the Respondent had chosen to ignore the final chaser from the AGC to comply with the PCOs.

As a result of the said circumstances, a total of three charges were formulated against the Respondent.

The First Charge and the Second Charge were for the Respondent’s failure to comply with cost orders (in HC/OS 130/2015 and HC/OS 226/2015, respectively) made against her within a reasonable time and without any reasonable explanation which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act.

The Third Charge was for the Respondent’s breach of Rule 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules by neglecting, refusing and/or failing to respond to AGC’s letter of 23 February 2018 in relation to her payment obligations under the costs orders, which amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act.

An Alternative Third Charge referencing section 83(2)(h) of the Act was also formulated.

Findings by the DT

Prior to the proceedings by the DT proper, the Respondent made payment for the outstanding amount. However, the AGC stated that it wished to proceed with the matter.

The DT noted that the final payment for the costs were made some three years after the orders were made and it was the Respondent who had sought the AGC’s indulgence to settle the costs orders along with the proposed quantum and timing for the instalments. Thereafter, she repeatedly failed to honour the payment schedules as agreed between her and the AGC, and as a result the AGC had to chase for the overdue payments and repeatedly remind her of her obligations. Further, it was only after AGC had referred the matter to the Society that the Respondent decided to make the final payment.

To this end, the Respondent was not able to provide any satisfactory explanation as to why she could not have responded to AGC’s letter dated 23 February 2018 or why she could not have paid that amount. Her dilatory conduct in failing to comply with the costs orders within a reasonable time and without out any reasonable explanation goes against the “interest of the judicial administration of justice”. Accordingly, the DT found the Respondent guilty of the First Charge and Second Charge.

For the Third Charge, the DT noted that between 13 April 2015 and 22 February 2018, the Respondent had failed to respond to approximately 14 letters from the AGC in relation to the costs orders, including the letter dated 23 February 2018 which was the final chaser from the AGC and she was not able to provide any satisfactory explanation as to why she could not have done so. As such, the DT found her guilty of the Third Charge.

Given the said circumstances, the DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded. The DT made no order as to costs.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the determination of the DT and reprimanded the Respondent.
",,,2020-07-06T06:00:09+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/,"In the Matter of L. F. Violet Netto, Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jul-2020/",1049
24,dabb4099223a46672fea0410970fdd9f06c7a015,In the Matter of Chan Chun Hwee Allan Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Chan Chun Hwee Allan Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) has determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000.

The disciplinary proceedings were brought by the Law Society against the Respondent for breach of ethical and professional standards that were expected of the Respondent as an advocate and solicitor. The gravamen of the charges related to the Respondent’s rendering of excessive bills to one of his clients’. The said client filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Law Society on 12 October 2015, which led to the present proceedings.


The following charges were preferred against the Respondent at the onset of the proceedings:

1st Charge

“You, Chan Chun Hwee Allan, are charged that you, on or about 8 September 2014, at 133 New Bridge Road, #14-06 Chinatown Point, Singapore 059413, did charge your client a total fee of $32,768.20 (including $268.20 for disbursements) for work done by you as his solicitor for the period 7 August 2013 to 8 September 2014, as evidenced by your Bill No.1582/14 dated 8 September 2014, which fee was far in excess of and disproportionate to what you were reasonably entitled to charge for the services rendered to your client, and such overcharging by you amounts to a breach of Rule 38 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (“PCR”), and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act as amounts to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.”

2nd Charge

“You, Chan Chun Hwee Allan, are charged that you, on or about 24 April 2015, at 133 New Bridge Road, #14-06 Chinatown Point, Singapore 059413, did charge your client a total fee of $72,063.80 (including $563.80 for disbursements) for work done by you as his solicitor for the period 7 August 2013 to 8 September 2014, as evidenced by your Bill of Costs No. FC/BC11/2015 dated 24 April 2015, which fee was far in excess of and disproportionate to what you were reasonably entitled to charge for the services rendered to your client, and such overcharging by you amounts to a breach of Rule 38 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act as amounts to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.”

Additionally, an alternative 2nd charge was tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

At the onset of the disciplinary proceedings, the Respondent contended that both charges were against the rule of duplicity as they were related to overcharging for the same set of work done. He contended that only the 1st Charge should be considered by the DT. However, the DT determined that both charges were related to separate and distinct acts. While the 1st charge was related to his invoice, the 2nd charge was related to the Bill of Costs presented for taxation instead.

Findings by the DT

Whilst the DT was of the view that there had been breaches of Rule 38 of the PCR as per both charges, the DT did not consider these breaches as amounting to grossly improper conduct on the part of the Respondent. Otherwise, the DT accepted the Respondent’s explanation and found that the nature of the errors relating to the wrongful inclusion of items in the Bill of Costs pointed to an oversight rather than deceit. Moreover, this was the presentation of a Bill of Costs, and not the presentation of an invoice, so it is an act one step removed from requiring payment by the Complainant and hence an act one step removed from bringing pressure to bear on him to pay the bill. Although the breaches did not amount to grossly improper conduct, the DT found the Respondent’s conduct unsatisfactory and that the alternative 2nd charge set out below was made out.

Alternative 2nd Charge

“You, Chan Chun Hwee Allan, are charged that you, on or about 24 April 2015, at 133 New Bridge Road, #14-06 Chinatown Point, Singapore 059413, did charge your client a total fee of $72,063.80 (including $563.80 for disbursements) for work done by you as his solicitor for the period 7 August 2013 to 8 September 2014, as evidenced by your Bill of Costs No. FC/BC11/2015 dated 24 April 2015, which fee was far in excess of and disproportionate to what you were reasonably entitled to charge for the services rendered to your client, and further, in which Bill of Costs, you included items which you are not legally entitled to claim fees for work done and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act.”

Given the said circumstances, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000. Further, the DT ordered the Respondent to bear the costs of these proceedings, to be taxed if not agreed.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council agreed with the determination of the DT and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $5,000.


",,,2020-06-06T06:00:04+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,In the Matter of Chan Chun Hwee Allan Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,1049
25,33761d9f8871ada7e5e8c70736f4630d3bdc8fd0,In the Matter of Kang Bee Leng Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Kang Bee Leng Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of a complaint by the Attorney-General that the Respondent had breached Rule 70D of the Act. Prior to this complaint, the Respondent had been convicted of an offence under section 39 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA) for failing to file a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) despite having reasonable grounds to believe that the $5.5 million paid by her client towards the purchase of a property represented proceeds that were linked to a Ponzi scheme operating in China. The evidence showed that the Respondent had been informed by the real estate agent that her client had been detained by the authorities in China for her involvement in a Ponzi scheme and thereafter the Respondent came across various news articles verifying that her client had indeed been involved the said Ponzi scheme.

The Respondent became suspicious that the monies used by the client to pay for the said property purchase could have been derived from fraud. However, despite her suspicions, she did not file an STR as stipulated under section 39(1)(a) of the CDSA. On 17 April 2018, she was sentenced to a fine of $10,000 for an offence under section 39 of the CDSA.

The Respondent was charged for failing to disclose to a STR Officer by way of a suspicious transaction report or to an authorised officer under the CDSA that the monies paid by her client towards the purchase of a property represented proceeds of an act that may have constituted criminal conduct despite having reasonable grounds to believe so and had thereby breached section 70D of the Act, such breach amounting to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.

Additionally, an alternative charge was tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Findings by the DT

The Respondent pleaded guilty to the charge referencing section 83(2)(b)(ii) of the Act at the onset of the proceedings.

The DT noted that the obligation for a solicitor to file an STR imposed by the CDSA is one of strict compliance and failure to do so not only constituted a criminal offence but also invited disciplinary proceedings to be taken out against her under section 70G of the Act.

Having considered the Respondent’s mitigation submissions, the DT accepted that her failure to file the STR was more of a lapse in judgement rather than a deliberate refusal to do so and noted that there was no dishonesty involved. Further, other than acting as the conveyancing lawyer in the aborted purchase of the property, the Respondent was not in any way involved in the criminal conduct relating to the receipt of four payments towards the purchase of the said property.

Given the said circumstances, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under section 83 of the Act against the Respondent but she should be reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty of $5,000. The DT further determined that costs for the proceedings be fixed at $2,000.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the findings of the DT and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $1,000.


",,,2020-06-06T06:00:04+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,In the Matter of Kang Bee Leng Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,1049
26,2d50a1c39f268fba8ce6be99433e42ba53667623,In the Matter of Kangatharan Kandavellu  Formerly an Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Kangatharan Kandavellu  Formerly an Advocate & Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that, whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $15,000.

The said disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a qualified Accountant’s Report dated 6 July 2015, which was submitted by the Respondent to apply to renew his practicing certificate in July 2015. The aforementioned Accountant’s Report showed that the Respondent’s Firm’s client account was overdrawn and the accountant could not verify with supporting documents (such as bills, disbursement schedules or other authorisation documents) transfers from the Firm’s client account to its office account for payment of legal fees in respect of six cases, as well as a general journal entry. These issues raised by the accountant in the said Account Report revealed several breaches of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Account) Rules (‘SAR’), and the said breaches formed the substance of the five charges preferred against the Respondent.

The following charges were preferred against the Respondent:

1st Charge

“You, Kangatharan Kandavellu, being an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, on or about 30 June 2014, withdrew a total sum of $36,328.26 from the Clients Account of KANGA & CO which exceeded the sum of $11,078.65 being the total of the money held at the material time in the said Clients Account and in so doing you have thereby breached Rule 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).”

2nd Charge

“You, Kangatharan Kandavellu, being an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, on or about 31 December 2014, withdrew a total sum of $53,520.70 from the Clients Account of KANGA & CO which exceeded the sum of $28,270.99 being the total of the of the money held at the material time in the said Clients Account and in so doing you have thereby breached Rule 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).”

3rd Charge

“You, Kangatharan Kandavellu, being an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, failed to keep proper accounting records for the accounting period of 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014, namely, records of payment of $10,000.00, $11,200.00, $6,000.00, $8,000.00, $3,500.00 and $1,400.00 into the Clients Account of KANGA & CO and in so doing you have thereby breached Rule 11(1) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).”

4th Charge

“You, Kangatharan Kandavellu, being an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, failed to keep a record of all bills of costs (distinguishing between profit costs and disbursements) and of all written intimations under Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) and 9(2)(c)(i) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules delivered or made by your clients for the accounting period of 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014, namely, your bills of costs for $11,200.00 which sum was withdrawn on or around 21 February 2014 and in so doing you have thereby breached Rule 11(3) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).”

5th Charge

“You, Kangatharan Kandavellu, being an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, failed to conduct monthly reconciliation of the balance of your clients’ cash books with your clients’ bank statements and to keep a statement showing the reconciliation for the months of June 2014 and December 2014, and you have thereby breached Rule 11(4) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161).”

Additionally, five alternative charges were tendered against the Respondent citing section 83(2)(h) of the Act for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Findings and Determination of the DT

The Respondent pleaded guilty to the five alternative charges at the onset of the proceedings.

The DT agreed with the Society’s Counsel that the breaches of Rules 7 and Rule 11 of the SAR in the present case could be seen as less serious than a failure to deposit client’s money into a client account, in contravention of Rule 3 of the SAR. As the funds in question had properly been deposited into a client account initially, the accountant was able to highlight issues with the accounts that led to the breaches being discovered and rectified. Furthermore, the Respondent had neither been fraudulent nor dishonest and the breaches did not lead to a permanent loss to any client.

In Law Society of Singapore v Tay Choon Leng John [2012] 3 SLR 150, the DT noted that where dishonesty or deceit on the solicitor’s part was not made out, the starting point should be a monetary penalty. Whilst the sum of $15,000 imposed in Tay Choon Leng John was related to a more serious breach of Rule 3 of the SAR, the client account in the present matter was overdrawn to a greater extent. Furthermore, the Respondent’s failure to keep proper accounting records, records of bills and to conduct monthly reconciliation also affected a larger number of transactions rather than just two as in Tay Choon Leng John.

For the foregoing reasons, the DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, a penalty of $15,000 should be imposed on the Respondent. Further, pursuant to section 93(2) of the Act, the DT ordered the Respondent to pay the Society costs of $3,000 plus reasonable disbursements.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the findings of the DT and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $2,500.


",,,2020-06-06T06:00:04+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,In the Matter of Kangatharan Kandavellu  Formerly an Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,1049
27,c82a7ffe3e4792c27b399f4fa0dd1a28ef7d3f05,In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor,"In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded.

The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of his failure to keep the client’s daughter/Complainant informed of matters concerning his High Court Suit of various matters in the client’s High Court Suit and his subsequent discharge from the matter. The client was at the material time facing criminal charges overseas and was detained, thus becoming uncontactable. It was later learnt that he subsequently suffered a stroke.

A total of 12 charges were preferred against the Respondent at the onset of the proceedings. Each of the principal charges referenced section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act whilst the alternative charges referenced section 83(2)(h) of the Act. The charges referencing the various breaches of the 2010 edition of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (‘PCR’) and the findings by the DT are summarized in the table below.

Nature of Charge Findings of the DT     1st Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the directions made at the 25 January PTC. Charge made out as DT found that the Law Society had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent had made “no attempt” to inform his client of the directions made at the PTC.   2nd Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the directions made at the 8 February PTC. Charge made out, the DT took the same position as it did for the 1st charge.   3rd Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT found that the Respondent had served a copy of the Discharge Order on his client’s last known address in compliance with Order 64 Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.   4th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent failed to give client due notice of discharge by making no attempt to inform the client about the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 3rd charge.   5th charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent failed to allow client reasonable time to substitute a new solicitor, by making no attempt to inform the client about the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 3rd and 4th charge.   6th charge Breach of Rule 56 of PCR for making a false and misleading statement during his discharge application when he informed the Court that his client was estranged from his children and unable to find others to contact. Charge dismissed, DT found that Respondent’s statement to be an honest belief and the requisite mens rea to “knowingly” mislead or deceive the Court when he made the Representation was absent.   7th Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of his matter’s progress when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client about the directions given or Interlocutory Judgment (IJ) entered at the 28 February PTC. Charge dismissed, Law Society acknowledged that the Respondent would not be aware of any updates in the Suit after being discharged from the same.   8th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client about the directions given or IJ entered at the 28 February PTC. Charge dismissed, the DT takes the same position as it did for the 7th charge.   9th Charge Breach of Rule 53A of PCR for misleading the Complainant into believing that he was still acting for the client when he had obtained a discharge from so acting. Charge made out, the DT found that the response given by the Respondent evidence did not make it clear that he was no longer acting for the client but seemed to suggest he was still involved in the Suit, thereby still acting for the client.   10th Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of his matter’s progress when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client of discharge. Charge dismissed, Law Society was unable to provide that even though it was the Complainant who called him, the Respondent’s duty extended to contacting the client to inform him of the discharge.   11th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent made no attempt to inform the client that the Respondent’s firm had been discharged as client’s solicitors. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 10th charge.   12th Charge Breach of Rule 53A of PCR for misleading the Complainant into believing that the Respondent was still acting for client when he had already obtained a discharge from so acting. Charged dismissed, the WhatsApp messages and emails cannot be said to be misleading when the Complainant was aware before exchanging messages with the Respondent that the Respondent had discharged himself, and the last message stating that he “will revert” did not amount to any representation that the Respondent was still acting or not acting for the client in the Suit.

In arriving at its determination, the DT noted that in relation to the 1st charge, the omission to inform the client of the directions made at the 25 January PTC was more of an error of judgment on the Respondent’s part as to whether other means of communicating with the client (such as via e-mails or third parties) are viable/permissible in view of his obligations to keep client information confidential. As for the 9th Charge, the DT accepted the Respondent’s submission that there was no intention to mislead the client as well as the Society’s submission that the conduct was not so serve as to constitute taking unfair advantage of the Complainant since the Respondent never gained any real benefit at all.

For the foregoing reasons, the DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded.

The Council’s Decision

Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the determination of the DT and ordered the Respondent to be reprimanded.
",,,2020-06-06T06:00:04+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/,1049
28,07e7baec882d4cd36a2828591d7c6a36c859e322,In the Matter of Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern) (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor,"In the Matter of Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern) (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor

The present proceedings against the Respondent arose out of information referred by the Deputy Attorney-General to the Law Society that the Respondent may have “potentially breached Rules 25 and 46” of the (the Professional Conduct Rules 2010 Edition)”. On the application of the Society, on the 13 of February 2019 the Chief Justice empaneled a Disciplinary Tribunal to be presided by Mr Sarjit Singh Gill SC and Mr Yee Kee Shian Leon as Advocate member. The complaint related to the preparation and execution of the Last Will of the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew (Mr Lee) on or around 16 and 17 December 2013.

Two charges were preferred against the Respondent:


1st Charge – Breach of Rule 25(a) and/or (b) of the PCR in that the Respondent failed to advance Mr Lee’s interest unaffected by her interest or the interest of her husband, LHY by preparing and arranging for the execution of Mr Lee’s Will where a one-third share in Mr Lee’s Estate was to be given to LHY and such act amounting to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act).

2nd Charge – Breach of Rule 46 of PCT by acting in respect of significant gift (a one-third share of in Mr Lee’s Estate) that Mr Lee intended to give by Will to LHY and failing to advise Mr Lee to be independently advised in respect of this significant gift, such acts amounting to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duty within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act.

Other than the aforesaid main charges, alternative charges, based on the same facts as the main charges but referencing improper conduct and or practice as a solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the Act (DT refers to these charges as “Charge 1A” and “Charge 2A” to distinguish them from the main charges and further alternative referencing misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as a member of an honorable profession or as an officer of the Court under section 83(2)(h) of the Act (DT refers to these charges as “Charge 1B” and “Charge 2B” to distinguish them from the main charges were also preferred against the Respondent.

The Disciplinary Tribunal hearings were conducted over five hearing days with written submissions filed and on the 18th of February 2020 the Disciplinary Tribunal issued its report. The Disciplinary Tribunal found the Respondent guilty of all charges and determined pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Act that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act.

Pursuant to the findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal and section 94 of the Act, Council determined to apply pursuant to section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause why the Respondent should not be made liable to suffer the sanctions pursuant to section 83(1) of the Act.

To access the full report click here.
",https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Lee_Suet_Fern_DT_Report-c.pdf,"DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
1 SUPREME

COURT

LANE,

SECRETARIAT

SINGAPORE

178879

TEL: 6332 4040, 6332 4060, FAX: 6332 4061

DT/SEC/01/2019
18 February 2020

Director, Conduct Department

The Law Society of Singapore
28 Maxwell Road
#01-03 Maxwell Chambers Suite
Singapore 069120
Dear Sir

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF LEE SUET FERN (LIM SUET FERN)
AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR
Pursuant to section 93(4)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed),
I submit a copy of the Report of the Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of Mrs Lee Suet
Fern.

Yours faithfully

EDWIN SAN
SECRETARY
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

C:DT/01/2019.(18D) - ES/AC.

DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
DT/1/2018
In the Matter of LEE SUET FERN (LIM
SUET

FERN),

an

Advocate

and

Solicitor
And
In the Matter of the Legal Profession

Act (Chapter 161, 2009 Rev ED)

REPORT

Coram:

Mr Sarjit Singh Gill, SC
Mr Yee Kee Shian Leon
Solicitors for the Applicant

Solicitors for the Respondent

M/s WongPartnership LLP
Mr Tan Chee Meng, SC

M/s Providence Law LLC
Mr Tan Wee Kheng Kenneth

Ms Koh Swee Yen
Mr Eugene Oh Jiayi

Michael, SC
Mr Walter Woon, SC
Mr Abraham Vergis
Ms Asiyah Arif
Ms Soh Wei Chi

|

TABLE OF CONTENTS
|.

Introduction

I

The Charges against the Respondent ..

HH.

Background 0.0... seecseeeereeenaneceeetenenereneestenenssnenttensenenrritesasatent

(A)

The relevant parties

(B)

Mr Lee’s First to Sixth Wills.

(C)

MrLee’s First Will

(D)

Mr Lee’s subsequent changes to his Wills

(E)

Mr Lee’s Sixth (or Penultimate) Will

(F)

Events preceding the Last Will...

(G)

The Last Will

(H)

Mr Lee's Codicil .

esi csssesesseceensetsenteseeees

(I) Mr Lee’s passing
IV.

Procedural History

(A)

AGC referral

(B)

Originating Summons 639 of 2019 (‘os 639”)

(C)

The Hearing & submissions...

V.

Preliminary Issues
(A)

Jurisdiction

(B)

Admissibility of evidence

(C)

Unfair Conduct.

VI.

Summary of the Parties’ Positions on the Charges...

(A)

The Law Society's Case

(B)

The Respondent's Case
issues for determination ...

VI.

on

(A)

Implied Retainer ...........

(B)

Breach of duties/Misconduct

(C)

Cause for disciplinary action

VIII. Retainer..........

(A)
(B}

The applicable principles ....
The relevant questions to be considered on the question of Implied

Retainer, the evidence that was presented and our viewS...............-.. 58
136
Conclusion on question of Implied Retainer...
(D) The positions that the parties had taken previously, in respect of
137
some of the questions that arose before us
(C)

IX.

(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

Breach of Duties / Misconduct

Preliminary point......ccccceeersetetensecerensenesenensssererennesnaseaens
The Primary and Alternative First Charges — Rule 25, PCR.....162
The Primary and Alternative Second Charges: Rule 46 of the PCR
179
Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA: Grossly improper conduct........... 184

X.

The Further Alternative First & Second Charges............0-0+
Cause of sufficient gravity under section 93 of the LPA...

Xl.

Conclusion...

XID

ANMOX Al.

(E)

XIN ANM@X Bice

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XIV. ANNEX Coie
XV.

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Annex Di

XVI Annex BE...

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Introduction

These proceedings concern charges (collectively the ""Charges”) of
professional misconduct brought by the Law Society of Singapore
(the ""Law Society""), against Mrs Lee Suet Fern (Ms Lim Suet Fern)
(the “Respondent’).
The

Charges

relate

to

the

Respondent's

involvement

in

the

preparation and execution of the last will (the ""Last Will"") of Mr Lee
Kuan Yew (“Mr Lee”) on or around 16 and 17 December 2013. The
Respondent is Mr Lee’s daughter-in-law, and she is married to the
youngest of Mr Lee's three children, Mr Lee Hsien Yang (“Mr LHY”).
The Last Will increased Mr LHY’s share in Mr Lee's estate (the
“Estate”), as compared with Mr Lee’s immediate preceding will.
The Respondent is an advocate and solicitor of 37 years’ standing.
She is the founder of Stamford Law Corporation (‘Stamford Law’),
now Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC (‘MLS’), and was its Senior
Director at the material time. She is currently a director of MLS.
On 13 February 2019, the Honourable Chief Justice appointed this
Disciplinary Tribunal (the “Tribunal’) to hear and investigate the
matter.

The Charges against the Respondent

The Law Society preferred two primary charges against the
Respondent. These are brought on the ground of grossly improper
conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161,
2009 Rev Ed) (the “LPA’), read with the Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap. 161, R1, 2010 Rev Ed) (the
“PCR’). Alternative and further alternative charges were also

formulated,

of the two primary charges

for each

(collectively the

“Charges”). The Charges are:
First Charge

That

you,

Mrs

Lee

Suet

Fern

(Lim

Suet

Fern),

are

charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December

2013, during the course of your retainer for your client,
Mr Lee Kuan Yew, breached Rule 25(a) and/or Rule
25(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)
Rules (Cap. 161, R14, 2010 Rev Ed) in that you failed to
advance your client's interest unaffected by your interest
and/or the interest of your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang,
by preparing and arranging for the execution of your
client's will where a one-third share in ‘your client's
estate was to be given to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien
Yang, such act amounting to grossly improper conduct
in the discharge of your professional duty within the
meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.
161, 2009 Rev Ed).
(‘Charge 1”)
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE

That you, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern), are
charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December
2013, during the course of your retainer for your client,
Mr Lee Kuan Yew, breached Rule 25(a) and/or Rule
25(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)
Rules (Cap. 161, R1, 2010 Rev Ed) in that you failed to
advance your client's interest unaffected by your interest

and/or the interest of your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang,

by preparing and arranging for the execution of your
client's will where a one-third share in your client’s
estate was to be given to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien
Yang, such act amounting to improper conduct or
practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning
of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev Ed).

(‘Charge 1A’)
OR, IN THE FURTHER ALTERNATIVE
That you, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern), are
charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December

2013, you failed to advance Mr Lee Kuan Yew's interest

unaffected by your interest and/or the interest of your
husband,

Mr

Lee

Hsien

Yang,

by

preparing

and

arranging for the execution of Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s will
where a one-third share in Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s estate
was to be given to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang,
such act amounting to misconduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme
Court

or as a member

of an

honourable

profession

within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Eq).
(‘Charge 1B”)
Second Charge

That you, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern), are
charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December
2013, during the course of your retainer for your client,

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, breached Rule 46 of the Legal
Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap. 161,R1,
2010 Rev Ed) by acting in respect of a significant gift (a
one-third share in your client's estate) that your client
intended to give by will to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien
Yang, and failing to advise your client to be
independently advised in respect of this significant gift,
such acts amounting to grossly improper conduct in the
discharge of your professional duty within the meaning
of s 83(2)(b) af the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009
Rev Ed).
(“Charge 2"")
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE

That

you,

Mrs

Lee

Suet

Fern

(Lim

Suet

Fern),

are

charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December
2013, during the course of your retainer for your client,
Mr Lee Kuan Yew, breached Rule 46 of the Legal

Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap, 161, R1,
2010 Rev Ed) by acting in respect of a significant gift (a
one-third share in your client’s estate) that your client

intended to give by will to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien
Yang, and failing to advise your client to be
independently advised in respect of this significant gift,
such act amounting to improper conduct or practice as
an

advocate

and

solicitor

within

the

meaning

83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.
Rev Ed).

of s

161, 2009

(‘Charge 2A”)
OR, IN THE FURTHER ALTERNATIVE
That you, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern), are
charged that, sometime between 16 and 17 December
2013, by acting in respect of a significant gift (a one-third
share in Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s estate) that Mr Lee Kuan
Yew intended to give by will to your husband, Mr Lee
Hsien Yang, and failing to advise Mr Lee Kuan Yew to
be independently advised in respect of this significant
gift, such
advocate

act amounting to misconduct unbefitting an
and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme

Court or as a member of an honourable profession
within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).
(‘Charge 2B"")

The Respondent has defined the first primary Charge as “Charge 1"",
and the alternative first Charge and further alternative first Charge as
“Charge 1A” and “Charge 1B” respectively. Similarly, the second
primary Charge has been defined as “Charge 2”, and the alternative
second Charge and further alternative second Charge as “Charge 2A”

and “Charge
definitions.

2B”

respectively.

The

Tribunal

will

adopt

these

As would be apparent, each of the alternative and further alternative

Charges are premised on the same conduct, as their corresponding
primary Charges. However:
(a)

The primary Charges (Charges 1 and 2) are premised on the
conduct in question being grossly improper conduct, as
defined in section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

(b)

The alternative Charges (Charges 1A and 2A) are brought on
the alternative ground in section 83(2)(b) of the LPA
(‘improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor’).

(c)

The further alternative Charges (Charges 1B and 2B) are
unlike their respective primary and alternative Charges, in that
(i) they

are

not

premised

on

the

existence

of a retainer

between the Respondent and Mr Lee, and (ii) they are brought
under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA (“misconduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor’).
The Respondent pleaded not guilty to all the Charges. Proceedings
before the Disciplinary Tribunals are quasi-criminal in nature. This

means that the Law Society has to prove
Respondent beyond reasonable doubt.

its case

against the

Background

We will first set out briefly the undisputed background facts. We will,
where necessary, also refer to emails and other documents. The
respective parties’ evidence and positions will be considered, as
appropriate, when we set out our views.

(A)

The relevant parties

10.

Mr Lee was the first Prime Minister of Singapore, and served in that
role from 1959 to 1990. Subsequently, he served as Senior Minister,
and thereafter Minister Mentor.

11.

Other than Mr LHY, Mr Lee’s two other children (in order of age) are
Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“Mr LHL”) and Dr Lee Wei Ling (""Dr LWL"").

12.

Mr Lee’s wife, Mdm
Thereafter,

and

Kwa Geok Choo, passed away in October 2010.
before the Last Will in December 2013, Mr Lee

executed six other wills (the “First Will” to the “Sixth Will” or
“Penultimate Wil”). Ms Kwa Kim Li (“Ms KKL”), a partner in the law
firm Lee & Lee, prepared all these six Wills for Mr Lee.
13.

Mr Lee was 90 years old when he signed the Last Will in December

2013. He passed away in March 2015.

(B)

Mr Lee’s First to Sixth Wills

14.

Mr Lee’s First to Sixth Wills were executed on the following dates:

(a) _ First Will - 20 August 2011;
(b)

Second Wil! = 24 December 2011;

(c)

Third Will ~ 6 September 2012;

(d)

Fourth Will - 20 September 2012;

(e)

Fifth Will - 4 October 2012; and

(f)

Sixth (or Penultimate) Will — 2 November 2012.

15.

Ms KKL retained the originals of ail six Wills‘.

(C)

Mr Lee’s First Will

16.

Mr Lee executed his First Will on 20 August 2011. It is not in dispute
that this First Will was drafted by Ms KKL. It is also not in dispute that
the Respondent made some drafting suggestions to Ms KKL, with Mr
Lee's approval, on the First Will. At the time, there had been
discussions between Mr Lee and his three children, Mr LHL, Dr LWL

and Mr LHY, regarding the future of Mr Lee’s residence at 38 Oxley
Road (“38 Oxley’). These discussions sometimes included Mr Lee's
daughters-in-law, namely the Respondent and Ms Ho Ching.

17.

On 17 August 2011, the Respondent emailed Mr Lee, with Mr LHY

and Dr LWL in copy, with a draft of a passage to be included in Mr
Lee's First Will?. Mr Lee then instructed Ms KKL to include the portion
drafted by the Respondent in his First Will>.
18.

On 19 August 2011, at 11.06pm, the Respondent
and Ms KKL,

emailed Mr Lee

attaching a document titled “WILL-LKY — Draft of 19

August 2011 — v3.DOC’4, The document contained additional edits
that the Respondent had made to the draft. The changes made to the

draft document were marked up. This was the final draft of the First
Will, which Mr Lee executed the following day, on 20 August 201 18.
+ See paragraph 266 of this Decision.

2 Law Society's Bundle of Documents (“LSS BOD""), Vol 4, p 91, email from the Respondent to Mr Lee,
Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 17 August 2011, 11.21pm.
3 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 91, email from Mr Lee to the Respondent, Ms KKL, Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 17
August 2011, 11.23pm.
4 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 101 — 108, email from the Respondent to Ms KKL and Mr Lee dated 19 August
2011, 11:06pm, with the attachment “WILL-LKY — Draft of 19 August 2011 - v3.DO0C"".
3 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 107 — 112, First Will executed by Mr Lee on 20 August 2011.

(D)

Mr Lee's subsequent changes to his Wills

19.

Subsequently, Mr Lee executed five further wills before the Last Will.
Some

of the

differences

between

Mr

Lee’s

First to

Sixth

Wills

concerned the following areas:
(a)

(bo)

What shares in the Estate each child would receive;

| Whether the Will contained a Demolition Clause (setting out
Mr Lee's wishes for his residence at 38 Oxley to be
demolished after his passing) and, if so, which of two versions
of the Demolition Clause; and

(c)

| Whether Dr LWL was to be given a
after Mr Lee’s passing and, if so:
(i)

right to reside at 38 Oxley

| Whether Dr LWL'’s right to reside at 38 Oxley was (A)
stated to be free of rent; and/or (B) subject to Mr LHL’s
consent; and

ii}

Whether Mr LHL was to pay for the upkeep of 38 Oxley,
for as long as Dr LWL stayed there.

A table setting out these differences is at Annex A®.
20.

Some of the changes in the Wills were as follows:
(a)

In the Second Will, the clause granting Dr LWL a right to reside
in 38 Oxley was removed;

® The Wills are in LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 264 - 289.

(b) — In the Third Will, Dr LWL was granted a

life interest in the

Estate in place of the one-third share she had been given in
the First and Second Wills;

(c)

In the Fourth Will, the distribution of the Estate in equal shares
was restored;

(d)

Inthe Fifth Will, a right to reside at 38 Oxley was granted again
to Dr LWL. The Demolition Clause (relating to the demolition
of 38 Oxley) was removed; and

(e)

In the Sixth (or Penultimate) Will, the shares that Mr Lee’s
children would receive upon his death were amended, such
that there was a total of seven shares. Mr LHL and Mr LHY
each received two shares, whilst Dr LWL received three
shares (one share more than each of her brothers).

21.

All of Mr Lee's First to Sixth Wills contained a gift-over clause, which
made provision for the scenarios where any of Mr Lee's children
predeceased him. The same gift-over clause was included in all of
these wills, save for the Third Will (which granted Dr LWL only a life
interest in the Estate), wherein the gift-over clause was amended to
provide that if Or LWL pre-deceased Mr Lee, her share in the Estate
would lapse. (See Annex A.)

(E)

Mr Lee’s Sixth (or Penultimate) Will

22.

As stated above, Mr Lee’s Sixth (or Penultimate) Will, which was
signed slightly over a year before the Last Will, gave Dr LWL an extra
share in the Estate.

23.

This appears to be the only difference between the Fifth and Sixth
Wills. Like Mr Lee’s Fifth Will, the Sixth Will did not contain any

Demolition Clause, and Dr LWL’s right to reside at 38 Oxley was
made subject to Mr LHL’s consent.
24,

Thus, the position as of the Sixth Will was that (a) Mr Lee did not want
to include the Demolition Clause for 38 Oxley, and (b) Dr LWL’s right
to reside at 38 Oxley was made subject to Mr LHL's consent.

25.

On Mr Lee’s instructions, both the Fifth and Sixth Wills also expressly
stated that Dr LWL's right to reside at 38 Oxley did not give Dr LWL
a life interest in the property.

26.

The Last Will made significant changes to the Sixth Will in respect of
the shares that each child would receive. A Demolition Clause was

added. There were also other changes (these will be dealt with later).

(F)

Events preceding the Last Will

27,

In 2013,

Mr Lee’s

health

Between

deteriorated.

September

and

October 2013, Mr Lee was hospitalised for an extended period, over
several weeks, due to a number of different medical issues. These
included pneumonia,

atrial fibrillation, and transient ischemic attack

(or mini strokes)’.
28.

The

documentary

evidence,

and

in

particular,

the

email

correspondence between Ms KKL and Mr Lee, shows that sometime
around 30 November 2013 (17 days prior to Mr Lee signing his Last

Will), Mr Lee had asked Ms KKL about his Sixth (or Penultimate) Will.
It is apparent that Ms KKL envisaged that Mr Lee would make
7 Itwas the Respondent's own case before the Tribunal that Mr Lee had been in and out of the hospital
in September and October 2013.
See Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 23, 24; Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August
2019) at para 11; Counsel for the Law Society canfirmed that they were not challenging Mr LHY's
evidence on the issue. See Transcripts, 4 July 2019, Page 147 line 7 to line 5 (hereinafter the notation
used will be: “Transcripts (4 July 2019), 147:1-5"").

10

amendments or changes to the Sixth Will. Mrs KKL sent an email of
30 November 2013? and the final line of her email to Mr Lee read:
“Please let me know your thoughts, and | can make the appropriate

changes to the Will’. The last email exchange between Mr Lee and
Ms KKL, on his will, during this period was on 13 December 20139.

29.

The upshot of the discussions between Mr Lee and Ms KKL was that,
as of 13 December 2013, Mr Lee instructed Ms KKL to make two

changes, through a codicil, to the Sixth (or Penultimate) Will: (a) first,
to give his three children equal shares in his Estate; and (b) second,
to bequeath two carpets (one silk and the other wool) to Mr LHY. Thus,
as of four days before the Last Will was signed on 17 December 2013,
Mr Lee's decision was to keep to the terms of his Penultimate Will,

with the above two changes to be made, and these changes were to
be made through a codicil.

(@)

The Last Will

30.

In the evening of 16 December 2013, at 7.08pm, the Respondent sent

Mr Lee a draft of what-eventually became the Last Will. The
circumstances in which the Respondent came to send this draft to Mr
Lee are discussed in Section VIII(B) below. The Respondent's
position"" is that Mr Lee independently decided that he would make
the Last Will, the terms of which were substantially different from what
he had discussed with Ms KKL, three days earlier (see paragraphs

28 - 29 above).

® LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 162 — 163, email from Ms KKL to Mr Lee dated 30 November 2013, 11.25am.

® LSS BOD, Vol 1, 189, email from Mr Lee to Ms KKL dated 13 December 2013, 10.50pm.
19 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 76.

11

31.

ttis not disputed that both the Respondent and Mr LHY were aware,
when the Respondent's email was sent, that Ms KKL was likely to be

travelling, and might not respond"".
32,

The Respondent’s email of 7.08pm on 16 December 2013 stated as

follows"":
“Dear Pa Pa

This was the original agreed Will which ensures that all 3 children
receive equal shares, taking into account the relative valuations (as
at the date of demise) of the properties each receives.

Kim Li
Grateful if you could please engross.
Kind regards
Fern”
33.

Parties are agreed that the Respondent intended, by the phrase
“original agreed Will’, to refer Mr Lee’s First Will (signed in August
2011), and that the phrase would have been understood by Mr Lee
as such.

34,

However, the draft which the Respondent attached was not the First
Will. The draft which the Respondent sent to Mr Lee differed from the
First Will in the following main respects:

41 Transcript (3 July 2019), 86:7-11; Transcript (4 July 2019), 132:34 - 133:31; Transcript (6 July 2019),
4:20-32.
12LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 174, email from the Respondent to Mr Lee, Mr LHY and Ms KKL dated 16
¥
December 2013, 7.08pm.
12

(a)

First, the

First Will contained

a gift-over

clause.

This was

missing from the draft.

(b)

| Second, the First Will made provision for Mr LHL to pay for the
upkeep of 38 Oxley while Dr LWL was in occupation. This was
also missing from the draft.

(See Annex B for a detailed comparison.)

35.

It is not in dispute that what the Respondent told Mr Lee (“This was

the original agreed Will..."") is not accurate’. It is also not in dispute
that Mr Lee was

entitled to, and would

have

relied

on, what the

Respondent had told him""*, The draft which the Respondent sent to
Mr Lee (in addition to being different from the First Will) was also
different from the Sixth (or Penultimate) Will in the following ways:
(a)

As the Respondent’s email indicated, the draft gave Mr Lee's
three children equal shares in his estate. The Penultimate Will
had

given

Dr

LWL

an

extra

share,

compared

to her two

brothers.

(b)

In addition, the draft reinserted a version of the Demolition
Clause. This was not in the Penultimate Will.

(c)

The draft also gave Dr LWL an unfettered right to stay at 38
Oxley. In the Penultimate Will, this was conditional upon Mr
LHL’s consent.

(d)

Finally, the draft removed the gift-over clause which was in the
Penultimate Will (and which was also in Mr Lee's First to Fifth
Wills (see paragraph 21 above)).

13 Transcript (3 July 2019), 20:8-12; 28:1-4; see also Annex B.
14 Transcript (3 July 2019), 30:30 — 31:8.
13

(See Annex C for a detailed comparison.)

36.

The Last Will, signed on 17 December 2013, was in the same terms

as the draft that the Respondent sent to Mr Lee on 16 December
2013. it is not in dispute that other than the change in shares, the
differences between the Penultimate Will and the Last Will were not
brought to Mr Lee’s attention (see also paragraphs 534 - 544 below).
It is also not in dispute that the Last Will did not incorporate the
second change that Mr Lee had wanted to make to his Penultimate

Will (see paragraph 29 above), which he had discussed with Ms KKL.

37. Thus, the Last Will was substantially different from what Mr Lee had
wanted, when he had jast discussed and agreed (with Ms KKL) on
amendments to his Penultimate Will, four days earlier on 13

December 2013 (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above)'®. Mr Lee had
then decided, as of 13 December 2013, to keep his Penultimate Will

intact, with only the two changes (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above)
to be made by way of a codicil.
38.

The Respondent then spoke to Mr Bernard Lui (""Mr BL’), a partner
from her law firm (Stamford Law), to brief him about the Last Will, and

request his assistance with its engrossment and witnessing’®.

46 The final email exchange between Mr Lee and Ms KKL was on 13 December 2013 (see paragraphs
28 and 29 of this Decision}. The Respondent sent the draft Last Will to Mr Lee on 15 December 2013

(which was 3 days after 13 December 2013), and Mr Lee signed it (the Last Will) on 17 December 2013
(which was four days after 13 December 2013). The Tribunal will refer to the events of 16 and 17
December 2013 as taking place three to four days after the discussions between Mr Lee and Ms KKL.
(on 13 December 2013), as appropriate.

18 Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 41-43; the Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 19.

14

39.

At 7.31pm, after the Respondent spoke to Mr BL, Mr LHY replied to
the email the Respondent had sent. Mr LHY's email was addressed
to Mr Lee, and read’”:

‘Pa
| couldn't get in touch with Kim Li. | believe she is away. | don’t think
it is wise to wait till she is back. | think all you need is a witness to
sign the will. Fern can get one of her partners to come round with

an engrossed copy of the will to execute and witness.

They can

coordinate it with Lin Hoe fora convenient time.
Yang”

The “Lin Hoe” referred to above is Ms Wong Lin Hoe (“Ms WLH”),
who was then Mr Lee’s personal assistant, in his office.
Mr LHY removed Ms KKL from this email'®. (Apart from Mr Lee and
Mr LHY, only the Respondent and Ms WLH were copied.) Thereafter,
Ms KKL was not copied on subsequent email exchanges leading up
to the execution of the Last Will.

40. The Respondent emailed Ms WLH, Mr LHY and Mr BL at 8.12pm’.
The Respondent said that she introduced Mr BL to Mr LHY and Ms

WLH through this email?°. She instructed Ms WLH to contact Mr BL,
regarding the execution of the Last Will. She said to Ms WLH that Mr

17LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent,
December 2012, 7.31pm.

Mr Lee and Ms WLH dated 16

18LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent,
December 2013, 7.31pm.

Mr Lee and Ms WLH

191SS BOD, Vol 1, p 179, email from the Respondent to Ms WLH,
December 2013, 8.12pm.

dated 16

Mr LHY and Mr BL dated 16

20 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 20.

as)

BL had the Last Will “ready for execution” and told Ms WLH to contact
Mr BL “to make arrangements”.
41.

In response to Mr LHY’s email of 7.31pm (see paragraph 39), Mr Lee
replied to Mr LHY and the Respondent, at 9.42pm, saying”:
“Ok. Do not wait for Kim Li.

Engross and | will sign it before a solicitor in Fern’s office, or from
any other office.”
42,

Various emails were then exchanged, regarding Mr Lee’s execution
of the Last Will. The parties to these emails included the Respondent,
Mr LHY, Ms WLH and/or Mr BL.

43.

At the time of these exchanges, the Respondent and Mr LHY were

respectively en route to, or in Paris and Australia.

44,

At 4.53am on 17 December 2013, Mr LHY replied to Mr Lee’s email

(see paragraph 41 above)”2. He informed Mr Lee:
“We will get someone to come to execute if either in Oxley Road or
at your office at your convenience. Lin Hoe has the contacts and will
arrange it. One of the partners at Stamford Law who is a notary
publics.”
45.

At 10:06pm on 16 December 2019, Dr LWL emailed Mr LHY stating

“To get a notary public not from Lee n Lee to witness his signature n

21 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr Lee dated 16 December 2013, 9.42pm.

22 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to Mr Lee, Ms WLH
December 2013, 4.53am.

and the Respondent dated 17

16

that setiles if?3, At 4.54am, Mr LHY replied to Dr LWL’s email with

the subject “Re: Papa says go back to 2011 wil’. He wrote’:
“Will arrange. Lin Hoe has contacts. Will get person to come
Oxley Road or Istana whichever is more convenient.”

46,

to

Subsequently, at 5.32am, Mr LHY emailed Mr BL”, forwarding the
Respondent’s email to Ms WLH (see paragraph 40 above). Mr LHY
requested that Mr BL engross a copy of the will, as Mr Lee wished to
have it executed. He asked that Mr BL be available, when Ms WLH
got in touch. Mr BL acknowledged and replied to Mr LHY, with the

Respondent in copy, at 9.02am?6.
47.

At 9.22am,

the Respondent

emailed

Mr BL?’ with the message

“please be ready and accessible at short notice. Ready to go. impt

that we get this done asap please’**, From the email chain exhibited

py Mr BL in his Affidavit of Evidence in Chief (“Mr BL’s Affidavit’), it
appears that the Respondent had replied to Mr BL’s email to Mr LHY
at 9.02am (see paragraph 46 above). However, Mr LHY appears not
to have been copied in this email from the Respondent. Mr BL

acknowledged and replied to the Respondent at 9.23am*.

23 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 189, email from Dr LWL dated 16 December 2013, 10.08prn.
24 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 189, email from Mr LHY to Dr LWL, the Respondent, Ms WLH dated 17 December
2013, 4.54am.
25 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 190, email from Mr LHY to Mr BL and the Respondent dated 17 December 2013,
§.32am.
26 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 192, email from Mr BL to Mr LHY and the Respondent dated 17 December 2013,
9.02am.

27 Law Society's Suppiementary Bundle of Documents (‘LSS SBOD’), p 10, email from the Respondent
to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 9.22am.

28 Mr, BL's AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 16.

28 LSS SBOD, p 9, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 9.23am.

1?

48. At 9.23am as well, Ms WLH emailed the Respondent” (in reply to the
Respondent's email of 16 December 2013 at 8.12pm (see paragraph

40 above)) informing the Respondent that she would coordinate with
Mr BL in relation to making an appointment with Mr Lee, Mr LHY and
Mr BL were copied on this email.
49.

At 9.24am, the Respondent emailed Mr BL again, on the email chain,

stating the following:

“be good to run. Are engrossments ready?”*""
Mr BL responded to the Respondent at 10.13am, stating:

“Preparing. 11am. EK will be with me. | keep the Will? ®2”
50.

It appears that by 10.13am,

Ms WLH

had been told to fix, or was in

the process of fixing, an appointment with Mr Lee, at 11am that
morning. This is borne out by the fact that Ms WLH emailed Mr Lee

at 10.17am* (with the Respondent,

Mr LHY and Dr LWL

being

copied), to inform Mr Lee that Mr BL and Ms Elizabeth Kong (“Ms EK”)
(another lawyer from the Respondent's law firm, Stamford Law),
would be seeing Mr Lee at his residence at 11am. Text messages
exchanged between Mr BL and Ms WLH, exhibited in Mr BL’s
Affidavit, also show that Mr BL had sent a text message to Ms WLH
at around 10.03am, with Ms Ek’s details“.
30 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 194, email from Ms WLH to the Respondent, Mr LHY and Mr BL dated 17
December 2013, 9.23am.

31 LSS SBOD, p 9, email from the Respondent to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 9.24am.
32 LSS SBOD, p 9, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 10.13am.
33 Respondent's Bundle of Documents (""RBOD""), p 42, email fromm Ms WLH to Mr Lee, the Respondent,

Mr LHY and Dr LWL. dated 17 December 2013, 10.17am.

4 Mr BL’s AEIC (1 July 2019) at p 31, see also LSS SBOD, p 16, text message from Mr BL to Ms WLH
dated 17 December 2013, 10.03am.

18

51.

At 10.35am, Mr BL sent the Respondent another email, following from
his email at 10.13am (see paragraph 49 above), where he informed
the Respondent:

“Date of will is 2011 —/ put today’s date”
52.

The Police Station Diary maintained for 38 Oxley shows that Mr BL
and

Ms

EK

arrived

at 38 Oxley,

at or about

11.05am,

and

left at

41.20am**. During this time (15 minutes), they had met with Mr Lee,
and the Last Will had been executed.
53.

At 11.22am, Mr BL wrote to the Respondent stating:

“Done. Liz and | witnessed. 2 copies. One each for Yang and Wei

Ling.’°7
The Respondent replied at 12.01pm, stating that she was thankful,

and that it was a “huge relief fo everyone’®. The Respondent then
posed the following queries to Mr BL:
“Is there not a copy for LKY himself?

Where was this witnessed? Istana or home?
How did it go?”
54.

Mr BL replied to the Respondent at 12.07pm**:

38 LSS SBOD, p 8, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 10.35am.
36 LSS SBOD, p 24, Police Station Diary maintained for 38 Oxley Road, 16-17 December 2013.

37 LSS SBOD, p 8, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 11.22am.
38 LSS SBOD, p 8, email from the Respondent to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 12.01pm

38 LSS SBOD, p 7, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 12.07pm.

19

“Home. It went fine. He didn't say much as it seemed he just got up.
He went through the Will.
One copy is faxed to him (coordinated with Lin Hoe)
The 2 originals are in your room.
Clara came back to help out.”

55. The Respondent wrote again at 12.10pm*°, to express her thanks. In
this email, she included in copy, Ms EK and one Ms Clara Ng, the
Respondent's secretary.

56.

At 12.13pm, the Respondent wrote to Mr LHY, to inform him that the
Last Will had been executed*’. She wrote:
“! think you know it was signed uneventfully already. Bemard and
Elizabeth went down. He read it carefully and then signed and
witnessed. Lin Hoe has a faxed copy and the 2 original are sitting in
my office.
What would you like to do with the 2 originals? Bernard’s suggestion
is that you are (sic) Ling keep a copy each? Or you give one to Lin
Hoe and | keep the other original in my office safe?”

57.

Between

12.18pm

and

12.21pm,

the

Respondent

and

Ms

EK

exchanged two emails regarding the execution of the Last Will.
Once again, the Respondent expressed her thanks.

49 LSS SBOD, p 7, email from the Respondent to Mr BL, Ms EK and Ms Clara Ng dated 17 December
2013, 12.10pm.

41 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 200, email from the Respondent to Mr LHY dated 17 December 2013, 12.13pm.
42 LSS SBOD, p 6 — 7, email from Ms EK to the Respondent, Mr BL and Ms Clara Ng dated 17
December 2013, 12.18pm, and email from the Respondent to Ms EK dated 17 December 2013,
*
12.21pm.

20

58.

Mr LHY replied to the Respondent's queries (in the email referred to
at paragraph

56 above),

by email at 12.21pm*,

Mr LHY

told the

Respondent to keep one of the two original Last Wills in her office
safe, and give the other to Ms WLH.
59.

At 12.25pm, Ms EK replied again to the Respondent (see paragraph
57 above), setting out certain details of the execution that day:

“Yes, | could see that he is getting very frail. He was slurring in his
speech so it was very difficult to understand what he was saying.
But he is definitely still very lucid — he asked Bernard who drafted
the will, twice... and Bernard wasn't entirely sure but mentioned it
was primarily you and Ms Kwa from Lee & Lee.

LKY read through every single line and was comfortable to sign.”
60.

At 12.26pm, the Respondent emailed Mr BL, Ms Clara Ng, and one

Ms Joyce Han, also from Stamford Law, with Ms EK in copy*®. The
Respondent gave instructions on what was to be done with the two
originals of the Last Will. She instructed that a copy be made for her
(the Respondent) to retain, that one original be given to Ms WLH, and
the other original to be kept in the safe at her office (Stamford Law).
Subsequently, at 12.45pm, the Respondent emailed Ms WLH, to
inform her that the Respondent's office would be arranging to send
one original of the Last Will to Ms WLH for safekeeping, and the
second original would be kept in her (the Respondent's) office safe.
43 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 204, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 12.2ipm.
44 LSS SBOD, p 6, email from Ms EK to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 12.25pm.

48 LSS SBOD, p 14-15, email from the Respondent to Mr BL, Ms Joyce Han, Ms Clara Ng and Ms EK
dated 17 December 2013, 12.26pm.
48 LSS BOD, Vol 4, p 203 — 204, email from the Respondent to Ms WLH,

Mr LHY, Mr BL dated 17

December 2013, 12.45pm.

21

61.

Later, at 1.16pm on 17 December 2013, the Respondent emailed Ms

KKL*’ stating: “just a quick note to say this has been dealt with
reference to the execution of the Last Will. The
Respondent’s email of 1.16pm went back to the email chain where

already’,

in

she had sent an email to Mr Lee, copying Ms KKL, of 16 December

2013, at 7.08pm, and where she had asked Ms KKL to engross the
draft of the Last Will (referred to at paragraph 32 above). (The
subsequent emails, after that email of 16 December 2013, 7.08pm,

had left Ms KKL out. Ms KKL had been removed from the address
list.)

62.

Ms KKL replied at 2.59pm to say*®:
«., Ldon’t seem to have received your first mail of 16 dec 7.08pm
asking me to engross.
With reference to your email of 17 dec, does this mean that he has
signed a new will yesterday, in which case the former will which is
on my record, is revoked? If so, | will update my file record.”

63.

The Respondent replied by email at 3.10pm to say**:

""Yes, he has signed already. In fact this is just. going back to his
2011 will so it supercedes ail. He read it extremely carefully before
signing.
”

471$S BOD, Vol 1, p 208, email from the Respondent to Ms KKL dated 17 December 2013, 1.16pm.
#2 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 208, email from Ms KKL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 2.69pm.
48 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 208, email from the Respondent to Ms KKL dated 17 December 2013, 3.10pm.

22

That is the correspondence (presented to us), involving Ms KKL, as
of 17 December 2013.

64.

At 3.10pm on 17 December 2013, Mr BL emailed the Respondent,
Ms Joyce Han and Ms Clara Ng, with Ms EK in copy, to inform the
Respondent

that

he had

spoken

to Ms

WLH,

and

arrangements

would be made for one of the originals of the Last Will to be delivered

to the Istana, after 11am the next day®.
65.

Ms WLH

sent an email to Mr Lee at 4.29pm, to inform him that the

Respondent was arranging for one of the originals (“Original A”) to be
sent to Mr Lee's office for safekeeping, while the other original

(‘Original B"") was being kept in the Respondent's office safe*'. Ms
enquired whether Mr Lee would like to keep Original A in his
office safe, or pass it to Ms KKL for safekeeping. Ms WLH also
highlighted to Mr Lee that Ms KKL was keeping all the originals of the
“title deeds of all the properties, including 38 Oxley Road”.

WLH

66.

Mr Lee replied at 6.38pm, saying simply: “Yes, Kwa Kim Li? Ms
WLH replied to Mr Lee at 7.01pm, noting his instructions, and
informing Mr Lee that she would arrange for the original of the Last
Will (Original A), to be passed to Ms KKL*. At 10.27pm, Mr Lee
emailed Ms WLH again, to instruct her to keep the original in his office,

and to provide Ms KKL with a copy of the Last Will®.

50 LSS SBOD, p 14, email from Mr BL to the Respondent, Ms Joyce Han, Ms Ciara Ng and Ms EK dated

17 December 2013, 3.40pm.

5t LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 211, email from Ms WLH to Mr Lee and Ms Lilian Ho dated 17 December 2013,

4.29pm.

82 LSS BOD, Vol t, p 241, email from Mr Lee to Ms WLH dated 17 December 2013, 6.38pm.

63 LSS BOD, Vol t, p 211, email from Ms WLH to Mr Lee, Mr LHY, the Respondent and Dr LWL dated
17 December 2013, 7.07pm.
54L§S BOD, Vol 1, p 210 — 211, email from Mr Lee to Ms WLH dated 17 December 2013, 10.27pm.

23

67.

At 11.02pm, the Respondent emailed her colleagues, in response to
Mr BL's email of 3.10pm (referred to at paragraph 64 above)®®. She
informed Mr BL that “the suggestion is that [Stamford Law] pass other
copy to Kim Li and [Lee & Leej’. She instructed Mr BL to check with
Ms WLH, and commented: ""Could save some trouble”.

68.

The Respondent kept one original of the Last Will (Original B) in her
office safe. The other original (Original A) was kept in Mr Lee’s office.

69.

There is also an email on 17 December 2013°”, from Ms EK to Mr BL,
with

an

attendance

note

(the

“EK

Attendance

Note”),

from

the

execution of the Last Will. This was sent to Mr BL at 4.32pm. The EK
Attendance Note was as follows:
“4. We arrived and met with LKY today (17 Dec) at his residence,
38 Oxley Road $238629, at approximately 11.10AM.
2. We were ushered into his room by his assistant, who was

present with us and LKY throughout our meeting with LKY.

3. You introduced the both of us to LKY and explained the purpose
of our presence — to witness the execution of his will.

4. LKY appeared frail and his speech was slurred, but his mind
was certainly lucid — he asked us who drafted the will and
specifically instructed us to date the will today.

55 LSS SBOD, p 14, email from Mr BL to the Respondent, Ms Joyce Han, Ms Clara Ng and Ms EK dated
47 December 2013, 3.10pm.
55 LSS SBOD, p 14, email from the Respondent to Mr BL, Ms Joyce Han, Ms Clara Ng and Ms EK dated
17 December 2013, 11.02pm.
87 LSS SBOD, p 20, email from Ms EK to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 4.32pm.

88 LSS SBOD, p 20, Attendance note as set out in the email from Ms EK to Mr BL dated 17 December
2013, 4.32pm.
24

5. LKY read through every line of the wilf and was comfortable to
sign and initial at every page, which he did in our presence.
6. We then confirmed that we witnessed LKY’s signature by
placing our own signatures at the relevant execution blocks
respectively.

7. We took our leave shortly after.

A copy of the duly executed will by LKY is attached.”

70.

As stated previously, the substantive provisions of the Last Will, that
was signed by Mr Lee on 17 December 2013, were identical to the
draft that the Respondent had sent to Mr Lee the previous evening
(16 December 2013), by way of her email of 7.08pm (see paragraph
32 above).

(H) Mr Lee’s Codicil
71.

On 2 January 2014, Mr Lee prepared and executed a codicil to the

Last Will (the “Codicil’)*. The Codicil bequeathed two carpets (one
silk and the other wool) to Mr LHY. This was in accordance with what
Mr Lee had previously discussed with Ms KKL (see paragraphs 28
and 29 above).
72.

The next day, Ms WLH emailed the Respondent, attaching a copy of
the Codicil®. Ms WLH’s email was sent as a follow-on, to an earlier
chain of emails on 16 and 17 December 2013, regarding the Last Will.

59 LSS BOD, Vol 4, p 229, Codicil executed by Mr Lee on 2 January 2014.

® LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 230, email from Ms WLH to the Respondent, Mr Lee, Mr LHL, Mr LHY, Dr LL,
Ms Ho Ching and Ms KKL dated 3 January 2074, 10.30am.
25

73.

Ms WLH's email stated as follows:
“Dear Mrs Lee,

Further to our emails below, attached is a copy of Mr Lee’s
codicil for your information.
As instructed by Mr Lee, we will retain the original copy of Mr
Lee’s fast Will & Testament and the Codicil in my office for

safekeeping, and send a copy to Ms Kwa Kim Li for her record.
Thank you.

Regards
Lin Hoe”

74.

MrLee, Mr LHL and his spouse (Ms Ho Ching), Dr LWL, Mr LHY, and
Ms KKL, were also copied in Ms WLH's email.

()

Mr Lee’s passing

75.

Mr Lee passed away on 23 March 2015. Mr LHY and Dr LWL
(collectively, the ""Executors"") were appointed the executors of the
Estate, in accordance with the terms of his Last Will.

IV.

Procedural History

(A)

AGC referral

76.

The disciplinary process was commenced following a complaint filed
by Deputy Attorney-General, on 4 December 2018 (the “AGC
stated that the
Attorney-General
Deputy
The
Complaint”).

26

Respondent may have “potentially breached Rules 25 and 46"" of the

PGR in force at the material time®. The Complaint (hereafter referred
to as the “AGC Complaint”) was made pursuant to section 85(3) of
the LPA, and contained a request that the Council of the Law Society
(the “Council”) refer the matter to a Disciplinary Tribunal. Section 85(3)
of the LPA obliged the Council to do so.

77.

The Law Society filed its Statement of Case on 1 February 2019. The
Disciplinary Tribunal Secretariat (the “Secretariat”) served the
Respondent the Notice of Disciplinary Tribunal Proceedings, along
with the AGC Complaint and the Statement of Case, on 19 February

2019.

The

Defence

was

filed on

10 April 2019.

A Pre-Hearing

Conference was first fixed on 8 May 2019.
78.

The Law Society wrote on 16 April 2019, seeking for directions from
the Tribunal. By way of its Submissions on 23 April 2019, the Law

Society sought: (a) further discovery of documents from the
Respondent; and (b) directions from the Tribunal on the question of
confidentiality of the proceedings. The latter aspect of the Law
Society's application arose from various Facebook posts that were

made by Mr LHY and Dr LWL, about the proceedings before this
Tribunal.
79.

Mr LHY

posts, relating to these
and referring to documents which were filed in these

and Dr LWL

proceedings,

had

made

Facebook

proceedings® (see also paragraphs 486 - 496 below). They appear
to have been given documents from these proceedings,

and were

making public statements about them. These proceedings are (by law)
confidential until the matter is disposed of. The Respondent filed

Written Submissions on these issues, on 26 April 2019°.

After

1 LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 803, AGC Complaint.
82 LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 1336 - 1341.

®3 Respondent's Skeletal Written Submissions dated 26 April 2019.
27

hearing

Counsel

for both

parties,

the Tribunal

no order in

made

relation to the Law Society's application for further discovery of
documents. While we considered the documents to be relevant, we
made no order because it was not clear to us that a Disciplinary
Tribunal had the powers to order discovery. We told the Law Society
that it had other means to seek production of the documents. On the
question of confidentiality, parties were directed to desist from
disclosing

details

and/or

documents

related

to the

proceedings,

except to the relevant witnesses, and that there should be no public

statements. The Tribunal also fixed the timetable for parties to file
their respective Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC’s), and fixed 4
5-day evidentiary hearing (""Hearing"") from 1 to 5 July 2019.
80.

Parties had been directed to exchange their AEICs on 10 June 2019.
The Law Society filed and exchanged the AEIC of Mr K Gopalan (“Mr
Gopalan’s Affidavit’). The Respondent filed and exchanged the
Respondent's

AEIC

(the

“Respondent's

Affidavit"")

and

Mr

LHY’s

AEIC (“Mr LHY’s Affidavit’).
81.

Mr Gopalan’s Affidavit enclosed various documents. The Respondent

took objections to the documents being in evidence. The Tribunal
directed parties to state their position by letter, and received the
following letters: (a) a letter dated 11 June 2019 from solicitors for the
Respondent, Providence Law Asia LLC (“Providence Law’); (b) a
letter dated

12

June

2019

from

solicitors

for ihe

Law

Society

(‘WongPartnership”); (c) a letter dated 13 June 2019 from Providence
Law; and (d) a letter dated 17 June 2019 from WongPartnership.
82.

Having considered the parties’ positions, the Tribunal directed that it
would allow the Law Society to rely on Mr Gopalan’s Affidavit at the
Hearing. The Tribunal also indicated that the parties would be at
liberty to make any submission(s), in Closing (including on
admissibility), on the evidence adduced by the other party.

28

83.

On 24 June 2019, the Law Society informed the Tribunal and the

Respondent,

that it had

issued

a subpoena

for Mr BL,

to give

evidence before the Tribunal. Mr BL was the Respondent's colleague

at MLS, and (as stated earlier) was her colleague at Stamford Law,
at the time the Last Will was executed. Mr BL had attended the
execution of the Last Will, and had signed as a witness to the same.
84,

After the subpoena was issued, Mr BL's Affidavit, giving his evidence
on the material events, was filed. Documents were produced by Mr
BL (the “BL Documents”), and annexed to Mr BL's Affidavit. and put

in evidence. This was done on 1 July 2019, about three weeks after
the parties had (on 10 June 2019), exchanged AEICs.

(B)

Originating Summons 639 of 2019 (“OS 639"")

85.

On 17 May 2019, an application was brought in the High Court by the
Estate by way of OS 639. The Executors of the Estate (as stated
earlier) were Mr LHY and Dr LWL. The documents which were the
subject of OS 639 were the First to Sixth Wills, the Last Will and the

Codicil thereto, and all drafts of these wills (see also paragraph 143
below). These were the documents

numbered

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8

and 9 in the Law Society's Notice te Admit Hearsay Evidence, dated

24 June 2019 (""LSS Hearsay Notice”).
86. The Estate sought, in the main, an injunction against the use of these
documents in the disciplinary proceeding. The basis of the Estate's
application was that the documents in question were confidential, and

protected by legal professional privitege.

LSS Closing Submissions (20 September 2019) at paras 186 - 190 sets out what happened in OS
639 and how the Executors’ position evolved, The Executors started with a broad objection. But at the
hearing before Justice Hoo, they offered to disclose the Last Will and narrowed their claims of
confidentiality.

29

87.

Law Society accepted that the documents were confidential.
Justice Hoo, who heard OS 639, noted that the documents were
already in the Law Society’s possession. The Estate was not
asserting privilege to withhold disclosure and the question was
The

admissibility of evidence.
88.

Justice Hoo held that the Revoked Wills and the draft Last Will were
protected by legal advice privilege, and were also confidential. The
Last Will and Codicil, on the other hand, were no longer protected by
legal advice privilege, having been proven in probate. However, the
Last Will and Codicil remained confidential, save for paragraph 7 of
the Last Will, the Demolition Clause, which expressly provided that
the clause could be publicly disclosed.

89.

Justice Hoo however declined to grant injunctive relief that the Estate
sought, on the basis that the interests of justice in disclosure of a third

party's iniquity prevail over the privilege of a client. Justice Hoo held
that

“where

a sufficient

connection

can

be

drawn

between

the

privileged material and the inquiry before the DT, the [Law Society]
should not be unduly constrained in how it conducts its prosecution
of the DT proceedings’. The argument based on confidentiality also
did not succeed. Justice Hoo accordingly dismissed the Estate's
application for an injunction restraining the use of Mr Lee's wills and
drafts thereof. The Law Society was thus not prevented from relying
on the documents.

(©)

The Hearing & submissions

90.

The Tribunal heard the Law Society’s case on 1 and 2 July 2019.
After the Law Society’s Opening Statement, the Law Society called
four witnesses, namely, Mr K Gopalan, and three other witnesses
who had been issued with subpoenas. They were: (a) DSP Lim Seng
Chuan, the Commanding Officer of VIP Protection Unit 3 of the Police

30

subpoena issued to Police
Security Command); (b) Mr BL; and (c) Mr Manoj Pillay. Mr Manoj
Pillay was an agent of MLS, who was subpoenaed by the Law Society,

Security

Command

(pursuant

to the

for emails from the firm's email accounts.

of the Law Society's case on 2 July 2019, the
Respondent made a submission of no case to answer. The Tribunal
received the following written submissions: the Respondent's
Skeletal Submissions for No Case to Answer dated 2 July 2019
close

91. At the

(""Respondent’s No Case Submissions’), and the Close of Law
Society's Case dated 3 July 2019 (""Law Society’s Close of Case
Submissions’).
92.

In addition, the Tribunal heard Oral Submissions from Counsel for

on 3 July 2019. Having read the Parties’ Written
Submissions, and having heard oral arguments from the Parties’
Counsel, the Tribunal found that the Law Society had established a
prima facie case against the Respondent, and rejected the
submission of no case to answer. The Respondent then called two
both

parties

witnesses in her Defence, namely, herself, and Mr LHY.

93.

At the end of the 5-day Hearing, on 5 July 2019, the Tribunal
directed parties to provide the Tribunal with Written Closing
Submissions. The Respondent was directed to file her Closing
Submission on 2 August 2019 and the Law Society was directed to
file its Closing Submission four weeks later (on 30 August 2019).
The Respondent subsequently asked for an extension of time,
which was granted. The Respondent filed her Closing Submissions
on 16 August 2019 (“Respondent's Closing Submissions”). The Law
also asked for an extension of time to file its Closing
Submission by 20 September 2019. That request was also granted.
The Law Society filed its Closing Submissions on 20 September
2019 (“Law Society's Closing Submissions”). At the Respondent's
Society

31

request, the Tribunal also fixed a half-day hearing for Oral Closing
Submissions, on 7 October 2019. The Respondent and the Law
Society prepared Skeletal Submissions, to assist the Tribunal at this
Hearing, namely the Respondent's Skeletal Submissions dated 27
September 2019 (“Respondent's Closing Skeletals’), and the Law
Society's Skeletal Submissions dated 5 October 2019 (“Law
Society’s Closing Skeletals’).
Preliminary Issues

94.

Before dealing with the legal and factual issues that arise from the
Charges, we will first address three Preliminary Issues that were
raised by the Respondent.

(A)

Jurisdiction

95.

The Respondent submitted that the Tribunal does not have the
jurisdiction to hear Charges 1B and 2B. She contended that these
Charges fall beyond the remit of the AGC Complaint, which is
premised on the existence of a retainer between the Respondent and
Mr Lee. She advanced this position in her Defence, her No Case
Submissions, and her Closing Submissions.

96.

In support of this argument, the Respondent relies on the cases of
Re Seah Pong Tshai [1991] 2 SLR(R) 744 (""Seah Pong Tshai’) and

Re Lim Chor Pee [1990] 2 SLR(R) 117 (“Lim Chor Pee’).
97.

Having considered these cases, we are unable to agree that they
support the Respondent's position — either by reason of their facts, or
as a matter of law.

32

98.

Seah Pong Tshai and Lim Chor Pee involved complaints which were
referred to an Inquiry Committee, and thereafter culminated in formal
investigations by a Disciplinary Committee (the predecessor of
Disciplinary Tribunals under the current LPA). in both these cases,
the charges were found to be defective because they: (a) went
beyond the scope of the complaint, and (b) were not considered by
the Inquiry Committee, and therefore fell outside the scope of notice
given by the Inquiry Committee to the lawyer (see Lim Chor Pee at
[35] and Seah Pong Tshai at [14]).

99.

In our view, neither of these objections applied on the facts before us.

The Gravamen of the AGC Complaint
100.On the former, the cases establish that the charges must reflect the

“gravamen” of the complaint (Seah Pong Tshai at [9]); the “subject
matter” of the charges must accord with the complaint (Lim Chor Pee
at [35]). In other words, if the charge framed is different from the
complaint

“both

in form

in substance’,

and

it will be found

to be

defective (Seah Pong Tshai at [9}).
101.We note that this position has been affirmed more recently, by the
High Court, in Law Society of Singapore v Yeo Khirn Hai Alvin [2020]
SGHC 3 (“Yeo Khim Hai’). The Court held (at [66]) that:

“In my judgment, the following propositions emerge from Seah
Pong Tshai and the case law which I discuss in turn below:

(a)

First, the “matter” that has to be heard and investigated
by the DT is the complaint, and in a typical case, it is
assumed that the matter would be the complaint as
properly framed by the Law Society in the charge. Put
another way, it is assumed that the substance of the
complaint

_will

be

reflected

in the

charge,

and_that
33

the

constitutes

matter to be

and_investigated.

heard

Where the Law Society has erred in framing the charge,
then the DT’s determination is liable to be set aside, as

,

it was in Seah Pong Tshai.
(b)

Second, the DT has a duty to hear and investigate the
complaint. The DT also has a duty to hear and
investigate the charges. The two duties are not mutually
exclusive and in fact are complementary to one another,
in that the expectation must be that the charges reflect

the gravamen of the complaint and fall within the scope
of the complaint.”
{Emphasis added.]

102.The

corollary to these

propositions

is that a complaint is not and

should not itself be regarded as a charging document; the two are
distinct, albeit related. it is for the Law Society (and not a
complainant) to determine what charges should be brought against a
respondent lawyer, taking into account the essence of the complaint
that has been made; this reflects the principle of self-regulation set
out in the LPA (see also Yeo Khirn Hai at [80]). As the cases set out,

what is required is not a complete identity between the complaint and
the charges,

but that the charges

encapsulate

the substance,

or

essence of the complaint.
103.In Seah Pong Tshai, the complaint was that the respondent lawyer
refused

to

refund

his

client

a

sum

of

$1,000

which

he

had

him was defective, because it
accused him of something entirely different - that he “falsely denied
the receipt of the said sum of $1,000"".
overcharged.

The

charge

against

104.In Lim Chor Pee, the first charge against the respondent lawyer was
that he had wrongfully evaded tax in respect of a sum of $85,000.

34

This went beyond the scope of the complaint, which had not made
any specific allegation in respect of this sum of $85,000.
105.In Yeo Khim Hai, two of the charges against the respondent lawyer
were found to be “wholly outside the scope of the [clomplaint” (at
[92]). These charges alleged overcharging, whereas the gravamen of

the complaint related to the adequacy of steps that the lawyer had
taken to ascertain his client's mental capacity.
106. The circumstances before us are quite clearly different. Charges 1B
and 2B are premised on the same conduct that Charges 1 and 1A,

and 2 and 2A respectively, are premised on. Charges 1B and 2B are
based on the same information in the AGC Complaint, as the other
charges. The gravamen (or subject matter) is the same for all the
Charges — namely, that the Respondent was guilty of misconduct
because of her involvement in the preparation and execution of Mr
Lee’s Last Will.

107.The

conduct

complained

of in Charges

conduct which is the subject of Charges

1B and 2B is the same
1 and

1A, and 2 and 2A,

respectively. For instance, Charge 7 reads:

""you failed to advance your client’s interest unaffected by your
interest and/or the interest of your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang, by
preparing and arranging for the execution of your client's will where

a one-third share in your olient’s estate was fo be given fo your
husband, Ms Lee Hsien Yang, such act amounting to grossly
improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within
the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161,

2009 Rev Ed).”

35

while Charge 1B reads:

""you failed to advance Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s interest unaffected by
your interest and/or the interest of your husband,

Mr Lee Hsien

Yang, by preparing and arranging for the execution of Mr Lee Kuan
Yew’s will where a one-third share in Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s estate was
to be given fo your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang, such act
amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an
officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable
profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession

Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed).”
408. The Respondent accepts that the conduct complained of in Charges
1B and 2B is the same as the conduct complained of in Charges 1
and 1A, and 2 and 2A respectively®. Charges 1B and 2B are
premised on information in the AGC Complaint, like Charges 1, 1A,
2 and 2A. The substance of all these Charges is the same, and
reflects that of the AGC Complaint.

109. For completeness, we should also address a related point which the
Respondent raised - that because the inquiry stage had been
bypassed, and the Deputy Attorney-General’s complaint was referred
directly to this Tribunal, the scope of the complaint therefore had to
be construed even more carefully.

110. She submitted that the power of direct referral under section 85(3(b)
of the LPA is a power that should be exercised “only in cases where
the Respondent would undoubtedly be guilty of grossly improper
conduct if the evidence supports his specific complain?. and
therefore, where this power was exercised, the Law Society does not

85 Respondent's Skeletal Submissions for No Case fo Answer (2 July 2019) at paras 65 - 66.

36

have the power to change the “basis on which the Respondent is tried

before the Tribunal®.
111. The Tribunal is unable to accept this Submission. The exercise of the
power under section 85(3)(b) of the LPA, to request that a complaint
be escalated directly to a Disciplinary Tribunal, does not change the

nature of the Law Society's role and duty, in framing the charges
arising from the complaint. In Yeo Khirn Hai, Justice Thean accepted
that the Law Society's responsibility in framing charges was the same
whether the complainant was

a jay complainant

or a complainant

under section 85(3) of the LPA (see Yeo Khir Hai, at [82]).
Adequate Notice of the Charges

112. The second ground relied upon in the Seah Pong Tshai line of cases,
namely

that notice of the relevant charges

was

not given

(see

respondent at the Inquiry Committee stage
above), is also quite clearly inapplicable here.

to the

paragraph

98

113.To begin with, no Inquiry Committee was convened in this case. The
adequacy of notice arising from this phase of proceedings therefore
does not arise.

114. More fundamentally, the Tribunal is also guided by the decision of
the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Wong Kai
Kit [1993] 3 SLR(R) 721 (""Wong Kai Kit’). In Wong Kai Kit, the Court
rejected the proposition that, based on Seah Pong Tshai and Lim
Chor Pee, matters outside an original complaint can never form the
subject matter of disciplinary proceedings commenced, as a result of
that complaint.

What

was

crucial, the Court

opined,

was that the

66 Respondent’s Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at paras 49 - 50.

37

advocate and solicitor against whom disciplinary proceedings
been brought, had notice of the charges against him.

had

115.The Court in Wong Kai Kit held (at [18] and [31]) that:
“It is plain from these [LPA] provisions that the primary concern of
the Legislature was that an advocate and solicitor whose conduct is
being investigated by an Inquiry Committee should be given a
reasonable

opportunity

to

present

his case...

Nowhere

in the

legislation is the leap made from this to the suggestion that matters

outside an original complaint can never form the subject maiter of
disciplinary proceedings commenced as a result of that complaint...

.. The fact that_a charge was
referred

by the AG

to the Law

not contained in the information
Society

is not by reason

of this

passage [in Lim Chor Pee at [36]| sufficient to render such charge
invalid or improper if notice of it was in fact given by the Inquiry
Committee as statutorily required.”
[Emphasis added,]

416. In the present case, the charges brought against the Respondent by
the Law Society have remained consistent throughout these
proceedings. The Respondent was not taken by surprise.
117.We should also highlight that this aspect of the Courts’ findings in
Seah Pong Tshai and Lim Chor Pee pre-dated amendments to the
LPA, which broadened the scope of Disciplinary Tribunals’
jurisdiction to consider additional charges.

418.The Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1993 introduced a new
provision (section 89(4) of the LPA), that provided as follows:

38

“Where, in the course of ifs investigation of any matter against an
advocate and solicitor referred to it under subsection (1) or (3), a
Disciplinary Committee receives information touching on or
evidence of the conduct of the advocate and solicitor which may give

rise to proceedings under this Part, the Disciplinary Committee may,

on the application of the Council, prefer such additional charge
against the advocate and solicitor as it thinks fit with respect to such
misconduct and, after giving notice to him, hear and investigate such
charge and section 93 shail apply to such charge accordingly.”

[See section 19 of the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1993 (No.
41/93)
[Emphasis added.]

119.As the Explanatory Statement to the Amendment Bill set out, the aim
of this amendment was to “enable a Disciplinary Committee to prefer
other charges against an advocate and solicitor in certain
circumstances”. In other words, a Disciplinary Committee (and now,

a Disciplinary Tribunal) is endowed with the statutory jurisdiction to
extend its investigation to “fresh matters”, and even to prefer “fresh
charges”, once adequate notice of its intention to do so is given to the
respondent lawyer (see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay
Khiang [2007] SGHC 83 (""Tan Phuay Khiang’), at [58)).
120.As stated above, the Respondent had ample notice of all the Charges
against her. She was given sufficient time to respond, and did in fact

do so, substantively, for all the Charges (including Charges 1B and
2B).
421. This Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction to hear Charges 1B and 2B.

39

(B)

Admissibility of evidence

422.The Second Preliminary Point raised by the Respondent relates to
admissibility of documents into evidence (to prove the truth of the
in Mr

underlying facts). The Respondent says that the documents

Gopalan’s Affidavit are inadmissible.
123. First, the Respondent argues that the Evidence Act (Cap. 97, 1997

Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act’) requires that only direct evidence may be
given of any fact. Mr Gopalan was not the maker of any of the
statemenis in the documents exhibited in his Affidavit. Therefore, the
Respondent submits, “save for a limited number of documents which

may be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule,” all the
documents exhibited in Mr Gopalan’s Affidavit are inadmissible.
124. The Respondent relies on Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008]
3 SLR(R) 447, for the proposition that only direct evidence may be
given of any fact.
125. Section 62 of the Evidence Act relates to oral evidence. The other
provisions in the Evidence Act, which deal with documentary
evidence, are more relevant to the exhibits to Mr Gopalan’s Affidavit.

126. Section 67A of the Evidence Act provides:
“Where in any proceedings a statement in a document is admissible

in evidence by virtue of section 32(1), it may be proved by the
production of that document or (whether or not that document is still
in existence) by the production of a copy of that document, or of the
material part of it, authenticated in a manner approved by the court.”
127.Section

32(1)

of

the

Evidence

Act,

in

turn,

provides

for

the

admissibility of the type of evidence, which, at common law, would be

40

referred to as hearsay evidence. Both parties have filed notices to
admit hearsay evidence, and this issue will be dealt with, later.

128. The effect of section 67A of the Evidence Act, read with section 32(1)
of the Evidence Act, has been summarised by Justice Woo Bih Li, in
Columbia Asia Healthcare Sdn Bhd and anotherv Hong Hin Kit
Edward and another [2016] 5 SLR 735, at [23] to [25]:
""23

Section 32(1)(b) [of the Evidence Act]

deals with the

exceptions to the hearsay rule. Moreover, s 66 must be read

subject to s 67A of the EA which states that where a statement
in a document is admissible in evidence by virtue of s 32(1) it
may be proved by the production of that document (fe, the
original) or a copy.

In summary, in so far as the Hongs submitted that the
24
maker_of the document must _be called to give evidence,
s 32(1)(b)(iv) states that this is not necessary under certain
circumstances.

25
be

In so far as the Hongs submitted that the original must
produced, s66 must be read subject to s67A which

provides that where s 32(1) applies, a copy may be produced.”

{Emphasis added.]
question of admissibility of the documents exhibited to Mr
Gopalan’s Affidavit (to prove the truth of the statements therein) will
have to be determined by whether these documents are admissible,
by virtue of section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

129.This

130.We will therefore consider whether the documents

Law

Society are admissible,

relied on by the

with reference to the LSS

Hearsay
AL

Notice®’. Both the Law Society and the Respondent have relied on
section 32 of the Evidence Act for admissibility of various documents
into evidence.
131.lnsofar as hearsay

evidence

is adduced

in relation to statements

made by Mr Lee, we find these documents admissible pursuant to
section 32(1)(i)(i) of the Evidence Act, read with section 67A of the
Evidence Act, on the ground that the maker of the statemenis,

Mr

Lee, has passed away.
132. This will include documents numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 13,
15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 in the LSS Hearsay Notice. In addition, we
also find that these documents

are admissible pursuant to section

32(1)(b)(iv) of the Evidence Act, being documents forming part of a

record kept by Ms KKL, in the course of her profession as Mr Lee’s
lawyer (see also paragraph 135 below).
133. The Respondent also objected to various documents in Mr Gopalan’s
Affidavit, which related to correspondence between Mr LHY and Dr

LWL,

and

the Ministerial

Committee

(the ""MC”)®;

as well

as

correspondence between various family members and Mr Lee. The
authenticity of these documents is not in dispute. They are admissible
to show what had been said by the various parties. In so far as these
documents originated from Mr LHY and/or the Respondent, both of
them gave evidence and were cross-examined. The Tribunal
received direct evidence on some of the documents and is able to
87 LSS Hearsay Notice dated 24 June 2019.
* On 1 June 2016, a Ministerial Committee (""MC"") had been formed by the Singapore Cabinet to
consider the options for 38 Oxley Road and the implications of those options [Report of the MC on 38

Oxley

Road,

dated

2 April

2018

(httos:/Awww.pmo.gov.sq/-/media/PMO/Newsroom/Files/Media-

Release/MC Report 38 Oxley Road.pdf]. These included looking into various aspects, including the
historical and heritage significance of 38 Oxiey Road, as well as to consider Mr Lee's thinking and
wishes in relation to 38 Oxley in the Last Will (see paras 7 — 30 of the Report). The MC stated that it
had engaged in correspondence with Mr LHL, Mr LHY and Dr LWL, to obtain as full a picture as possible
on Mr Lee's thinking on 38 Oxley Road (see para 24 of the Report}. Some of the questions raised,
related to the Last Will (See paras 4 and 9 of Annex C to the Report: https:/Avww.pmo.gov.sa//media/PMO/Newsroom/Files/Media-Release/MC_ Report 38 Oxley Road Annex C.pdf}.

42

form views on the matters set out in the documents, in the context of
the evidence given. The same goes for documents that Mr LHY sent
to the MC.

134.Next we consider the documents relating to statements made by Ms
KKL, which are documents numbered 10, 11, 14, 17, and 23 in the
LSS Hearsay Notice. It appears from the LSS Hearsay Notice that

the Law Society relies on two grounds for the admission of these
documents:

(a)

First, the Law Society states in the LLS Hearsay Notice, that
these documents are emails sent by Ms KKL, and therefore,

form part of “a document constituting, or forming part of, the
records

(whether

past

or present)

of a

trade,

business,

profession or other occupation that are recorded, owned or
kept by any person, body or organisation carrying out the trade,
business, profession or other occupation”, pursuant to section
32(1)(b)(iv) of the Evidence Act.
(b)

| Second,

the Law

Society states that these

documents

are

admissible pursuant to section 32(1)(i}(iv) of the Evidence Act;
as statements made by a person who “being competent but
not

compellable

to give

evidence

on

behalf of the party

desiring to give the statement in evidence, he refuses to do
”
so.

135.First,

in relation to section

32(1)(b\(iv) of the Evidence

Act, this

Tribunal finds that the documents numbered 10, 11, 14, 17, and 23
in the LSS Hearsay Notice are admissible pursuant to that provision.

These documents form a record, or part of a record, kept by Ms KKL,
as a lawyer in the ordinary course of business.

43

136.In relation to section 32(1}(j)iv) of the Evidence Act, it appears that
Ms KKL has said that she will not give evidence.

137. The Tribunal was informed that Ms KKL had refused to participate in
“any meeting and/or discussion with the Law Society regarding the
documents referred fo in your email and any information or

documents pertaining to my engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor®.
Counsel

for the Law Society

informed this Tribunal that the Law

Society was “told in no uncertain terms that she is not allowed and
the estate fof Mr Lee] has asserted privilege”. The Executors of Mr

Lee’s Estate (namely, Mr LHY and Dr LWL) had taken this position’®.
The Law Society stated that it did not subpoena Ms KKL, inter alia,
because “a subpoena fo her will not waive privilege if she maintains

that privilege’”' (see also paragraph 153 below).
138.The documents will be admissible,

Evidence _Act
“compellable’.

if Ms
There

under section 32(1)()(iv) of the

KKL (as a solicitor to
is no direct case law

Mr Lee) was
precedent on

not
the

compellability of a solicitor, though there is some learning which has
been referred to us by the parties. We do not see the need to decide

on the question

of whether

Ms KKL was

compellable,

(and thus

whether the documents are admissible under section 32(1)(j)(iv) of

the Evidence Act), since we have stated (above), that the documents
10, 11, 14, 17 and 23, are admissible under section 32(1)(b)(vi) of the
Evidence Act.

6 Transcripts (5 July), 60:31 - 61:2.
7° Transcripts (5 July), 60:27- 63:14.

71 Transcripts (5 July), 63:8-10.

Exclusionary Discretion

139. The Respondent submits that even if the evidence is admissible, this
Tribunal should exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence, which
she says was obtained by the Law Society in breach of legal privilege.
Save for documents numbered 1 and 2, which are the Last Will and
the Codicil to the same, the Respondent submits that all the other

documents ought to be inadmissible on this ground”.
140. The Court of Appeal in Mykytowyeh, Pamela Jane v V/ P Hotel [2016]
4 SLR 829 (“Pamela Jane”) has cautioned (at [57]) that the “concepts
of admissibility, privilege and confidentiality should not be confused”.

The Court of Appeal, considering the admissibility of a report by one
Dr Tay opined, at [58] — [59]:
Privilege allows a party to withhold the disclosure of
‘58
to
compulsory
be
otherwise
would
which
information
disclose. Admissibility, on the other hand, relates to the question of
whether a particular piece of evidence may be received by the court,
and is governed by whether that piece of evidence is relevant to the

matters in issue (see Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen [1955]
2 WLR 223 at 226-227 as cited in Wee Shuo Woon at [19}). Where
the document in respect of which privilege is being asserted — such
as Dr Tay’s medical report in the present case — is already in the
possession of the other party, the issue is no longer one of
and the
disclosure,
withholding
admissibility rather than privilege.

question

becomes

one

of

The question of whether Dr Tay’s medical report is protected
59
by litigation privilege is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the issue of
whether it is admissible as evidence. It may, however, have a
bearing on whether the report should be admitted. This arises from

the fact that equity may, through the grant of injunctions, intervene
to prevent the unauthorised use in court proceedings of information
72 Respondent's No Case Submissions (2 July 2049) at paras 26 — 27.

45

contained in privileged material, which would, in most instances, be

of a.confidential nature (see Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch
Building
Nationwide
v
(‘Lord Ashburton""), Goddard
469
Society [1986] 3 WLR 734 (""Goddara""), Tentat Singapore Pte Lid v

Multiple Granite Pte Ltd[2009] 1 SLR(R) 42 (""Tentat"") and Wee
Shuo Woon at[22]). The court’s equitable jurisdiction to restrain
breaches of confidence is invoked in these instances.”

141.The

Respondent's position, in summary, is that the documents in
question (being the Wills and other documents) were privileged
between

Mr Lee and Ms

KKL.

The Estate of Mr Lee now

has the

benefit of that privilege, and thus, she says, the documents cannot
be relied upon in these proceedings.

142.The first point to note is that the Respondent has no privilege in
respect of the documents. It is for the Estate, which is not a party to
these proceedings, to assert any legal privilege. This is a basic point,

which the Respondent accepted”. Second, that the documents may
be

protected

by

privilege

is in itself

insufficient to affect their
admissibility. The question for the Tribunal is, if these documents are
indeed protected by privilege, nonetheless (and if such privilege is
asserted by the Estate), should the Tribunal exercise its discretion to
exclude this evidence? The Tribunal has the discretion to exclude

otherwise admissible evidence”*.

143. This question was in substance dealt with by the High Court in OS
639 (see paragraphs 85 — 89 above). In OS 639, the Estate (acting
through Mr LHY and Dr LWL) made an application to the High Court
seeking an injunction against the Law Society. The Estate wanted to
restrain the Law Society from relying on all of Mr Lee’s wills and the
Codicil, and all drafts of these Wills, in these Disciplinary
78 Transcript (3 July 2019), 94:18-21.
74 See Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205.

46

proceedings. This included the Last Will, the Codicil, the First to Sixth

Wills, and all drafts of these wills’5. In relation to the Last Will, the
Codici], the First to Sixth Wills,

and the drafts thereof, the Estate

claimed that these documents
legal privilege.

were confidential and protected by

144.As stated earlier (see paragraph 89 above), Justice Hoo declined to
grant the injunction against the Law Society. The attempt to prevent

the Law Society from relying on these documents was rejected. This
Tribunal notes that the documents which were the subject of OS 639,
were the documents numbered

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the LSS

Hearsay Notice. !n coming to her decision, Justice Hoo applied the
principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Pamela Jane.
145. In relation to the documents numbered

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in

the LSS Hearsay Notice, this Tribunal finds that if the Court did not
deem fit to exercise its equitable discretion, to restrain the Law
Society from using these documents in these proceedings, then there
is no reason for this Tribunal to exclude the same. The Estate tried
but failed, to prevent the documents from being in evidence in the

proceedings.

146.In relation to the documents in the LSS Hearsay Notice, which are
email communications between Ms KKL and Mr Lee, in relation to Mr
Lee’s Wills, (the documents numbered 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,

20, 21 and 22 (“LKY-KKL Emails”)), this Tribunal is of the view that
these

documents

would

ordinarily be protected

by legal privilege.

However, this privilege is for the Estate to claim, not the Respondent.
This is accepted by the Respondent”. The Tribunal notes that the
Estate did not seek to restrain the Law Society from using the LKYKKL Emails, in OS 639, Further, the High Court’s reasoning in OS
78 See paragraph 86 and fn 64 of this Decision.

7 Transcripts (3 July), 94:13-21.
47

639 applies equally to the LKY-KKL
exclude the documents.

Emails. This Tribunal will not

147.Excluding these documents will mean, infer alia, that the Tribunal will

be precluded from considering the differences between the different
Wills, and understanding the positions taken by Mr Lee.
Respondent's Hearsay Notice

148.We

highlight that the Respondent

too had filed a Notice to Admit

Documentary Hearsay Evidence (“Respondent's Hearsay Notice”),
dated 24 June 2019. The Respondent relies on the same sections,
viz, section 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act and section 32(1)(/)(i) of the

Evidence Act. The Law Society has not objected to the admissibility
of the evidence listed in the Respondent's Hearsay Notice. The
evidence listed in the Respondent's Hearsay Notice is admissible.
(C)

Unfair Conduct

149. We will now consider the Third Preliminary Point. In the Respondent's
Closing

Submissions,

the

Respondent

submitted

that

the

Law

Society acted unfairly to the Respondent. At Annex C of the
Respondent's Closing Submissions (the “RAC”), the Respondent has
set out a list of instances where she alleges she was treated unfairly.

The Law Society, in its Closing Submissions, has responded to the
instances of alleged unfairness, also in table form. The Tribunal will
briefly

address

these

submissions,

with

reference

to

the

serial

number assigned to these instances in the RAC.
450. Items 1 and 2 of the RAC state (a) that the charges did not conform
to the AGC Complaint, and (b) that the Law Society used documents
which were disclosed in breach of confidentiality and legal

48

professional privilege. These points have been deait with earlier (see
Sections V(A) and V(B) above).
151. items 3 and 4 of the RAC relate to procedural matters before the trial
stage of the hearings before the Tribunal. The Respondent submitted
that the Law Society failed to inform the Respondent why an urgent
Pre-Hearing Conference (“PHC”) was required, when the Law
Society requested for one on 16 April 2019 (Item 3), and that the Law

Society made an illegitimate demand for immediate disclosure of all
copies of documents in the Respondent's list of documents (Item 4).
In relation to the request for an urgent Pre-Hearing Conference, the
Tribunal had addressed the same in its directions to parties. No
urgent PHC was fixed, and the Law Society was directed to address

the issues it wished to bring to the Tribunal’s attention (by way of the
urgent PHC) in written submissions. The Respondent was given an
opportunity to provide submissions in reply, and both parties were
heard during the PHC on 8 May 2019. In relation to the request for
copies of documents (and the Tribunal fails to see how such a request
be illegitimate), the Tribunal directed that the inspection and
furnishing of documents be done in accordance with Rule 9 of the
can

Leaal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules. Leaving aside the
fact that the Respondent did not suffer any prejudice procedurally,
the Tribunal does not see any force in the argument that the
Respondent was treated unfairly. The Law Society sought directions.
The Tribunal, having considered the Law Society’s requests for
directions, declined to grant the directions sought for the urgent PHC,
and in respect of inspection and furnishing of documents, directed
that this be done in accordance with the Rules.

152. ltems 5 and 6 of the RAC relate to the Law Society's failure to call Ms
KKL as a witness, and the “delayed decision” to call Mr BL as a
witness. The Law Society had indicated in its list of witnesses,

49

provided on 27 May 201977, that it would be calling Ms KKL as a
Society's position is that its list of witnesses,
provided on 27 May 2019 was “fentative and subject fo change’.

witness.

The

Law

153.The Law Society said that it eventually decided not to call Ms KKL
because Ms KKL had declined to participate in “any meeting and/or
discussion with the Law Society regarding the documents referred to
in [the

Law

Society’s]

email

and

any

information

or documents

pertaining to [Ms KKL’s] engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor’”® (see
also paragraph 137 above), and that her evidence was not necessary

because the Law Society was able to rely on various documents

which had become available®. Ms KKL’s position was based on the
objections raised by the Executors of the Estate. We do not find any
merit in the points made in the RAC about Ms KKL not being called
as a witness. It is for each party to decide, at the Hearing, which
witnesses are called. The Tribunal is entitled to also draw the
appropriate inferences when a witness is not called, and regardless

of whether a witness is called or not called, the burden of proof (to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt) lay on the Law Society. We
also note that the Respondent’s husband, Mr LHY, as Executor, had
asserted legal privilege, vis-a-vis Ms KKL (see paragraphs 423 — 434

below).
154. In relation to the Law Society's decision to subpoena

Mr BL as a

witness, the Tribunal does not find any unfairness. The evidence he

gave and the documents he preduced were within the Respondent's
knowledge. The Respondent also had the opportunity to crossexamine Mr BL. We have made some further observations below on
77 Email from the Law Society to the Respondent and the Tribunal, setting out the list of its witnesses,
dated 27 May 2019.
78 LSS Closing Submissions (20 September 2019)

at p 123, Item 5.

79 Transcripts (5 July 2019), 60:31 - 61:2.
8 Transcripts (1 July 2019), 5:28 - 6:18.
50

this objection, in relation to Mr BL being called to give evidence (see
paragraphs 182 — 193 below).
155. Items 7 and 8 of the RAC relate to the subpoena issued against MLS
for documents. The Law Society informed the Tribunal on 2 July 2019,
the second day of the Hearing, that the Law Society was considering
issuing a subpoena against MLS. The Respondent submitted that
issuing the subpoena, after the close of the Law Society’s case,
resulted in unfairness to her. The Tribunal notes that the witness from

MLS, Mr Manoj Pillay, simply confirmed that MLS had not been able
to retrieve any document responsive to the subpoena. The Tribunal
fails to see how this (the fact that the Respondent’s law firm did not
produce any documents) caused any unfairness, to the Respondent.
The Respondent was put on notice on the second day of the Hearing
that the Law Society may issue a subpoena against MLS. The
subpoena was in relation to the specific email(s) on the question of
from

whom

Mr

BL

the

received

had

draft document,

which

was

executed to become the Last Will. This issue arose as a consequence
of the evidence given by Mr BL.
156.The Respondent also alleges that Mr LHY was subject to unfair
allegations in cross-examination (Item 9 of the RAC). The Tribunal
does not see any merit in this submission, or how this amounts to
unfairness. In the Tribunal’s view, cross-examination of Mr LHY by
Counsel for the Law Society was in accordance with the rules and
principles governing evidence and cross-examination. Counsel for
the Respondent did not raise any objection in this regard during Mr
LHY’s cross-examination.
at Item 10 of the RAC,

157.Lastly,
reading

of

an

received

by

the

Law

submits that the

Society's

solicitors,

KKL,

was

unfair as the Estate did not

an opportunity to respond.

The

Respondent

WongPartnership,
have

email

the Respondent

from

Ms

claims that the

54

allegation by the Law Society that the Estate had refused to allow Ms
KKL to testify in these proceedings was based on this email. We do
not see any merit in this argument. The Respondent did not raise any
objections at the hearing. Second, the Respondent had the
opportunity to object at the oral hearing on 7 October 2019, but did
not do so. We have also dealt with this matter at paragraphs 431 —

434 below.
458. There was no unfairness to either party in respect of these matters.
Many of the objections relate to procedures which are normal and
routine in hearings: calling / not calling of witnesses, seeking
directions from the Tribunal, cross-examination, issue of subpoenas,

production of documents, and so on.

Vi.

Summary of the Parties’ Positions on the Charges

159.We will now set out a short summary
relation to the Charges®'.
(A)

of the parties’ positions in

The Law Society’s Case

160.The Law Society's case was that there was an Implied Retainer
between the Respondent and Mr Lee. The Law Society said that the
Respondent acted as Mr Lee's solicitor. She prepared the draft Last
Will and advised Mr Lee on it. Mr LHY, the Respondent’s husband,

was a beneficiary under the Last Will. The Law Society argues that
Respondent's conduct is in breach of Rules 25 and 46 of the PCR.

161. The Law Society argued that the Respondent had failed to advance
Mr Lee’s interests unaffected by her interests and/or those of her
husband, Mr LHY. The Law Society's case is that there were material
81 We will only set out brief details here. The points made by the parties are dealt with in greater detail,
hereafter.
52

differences between

the draft sent by the Respondent, which was

executed to become the Last Will, and the First Will (contrary to her
representation that the draft Last Will was in the same terms as the

First Will). Mr Lee was also not advised in detail on the draft Last Will,
on the various clauses in the Last Will (which Mr Lee had earlier
decided to drop), and how the Last Will was different from the
Penultimate Will. The Law Society also points to the fact that Mr Lee’s
usual lawyer, Ms KKL, was absent from the matters surrounding the
preparation and execution of the Last Will and that the Respondent
rushed the execution of the Last Will, contrary to Mr Lee’s interests.

162.As regards the differences between the draft Last Will (which the
Respondent sent Mr Lee on 16 December 2013, and which was
executed to become the Last Will), and the First Will, the Law Society
points to the following in particular:

(a)

The Last Will omitted (infer alia) the Gift-over Clause, which
had been present in the First Will.

(b)

The

Last Will also included various clauses,

including the

Demolition Clause, which, while present in the First Will, had

been removed by Mr Lee in later wills, including the Sixth Will,
which immediately preceded the Last Will.
The Law Society argued that the Respondent, by not advising Mr Lee

(amongst other things) on these differences or changes, had failed in
her duties to Mr Lee as his solicitor.

163.[n addition, the Law Society also argues that Charges 1B and 2B can
be maintained even if the Tribunal were to find that there was no
Implied Retainer between Mr Lee and the Respondent.

53

(B)

The Respondent's Case

164. The Respondent said that she was not Mr Lee's lawyer in relation to
the

Last

Will,

and

that

there

was

no

Implied

Retainer.

The

Respondent's position is that she was helping as a family member,
and

as

Mr

Lee’s

daughter-in-law
®; she

did

not

give

or take

instructions from Mr Lee®’, and Mr Lee had access to his own lawyer

at all times®*. (See also paragraph 265 below.)

:

165. The Respondent also said that there was no conflict of interest as she
Was unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the conflict. It is the
Respondent’s case that both she and Mr LHY were unaware of the
terms of the Sixth Will, and in particular, that it provided for distribution
which gave Mr Lee’s daughter, Dr LWL, a larger share than Mr Lee's
sons, Mr LHL and Mr LHY. If the Respondent was indeed in a position
of conflict, the Respondent argued that Mr Lee was fully aware of the
Respondent’s involvement and consciously chose to proceed®®.
Vil.

Issues for determination

166.The

main

issues that arise for our determination,

in respect of the

Charges, are as follows:

(A)

Implied Retainer

Was the Respondent
Implied Retainer?

Mr Lee’s lawyer, for the Last Will, by way of an

82 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 141.
83 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 149.
® Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 169.
85 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 192.

54

(B) Breach of duties/Misconduct
If an Implied Retainer is made out:

(a)

Did the Respondent

under

breach the professional duties,

Rule 25 and/or 46 of the PCR?

(b)

If so, did this amount to:

(i)

grossly

improper

conduct

(pursuant

to the

primary

Charges (Charges 1 and 2)); or
(ii)

improper

conduct,

or practice,

as an

advocate

and

solicitor, (pursuant to the alternative Charges (Charges
1A and 2A)),
under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA?

(c)

Aside from the question of Implied Retainer. Was the
Respondent nevertheless guilty of misconduct unbefitting an
advocate and solicitor, under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA,
(pursuant to the further alternative Charges (Charges 1B and
2B))?

' (C)

Cause for disciplinary action

if there was an Implied Retainer, and if there were breaches

of duties,

nevertheless, is there cause of sufficient gravity, for disciplinary action
under section 83 of the LPA?

167.We will consider each of the issues separately.

55

168.The Written Submissions from the parties in this matter ran to 237
pages and the Annexes totalled another 42 pages. The transcript of
the Hearing ran to 627 pages. The parties covered fairly extensive
ground, both on procedures, preliminary issues and on the
substantive issues.
169.We have considered the points made. We will deal with the points
raised, in respect of the three issues set out at paragraph 166 above.
We will also deal with several other points raised, even though some
of them were not strictly necessary for our decision. This has resulted
in some repetition of the facts and reasoning, as we have tried to deal
with many of the points and arguments raised.
Vill.

Retainer

170,Parties are agreed that there was no Express Retainer between the

Respondent and Mr Lee. The issue is whether there was an Implied
Retainer between the Respondent and Mr Lee, in respect of the Last
Will.
171.We will set out:

(A)

(B)

The applicable
Retainer.

legal

principles,

on the question

of Implied

:

The relevant questions to be considered, on the question of
Implied

Retainer, the evidence

that was

presented,

and

our

views.

(C)

Our conclusions, on the question of Implied Retainer.

(D)

The positions that the parties had taken previously, in respect
of some of the questions that arose before us.

56

(A)

The applicable principles

172.No legal formalities are required for a retainer to exist (Law Society

of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] SGHC
(‘Ahmad Khalis’) at [64]).

143

173. The assessment turns on whether, on “an objective consideration of

all the circumstances”, a contractual relationship of lawyer and client
“ought fairly and properly to be imputed to all the parties” (see Ahmad
Khalis at [66]). [Emphasis added.]
174.To that end, an objective analysis is applied, from both perspectives
— that of the lawyer, and of the putative client (Anmad Khalis at [66]).
A tribunal must undertake “the objective inquiry” of considering —

whether the putative client reasonably considered

(a)

that the

lawyer was acting for him, and

whether the lawyer ought to have reasonably known that he
was acting for the putative client

(b)

(see BOM v BOK [2019] 1 SLR 349 (“BOM’) at [109]).
The parties’ subjective perspectives, are “by no means conclusive”.
They must be consistent with the objective facts, and reasonable,
when construed against that context (Ahmad Khalis at [66]).

175. The final assessment rests on a “holistic and careful consideration of
the factual matrix’ (BOM at [109]). Factors that will be considered
include:
(a)

| Whether the lawyer gave advice to the putative client on the

relevant document (see Anwar Patrick Adrian and another v
57

Ng Chong & Hue LLC and another [2014] SGCA 34 at (52);
BOM at [109]);

{b)

Whether there was another lawyer acting for the putative client
(Ahmad Khalis at [67]);

(c)

Whether the lawyer asked the putative
independent advice (BOM at [109]); and

(d)

Whether the lawyer and the putative client are spouses, in a

client

to

seek

marital relationship (BOM at [112]).

(B)

The

relevant questions

to_be

considered

on

the question

of

Implied Retainer, the evidence that was presented and our views

176. The questions we will consider on the issue of Implied Retainer are
as follows:
(a)

Did Mr Lee and the Respondent proceed on the basis that the
Respondent was his lawyer, for the Last Will;

(b)

The actual nature and extent of the Respondent’s role, in the
Last Will; and

(c)

The nature and extent of Ms KKL’s involvement (Mr Lee’s
usual lawyer), in the Last Will.

177.Before we deal with the above three questions, we will refer briefly to
some of the important evidence that was put before us, and the

manner in which some of it came before us.

58

Production of Relevant Evidence

178. The documentary evidence which was put before us provides a fairly
comprehensive record of what transpired, in the period leading up to,
during, and immediately after Mr Lee signed the Last Will. This is
primarily contained in the form of email correspondence.
179. This evidence was

particularly relevant,

given

its contemporaneity

and being a written record.

180. In this regard, as more than five years have lapsed between the Last
Will and these proceedings, the Court of Appeal’s observations in
Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Strategic Worldwide Assets
Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 562 (“Sandz”) are instructive. In Sandz, the events
in question took place nearly five years before the trial (see Sanaz at
[77]). The Court of Appeal said (Sandz at [50] and [77]):
«_. As a rule of thumb, the longer the lapse of time between the
happening of the event or matter being recollected and the witness's
appearance on the witness stand, the less the reliance that should
be placed on pure oral evidence and the more searching the court
ought to be in assessing and testing that evidence...
..AS

we

observed

above...even

the

recollections

of the

most

truthful of witnesses would be tested by the lapse of time. In the
premises, we think it preferable in these proceedings to place more
reliance _on the objective documentary evidence before us as well
as the actual conduct _of the parties, as opposed to their _hazy
recollections of past events on the witness stand.”
[Emphasis added.]

so

181.We found the documentary evidence inherently more reliable than
the witness testimony, for the reasons set out by the Court of Appeal,
and also because of the nature of same of the oral testimony that was
given.

182. The key factual witnesses before us were Mr BL, on behalf of the Law
Society, and the Respondent and her husband, Mr LHY, on behaif of
the Respondent. Mr BL’s evidence was largely unchallenged by the
Respondent, save for one point, on what the Respondent told him
about the contents of the Last Will (we will refer to this later (see
paragraph 514(b) below)).
183.The other witnesses before us, (namely, Mr Gopalan,

Chuan,

and

Mr

Manoj

Pillay

(see

paragraph

90

Mr Lim Seng

above)),

gave

evidence of a more formal nature, relating to documents.

184.We had referred earlier (at paragraphs 83 - 84) to the BL Documents
which were produced by Mr BL, a few days before ihe Hearing
(pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Law Society).
185.The BL Documents contained, inter alia:

(a)

Emails before the Last Will was signed, which showed

the

Respondent giving Mr BL instructions, on the preparation and
execution of the Last Will (see paragraphs 47 — 49 and 51
above);
(b)

Emails

after the

Last Will was

signed,

which

showed

the

Respondent giving Mr BL and her other colleagues at
Stamford
Law instructions on how to follow-up (see
paragraphs 53 — 55, 57, 59 - 60, 64 and 67 above); and

60

(c)

Ms EK’s Attendance Note (see paragraph 69 above), which
showed what transpired when Mr Lee signed the Last Will, and
her email exchange with the Respondent, which recounted Mr
Lee's queries on who drafted the Last Will.

Some significant parts of the facts set out in Section IN(G) were
based on the BL Documents. (See also paragraph 370 below.)
486.We will consider these BL Documents, in detail, later.

187.The BL Documents (and Mr BL’s Affidavit) deal with issues and
matters that are also dealt with by the Respondent in her Affidavit.

(a)

| The Respondent stated in her Affidavit®* that her involvement
in the Last Will was limited to forwarding the draft of the Last
Will and the introducing of Mr BL to Ms WLH. Mr LHY

described

these

tasks

as

“administrative

tasks’ ®’.

The

Respondent said that she ceased involvement in the Last Will,
after introducing Mr BL to Ms WLH and Mr LHY, in the evening
of 16 December 2013 (see paragraph 40 above).

The BL Documents and Mr BL’s evidence showed that the
Respondent remained closely involved throughout, and
continued to exchange multiple emails with Mr BL and others,
regarding the Last Will, until after the Last Will was signed (we
deal with this later (see paragraphs 367 — 394)).

(b)

The Respondent stated in her Affidavit® that there was no
reason for Mr Lee to have believed that she was his lawyer.

®6 The Respondent’s AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 27 and 29.
87 Transcript (4 July 2019), 127:28; see also Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 36 and 56.

88 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 28.

61

The BL Documents and Mr BL’s evidence showed that just
before he signed the Last Will, Mr Lee asked Mr BL, more than

once, who drafted the Last Will. The BL Documents state that
Mr Lee was told that the Respondent was the primary lawyer
who drafted the Last Will. The Respondent knew that Mr Lee

was told this, and had not objected (we deal with this later (see
paragraphs 200 —- 221)).

(c)

| The Respondent also said, on Affidavit®®, that Mr LHY and Dr
LWL

had never sought her inputs on their correspondence

with the MC (which, inter alia, dealt with the Last Will). The BL

Documents showed that the Respondent was kept informed of
Mr LHY and Dr LWL’s correspondence with the MC, and
helped them gather information for their responses (we deal
with this later (see paragraphs 459 - 471)).

188. The Respondent knew about the BL Documents (many of them were
correspondence sent to or sent by her), and what Mr BL’s evidence
was. She had possession of several of the BL Documents. Mr LHY
was also aware of them:
(a)

December 2016, the Respondent received the EK
Attendance Note (see paragraph 69) from Ms EK, when she
In

wrote to Ms EK, to gather information on Mr LHY and Dr LWL’s

behalf, to prepare responses to the MC%®.
(b)

In late 2018,

after AGC

first wrote

to the Respondent,

the

Respondent had spoken with Mr BL, who recounted to her his

8° The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 35.
01 SS SBOD, p 18, email fram Ms EK to Mr BL and the Respondent dated 19 December 2016, 10.49am.

62

recollection of what happened in December 2013. Mr BL gave

evidence on this and this was not disputed®*.
(c)

More recently, during the discovery phase of the current
proceedings, the Respondent's lawyers also met with Mr BL

to check what documents were in his possession®.
189. The Respondent did not give discovery of the BL Documents. She
said that she chose not to disclose or refer to the BL Documents, as

she “didn’t think that they were relevant at alf’®.
190.In our view, the BL Documents go to important issues before us (as
will be seen hereafter). The questions we have to deal with include:
whether the Respondent acted as Mr Lee’s lawyer, for the purposes
of the Last Will. The BL Documents provide relevant evidence, inter
alia, on the nature and extent of the Respondent's involvement in the

Last Will, that Mr Lee wanted to know who had drafted the Last Will,
and that he was told that the Respondent had (primarily) drafted the
Last Will.

191.We will also deal briefly with how the parties dealt with discovery, in
respect of some documents.

192.As part of the discovery process, the Law Society sought specific
discovery,

inter

alia,

of:

(a)

all

correspondence

Respondent, Mr BL and Ms EK, on the Last Will,
Attendance Note for Mr Lee’s signing of the Last Will.

between

and

the

(b) the

51 Transcript (3 July 2018), 46:23-28.
52 Transcript (3 July 2019), 47:10-19.
3 Transcript (3 July 2019), 47:30 - 48:42, 49:11-14.
63

193.As regards the Law Society's request for the former category of
documents, the Respondent took the position that the Law Society's
request was “unnecessary” because she had already listed “various
correspondences between herself or [Mr LHY] with [Mr BL] and [Ms
EK] in her list of documents’. The Respondent thus gave the
impression that the correspondence disclosed in her List of
Documents reflected the entirety of her exchanges with Ms EK and

Mr BL.

The Respondent's List of Documents however, made no

mention of the BL Documents.

194.As

regards

the Law

Society's

request for the latter category

of

documents, the Respondent refused to disclose the EK Attendance
Note, on the basis that it was “wholly irrelevant to these
proceedings’. The EK Attendance Note, inter alia, set out Mr Lee's
queries on who prepared the Last Will. In our view, that is relevant to

the issue of whether the Respondent (or someone else) acted as Mr
Lee’s lawyer, in drafting the Last Will.
195.Both the Respondent and Mr LHY were in possession of the EK
Attendance Note. Mr LHY said that he may have been given a copy

of the same by the Respondent in December 2016, or he may have
received it earlier® (see also paragraphs 465 - 466, 493 - 495 below).
196. We will now deal with the three questions set out at paragraph 176
above, to determine whether there was an Implied Retainer, by
reason of the circumstances, including the Respondent's conduct.

4 Respondent's Skeletal Written Submissions (26 April 2019) at para 28.
95 Respondent's Skeletal Written Submissions (26 April 2019) at para 42.
°% Transcript (4 July 2049), 11:11-18, 22:22 ~ 23:11, 43:18 ~ 44:5, 112:25-30.

(1)

Did Mr Lee and the Respondent proceed on the basis that the

Respondent was his lawyer for the Last Will?
197.We

will now

deal with the first of the three

questions

set out

in

paragraph 176 above. The Law Society argued that Mr Lee regarded
the Respondent as his lawyer for the Last Will. The Respondent and
Mr LHY took the position that Mr Lee regarded Ms KKL, and not the
Respondent, as his lawyer for the Last Will. They said that there was

no reason

for Mr Lee to have

regarded

the Respondent

as his

lawyer*”. They said that Mr Lee never spoke with the Respondent
about the Last Will, and gave his instructions to execute the Last Will

only to Mr LHY®.
198. We have considered these points, and the evidence carefully. The
evidence shows that Mr Lee regarded the Respondent as, and
believed her to be, his lawyer for the Last Will. The Respondent also

proceeded on that basis. We will refer to three points:
(a)

Just before he signed the Last Will, Mr Lee asked, twice, who
prepared the Last Will. He was told that the Respondent was
the primary lawyer for the Last Will. Mr Lee accepted this and

signed the Last Will on this basis. The Respondent knew what
Mr Lee was told, and did not contradict what Mr Lee was told

(see paragraphs 200 ~ 222};
(b)

The Respondent took instructions directly from Mr Lee, on the

Last Will (see paragraphs 223 — 249); and

57 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 23, 27 and 28; Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at
paras 56 and 84(a); Transcript (3 July 2019), 34:15-17; (4 July 2019), 51:4-5, 71:11-12. See also
Defence at paras 49, 50 and 64(b).
# Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 156; Transcript (3 July 2019), 102:1-4;
.
Transcript (4 July 2019), 56:2-4, 66:27, 67:9-11, 97:4-7, 98:13-18.

65

After the Last Will was signed, Mr Lee kept one of the two
originals, and allowed the Respondent to keep the other

(c)

original. Ms KKL was sent a copy. Mr Lee also made sure that

the Respondent was informed, when he signed the Codicil to
the Last Will, the following month (see paragraphs 250 — 263).
199.We will set out the evidence in respect of these three points.

(a)

Mr Lee was told that the Respondent prepared the Last Will

200.Mr Lee was told that the Last Will was primarily prepared by the
Respondent. This took place immediately before he signed the Last
Will, when Mr BL and Ms EK were at 38 Oxley for its execution.
201.The Respondent was also
exchange later that day.
202.Slightly

over an

December

informed

hour after Mr Lee

2013),

Ms

of Mr

Lee’s

and

Mr

BL’s

signed the Last Will (on

EK told the Respondent

in an email

17
(see

paragraph 59 above) that®:
""he [Mr Lee] is definitely still very lucid - he asked Bernard who

drafted the will, twice... and Bernard wasn’t entirely sure but
mentioned it was primarily you and Ms Kwa from Lee & Lee”.
[Emphasis added.]
203. The contemporaneous attendance note prepared by Ms EKlater that
afternoon (namely, the EK Attendance Note (see paragraph 69

above)), also states that “he [Mr Lee] asked us who drafted the wilf'™.
#9 LSS SBOD,

p 6, email from Ms EK

to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 12.25pm.

10 LSS SBOD, p 26, Attendance note contained in the email from Ms EK to Mr BL dated 17 December

2013, 4.32pm.

66

corroborated

were

accounts

204. These

by Mr BL's evidence.

In his

Affidavit, Mr BL said that:

Before Mr Lee signed the Last Will, he asked Mr BL, who
drafted the Last Will. Mr BL told Mr Lee that the Respondent

(a)

had drafted the Last Will'®"".
Mr Lee then asked Mr BL again (i.e. a second time), who
drafted the Last Will. On this second occasion, Mr BL told Mr

(b)

Lee that it was the Respondent, and Ms KKL'®?,
205.The

Respondent

not challenge

did

Mr

BL’s

evidence

in cross-

examination on this aspect.

206.We consider this exchange

between

Mr Lee and Mr BL significant,

for a number of reasons.
207.First, Mr Lee’s questions to Mr BL show that it was important to Mr
Lee to have a lawyer prepare the Last Will. It was the only question
that Mr Lee asked (and he asked it twice), before he signed the Last
Will. We note that Mr Lee had also wanted even the witnesses to the

Last Will to be lawyers. He gave express instructions to get “a solicitor”
(or a ""notary public”) to witness the signing of the Last Will (see
paragraphs

41

and

Mr

LHY’s

response,

set out at paragraph

44

above).
208.Second, in response to Mr Lee's queries, Mr BL said to Mr Lee, both

times, that the Respondent was the lawyer for the Last Will. On the

101 Mr BL's AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 25.
102 Mr BL’s AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 25,

67

second occasion he also referred to Ms KKL. Mr BL was mistaken in
this and Ms KKL had no role in drafting the Last Will (see Section
VII(BY3) below). Mr Lee was given the impression that the
Respondent had primarily drafted the Last Will. Mr Lee proceeded to
sign the Last Will after being told this.
209. Third,

the

material.

own

Respondent's

The

Respondent

reaction

to what

replied to other

transpired

aspects

is also

of Ms

EK’s

email'’°?, But she did not object to Mr BL saying that she drafted the
Last Will. She knew that she was held out as the lawyer, who had

primarily prepared Mr Lee’s Last Will, and was content to leave Mr
Lee with that belief.

210.As will be apparent from the email correspondence, set out earlier
(see Section ING) above, and Section Vill(B\(3) below), Ms KKL was

not involved in the drafting of the Last Will. She was left out of the
relevant emails. Thus, in fact, the Respondent was the only lawyer
who drafted the Last Will. But the inaccurate statement made to Mr
Lee, that Ms KKL was also involved in drafting the Last Will, was also

not corrected.
211. The

Respondent

said

to

us

that

Mr

Lee

“never

trusted

[the

Respondent] as a lawyer 1, and therefore could not have regarded
her as his lawyer for the Last Will. Both Mr Lee and the Respondent's
own acceptance of the representation, that she drafted the Last Will,
contradicted this assertion. Mr Lee had also (for example) agreed to
the Respondent helping Ms KKL draft aspects of the First Will (see,

for example, paragraphs 16 - 18 above).

108 LSS SBOD, p 6, email from the Respondent to Ms EK dated 17 December 2013, 12.31pm.
4% Transcript (3 July 2019), 31:12-18.

68

242. As mentioned earlier (see paragraphs 83 — 84 and 182 - 193 above),
the evidence of Mr Lee’s exchange with Mr BL came to light just
before the Hearing.

213. The Respondent's Affidavit was filed on 10 June 2019, before the BL
Documents and Mr BL's Affidavit were produced. When she filed her
Affidavit, the Respondent would have had no reason to believe that

the BL Documents and Mr BL’s Affidavit would be produced before
the Tribunal. Her Affidavit gave a very different picture from that
shown by the BL Documents and Mr BL’s Affidavit. Her evidence was
contradicted by the BL Documents and Mr BL’s evidence.

214. The Respondent said in her Affidavit that"":
“t simply did not consider Papa as a client nor did | contemplafe
even for a moment that Papa would be relying on me for any legal
advice. It was clear to me_and indeed to all of us that KKL was his
lawyer...

As for Papa, he did net consider me as his lawyer or rely on me for
legal advice... in fact, as far as | am aware, Papa never intended or
expected that | would be involved in making arrangements for the
execution of {the Last Will.”
{Emphasis added]

215.This is untrue. As set out earlier, the evidence is that Mr Lee was
expressly told, twice, that the Respondent had prepared the Last Will.
Mr Lee accepted this. The Respondent also knew that this was what
Mr Lee had

been told.

Despite

knowing

that, she said the direct

opposite in her Affidavit.
105 Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 27 — 28.

69

216.The Respondent’s Submissions on No Case to Answer, and Written
Closing Submissions (made after the BL Documents had been
produced), were silent on the BL Documents, and the variance with
her Affidavit evidence.
217.1n Oral Closing, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that this was
an ‘irrelevant’ point, and a “fruitless” line of enquiry’. In their Closing

Submissions, Counsel for the Respondent said that: (a) first, Mr Lee’s
exchange with Mr BL related to who had drafted the First Will, and
not the Last Will. It was therefore not surprising that the Respondent
did not object to what Mr BL said, since she had assisted “in the tiny

bit on the demolition clause” for the First Will’; and (b) second,
Counsel said there was no reason to ascribe significance to what Mr
BL had said, because he had, in his evidence, admitted that he was

unsure who had drafted the Last Will8,
218. We

are unable to accept the above submissions from Counsel for the

Respondent. The unchallenged evidence is that Mr Lee's exchange
with Mr BL was directed to the Last Will, which Mr Lee was about to
sign, and not the First Will (which Mr Lee would have known was
prepared by Ms KKL). This is confirmed by Mr BL’s Affidavit, which
the Respondent did not challenge. His Affidavit expressly stated that
“Mr Lee...asked me who drafted the Last Will...Mr Lee asked me

again who drafted the Last Wiif""°®. [Emphasis added.]
219.In our view, it is quite clear that the Respondent was represented to
Mr Lee as the lawyer responsible for the Last (and not the First) Will.
106 Transcript (7 October 2019), 24:14-16.

17 Transcript (7 October 2019), 24:5-16.
18 Transcript (7 October 2019), 23:28 — 24:4.
402 Mr BL's AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 25.

70

220.Further, the Respondent's position is that her role in the First Will
related to only a “tiny bit’. If that is true, then it does not explain why
she did not take issue with Mr BL’s representation, that she was the

lawyer, even if she understood Mr BL to be referring to the First Will.
221. We also do not regard it as relevant, as the Respondent suggests,
that Mr BL may not have known, what the full facts were. What

is

material is that the Respondent knew that Mr BL told Mr Lee that she
drafted the Last Will. If that was untrue, she could and should have
told Mr Lee what she considered to be the truth. But she accepted
what Mr BL told Mr Lee. She accepted it because as the evidence
shows, she did prepare the Last Will. In fact, she was the only lawyer
who had responsibility for the Last Will. Mr BL’s error was in referring
to Ms KKL, in addition to the Respondent (see paragraph 204(b)
above).
222. The Respondent's answers in cross-examination on several points,
were quite unsatisfactory. She often refused to answer questions,

and was evasive. On Mr Lee asking twice about who drafted the Last

Will, this was her evidence’:
MrTanCM:

Does it not show that in Mr Lee’s mindset, mind, at all
times the fact that either you or Kwa Kim Li was involved
in the preparation of the will that he was to sign was
important?

Respondent:

/ think what was important fo him was that he had decided
to go back to the original agreed will and he--

MrTanCM:

Sorry. You have not answered my question.

119 Transcript (4 July 2019), 49:12 — 50:18.
71

Mr Tan CM:

And the assurance he wanted was that either you or Kim
Li had been involved.

Respondent:

If it had been any---well, | think in his mind, that was the

will that Kim Li had done with my input.
President:

Answer the question, please. It’s a very simple question.

Respondent:

Could you repeat the question, please?

Mr Tan CM

And the assurance he wanted was that either you or Kim
Li had been involved. That was the reason why he asked
twice.

Respondent:

| don’t know.

Mr Tan CM:

| put it to you that if Mr Lee had not been told of either
you, yours or Ms Kwa Kim Li's involvement, itis likely that
he would want some assurance that the will is what he

wanted fo sign.
Respondent:

1m not sure. Papa was very familiar with the 2017 will.

Mr Tan CM:

| suggest to you--

Respondent:

The

August

2011

will,

he

knew

very

well.

If was

a

landmark will for him. So I'm not sure.
Mr Tan CM:

You have told us that even if you had sighted the draft
which

Bernard had, you would not have been

able fo

know that there were changes from the first will.

72

Respondent:

/ genuinely believed it was, | would---

Mr Tan CM:

Sorry, sorry.

Respondent:

No, no.

Mr Tan CM:

That's nof---

Respondent:

Okay, [ill try and answer your question.

Mr Tan CM:

/’m not talking about your genuine belief.

Respondent:

Yes—-no, no. Okay. Let me get your question.

Mr Tan CM:

You---/ am just re---

Respondent:

Yes,”
[Emphasis added.]

223.We will now refer to the second point referred to at paragraph 198,
on the question of whether Mr Lee and the Respondent proceeded
on the basis that the Respondent was his lawyer for the Last Will.
(b)

Mr Lee gave instructions to the Respondent

224.1n a letter sent jointly with Dr LWL dated 28 February 2017 to the

MC ‘t

Mr LHY

said that

Mr Lee

had

given

the

Respondent

instructions on the Last Will, before the draft Last Will was sent over
to Mr Lee.

141 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 408 — 422, Letter from Dr LWL and Mr LHY to Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister for
National Development, dated 28 February 2017.

73

225.The relevant paragraphs
February 2017 state’’:
(a)

in Mr LHY

and

Dr LWL’s

letter of 28

“When Mr. Lee gave instructions to Mrs Lee Suet Fern for the
[Last Will] to be engrossed,

she relied on what she believed

was the final version of the will Mr. Lee wanted and was not

aware of any later version including a gift-over clause.”
(b)

“fThe Last Will] was engrossed on the basis of Mr, Lee's
express instruction to revert to his first will from 2011. We have
explained above that on the basis of this instruction, Mrs Lee
Suet

Fern

obtained

what

she

understood

fo be

the

final

version of the first will from 2011...”

[Emphasis added.]

226.The Respondent adopted
correspondence with AGC

Mr

LHY’s

account

in December

2018.

of events
Her

in her

letter of 21

December 2018 stated that"":
“Matters relating to any involvement | had in assisting my family in
December 2013 were addressed by Dr Lee Wei Ling and Mr Lee
Hsien Yang in detailed correspondence to the Committee, in
particular in their letters of 28 February 2017 and 14 June 2017.”
[Emphasis added.]
227.The Respondent admitted that the plain meaning of what Mr LHY said

was that Mr Lee had instructed her directly on the Last Will""""*.
112 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 417 at para 53 and p 419 at para 62.
18 LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 1329, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 21 December 2018 at para
40.

114 Transcript (4 July 2019), 5373-23, 58:7-10.
74

228. Both the Respondent and Mr LHY sought to resile from this account
of events, in their testimony before us. They said that Mr Lee had
never spoken with the Respondent about the Last Will, and that Mr
Lee had given instructions, exclusively, to Mr LHY throughout, and
not to the Respondent.

229.This directly contradicted what Mr LHY had said previously, to the
MC, and what the Respondent had said to AGC.
Respondent nor Mr LHY provided any coherent
explanation, as to why Mr LHY had said to the MC that Mr Lee had
instructed the Respondent, if that statement was incorrect. °

230.Neither

the

231.The Respondent said that Mr LHY’s statement (“Mr Lee gave
instructions to Mrs Lee Suet Fem’) was always incorrect and simply

his “typical...way’ to “shortcut...his statements’""'®, This does not
make any sense, To adopt an analogy that the Respondent used, this
was not a case where Mr LHY “jumped” steps by going “from A fo D

and misse[d] the B, C D in between''®. This was a case where Mr
LHY said the exact opposite or something quite different from what
he purportedly meant to say. If Mr LHY meant to say that “Mr Lee
[never] gave instructions to Mrs Lee Suet Fern”, or alternatively, that
“Mr Lee gave instructions to me, [Mr LHY],” then it is surprising that,

the view, Mr LHY would in fact say “Mr. Lee gave
instructions to Mrs ‘Lee Suet Fern’. We find it difficult to accept that
to convey

this is a form of “shorthand”, intended to convey the very opposite/
a meaning quite different, from what the words suggest.

115 Transcript (4 July 2019), 18:32 - 19:2, 25:17-23,
Transcript (4 July 2019), 109:31-32, 4 10:31 — 111:2.

26:12-14,

53:23,

109:29 — 110:1; see also

116 Transcript (4 July 2019), 25:17-23; see also Transcript (4 July 2019), 109:31-32.
117 Transcript (4 July 2019), 18:32 — 19:2.

75

232.Second, the Respondent and Mr LHY characterised this as one of the
“litte .exceptions and details’ that had been omitted in the

correspondence with the MC"",
233.They both drew distinctions between statements to the MC on the
one hand, and court documents on the other and in the case of Mr
LHY,

he

went

further

and

made

a further

distinction

documents “1°. They said that different standards

with

IPO

of care and

precision apply between the two, because the former are merely in

the nature of “optional explanations””°. This was said by reference to
public and private statements made by Mr LHY. In plain
language, the effect of what they said is this: Mr LHY may make

both

untrue statements, in public and in private, whenever there is no legal!
penalty for telling untruths; his public and private statements cannot

be relied upon to be accurate. This is a surprising statement.

234.We do not find their explanations credible.
235. These contradictions were not subtle discrepancies, or small details,

that would only be apparent on close scrutiny. Mr LHY’s assertion to
the MC was direct and unequivocal - “Mr Lee gave instructions to
Mrs Lee Suet Fern”. lt related to a basic fact — did Mr Lee instruct the
Respondent, or did he not?

236.This was all the more so, given the significance of this particular
question,

in the context of the correspondence

with the MC.

The

possibility of the Respondent having acted in conflict of interest in
preparing the Last Will had been raised to the MC, including
148 Transcript (4 July 2019), 53:5-13.
149 Transcript (3 July 2019), 17:22-26; see also Transcript (4 July 2019), 111:4-8.
120 Transcript (4 July 2019), 18:4-11, 16-19, 111:4-7.

76

specifically the question: “What was [the Respondent's] role in the
preparation and execution of the Last Will?”""2’. The MC brought this
issue to the Executors’ (including Mr LHY) attention. It was referred
to as “serious questions in relation to [the Respondent's] involvement

as a lawyer"" for the Last Will’??. Mr LHY accepted,

under cross

examination, that serious allegations had been made in respect of the

Respondent and Mr LHY'?°. Mr LHY was responding to the questions
raised by the MC, by way of the Executors’ letter of 28 February 2017,
in that context.
237.As

such,

we

find

it difficult to believe that

Mr

LHY

would

have

unequivocally asserted that Mr Lee instructed the Respondent, if that
was not the case.

238.The first attempt to correct this alleged error was made in Mr LHY’s

Affidavit before the Tribunal’*+. This was more than two years after
Mr LHY’s representation to the MC in February 2017. The Defence
also made no mention of it. This is one of a number of assertions that
were

made,

for the first time,

in Mr LHY

and

the

Respondent's

Affidavits.
239.We also note that on 25 April 2017, the MC had written to Mr LHY
and Dr LWL, posing further questions about the preparation of the
121 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 460 at para 38(1), part of Letter from Mr. Lawrence Wong, Minister for National
Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.
12211 $§ BOD, Vol 1, p 365 at para 10, Annex A attached fo the Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister

for National Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 16 December 2016.

See also LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 377 at paras 51 and 56, part of Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister
for National Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 13 January 2017, Para 51 highlighted concerns
regarding “what appears fo be a confifct of interest: SF was involved in the preparation and/or signing
of the Last Will, while LHY was a beneficiary...”. Para 56 raised, inter alia, “the following serious

questions’ in light of the facts set out — “What was LSF's role in the preparation and execution of the
Last Wilt?"".
123 Transcript (4 July 2019), 106:23-26.
124 Mr LHY's AEIC (41 June 2019) at para &4(a).

77

Last Will""5, In particular, the MC expressly highlighted the Executors'
earlier representations, that Mr Lee had instructed the Respondent,
and asked for further details on the nature of the Respondent's

involvement'?6.
240.Despite this, Mr LHY never corrected his purported error.
241.As stated above (see paragraph 226), the Respondent also adopted
Mr LHY’s representations to the MC, in her own correspondence with
AGC, in December 2018. During cross-examination, the Respondent
claimed that she

“did realise” the error,

but intended

to “clarify if

further down”, because her letter was not “the time or place to go

through that""?”.
242.It

is not

credible

to say

that

the

Respondent

deliberately

left

uncorrected, a critical error, which overstated her involvement in the

Last Will. This was the Respondent’s response to AGC, regarding
serious allegations, that she had misconducted herself, in respect of

the Last Will. The Respondent knew that her professional conduct
was in question, and had been raised by AGC.

243,When cross-examined on the Estate’s Letter of 28 February 2017 to
the MC, and her letter to AGC, the Respondent was evasive and
made numerous attempts to prevaricate. The Respondent said the
position in respect of the passages in her letter dated 21 December
2018 was “nuanced”. The Respondent said that she “was terrified”

and “wantfed] to go back and check””®, Then her evidence changed,
125 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 442 - 447, Letter from Mr. Lawrence Weng, Minister for National Development,
to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.
126 1§S BOD, Vol 1, p 444 at para 6(d), Letter from Mr. Lawrence Wong,
Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.

Minister for National

127 Transcript (4 July 2019), 58:17-19.

128 Transcripts (3 July 2019), 11:8-10.

78

and the Respondent's position was that when she received the first
letter from

AGC

(on

30

December

2018),

she

knew

that it was

“foreshadowing [her] sitting here before the Tribunaf’'®, which was
an answer she repeated a number of times. Her responses did not
answer the question posed.

:

244.Finally, when it was put to the Respondent that her letter, dated 21

December 2018 to AGC, adopted the position the Estate had taken
in the letter of 28 February 2017, she disagreed. This was
notwithstanding her admission that in writing to the AGC on 21
December 2018, she had reviewed the two letters from the Estate

she made reference to'®?.
245, Mr LHY’s and the Respondent's evidence on this issue was neither
true nor honest. They changed completely their positions from what
they had said previously. Their evidence is contradicted by the clear,
contrary,

contemporaneous

evidence,

including

their

own

earlier

statements. Their new position (that it was Mr LHY who had taken
instructions from Mr Lee, and not the Respondent) seems to have
been crafted late in the day, just prior to the Hearing, and for the
specific purpose of the Hearing.
246.Our conclusion on the evidence is that, when the Estate wrote to the

MC in February 2017, presenting the Respondent as having acted in
a manner consistent with there having been a solicitor-client
relationship, this was a reflection that the Respondent did indeed see
her role as such.

129 Transcripts (3 July 2019), 11:25-26.

180 Transcripts (3 July 2019), 7:31.

79

247.Now faced with potential disciplinary action, the Respondent has
changed her position, and has instead adopted the position that her

involvement was only “peripheral''$*.
248.Mr LHY’s original account, to the MC — that Mr Lee gave instructions
to the Respondent — is also consistent with the Respondent's conduct,
in sending the draft Last Will to Mr Lee. As discussed below (see

paragraphs 274 — 281 below), the Respondent and Mr LHY gave no
credible explanation as to why it was the Respondent who
subsequently sent the draft Last Will to Mr Lee, if Mr Lee’s
instructions had been given to Mr LHY.

249. The giving and taking of instructions is one of the important hallmarks
of a solicitor-client relationship.
250.We will now deal with the third point referred to at paragraph 198,
relating to whether Mr Lee and the Respondent proceeded on the
basis that the Respondent was his lawyer, for the Last Will.
(c)

MrLee’s conduct following the execution of the Last Will

251.The Respondent and Mr LHY said that Mr Lee’s decision to send Ms
KKL a copy of the Last Will, and (later), the Codicil thereto, showed

that he regarded Ms KKL as his lawyer for the Last Will'®?.
252. In our view, these events do not support such an interpretation, For

the reasons set out below, Mr Lee’s conduct, in the way he handled
the originals and copies of both the Last Will, and the Codicil, are

consistent with him regarding the Respondent as his lawyer.

131 The Respondent’s AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 37.
132 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 31; Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 54.

80

{i}

The Last Will

253. Mr Lee signed two originals of the Last Will. After the signing, Ms
WLH informed Mr Lee that the Respondent had sent one of the
originals (Original A) to Mr Lee's office for safe-keeping. She told Mr
Lee that the other original (Original B) would be sealed and locked in

the Respondent's office safe'** (see paragraph 65 above).
254. Ms WLH asked Mr Lee if he would like to keep Original A in his office

safe'™*, Alternatively, she suggested that he could pass it to Ms KKL
for safekeeping, as Ms KKL was also keeping the originals of Mr
Lee's title deeds to all the properties.

255.Mr Lee initially responded: “Yes, Kwa Kim Li’?9®, However, when Ms
WLH

replied to confirm that she would arrange for Ms KKL to safe

keep Original A’, Mr Lee responded: “You keep original in office and
send Kim Lia copy”*’. [Emphasis added.] (See paragraph 66 above.)
256.Thus, despite Ms WLH’s suggestion to send one of the originals to
Ms KKL, Mr Lee ultimately opted to retain this himself, and send Ms
KKL a copy instead. This was a departure from the practice for Mr
Lee’s First to Sixth Wills. Ms KKL, who was Mr Lee’s lawyer for these

previous Wills, had kept the originals for all of them"".

133 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 215 — 216, email from Ms WLH
so
oO
2013; 4.29pm.

to Mr Lee and Ms Lilian Ho dated 17 December
.
.

184 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 215 — 216, email from Ms WLH to Mr Lee and Ms Lilian Ho dated 17 December
2013, 4.29pm,
138 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 215, email from Mr Lee to Ms WLH dated 17 December 2013, 6.38pm.
136 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 215, email fram Ms WLH to Mr Lee, Mr LHY, the Respondent and Dr LWL dated
17 December 2013, 7.01pm.
— 215, email from Mr Lee to Ms WLH dated 17 December 2013, 10.27pm.
137 1 SS BOD, Vol 1, p 214

138 See LSS’s Opening Submissions (Transcript (1 July 2019), 24:12); see also LSS Submissions for
No Case to Answer (3 July 2019) at paras 12(c), 29, LSS Closing Submissions (20 September 2019)

at paras 69(g) and 83, This was not disputed by the Respondent.

81

257.Mr Lee also knew that the Respondent would retain the only other
original of the Last Will, in her office safe. He accepted this.
258. In our view, it is material that Mr Lee chose to have the Respondent,

and not Ms KKL, retain the original of his Last Will. Mr Lee's practice
(in respect of the First to Sixth Wills), was to have his lawyer retain
the originals of his wills. Mr Lee asking the Respondent to keep the
original of his Last Will is consistent with him proceeding on the basis
that the Respondent,

and not Ms KKL, was

his lawyer for the Last

Will. As we discuss below (see paragraphs 395 - 401), the
Respondent's own conduct, in deciding to keep an origina! of the Last
Will, was equally relevant.
(ii)

The Codicil

259.The Respondent and Mr LHY relied on the events surrounding the
Codicil, as evidence that Mr Lee regarded Ms KKL, and not the

Respondent,

as his lawyer for the Last Will'%*. Their Affidavits

variously stated that:

(a)

On 3 January 2014, Mr Lee, (through Ms WLH), “informed his
lawyer_KKL, his children, and his 2 daughters-in-law about the

Codicil”.
(b)

MrLee also ‘insfructed...that a copy fof the Codicil] be sent to
his lawyer, KKL, for her records. He did not direct any copy to
be sent to Stamford”.

{c)

“This makes it apparent that even until January 2014, Papa
continued to view KKL as his lawyer in respect of his wills”.

138 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 30 and 31; Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras

57 and 58.

82

[Emphasis added.]
260.The suggestion that Mr Lee wanted Ms WLH to inform “his lawyer,

KKL...about the Codicil” is not borne out by the evidence. Ms WLH’s
email was expressly addressed specifically to the Respondent""°. Ms
KKL was copied as a recipient, just as Mr Lee and the rest of his
family

were.

Mr

Lee

decided

that

Ms

WLH

should

update

the

Respondent on the Codicil. This is consistent with the evidence that
he believed that the Respondent was his lawyer, for the Last Will.

261.Mr LHY said that Mr Lee “aid not direct any copy [of the Codicilj to be
sent to Stamford’""*'. [Emphasis added.] However, as stated above,
Ms WLH's email was personally addressed to the Respondent, and
attached a copy of the Codicil.

262.As regards the Codicil, the Respondent and Mr LHY accepted""? that
Mr Lee’s Codicil gave effect to his earlier discussions with Ms KKL,
to bequeath two carpets to Mr LHY (see paragraph 29 above).
263.We

have dealt with the three points, in respect of the question

of

whether Mr Lee and the Respondent proceeded on the basis that the
Respondent was his lawyer (see paragraph 198 above). That
question,

in turn,

is the first of three

questions,

we

consider,

in

deciding whether there was an Implied Retainer (see paragraph 176
above).

14 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 230, email from Ms WLH to the Respondent, Mr Lee, Mr LHL, Mr LHY, Dr LWL,
Ms Ho Ching and Ms KKL dated 3 January 2014, 10.30am.
144 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 58,

142 Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2049) at para 57; Transcript (4 July 2019), 65:22-27, 66:14-16.

83

264. We now turn to consider the second question to be considered on
the issue of Implied Retainer (see paragraph 176 above), namely, the

Respondent's involvement in the Last Will.
(2)__

The actual nature and extent of the Respondent's involvement

in the Last Will

265.The Respondent and Mr LHY’s evidence was that the Respondent
played only a peripheral role in the preparation and execution of the
Last Will. They gave evidence, inter alia, as follows:

(a)

Mr Lee was a brilliant lawyer who

knew “exactly what he

wantfed]""*. By 16 December 2013, he had independently
decided to re-execute the First Will'#4, and was just “looking

for somebody to witness it’.
(b)

The Respondent was only “incidentally” involved in the Last
Will, as Mr LHY’s wife, because Mr LHY asked her for a “little

bit of help” with “his...chore for his father’®,

(c)

Her involvement in the preparation and execution of the Last
Will was confined to two “administrative tasks”, which Mr LHY

delegated to her because he was “in a rush’.

143 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 27; Transcript (3 July 2019), 97:27-29, 99:10-12;
Transcript (4 July 2019), 23:19-20, 31:24-25, 69:1-2, 86:12-20, 98:16-20. See also Defence at para

64(f).

144 Defence at para 16; Transcript (3 July 2019), 102:5-6; Transcript (4 July 2019), 96:19-97:18; Mr
LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 32.

445 Transcript (3 July 2019), 37:14-15, 86:18-28; Transcript (4 July 2019), 48:15-16, 51:1-2, 65:16.
+48 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 29; Transcript (3 July 2019), 41:8, 75:17-18, 24-28;
77:8; 101:21-25; Transcript (4 July 2019), 2:7. See also Defence at paras 23, 36, 50, 54 and 64(c).
147 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 27 and 29; Mr LHY’s AEIC (17 June 2019) at para
56; Transcript (4 July 2019), 71:3-4, 127:28. See also Defence at para 64(c).

84

(i)

First, the Respondent simply forwarded the draft of the
Last Will, which she received from Mr LHY“, to Mr Lee
and Ms KKL as Mr LHY had instructed™9.

(A)

Mr LHY sought the Respondent's assistance to
follow-up with Mr Lee and Ms KKL,

as he was

flying to Brisbane that night and was unable to

reach Ms KKL""®°.
(B)

The

Respondent

was

also flying

off later that

evening to Paris. As she was having a “pre-trave!

departure work crisis [that] was particularly acute
that day’, she only got round to dealing with Mr
LHY's request later that evening’.
(C)

The Respondent did not think that she even
opened or looked at the attachment that Mr LHY
sent her, before she forwarded it on to Mr Lee and

Ms KKL""®2. She expected Mr Lee’s lawyer, Ms KKL,
who had advised him on the First Will, to deal with
it'83,

148 Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 36; the Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 13 and
15.
149 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 13, 16 and 27; Mr LHY‘s AEIC (11 June 2019) at
para 36. See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 29:7, 113:27-32.
189 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 35-36 and 56; the Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at
para 13. See also Transcript (4 July 2019), 128:22 - 129:23.
181 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 14.

182 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 16; Transcript (3 July 2019), 42:7-8, 73:11-74:8,
78:45-26.

183 Transcript (3 July 2019), 29:8-11, 31:10-11, 33:26-32, 75:10-23, 76:27-32, 79:11-12, 86:5-6, 114:57; Transcript (4 July 2019), 85:7-23, 137:23-25.

85

(i)

Second, the Respondent found someone from her law
firm, Mr BL, to witness the execution of the Last Will"".

(A)

After the Respondent sent the draft to Mr Lee and
Ms KKL, Mr LHY chastised her for having taken so

long to follow up. He told her again that Ms KKL
was uncontactable, and asked her to arrange for

someone from her firm to “standby” to witness the

execution™®.

(B)

The Respondent suggested Mr BL. Mr LHY toid
her that he would make arrangements directly with
Mr BL once she sounded him out, and Mr LHY

eventually sent him the draft Last Will’.

(C)

The Respondent consequently approached Mr BL

to brief him on the Last Will, and sent his contact
details to Ms WLH and Mr LHY*®”.

(d}

After

introducing

Mr

BL

to

Ms

WLH

and

Mr

LHY,

the

Respondent had “no further involvement in the preparation or

execution of [the Last Willy’®®.
(i)

The Respondent’s involvement in the arrangement for
the execution of the Last Will ended at that point.

154 Transcript (3 July 2019), 40:8-19, 62:7-12, 99:17; Transcript (4 July 2019), 67:16-17, 69:7-8,
185 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2079) at para 18; Mr LHY's AFIC (11 June 2019) at para 41;
Transcript (3 July 2019), 34:16-18, 44:11-25, 77:13-22, 78:8-14, 110:3-12.

1% The Respondent’s AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 18; Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2079) at paras 41-43.
187 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019} at paras 19 and 20; see also Transcript (3 July 2079), 47:

188 The Respondent’s AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 27; Transcript (3 July 2019), 52:30-53:9.

86

Mr

Thereafter,

LHY

and

WLH

Ms

co-ordinated

the

arrangements directly with Mr BL*®°.
(ii)

The Respondent left for Paris that night, and attended
back-to-back
meetings
in Paris for three days

“immediately from the time of... arrival’®.
266.A fair part of the above evidence was set out in the Respondent’s and
Mr LHY’s Affidavits, which were tendered when the BL Documents
and Mr BL’s Affidavit were not in evidence (and when there was no
reason for the Respondent to believe that the BL Documents, and Mr

BL's

Affidavit,

would

be

placed

before

the Tribunal) (see also
paragraph 213 above). The BL Documents showed that much of the
evidence given by the Respondent and Mr LHY (set out in paragraph
265 above) was not true. We will consider the evidence, and set out
our views on the nature and extent of the Respondent's involvement

in the Last Will, by reference to the following points:

(a)

The Respondent sent the Last Will to Mr Lee and represented

that it was ready for engrossment.
(b)

Ms KKL was excluded from being involved in the Last Will.

(c)

The basis on which Mr Lee decided to execute the Last Will.

(d}

The Respondent's role, in expediting the execution of the Last
Will.

(e)

The

Respondent’s

involvement,

in

the

lead-up

to

the

execution of the Last Will.

188 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 20; Transcript (3 July 2019), 38: 31-32, 39:31, 53:6,
160 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 21.
a7

The Respondent's involvement, after the execution of the Last
Will.

(f)

(a}

The Respondent sent Mr Lee the draft Last Will

267.The

Respondent

provided

Mr Lee with the draft Last Will in the

evening of 16 December 2013 (at 7.08pm)'*’ (see paragraph 30
above). Mr Lee signed the Last Will, which was in the same terms as
the draft, the next morning, without any substantive amendment.

268.The Respondent's email (see paragraph 32 above) represented to
Mr Lee that the document which she attached to her email: (a) was

the “original agreed Wilf (i.e. the First Will); and (b) it “ensures that
alf 3 children received equal shares”.
269. The Respondent admitted that Mr Lee would have relied on what she
told him, and Mr Lee would have assumed what she told him would

be true’®,
270.The Respondent said:

(a)

First,

that

her

act

of sending

the

draft

Last

Will

was

administrative'®*.
(b)

Second, that as a matter of law, her email to Mr Lee could not

amount to the giving of “advice” for purposes of an implied
retainer.

181 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 174, email fram the Respondent to Mr Lee, Mr LHY and Ms KKL dated 16
December 2013, 7.08pm.

182 Transcript (3 July 2019), 30:30 ~ 31:8.
163 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 56; The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 29;

Transcript (3 July 2019), 75:24-28; Transcript (4 July 2019), 2:7,127:28).

88

271.

We consider each of these points in turn.

(i) Was

merely performing

the Respondent

an_administrative

task?

272.The Respondent and Mr LHY said that on 16 December 2013, the
Respondent was told to “send [the draft Last Will] along’ as an
administrative act (after she had received it from Mr LHY), so that Ms

KKL could follow up with Mr Lee’®*, We find this difficult to accept.
273.First,

the Respondent

and

Mr LHY’s

claim

by the

is contradicted

Respondent's email of 7.08pm.

{a)

The Respondent’s email to Mr Lee advised him on the
contents and effect of the draft. It went beyond the simple act

up

(see

paragraphs 32 and 268 above, and paragraphs 291
below).

~ 302

of forwarding

(b)

a draft for Ms

KKL

to follow

The Respondent's email was addressed primarily to Mr Lee;
Ms KKL was copied in the email, with the request to engross
coming as an endnote. Prima facie, the email would indicate
to Mr Lee and Ms KKL, that the Respondent had done all that
was necessary, to carry out Mr Lee’s instructions, and all that

was left, was for Ms KKL to engross the Last Will.
274.Second, Mr LHY was unable to explain why he needed the
Respondent to send the draft to Mr Lee and Ms KKL, if it was simply
164 Transcript (3 July 2019), 29:7, 75:10-28, 73:30-32, 76:30-32, 79:11-12, 86:5-6, 88:10, 108:22-23,
113:27-32; Transcript (4 July 2019), 2:4-19, 62:16-31, 85:7-23.
465 On the Respondent and Mr LHY’s evidence that he had forwarded the draft to her (see paragraphs
303 — 322 of this Decision), the issue of who surfaced the draft is secondary - what is more relevant is
what transpired affer the Respondent obtained the draft (be it herself, or from Mr LHY), when she sent
it to Mr Lee, and how she explained its contents to him.

89

and administrative act of forwarding it on to Mr Lee. Mr LHY also
removed Ms KKL, from the emails, shortly thereafter (see paragraph
39 above).

275.One example from Mr LHY’s cross-examination is as follows’:
“Mr Tan CM:

So my question is: if you had ~~ could forward a draft to
your wife,

why don’t you directly forward the draft or

message

to Kwa

Kim

Li with instructions for her to

engross?

my

wife

helps

me

with

these

Mr LHY:

Because sometimes
administrative tasks.

Mr Tan CM:

Again, that doesn’t seem to answer my question. Why
go through your wife when a simple email to Kwa Kim Li
with wife in copy will ensure that this is taken care of
once and for all?

Mr LHY:

| didn’t do it.

Mr Tan CM:

That's incredible, right? Because you knew at ail times
Kwa Kim Li was the lawyer's --- your father's lawyer on
wills.

Mr LHY:

(No audible answer)

Mr Tan CM:

You can agree or disagree.

Mr LHY:

! disagree.

Mr Tan CM:

| think your evidence is unbelievable.

168 Transcript (4 July 2019), 127:25-128:7.
90

Mr LHY:

! disagree.”
[Emphasis added.]

276.Mr LHY was frequently evasive, refusing to answer questions put to
him.
277.Mr LHY said:

(a)

Mr Lee was very impatient and wanted the Last Will finalised
quickly;

(b)

| Mr Lee spoke to Mr LHY, and asked him to arrange for the
First Will to be engrossed;

(c)

The draft, circulated on 16 December 2013, also came from

Mr LHY, who sent it to the Respondent’®”; and
(d)

However,

because the Respondent was very busy at work,

hours passed, before she eventually sent it on to Mr Lee, and

Ms KKL""®,
278.\f this was true, Mr LHY could himself have sent the draft Last Will
directly to Mr Lee and KKL. This was especially so if, as he said, he
was the one who found the draft. It would have been much faster,
easier, and the best way for Mr LHY to execute Mr Lee’s instructions.
(As to whether it was Mr LHY who found the draft and sent if to the
Respondent, see paragraphs 303 - 322 below.)
167 On the Respondent and Mr LHY's evidence that he had forwarded the draft Last Will to her, see
paragraphs 303 — 322 of this Decision.
168 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 40 and 41; The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras
14 and 18; Transcript (4 July 2019), 135:12-14; Transcript (5 July 2019), 51:28-29, 54;16-17.

91

279.Mr LHY admitted, several times, that he could have gone straight to

Ms KKL, instead of involving the Respondent'®. But he said that he
wanted to “pass the buck’ to the Respondent, to help him with the

chore 7°, We

found

his explanations contrived.

They were

:

credible:
{a)

not

Mr LHY said that he was travelling that night. But the
Respondent was also travelling that night. He claimed that the

Respondent was “leaving much later’ than him'”’. But their
flights were only three hours apart’. In addition, the
Respondent had stated that she was in the midst of a bad “pretravel departure work crisis’, because it was her last day in the
office for the year”, There was no credible explanation as to
why she was given this additional task.
(b)

Even after Mr LHY says he asked the Respondent to help
send the draft to Mr Lee and Ms KKL, the Respondent and Mr

LHY continued to send emails and make phone calls about

the Last Will‘,

throughout the day, and early the next

morning‘’5 (see facts set out in Section II(G) above).
188 Transcript (4 July 2019), 130:11-22, 134:10-21, 138:15-22.
170 Transcript (5 July 2019), 58: 19-23, see also Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 36.
47 Transcript (4 July 2019), 130:15.

172 Mir LHY's AEIC (114 June 2019) at para 40; the Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 21; See
also Transcript (4 July 2019), 138:15-22.

173 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 14; Transcript (3 July 2019), 72:20-22; Transcript
(4 July 2019), 86:6-7.
174 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 36-45; LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to Mr
Lee, Ms WLH and the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 4.53am; LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 189; email
from Mr LHY to Dr LWL, the Respondent, Ms WLH dated 17 December 2013, 4.54am; LSS BOD, Vol
1, p 197, email from Mr LHY to is WLH, the Respondent and Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 11.25am.
See paragraphs 39 - 44 of this Decision where the different email correspondence is referred to.
175 During cross-examination, the Respondent said that Mr LHY had only ""passed the buck’ to her
“during the day when he was at work’, whereas his exchanges with Mr BL took place in the evening.

(See Transcript (3 July 2019), 110:22-25.) This was inherently incredible — that Mr LHY would have

92

(c}

In

particular,

Mr

LHY

made

various

calls

and

emailed

a

number of parties that evening, before he flew off (see Section
lU(G) above). For example:
(i) | Mr LHY called the Respondent, to ask her to arrange

for a witness'76,
(ii)

He claims to have called Mr BL, and to have emailed
Mr BL the draft Last Will'”’; and

(iii)

He sent an email to Mr Lee, the Respondent and Ms
WLH"" (see paragraph 39 above).

280.Mr LHY said that he did all these things. But he specifically required
the Respondent's

assistance to send the one email, enclosing the

draft Last Will, to Mr Lee. This must have been to involve the
Respondent as a lawyer. This is on the assumption that Mr LHY’s
evidence that it was he who found the draft and sent it to the
Respondent is true. However, we do not believe that to be the case
(see paragraphs 303 - 322 below). We have concluded that Mr LHY’s
evidence is untrue, and that it was the Respondent who found the
draft and sent it to Mr Lee. in any event, it does not matter whether it
was the Respondent or Mr LHY who found the draft, for the purposes
of deciding whether there is an Implied Retainer (see paragraph 304
below).

delegated tasks to her during the day, but stepped up his involvement in the hours and minutes just

before he flew off.

176 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 41.

177 Mr LHY's AEIC (14 June 2019) at para 42.
178LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to Mr Lee, Ms WLH

and the Respondent dated 17

December 2013, 4.53am.

93

281.Mr LHY also suggested that he had not wanted to contact Ms KKL,

because he thought very poorly of Ms KKL, and disliked her'”®. But
Mr LHY had no issues dealing with Ms KKL on Mr Lee’s previous

Wills 2°, He was also prepared to call Ms KKL on that day (16
December 2013), to try to speak with her""®’. It is unclear why an email
would have been any more unpleasant.
282. In addition, if the Respondent and Mr LHY’s intention was to have Ms
KKL follow-up with the execution, why was the draft Last Will attached?

Ms KKL would have the final version of all Mr Lee’s Wills.

283.Mr LHY’s explanation on this shifted in the course of his evidence.
284. Initially, during cross-examination, Mr LHY accepted that there was
no need to have attached the draft; he agreed that he could have sent

a simple email, and left Ms KKL to follow-up directly with Mr Lee’?
Mr LHY said, at that point, that he had forwarded the draft not for
KKL's benefit, but for Mr Lee, so that Mr Lee could see the

document*®*.
285.However, during re-examination, Mr LHY changed his position quite
substantially. He said that he had also wanted Ms KKL to see the
draft, because he thought very poorly of her, and was afraid she might

use the wrong will from 201 1184,

179 Transcript (4 July 2019), 127:14; Transcript (5 July 2019), 61:22-26, §5:14-21.
180 ir LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 19 and 21.
181 (ar LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 35.
182 Transcript (4 July 2019), 131:1-9.
183 Transcript (4 July 2019), 130:27-32; Transcript (5 July 2019), 55:3-13.

184 Transcript (5 July 2019), 57:21-58:14.

94

286.We do not find this explanation by Mr LHY to be credible either. If this
was true, there is no reason why he could not have said so, when first

asked. Further, Mr LHY knew that there had been different drafts of

the First Will “ffoating back and forth” in 2011'®°, and he had never
seen the executed version of the First Will'*°. That militates against
believing that he would have known better than Ms KKL, which was
the correct draft.

287.The Respondent's email of 7.08pm must also be seen together with
the other events that took place that evening.
288.On

Mr LHY

and the Respondent's evidence, they knew before the

Respondent sent her email, that Ms KKL could not be reached and

was possibly out of town'®?. They sent the email to see if she “might
be contactable on emaif’'®. They were therefore alive to the
possibility that Ms KKL might remain uncontactable, or be unable to
assist with the Last Will. In Mr LHY’s own words, “if Kim Li responded

and was able fo, she could. If she can’t, she can't.”""®
289. They also took other steps, shortly after the Respondent sent Mr Lee
the draft Last Will, to arrange for the Last Will to be engrossed and

witnessed by another lawyer (Mr BL), without Ms KKL (see paragraph

328 below)'®. All this happened without any further attempts to
contact Ms KKL'®"", and without waiting for Mr Lee's agreement to
proceed without her.
485 Transcript (4 July 2019), 121:11-14.
168 Mr LHY's AEIC (14 June 2049) at para 22.
187 Transcript (4 July 2019), 129: 8-23, 132:30-134:5; Transcript (5 July 2019), 1:22-32.

188 Transcript (4 July 2019), 130:25-26, 131:12-13,
189 Transcript (4 July 2019), 134:8-9.
19 Transcript (3 July 2019), 33:32-34:24, 40:4-22, 41:22-25; Transcript (4 July 2019), 135:21-30.

181 Transcript (4 July 2019), 63:30 — 64:1, 86:3-7, 132:1-4.

95

290. In the premises, we do not accept the Respondent and Mr LHY’s
evidence

(see

paragraph

272

above),

that

her email

of 7.08pm

served a purely administrative function. Itis clear that the Respondent
intended to send the draft Last Will to Mr Lee, as a lawyer, to advise
him that it was as he had wanted, and to assure Mr Lee that it was in

order. Even if it was Mr LHY who found the draft, and sent to the
Respondent'®, it is her sending it to Mr Lee with her advice, which is
important. It is clear that the Respondent and Mr LHY contemplated
the need for a lawyer, other than Ms KKL, to advise Mr Lee on the
contents of the draft Last Will. The Respondent’s email gave that
advice.

(ii)

Did the Respondent give Mr Lee “advice”?

291. The Respondent also argued that her conduct could not, as a matter
of law, amount to “advice” because she had only described the draft
to Mr Lee.

292.Her Counsel relied an the High Court decision in C/FG Special Assets
Capital | Ltd v Polimet Pte Ltd and others [2016] 1 SLR 1382 (“C/FG""),
at [138] as authority for the proposition that: (a) explaining the legal
effect of a document, does not amount to “advice”, for the purposes
of an implied retainer, and (b) an implied retainer should oniy be

found, when a solicitor has gone to the extent of providing advice, for
the purposes of safeguarding or advancing the interests of the
putative client.

293.Having reviewed the judgment in C/FG,
supported the Respondent's position.

we

did not find that

it

182 See paragraphs 305 — 322 of this Decision, where this question is dealt with.

96

294.In CIFG, an implied retainer was alleged to arise between: (a) the
lawyer acting for the plaintiff, who was party to a proposed agreement,
and (b) the unrepresented counterparty to the transaction, who was
the defendant. The Court found that no implied retainer arose. In
arriving at its decision, the Court took into account the specific duties
that arise when a solicitor acts for a client, in a transaction with an
unrepresented counterparty. In such cases, a solicitor must strike a
balance between two competing duties:
(i)

On the one hand, the solicitor is under an obligation not to take

unfair advantage of the opposing party: see Rule 53A of the
PGR (see C/FG at [100]). He therefore owes a duty io the
unrepresented counterparty to (see C/FG at [101]):

(A)

explain the terms and conditions of the contract and
legal consequences thereof, fully and frankly, to the

unrepresented counterparty; and
(B)

ensure that the unrepresented party understands these
terms

and

conditions,

and

legal consequences,

fully

(see CIFG at [126] ~ [128)]).

(ii) | On the other hand, the solicitor also owes a concurrent duty to
his own client,

not to act against the client's interests,

(see

at [132] — [137]). In particular, the solicitor is not
permitted to act against his client, by giving “advice” to another
party, with opposing interests: Rule 30 of the PCR.
CIFG

295.The Court observed that a solicitor in this situation is placed in “an
invidious position’; he owes duties, both his client, and the
unrepresented

party

who

has

interests,

that

are

opposed

to his

client's (see C/FG at [100] and [101].

97

(a)

If he

overreaches

by

providing

more

assistance

to the

counterparty that he ought to, he could find himself:

(i)

with a new putative client, if an implied retainer is found;
and/or

(i)

in breach of his duty, not to act against his (original)
client.

(b)

However, if he provides less assistance to the unrepresented

counterparty than he ought to have, he could be blamed for
having taken unfair advantage of third parties.
296. In view of the balance that has to be struck, between these competing
duties, the court agreed that the word “advice” in Rule 30 of the PCR
(and, by extension, for the purposes of an implied retainer) cannot be

given its natural and ordinary meaning (see C/FG at [134}). In
particular, a solicitors conduct, in explaining the meaning of a
document to an unrepresented counterparty (as his duties under Rule
53A of the PCR require), should not, in itself, constitute “advice”, for
the purposes of Rule 30 of the PCR, and/or an implied retainer (see
CIFG at [137] and [138]).
297.The Court’s approach in C/FG is understandable, in the context of
dealings between a solicitor, and an unrepresented counterparty toa
transaction. The ordinary meaning of “advice” is untenable, in such
cases, because of the solicitor’s concurrent duty to the counterparty,

if the meaning of “advice” is not narrowed. A solicitor will then run the
risk of an implied retainer, and/or of being found in breach of Rule 30
of the PCR whenever he tries to discharge his duty under Rule 53A
PCR, by explaining the document to the counterparty.
f the PUR,
orithe

98

298.There are clear differences between the facts before us, and those in
CIFG.

In

CIFG,

the

lawyer

in

question

took

care

to

tell the

unrepresented counterparty that: (a) he was not their lawyer and did
not act for them, (b) he could not advise them, and (c) they should
seek independent legal advice. in addition, the lawyer never took
instructions directly from the counterparty. He anly explained the
terms of the document to them, as he believed it was his duty to do

so, to avoid any unfair advantage to his client. (See C/FG at [125],
[142], and [150).)
299. The

facts before us are quite different. First, the Respondent

never

told Mr Lee that she was not his lawyer. To the contrary, she allowed
him to believe that she was the lawyer who had drafted the Last Will
(see paragraph 209 above).
300. Second, the Respondent never told Mr Lee to seek independent legal
advice. This is undisputed. Instead, the Respondent took active steps
to allow the execution to proceed, without Mr Lee's usual lawyer, Ms

KKL (see paragraphs 327 - 331 below).
301.Third, as set out hereafter, the Respondent’s involvement in the Last

Will went beyond sending Mr Lee the draft Last Will, and explaining
its contents to him. She additionally assumed the responsibility of
making all the preparations for Mr Lee’s Last Will, which Ms KKL
would ordinarily have handled.
302. Between

the evening of 16 December 2013, when Mr Lee received

the draft from the Respondent, and the morning of 17 December 2013,
when Mr Lee signed the Last Will, no other lawyer advised Mr Lee on
its contents.

99

(iii) Did Mr LHY send the Respondent the draft Last Will for her
to send to Mr Lee?

303. The Respondent and Mr LHY said that it was Mr LHY who had found,
amongst his emails, what he believed to be the final draft of the First

Will, and that he had then forwarded this on to the Respondent, so
that she could follow up with Mr Lee and Ms KKL. Thus, they say, the
Respondent's role was merely administrative.
304. The

issue is not, strictly speaking,

material to the question

of the

Implied Retainer. For the reasons explained above, the Respondent

adopted and assumed responsibility for the contents of the draft Last
Will, vis-a-vis Mr Lee. Thus, even if it was Mr LHY who found the draft,

and sent it to the Respondent,
Respondent's legal responsibility.

that does

not detract from

the

305.The claim that Mr LHY sent the Respondent the draft Last Will, is
however, not borne out by the evidence. Neither the Respondent nor

Mr LHY produced any emails to support their account.
308.We

found

this surprising.

Mr LHY

had

no difficulty locating

other

emails from this period’®®, and even emails pre-dating this period,

from 2011 and 20121%4, However, he was unable to produce an email,
showing that he had forwarded the draft Last Will to the Respondent

(or Mr BL, as he also claimed (see paragraph 333 below))'®.
307.Mr LHY attributed this to his policy of deleting emails with
attachments’; he said that “where documents have been executed
183 See for example Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) — Exhibit “LHY~8"", “LHY-10"", ""LHY-11"", “LHY-12”.
1 See for example Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) — Exhibit “LHY—1” (Email exchange from August
2044), *LHY-3"" (Email exchange from Sep 2012), “LHY-4” (Email from Oct 2013).

198 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 37 and 42.
498 Mr LHY'’s AEIC (41 June 2019) at para 37; Transcript (4 July 2019), 125:13-31.
100

the hardcopy

and there’s a hardcopy,

becomes

the determining

one”""®?, However, if what Mr LHY said is accurate, then it is difficult
to see why, in 2013, Mr LHY would have kept a draft of the First Will
from 2011, when that First Will had long been executed and itself
superseded by other Wills.
308. The Defence that the Respondent filed also made no mention of the

fact that it was

Mr LHY who

Respondent'®*.

These

surfaced the draft Last Will to the

claims were made,

for the first time,

in the

after

these

Respondent's and Mr LHY’s Affidavits.
309.These

Affidavits

were

filed

in

June

2019,

months

proceedings were started, and years after the questions about the
Last Will first arose.
310.In

particular,

Mr LHY's

role in sending

the draft Last Will to the

Respondent was not referred to in Mr LHY’s responses to the MC, in

2016 and 2017, despite these documents having been drafted with

the assistance of lawyers from Rajah & Tan LLP’.
311.Mr LHY’s explanation for not raising this earlier was inconsistent and

evasive?©.
312.Mr LHY initially said that his new account was reconstructed evidence,
rather than based on his actual recollection (as his earlier
representations to the MC had been). He suggested that these facts
were omitted from his letters to the MC because at the time, he had

187 Transcript (4 July 2019}, 126:29-30.
198 Transcript (3 July 2019), 46:11-17, 75:29 — 76:8.

199 Transcript (4 July 2019), 107:23-30.
200 Transcript (4 July 2019), 118:20-31.

101

relied solely on his recollection. In contrast, he said that after the
Tribunal was convened, he and the Respondent's legal team had put

in “an enormous amount of effort’, to do a “very careful review of
many documents, emails” and “based on that... to put together what

was a complete picture”"".
313.In other words, based on Mr LHY’s explanation:

(a)

What he told the MC was based on his recollection and was
therefore not correct; and

(b)

What

he

said

to

us,

two

years

later,

was

based

on

reconstruction, not his recollection, and was therefore correct.

314. The High Court had cautioned in Lim Ah Leh v Heng Fock Lin [2018]

SGHC 156 at [80]:
“Reconstructed evidence is of limited value. It is self-serving and is
particularly susceptible to the influence of hindsight, It is therefore a

significantly weaker form of evidence than evidence from actual
recollection.”
[Emphasis added.]

315.Mr LHY spoke about his extensive efforts with the Respondent's
lawyers to reconstruct what happened in order to prepare the
Respondent's case. He was asked why the Defence was still silent
on his role in sending the draft Last Will to the Respondent. He said

he had no responsibility for the document”.

But that does not

answer the question as to why he did not point out to the Respondent,

that her Defence should set out this fact (if he had thought it relevant):
201 Transcript (4 July 201 9), 116:8-19, 118:20-31.
202 Transcript (4 July 2019), 117:15 — 118:15.
102

“Tan CM:

did you think it unnecessary to include in this
defence [that was filed by Mrs Lee Suet Fern for this
Tribunal] the fact that you were the one who forwarded
a draft to Mrs Lee Suet Fern?

Mr LHY:

{ wasn't responsible for preparing this defence.

Tan CM:

Did you not think that this was an important [fact] when
you assist Mrs Lee Suet Fern in the defence?

Mc LHY:

She’s assisted by a team of lawyers.

Tan CM:

So if this is an important fact, why was this not put in her

Why

defence if you had some involvement in helping her with

the defence?
Mr LHY:

I'm not her lawyer.

Tan CM:

Alright.

Mr. LHY:

| mean,

this is not my document.”

[Emphasis added.]
316.In addition, when

asked to provide the evidential basis for his new

assertion (i.e. reconstruction (see paragraphs 312 and 313 above)),
that he sent the draft to the Respondent,

Mr LHY

was

unable to

provide an answer. He could not point to any document which allowed

103

him to come to this new reconstruction. Eventually he said that his

account was based on recollection”:
“Tan CM:

Alright. You've... combed through everything in 2019 for
the purposes

of assisting Mrs

Lee

Suet Fern in this

defence. !s there any objective evidence that you have
that will show that you were the one who forwarded the
draft to her?

Mr LHY:

My wife is incapable of finding her file by herself.

Tan CM:

I'm not asking about your wife, I'm asking about you.
You said that you ---

Mr LHY:

My recollection.

Tan CM:

So nothing more than your recollection? No objective
documents,

no emails,

no records,

no diary?

Would you have that email?
Mr LHY:

've searched for it and unfortunately, | can’t find it.

Tan CM:

/ suggest to you, Mr LHY, that you have not been entirely
truthful because

in your earlier evidence,

| asked you

how is it that you can now remember in... 2019 that you
forwarded the draft to Mrs LSF, and your answer was
you combed through all your emails.

208 Transcript (4 July 2018), 119:1-11.
104

But what was it that prompted you from your emails or
otherwise that this was what you did in 2013?

This_is based on my best reconstruction taking into
account the circumstances and the emails which | could

Mr LHY:

record.

Tan CM:

! must suggest to you that your recollection is either
faulty or worse, you had --- you are not being truthful.

Mr LHY:

This is the best of my recollection and as | put if, my wife
is incapable of finding her document from the past.""

[Emphasis added.]

317.This version
recollection

of events was
(as his

then said to be based

on Mr LHY’s

was).

But the two

initial account

to the

recollections were diametrically opposite.
contradicted

by the documents,

MC

His latest recollection is

and js not in the Defence that the

Respondent filed. The latest recollection, however, fits in with the line

of defence put to us during the hearing. Having observed him on the
witness stand, it was clear to us that he was not telling the truth. Mr

LHY came up with this untrue explanation, for the purposes of the
Hearing.
318. The Respondent also said that she did not recall opening or reading

the draft before sending it to Mr Lee?™.
319. Even

if this is true, for reasons that have been stated earlier (see

paragraphs 290, and 299 — 302 above), the fact that the Respondent

206 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 16; Transcript (3 July 2019), 73:11 — 74:8, 75.1044.

105

did not read the document, before sending it to Mr Lee, does not
detract from her legal responsibility for the document.

320.In addition, we do not find the Respondent's evidence credible. The

Respondent testified that she was “terrified” of Mr Lee”. In particular,
she said that “! wouldn't have dared send [the draft Last Will] if | didn’t
think that it was what he wanted’, because “if I've got it wrong... I'd

be shot’. |f that was so, it is difficult to believe that she would have
given

Mr

Lee

assurance,

on

what

the document

was,

and

then

forwarded the document on, without first reading it, to make sure that

its contents were in order?°”,
321. The objective evidence points against the Respondent and Mr LHY’s
new account of events. There was no evidence that Mr LHY received
any draft of the First Will in 2011 (which he claimed that he then sent
on to the Respondent,

in December

2013).

The

assertion

in his

Affidavit, that he was “privy fo some drafts” of the First Will?8, was
unsupported,

322.The

documentary

evidence

available showed

the contrary — that it

was the Respondent, and not Mr LHY, who had received drafts of the

First Will in August 20112°°. The Respondent's email, which sent the
draft Last Will to Mr Lee, also made no reference to Mr LHY having
sent her the draft.

205 Transcript (3 July 2019), 53:9; See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 34:19-20, 36:32 — 37:2, 57:26-27,
62:26-28.

208 Transcript (3 July 2019), 89: 6; Transcript (4 July 2019), 85:16-19, 86:10-20.
207 Transcript (3 July 2019), 75:24-26.

208 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) ai para 19.
208 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 101, email from the Respondent to Mr Lee and Ms KKL dated 19 August 2011,
11.08pm.

106

323.We now turn to the second point, (b), referred to at paragraph 266
above, on the question of the role played by the Respondent in the
Last Will, by reference to the exclusion of Ms KKL.
(b)

Ms KKL was excluded from being involved in the Last Will

324.The documentary evidence shows that 23 minutes after the
Respondent sent her email (of 16 December, 7.08pm), Mr LHY sent
a further email to Mr Lee, asking Mr Lee to proceed without Ms KKL
(see paragraph 39 above). He also removed Ms KKL from the email
exchange,

even though

Mr Lee had

not decided,

at that point, to

proceed without Ms KKL. This was done with the Respondent's
knowledge as she was on the emails.
325.In his email, Mr LHY told Mr Lee?""°:
(a)

“I couldn't get in touch with Kim Li. | believe she is away.”

(b)

“i. don’t think it is wise to wait till she is back.”

(c)

“L think all you need is a witness to sign the will.”

(d)

“Fern can get one of her partners to come

round with_an

engrossed copy of the will to execute and witness. They can
coordinate it with Lin Hoe for a convenient time.”
[Emphasis added.]
326. Thereafter, Ms KKL was not a party to any other correspandence
before the Last Will was signed. On the evidence before us, Ms KKL
was not aware of any of the arrangements that the Respondent and
2101$S BOD, Vol 4, p 177, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent,
December 2013, 7.31pm.

Mr Lee and Ms WLH

dated 16

107

Mr LHY made, for Mr Lee to sign the Last Will. Ms KKL also did not
advise Mr Lee, on the draft that the Respondent sent to him, before
he signed it the next morning. She found out that Mr Lee had signed
the Last Will after the fact, when the Respondent informed her (see
paragraph 403 below).
327. The Respondent was copied on Mr LHY’s email of 7.31pm. She also
excluded Ms KKL from all further correspondence relating to the Last
Will, until after it was signed the next day.

328.In addition, the Respondent took immediate steps to arrange for
another lawyer to engross and witness the Last Will, without waiting
for Mr Lee to decide whether to proceed without Mrs KKL. This
showed considerable haste.
(a)

The Respondent approached her colleague, Mr BL, to seek
his assistance with the execution of the Last Will, and briefed
him. She also selected the other witness for the Last Will, Ms

EK, who was also a lawyer from her law firm?"""".
According to Mr LHY’s evidence, the Respondent briefed Mr
BL, on the Last Will, before Mr LHY emailed Mr Lee at 7.31pm

to propose proceeding without Ms KKL?"".
Based on Mr BL’s evidence, the Respondeni acknowledged
that she

was

doing

what

Mr

Lee’s

lawyer,

Ms

KKL,

was

“supposed to do’. According to Mr BL, when the Respondent
211 Transcript (3 July 2019), 34:16-20, 36:32; Mr BL’s AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 10.
242 Mr LHY's ABIC (11 June 019) at paras 41 - 43.
See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 34:15-19, 35:3-5; 40:4-22; 44:18-25, 49:34 - 50:5.
Whilst the Respondent was unable to recail the precise time that she called Mr BL, Mr LHY was clear
that the Respondent had called Mr BL before Mr LHY sent his email of 7.31pm. Transcript (4 July 2019),
121:22 — 123:3; Transcript (5 July 2018), 63:3-15.

108

called him about the Last Will on the evening of 16 December
2013, she had “explained that Mr Lee’s lawyer, Kwa Kim Li,
was supposed to do this but she was not around’. Mr BL's
evidence on this point was not challenged in cross-

examination?""’.

(b)

The

Respondent then

put Mr BL

in touch

with Mr Lee’s

personal secretary, Ms WLH, and Mr LHY (see paragraph 40

above}*""4, She emailed Ms WLH at 8.12pm, instructing her to
contact Mr BL regarding the execution of the Last Will.
The Respondent informed Ms WLH that she (the Respondent)
had already briefed her colleague, Mr. BL, who “‘hajd] the Will

ready for execution”. The Respondent told Ms WLH to contact
Mr BL ‘to

make arrangements”.

[Emphasis added.]
329.The Respondent said that these were provisional arrangements, and
that she had only asked Mr BL to be “on standby’, in case Mr Lee

decided to proceed without Ms KKL?*S.
330. The Respondent's evidence is contradicted by her email to Ms WLH,
Mr LHY and Mr BL at 8.12pm that evening (see paragraph 40 above).
There

was

nothing

tentative

about

Mr

BL’s

involvement.

The

Respondent told Ms WLH that:

(a)

Mr BL had the Last Will “ready for execution’; and

213 See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 77:10-14. (The Respondent could not recall precisely what she

told Mr BL, but agreed that this could be what she said).
214 See also Defence at paras 19, 23 and 64(c).
245 Transcript (3 July 2019), 33:25 — 34:4.

109

(b)

Ms WLH should contact him “fo make arrangements’.

[Emphasis added.]

331.The Respondent’s evidence is additionally contradicted by Mr BL’s

evidence2""®, According to Mr BL, when the Respondent called him,
she asked if he would engross and witness the Last Will, and he
agreed. Mr BL made no mention of his involvement being provisional,
or subject to Mr Lee’s agreement not to use Ms KKL. This aspect of
Mr BL’s evidence was not challenged.
332.The Respondent and Mr LHY also said that it was Mr LHY, and not

the Respondent, who sent Mr BL the draft Last Will to engross.
333.This

assertion

is unsupported

by

any

of the

contemporaneous

documentary evidence. Neither Mr LHY, the Respondent, nor Mr BL,

were able to produce an email from Mr LHY’s forwarding the draft
Last Will to Mr BL.

334. The above assertion was also was not mentioned in the Defence, or
in any of Mr LHY’s previous representations to the MC. It was raised

for the first time in the Respondent's, and Mr LHY’s Affidavits, before
us.
335. The Respondent and Mr LHY’s evidence is at variance with Mr BL's
evidence.

Whilst

Mr.

BL

could

not

recall

whether

it was

the

Respondent, or Mr LHY who sent him the draft Last Will?!’, his
testimony effectively excluded Mr LHY.
218 Mr BL’s AEIC (1 July 2049) at para 10. The Respondent accepted, during cross-examination, that
there was nothing in Mr BL’s evidence about him only being on standby: Transcript (3 July 2049), 71:4549.
217 Mr BL’s AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 22.

110

336.Mr LHY claimed that he sent Mr BL the draft Last Will by email, on 16

December 20132'8. However, Mr BL's evidence?""® was that he only
received one email from Mr LHY (see paragraph 46 above). This was
sent on 17 December 2013, and had not enclosed the draft Last Will.

337. The Respondent and Mr LHY's account is also contradicted by the
,
Defence.
338. Mr LHY said that he called Mr BL, and sent Mr BL the draft before Mr

LHY sent his email of 7.31pm to Mr Lee”? (see paragraph 39 above).
However, this is contrary to the Respondent's pleaded case, that she
had “introduced BL to... [Ms WLH] and her Husband via email’ —
namely, through her email of 8.12pm (see paragraph 40 above).

Similarly, she said in her Affidavit?"" that she emailed Ms WLH, and
Mr LHY, at 8.12pm “so that they could coordinate the arrangements

directly with Bernard’.
statement,

339.The

that

the

Respondent’s

email

of 8.12pm

was

to

introduce Mr BL to Mr LHY, contradicts the suggestion that Mr LHY
would

have called

Mr BL and sent him the draft, even

before the

Respondent made the relevant introductions. Conversely, if Mr LHY
was already in touch with Mr BL by 7.30pm, the Respondent would
not

need

to have

sent

an

email

at 8.12pm,

so that they

could

“coordinate. directly’.

28 Transcript (4 July 2019) at 124:12-22; Transcript (5 July 2019), 54:5-7.

248 Mr BL's AEIC (1 July 2019) at para 12, 14.
229 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019} at paras 42 and 43; Transcript (6 July 2019), 63:3-15; $4:5-10. See
also Transcript (4 July 2019), 122:28 — 123:3.

221 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 20.
222 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 20.
112

340. Our view is that the Respondent and Mr LHY’s latest accounts of how
Mr BL received the draft Last Will are contrived, and are not honest.
the
with
contradictions
of
points
numerous
are
There
contemporaneous

documents

and the Respondent's

own

pleaded

case.
341.We now turn to the third point, (c), at paragraph 266 above, relating

to the basis on which Mr Lee decided to execute the Last Will.
(c)

The basis on which Mr Lee decided to execute the Last Will

342.Mr Lee acted on the Respondent's advice to him (see paragraphs 32,

273, 289 - 290, and 299 - 301 above), in deciding to proceed to
execute the Last Will. There was no other solicitor who gave him
advice.

343. Mr LHY then advised Mr Lee to proceed with the execution of the Last
Will (see paragraph 39 above). Mr Lee agreed with what Mr LHY had
proposed (see paragraph 41 above) and said:

“Engross and | will sign it before a solicitor in Fer’s office, or from

any other office.” 22
344. The Last Will was signed the next morning on 17 Decernber 2013, at
11.10am.

345.We now tum to the fourth point, (d), at paragraph 266 above.

228LS§ BOD, Vol 1, p 182, email from Mr Lee to Mr LHY directing him to proceed without Ms KKL,
dated 16 Dec 2013 at 9.42 pm.

112

(d) The Respondent's role in expediting the execution of the Last Will

346. The Respondent and Mr LHY testified that the Last Will was signed
in arush, because Mr Lee was anxious and impatient. They said that
they became involved, because Ms KKL had failed to get back to Mr
Lee as she had promised, and he wanted the Last Will signed
urgently.
347.The considerations which the Respondent and Mr LHY cited did not
show any anxiety, on Mr Lee's part.
348. First, the Respondent and Mr LHY claimed that Mr Lee was
concerned about his own mortality, because he had been in poor
health.
349. It is not disputed that Mr Lee was hospitalised for several weeks, from

September to October 201374.
350.After

his discharge,

Mr

Lee

had

discussed

the

changes

to

his

Penultimate Will with Ms KKL over the course of several weeks (see
paragraphs 28 and 29 above). The last exchange between them was
on 13 December 2013, just three days before the Respondent and

Mr LHY entered the picture. There was no reasonable explanation
given as to why Mr Lee would have suddenly decided, on 16
December 2013, that he wanted the Penultimate Will changed in
material ways, immediately, on an urgent basis. The Respondent and

Mr LHY say that Mr Lee had decided that he wanted to revert to his

First Will, made in 2011725.

No account has been given of any

discussions which led Mr Lee to this decision. The Respondent and
Mr LHY do not say that they asked Mr Lee for his reasons for this
decision.
224 Transcript (4 July 2019), 147:1-5.
225 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 13; Mr LHY's AEIC (14 June 2019) at para 34,
113

351. The way the Last Will was executed is quite different from the way Mr
Lee had handled the First Will and the way he handled discussions
on making

changes to the Penultimate Will. Mr Lee discussed the

First Will with his family and worked with a lawyer (Ms KKL) (see
paragraphs 16 - 18, 28, and 29 above). He also discussed changes

to his Penultimate Will with Ms KKL over a period of time. The Last
Will (which superseded the Penultimate Will) was however executed

very quickly. The evidence shows that it was the Respondent and Mr

LHY who were anxious for the Last Will to be executed quickly and
rushed it.
352. These circumstances raise several serious questions.
353.Why did Mr Lee decide to go back to his First Will of 20117; Did he
have the First Will with him?; Did he remember the terms of the First

Will? (The Respondent admitted that Mr Lee cannot be expected to
remember the terms of his First Will (see paragraph 558 below); Did
he know that the Last Will made several significant changes to the
Penultimate Will (see paragraph 35 above)?; Did he remember that
only three days earlier, on 13 December 2013, the position he had
arrived at with Ms KKL was that he would make only two changes to
the Penultimate Will and by way of codicil (one of which was to
equalise the shareholding of the children) (see paragraphs 28 and 29
above)? Why did he suddenly change his position and decide to
completely revoke the Penultimate Will?

354.0n the Respondent's and Mr LHY’s evidence, none
questions were discussed between Mr Lee and them.

of these

355.The relevance of some of these points are considered
Section IX(B), when we consider a solicitor's duties.

later,

in

114

356.Leaving aside these questions, for the time being, we did not find
anything in the evidence to support the Respondent and Mr LHY’s
statements that Ms KKL had failed to respond to Mr Lee in a timely
fashion.
357.The

Respondent and Mr LHY claimed,

in this regard, that Ms KKL

had “promised” Mr Lee to have something ready by 15 December
2013, but had failed to do so.

358. The email exchange between Ms KKL and Mr Lee shows that Ms
KKL had offered, in her last email to Mr Lee on 12 December 2013,
to arrange for him to sign a codicil to the Penultimate Will “this week,

or when you are ready’. Mr Lee did not respond to indicate that he
wanted it done urgently. Nor is there any evidence of Mr Lee having
attempted to make an appointment with Ms KKL (to sign either a
codicil to the Penultimate Will, or a new will) between 12 December
2013 (when Ms KKL’s email was sent) and 16 December 2013, when

the Respondent sent her email to Mr Lee, enclosing the draft Last
Will. If there were such attempts, or if Mr Lee had shown any urgency,
such evidence should have been available to the Estate. The Estate,
with Mr LHY as an Executor, has, where it thought necessary, made
available evidence for the Respondent, in this matter.

359.Second, Mr LHY said that the timing for the execution was set by Ms
WLH, who was also anxious to get the Last Will executed. In support
of this, he referred to Ms WLH’s use of the word “asap” when she
replied

to

the

Respondent's

email,

instructing

her

to

make

arrangements with Mr BL to execute the Last Will (see paragraph 48
above)**’, Mr LHY’s interpretation was that Ms WLH had herself “the

228 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 167, email from Ms KKL to Mr Lee dated 12 December 2013, 12.48pm.

227 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 194, email from Ms WLH to Mr LHY, the Respondent and Mr BL dated 17 Dec
2013, 9.23am; Transcript (5 July 2019), 8:20-21.

115

same

sense

of urgency’,

“independent

of us [himself and

the

Respondentf??8,
360. The suggestion that Ms WLH had acquired this sense of urgency from
Mr Lee is speculative, and unsupported by any evidence. There is no
evidence that Ms WLH spoke or otherwise communicated with Mr
Lee on this matter, before she had sent the email at 9.23am on 17
December 2013.
361.Ms WLH received multiple emails from the Respondent and Mr LHY
through the night. The Respondent had herself used the same term,

“asap”, in her correspondence with Mr BL, just minutes before Ms
WLH sent her email.

362.When

Ms KKL could not be contacted,

it was Mr LHY who told Mr

Lee: “/ don’t think it is wise to wait...” (see paragraph 39 above).

363. The Respondent also took steps to arrange for Mr BL to help with the
execution, even before Mr LHY approached Mr Lee to suggest

proceeding without Ms KKL?*°, and before Mr Lee agreed to proceed
without Ms KKL (see paragraphs 38 — 42 above).
364. In addition, both the Respondent and Mr LHY repeatedly emphasised
the need to execute the Last Will as quickly as possible, in their
correspondence with Mr BL, the morning that the Last Will was signed
(see paragraphs 46 - 49 above):

(a)

In Mr LHY’s email of 5.32am, he told Mr BL to “get it engrossed

today’.

228 Transcript (6 July 2019), 6:26 — 7:5, 8:19-22,
228 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 41 - 43; Transcript (5 July 2019), 53:3-11.
116

(b)

In the Respondent's email of 9.22am, she told Mr BL to “be

ready and accessible at short notice...lmpt that we get this
done asap please’.
(c)

She repeated a minute later, at 9.23am, that Mr BL should ""be
good to run”.

[Emphasis added.]

365.Based on the evidence, it was the Respondent and Mr LHY who
proceeded with the execution of the Last Will quickly, while knowing
that Mr Lee would not be advised by any lawyer except the
Respondent. The Respondent worked with Mr LHY to expedite the
signing of the Last Will, with extreme haste, without any other lawyer
advising Mr Lee. The Last Will was signed within 16 hours of the
Respondent's first email to Mr Lee enclosing the draft Last Will.
366. We now turn to the fifth point, (e), in paragraph 266 above.

(e) The Respondent’s involvement in the lead-up to the execution of
the Last Will

367.The

said

Respondent

in her Affidavit that

she

“no further

had

involvement’ in the Last Will after she sent her email of 8.12pm to Mr

BL, Ms WLH and Mr LHY~*? (see paragraph 40 above). Her evidence
was

shown

to

be

untrue

when

Mr

BL's

evidence

and

the

BL

Documents were put before us by the Law Society (see paragraphs
184 - 190 above).
368.The

BL

Documents,

Respondent's

and

involvement

Mr

went

Affidavit,

showed

that

the

significantly

beyond

the

two

BL's

280 Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 20 and 27..

117

“administrative tasks”, of forwarding the Last Will, and introducing Mr

BL.

369. After the Respondent introduced Mr BL to Ms WLH and Mr LHY at
8.12pm (see paragraph 40 above), various emails were exchanged
between the Respondent,

Mr LHY, Ms WLH

and/or Mr BL, until the

next morning, before the Last Will was signed. Many of these emails
were also sent to, or by, the Respondent. They have been referred to
at Section IlI(G) above.

370.Even after the Respondent had boarded her flight to Paris®*', she
continued to monitor the progress of arrangements for execution, and
remained in close contact with Mr BL, who sent her regular updates.

(a)

At 9.22am on 17 December 2013, the Respondent told Mr BL

to be “ready and accessible at short notice’; to be “ready to
go”. She told him that it was “/mpt that we get this done asap”
232

(b)

A minute later, Mr BL replied to the Respondent, to note her

instructions?°>.
At the same time, Ms WLH also replied to the Respondent's
email of 8.12pm the previous night, thanking the Respondent

for Mr BL’s contact information, and informing the Respondent
that she would arrange for Mr BL to see Mr Lee, as soon as

possible?**,

231 Transcript (1 July 2019), 22:4-12; Transcript (3 July 2019), 59:1-3.
282 LSS SBOD, p 10, email from the Respondent to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 9.22am.
283 LSS SBOD, p 9, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 9.23am.

24 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 194, email from Ms WLH to the Respondent, Mr LHY and Mr BL dated 17
December 2013, 9.23am.

118

(d)

The

very

next

minute,

(at 9.24am),

the

Respondent

sent

another email to Mr BL, emphasising again that he must “be
good fo run”. She also asked Mr BL if the engrossments were

ready?5,
(e)

Mr BL replied at 10.13am: “Preparing. 11am’, and asked if he

should keep the Last Wil.
(f)

Mr BL emailed the Respondent again 20 minutes later, (at
10.35am), to inform her that he would change the date of the
draft to that day’s date (17 December 2013) 79’.

371.Save for the email from Ms WLH

(see paragraph 370(c) above), all

these emails were part of the BL Documents, which only came to light
after the Respondent had filed her Affidavit.

372.The Respondent's attempts to reconcile her Affidavit evidence with
the BL Documents were unconvincing. She maintained her position
that she had “handed over’ the arrangements for execution after she

introduced BL to WLH?°8. She gave a number of explanations for her
email exchanges with Mr BL:
(a)

First,

she

said

“merely...seeing

her

exchanges

with

through

a favour

and

Mr

that

BL

were

it’s properly

235 (SS SBOD, p 9, email from the Respondent to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 9.24am.
238 |SS SBOD, p 9, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 10.13am.
237 LSS SBOD, p 8, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 10.35am.
238 Transcript (3 July 2019), 52:30 - 53:9, 66:26 - 67:9.

119

done”*9; they just reflected “some anxiety’ that Mr BL be

ready, and did not constitute making arrangements”.
(b)

Second, she claimed that she was “just a conduit’, and that Mr
BL was “communicating to Yang through [herf’™"".

373.The BL Documents,

and the facts set out in Section II(G) above,

show that contrary to her evidence, that she had “no involvemen?

after her email of 8.12pm, the Respondent remained closely involved
in preparing the Last Will for execution. She made the arrangements
that a lawyer would normally make.
374.In addition, the BL Documents show that the Respondent continued
this engagement even after the Last Will was signed (see paragraphs
380 - 384, and 389 - 394 betow). She did so with Mr BL, and also with
Ms EK, and her other colleagues in Stamford Law, who helped with

the Last Will.
375.In total, the Respondent exchanged more than 15 emails with Mr BL
and

her other colleagues at Stamford

Law.

Her Affidavit made

no

mention that any of this had taken place.
376. We now turn to the sixth point, (f), in paragraph 266 above.
(f) The Respondent's involvement after the execution of the Last Will

377.After the Last Will was executed, the Respondent assumed
responsibility to coordinate the follow-up, and remained closely
involved in all the arrangements. See Section III(G) above.

28 Transcript (3 July 2019), 59:28 — 60:2.
240 Transcript (3 July 2019), 48:15-16, 53:6-9, 57:24-27,

241 Transcript (3 July 2019), 58:2-31.
120

378. The Respondent coordinated the matters that required follow-up with:
(a)

Mr BL;

(b)

MrLHy;

(c)

Ms EK, and her colleagues (in addition to Mr BL) in Stamford
Law;

(d)

Ms WLH; and

(e)

Ms KKL.

379.These coordinations were done through separate
communication. We will consider each of them.

threads

of

(i) The Respondent’s Exchanges with Mr BL

380.Mr BL and Ms EK left 38 Oxley at 11.20am?“?,
381.Two

minutes later, at 11.22am,

Mr BL emailed the Respondent to

update her that it was “Done. Liz and / witnessed. 2 copies. One each

for Yang and Wei Ling’ °°.
382.The

Respondent

replied to Mr

BL just past noon,

conveying

her

thanks. She asked him multiple questions — whether there was a copy
of the Last Will for Mr Lee; where the Last Will was witnessed (at the

Istana or Oxley Road); and “How did it go?” 24.

242 LSS SBOD, p 24, Police Station Diary maintained for 38 Oxley Road, 16-17 December 2013.
2415S SBOD, p 8, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 11.22am.

244 LSS SBOD, p 8, email from the Respondent to Mr BL dated 17 December 2013, 12.01pm.

121

383.Mr BL replied to her at 12.07pm: “Home.

It went fine.... He went

through the Will. One copy is faxed to him (coordinated with Lin Hoe)

The 2 originals are in your room. Clara [the Respondent's secretary,

Ms Clara Ngj came back to help out’ **8.
384.The Respondent then replied to Mr BL three minutes later (at
12.10pm), copying Ms EK and Ms Clara Ng, thanking them for their

help. She told them “/f is a relief to all, including him it is done” *°,
(ii) The Respondent's Exchanges with Mr LHY

385.Having received the update from Mr BL that the Last Will had been
successfully signed, the Respondent then emailed Mr LHY (at
42.13pm) to discuss what should be done with the originals of the
Last Will.

386.The Respondent fold Mr LHY that Mr Lee had signed the Last Will
“uneventfully”, and that Ms WLH had a faxed copy, whilst the two
originals were “sitting in my office”.

387.She asked Mr LHY what he “would...like to do with the 2 originals’,

and informed Mr LHY that Mr BL had proposed that Mr LHY and Dr
LWL

each

keep

one

of the

originals.

However,

the

Respondent

instead _that_one original be given to Ms WLH,
other be kept by her (the Respondent), “in my office safe"".

suggested

and the

388.Mr LHY replied to the Respondent, agreeing that she could give Ms
WLH one original, and that she should keep the other original in her
office safe.

245 LSS SBOD, p 7, email from Mr BL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 12.07pm.
248 | SS SBOD, p 7, email from the Respondent to Mr BL, Ms EK and Ms Clara Ng dated 17 December
2013, 12.40pm.
122

(iii) The Respondent’s Exchanges with her Colleaques

389. To follow up on the above discussion concerning where the originals
of the Last Will were to be kept, within a few minutes (at 12.26pm),
the Respondent then emailed her colleagues in Stamford Law (Mr BL,
Ms Clara Ng, Ms EK, and Ms Joyce Han), who had assisted with the
Last Will.
' 390.She told them that she “hajd] discussed and this is the position 1.
Please make me a photocopy to take home 2. Please coordinate with

LKY PPS

to have

one original copy....3.

original _in_a properly

sealed

Please keep the other

and labelled envelope

in our office

safe...Please confirm to me when done.” [Emphasis added.]
391.Mr BL replied to the Respondent, informing her that he would arrange
for the original to be delivered to the Istana, the next day.

392.In

a separate

email,

the

Respondent

also

thanked

Ms

EK,

for

witnessing Mr Lee’s Last Will. She told Ms EK that the Last Will “is
important to him [Mr Lee] and has given him some anxiety’ 247.

393.Ms EK replied, giving the Respondent more details on what
happened at the signing of the Last Will (see paragraph 59 above).
Amongst other things, she informed the Respondent that Mr Lee had
asked twice, who drafted the Last Will, and that Mr BL had told him

and Ms Kwa’. [Emphasis
that “if was primarily you [the Respondent]

added.]
394.These

exchanges

between

the

Respondent,

Mr

BL

and

the

Respondent’s other colleagues (see also paragraphs 380 - 384), are
part of the BL Documents.
247 LSS SBOD, p 6, email from the Respondent to Ms EK dated 17 December 2013, 12.21pm.

223

(iv) The Respondent’s Exchanges with Ms WLH

395.After instructing her colleagues on how to deal with the originals of
the Last Will, the Respondent then emailed Ms WLH,

with Mr LHY

and Mr BL in copy (at 12.45pm), informing her that “My office will
arrange to send an original to you... The second original will be sealed

and locked in my office safe""*“*. [Emphasis added.]
396.In our view, the Respondent's decision to retain the original of the
Last Will, in her office safe, is significant.
(a) | The Respondent agreed that the retention of a will, after its
execution, would be something that a solicitor would be

concerned about?”’.
(6)

It is undisputed that:

(i)

Ms KKL had kept the originals of all Mr Lee's other Wills,

as Mr Lee’s lawyer. The Last Will was the only exception.
(ii)

The Respondent

never kept the originals of any of Mr

Lee's other Wills?°,
(ii)

The Respondent

did not receive even

a copy of the

executed version of Mr Lee’s First Will, in 2011, despite

having helped to draft some paris of it?®"".
248 RBOD, p 42, email from the Respondent to Ms WLH, Mr LHY and Mr BL dated 17 December 2013,

12.45pm.

249 Transcript (3 July 2019), 66:16-18.
250 Transcript (4 July 2019), 69:18-23.
251 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 10; Transcript (4 July 2019), 84.4-6.

124

397.The Respondent communicated her decision to retain the original
Last Will, to Ms WLH, without first seeking Mr Lee’s concurrence (see
paragraph 60 above). She also instructed her colleagues at Stamford
Law to keep the original in her office safe, even before she informed

Ms WLH of the same.
398. The Respondent claimed that she retained the original “as a member
of Mr Lee’s family’, In their evidence, both she and Mr LHY said
that she had done this on behalf of the executors,

Mr LHY and

Dr

LWL5*, We did not find this tenable, in view of the following:
(a)

The originals of all Mr Lee's previous Wills were kept by Ms

KKL.
(b)

| Whilst Mr BL had intended for each executor to retain one
original of the Last Will, this was his own assumption,

made

without Mr Lee’s instructions or consent?*.
(c)

Despite being the executors of Mr Lee's First to Sixth Wills, Mr
LHY and Dr LWL did not retain any originals or copies of those

other executed wills. They also did not have copies of those
earlier Wills, in their capacity as the Executors of the Last

Will2®5, In addition, they did not receive even a copy of Mr Lee's
Last Will’,

282 Defence at para 64(e).
253 Transcript (3 July 2019), 49:3-8; 64:19-21; See also LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 51.
2% Transcript (2 July 2019), 13:2-15, 26:3-B.

255 Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 22; Transcript (4 July 2019), 69:24-26.
28 Transcript (4 July 2019), 79:1 — 80:20,

3

125

(d)

Similarly, none of Mr Lee’s other family members (including Mr

LHL) received a copy of the Last Will”.
(e)

The Respondent was aware of all this. There was accordingly
no reason why she should believe that she was entitled to
retain an original of Mr Lee’s Last Will, in her personal capacity,
as daughter-in-law, on Mr LHY and Dr LWL’s behalf.

the
399, Our view, based on the evidence, is that the Respondent retained

original Will, in her office safe, as part of her role as Mr Lee’s lawyer.
400.The Respondent tried to minimise the significance of her retention of
the Last Will. She said, during cross-examination, that:

(a)

“! had understood that your concern was arranging for the

execution... This relates to keeping of the will.
(b)

“itwas just safekeeping... That's not preparation of a willl, ..”25°

[Emphasis added.]
401.We found these distinctions difficult to accepi, in view of the facts set
out earlier.

——

June 2019) at paras 23 —
257 Mir LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 51; The Respondent's AEIC (17
Ms Lilian Ho dated 17
and
Lee
Mr
to
WLH
Ms
24. See also LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 203, email from
2013, 10.27pm.
December
17
dated
WLH
Ms
to
Lee
December 2013, 4.29pm and email from Mr

258 Transcript (3 July 2019), 67:5-9.
259 Transcript (3 July 2019), 49:3-8.

126

{v) The Respondent’s Exchanges with Ms KKL

402.After

the

follow-up

arrangements

above

were

dealt

with,

the

Respondent then emailed Ms KKL, to inform her that the Last Will
had been signed.
403.She emailed Ms KKL (at 1.16pm): “just a quick note to say this has

been dealt with already’.
404.Ms KKL replied to the Respondent (at 2.59pm), indicating that she

had not received the Respondent's email of 16 December 2013,
7.08pm (see paragraph 62 above). She asked the Respondent: “does
this mean that he has signed a new will yesterday fie. On 16
December 2013]...?” Ms KKL indicated that if that were the case, “fhe
former will which is on my record, is revoked”, and “I will update my
file record’.
Respondent replied, informing Ms KKL: “Yes, he has signed
already. In fact this is just going back to his 2011 will so it supercedes
all. He read it extremely carefully before signing.” (see paragraph 63

405. The

above).
406. In this regard:

(a)

The Respondent's initial update to Ms KKL was perfunctory—

she only told Ms KKL that the Last Will had been “dealt with”.
After Ms KKL asked further questions,
provided some additional information.
(6)

the

Respondent

The Respondent did not provide Ms KKL with a copy of the
executed Last Will, nor did she share with Ms KKL the details

280 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 208, email from the Respondent to Ms KKL dated 17 December, 1.16pm,

127

on what transpired during the signing, which
updated her on (see paragraph 59 above).
(c)

Ms

had

EK

The Respondent also did not correct Ms KKL, and explain that
the Last Will was signed on 17 December

2013,

not on 16

December 2013 (as Ms KKL had thought).

407. The Respondent obviously regarded herself (and not Ms KKL) as the
lawyer for the Last Will, and tock all the steps for the execution of the
Last Will, including getting a draft, and advising Mr Lee on it. She took
charge at every stage of the process, and directed the arrangements
leading up to, and after the signing, of the Last Will.
408.We now consider the third point, on the issue of Implied Retainer,
referred to at paragraph 176 above, relating to the nature and extent

of Ms KKL’s involvement in the Last Will.
(3) What was

the nature and

extent of Ms

KKL’s

involvement

(Mr

Lee’s usual lawyer) in the Last Will?

409. The Respondent and Mr LHY said that Ms KKL was Mr Lee’s lawyer

for the Last Will, as she had been for all his Wills"". They said that
since Ms KKL was copied in the Respondent's initial email to Mr Lee,
Ms KKL could have interjected at any time, if she thought that the

draft from the Respondent was not in order?®.
410.Having considered the evidence, we are unable to accept these
assertions. We will reference the following points:

281 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 27; Mr LHY's AEIC (11 June 2019) at paras 39 and
59; Transcript (5 July 2019), 32:14. See also Defence at paras 51 and 64(d).
282 Transcript (3 July 2019), 29:8-9, 31:10-11, 33:27-32, 34:8-9, 79:11-21, 87:10 — 88:4,
Transcript (4 July 2019), 70:30-31, 138:5-7; Transcript (5 July 2019), 32:8-32.

114:5-7;

128

(a) | Ms KKL did not have any role in the Last Will, and did not draft

it.
(b)

Mr Lee's discussions with

Ms

KKL,

on the Codicil to the

Penultimate Will.

411.We will also refer to Mr LHY’s attempts to prevent Ms KKL from giving

evidence in these proceedings.

:

(a) Ms KKL had no role in the Last Will and did not draft it

412. The evidence set out earlier (see paragraphs 323 - 328 above)
shows that Ms KKL had no involvement in the preparation, or
execution, of the Last Will.
413. The Respondent and Mr LHY’s assertions (see paragraph 409 above)
are also contradicted by their own conduct at the material time.
414,The

Respondent

and

Mr

LHY

excluded

Ms

KKL

from

all the

correspondence”®*. They gave no coherent explanation as to why
they excluded
Lee’s lawyer.

Ms KKL, if they had genuinely regarded her as Mr

415.Mr LHY said that these emails were “administrative’,

with

“logistical arrangements”

for attestation?

as they dealt

. That

is plainly

incorrect. These were matters-that Ms KKL would have handled if she

was Mr Lee's lawyer, just as she had done for all his other Wills. Ms
KKL was also not asked to give any advice on the changes to the
draft Last Will.

263 See paragraphs 324 ~— 328 of this Decision.

264 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2019) at para 44; Transcript (4 July 2019), 137:1-11.

129

416.The Respondent gave a number of other reasons:
(a)

She did not notice that Ms KKL had been removed”.

This is not credible. The Respondent was the one who started
some of the ensuing email chains in connection with. the

execution of the Last Will?®,
(b)

She did no “active removal’ Ms KKL by withdrawing her initial

email, or by asking Ms KKL to “stand down""?®”.
However,

Mr

LHY

excluded

Ms

KKL’s

involvement

and

proceeded quickly with the execution of the Last Will, without
giving Ms KKL a reasonable opportunity to respond. The
Respondent and Mr LHY knew that Ms KKL might be out of
Singapore, and proceeded on that basis.

417.For completeness, we should also mention that the Law Society
suggested that Ms KKL had not received the Respondent's email of
7.08pm (see paragraph 32 above)*®®. The Law Society relied on Ms
KKL's email to the Respondent, saying: “! don’t seem fo have

received your first mail of 16 dec 7.08pm asking me to engross”**.
We do not need to, and do not make a finding on this, beyond noting
that Ms KKL has said that she did not receive the email.

285 Transcript (3 July 2019), 77:3-4, 78:18-17, 79:8-11.

288 See for example LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 179, email from the Respondent to Ms WLH, Mr LHY and Mr
BL dated 16 December 2013 at 8.12pm, LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 200, email from the Respondent to Mr LHY
dated 17 December 2013 at 12.13pm, and LSS SBOD p 14, email from the Respondent to Mr BL, Ms
Joyce Han, Ms Clara Ng and Ms EK dated 17 December 2013 at 12.26pm,
267 Transcript (3 July 2019), 33: 27-30, 41:10-11, 80:7-8, 86:27, 88:1-3; Transcript (4 July 2019), 63:26 & 26-28,
268 Transcript (3 July 2019), 87:27 ~ 88:4; Transcript (4 July 2019), 83:14,

269 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 208, email from Ms KKL to the Respondent dated 17 December 2013, 2.59pm.

130

(b) Mr _Lee’s discussion
Penultimate Will

with

Ms

KKL_on

the

Codicil

to

the

418. The Respondent also referred to some earlier emails between Mr Lee
and Ms KKL (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above), as evidence that Ms
KKL had, priorto 16 December 2013, already advised Mr Lee on the
changes that he wanted to make to the Penultimate Will.

419.Mr Lee’s prior discussions with Ms KKL,

as evidenced

by these

emails, were unrelated to the Last Will, and did not touch on all of the
changes that the Last Will effected, either to the Penultimate Will or

the First Will. The Respondent offered no other evidence on this point.
420. The documents presented to us prima facie show that Mr Lee and Ms
KKL discussed an entirely different (and more limited) approach: a
codicil to the Penultimate Will, that would make two specific changes
(see paragraphs 28, 29 and 37 above).

421.The Last Will also omitted changes which Mr Lee had discussed with
Ms KKL (see paragraph 36 above).
422.To the Respondent and Mr LHY's knowledge, the Respondent was
the only lawyer who had advised Mr Lee on the Last Will before it was
signed. Mr LHY had also personally persuaded Mr Lee to proceed

without Ms KKL.

,

Mr LHY’s attempts to prevent Ms KKL from giving evidence

423,Mr LHY agreed that Ms KKL would have been a useful witness to

these proceedings?”°. However, as an Executor of the Estate, he

270 Transcript (6 July 2019), 63:17-24.

131

restricted Ms KKL from discussing her communications with Mr Lee,

on the grounds of privilege?”"".
424. In April 2019, the Law Society's lawyers wrote to Ms KKL, to request
a meeting with her, inter alia, to discuss?”*.
(a)

A public statement which Ms KKL had issued in June 2017,

stating that she did not prepare the Last Will?”;
(b)

Her email to the Respondent on 17 December 2013, asking if

Mr Lee had signed a new will (see paragraph 404 above), and
(c)

425.Ms

Ms WLH's email on 3 January 2014 (see paragraph 72 above),
regarding the Codicil.
KKL

responded

to inform the Law

Society's

lawyers

that the

Executors had objected to her participation in any discussion with

them “regarding the documents referred to...and any information or
documents pertaining to my engagement as Mr Lee’s solicitor?”
426. The effect of these restrictions was to prohibit Ms KKL from giving her
account (to the Law Society) of what transpired, vis-a-vis the Last Will.
She was barred from even explaining why she had no role in the Last
Will (see paragraph 424(a) above).

271 Transcript (5 July 2019}, 60:1-21, 63:2-3.

272 Transcript (5 July 2019), 60:27-62:22.
273 Ms KKL issued her statement to the media in response to a Facebook post put up by Mr LHY

(Transcript (5 July 2019), 62:15-16; LSS Closing Submissions (20 September 2019) at para 152 and fn
161). Mr LHY’s Facebook post stated that “/ifhe will was drafted by Kwa Kim Li of Lee & Lee” (sea

further paragraphs 486 — 496 of this Decision),
274 Transcript (5 July 2019), 60:27-61:7.

132

427.We found it difficult to see how this could be founded on a valid claim
of privilege,

particularly

on

Ms

KKL’s

position

that she

was

not

involved in the Last Will. The Law Society said that it did not call Ms
KKL, because of the arguments relating to privilege, and because her
evidence on the contents of Mr Lee's First to Sixth Wills was no longer
necessary after the Estate’s attempts (in OS 639) to preclude the Law
Society's production of these Wills had failed”.
428.We

note that it was

open

to the

Law

Society to have

issued

a

subpoena to Ms KKL and tested the argument on privilege. But the
Law Society did not do so.
428.The

Respondent

dishonesty

and Mr LHY also levelled serious allegations of

and misconduct against Ms KKL

before us?’*. They

alleged that Ms KKL had lied, by saying that she had no involvement
in the Last Will, and concealed her discussions with Mr Lee, regarding

the Codicil to the Penultimate Will?””. The Respondent also disclosed
communications between Mr Lee and Ms KKL, regarding the Codicil,

which were prima facie privileged (the Estate was of course entitled
to waive that privilege and appears to have so waived). However, the
Estate objected to Ms KKL giving evidence on these matters based
on assertion of privilege.
430. During cross-examination, Mr LHY said that the Law Society could

have subpoenaed Ms KKL?’®. if it disagreed with the claim of privilege.
275 Transcripts (1 July 2019), 5:28 ~ 6:18.

278 Mir LHY also repeated this allegation against Ms KKL publicly, whilst these proceedings were
pending (see paragraph 493 of this Decision).

27 Transcript (3 July 2019), 93:6-7, 95:25-27; Transcript (4 July 2019), 94:27 — 95:6; Transcript (5 July
2018), 30:18-20, 60:7-8.
278 The Respondent and Mr LHY referred, a number of times, to the Law Society's eventual decision
not to subpoena Ms KKL as a witness. See Transcript (3 July 2019), 95:21-24; Transcript (5 July 2019),
62:26 — 63:7. See also Transcript (1 July 2019), 5:28 - 6:18 on why the Law Society decided not to call

Ms KKL as @ witness.

133

431.In

her Closing

Submissions,

the Respondent

advanced

a new

position. Her Counsel submitted that Ms KKL’s response to the Law
Society had only conveyed the Estate’s objection “to her participation
in any meeting or discussion with Law Society’; the Estate did not

object to her “testifving in these proceedings"" *”®. [Emphasis added.]
432. This contradicted what Mr LHY had told this Tribunal?®°.
""Tan CM:

Can

| just ask,

did the estate

object to Kwa

Kim

Li

testifying before this Tribunal?
Mr LHY:

| think we were asked whether she could testify and /
believe we were concerned about privilege, | suppose,

given

how

Wei

and

Ling

| see

that

she’s

been

economical with the truth, she is free to testify on issues

which don’t regard privilege but to the extent that there
are_issues which shows privilege to the estate, she
needs to clear it with the estate but Kim Li has been, |
suppose,

on

instructions and

several

then

occasions

acknowledged

didn’t do and carry out those

instructions...and my sister...and | are concerned about

that.

For the reasons set out above, it is not in dispute that Ms KKL had no involvement in the events of 16
and 17 December 2013, and never advised Mr Lee on the specific contents of the Last Will. Nor is it
the Respondent's case that Mr Lee had spoken with Ms KKL, beyond what the email set out. {Had that
been the case, it would have been for the Respondent to call Ms KKL.) As such, it is for the tribunal to
draw the appropriate interferences on the issue of retainer based on the unchallenged facts and

objective evidence,

278 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 99.

280 Transcript (5 July 2019), 60:4-21. See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 92:21-23, where the
Respondent said she was aware that the Estate had written to Ms KKL to “object to her [Ms KKL's)
participation in these proceedings"".

134

Tan CM:

My question is very simple. Did the estate object to Kwa
Kim Li appearing before this Tribunal?

Mr LHY:

| can’t remember the exact answer that R&T gave but |
think we will have asserted privilege.""
[Emphasis added.]

433.1n this regard, Ms KKL's response to the Law Society was also read
fo Mr LHY, whilst he was on the stand. His response (which the

Respondent cited in her Closing Submissions) was as follows”**:
(a)

Ms KKL “could be subject to subpoena, she could appear here
and she would be giving evidence”. These was nothing that
“prevented her from appearing at this Tribunal’.

(b)

If Ms KKL was subpoenaed, she was “free to testify on any
issues which are not privileged. And if there are issues which
are privileged then, you know, they are subject to privilege.”

(c)

“TIF you ask me whether the estate should assert privilege, |
think that’s safeguarding the interests of the estate.”

[Emphasis added.]
434.The Respondent's statements are at odds with what Mr LHY had said.

His position before the Tribunal confirmed his intention to continue to
assert privilege, in the same terms as Ms KKL had set out to the Law
Society, if she was called as a witness (see paragraphs 424 — 425
above). Mr LHY had even objected to Ms KKL explaining why she
had no role in the Last Will (see paragraph 426 above). (In June 2017,
Ms KKL had issued a public statement, denying that she had drafted
281 Transcript (5 July 2019), 62:23 - 63:7.
135

did not want
the Last Will.) Itis clear that Mr LHY and the Respondent
Ms KKL to give any evidence on what role she played in the Last Will.
435. Having considered the three questions at paragraph 176, we will now
set out our conclusions on the question of Implied Retainer.
(C)

Conclusion on question of Implied Retainer

436. The Respondent (inter alia):

(a)

Took instructions from Mr Lee on the Last Will;

(b)

Advised Mr Lee on the Last Will;

(c)

Sent Mr Lee a draft of the Last Will, and assured him that: (i)
it equalised the shares to be received by the three children,
from the Estate (and was therefore in accordance with what

Mr Lee wanted); and (ti) that it was in the same terms as the

First Will;

(d)

Gave

instructions

to

colleagues

in

her

law firm,

on

the

execution of the Last Will;
Excluded Mr Lee's usual lawyer, Ms KKL, from the process;

ff)

Kept the original of the Last Will in her office safe, after it had
been executed;

(g)

Knew

that Mr

Lee

had

been

told that she was

primarily

responsible for drafting the Last Will; and

136

(i)

Subsequently conveyed to AGC that Mr Lee had instructed
her, on the drafting of the Last Will, a position which had also

earlier been confirmed by Mr LHY, to the MC.
437.As far as the Respondent knew:
(a)

No one, other than she, had advised Mr Lee on the Last Will;

(b)

of the First Will (as
opposed to the inaccurate version that the Respondent had
No one showed

Mr Lee a

true copy

sent him);

(c)

No one advised Mr Lee of the differences between the First
Will, and the draft Last Will that the Respondent sent to him;

(d)

No one advised Mr Lee on the differences between the draft
Last Will, and the Penultimate Will; and

(e)

No one advised

Mr Lee that the draft Last Will was very

different from what he had agreed with Ms KKL, on how his
Penultimate Will should be amended.
438.On

these

facts,

it is clear,

beyond

reasonable

doubt,

that

the

Respondent acted as Mr Lee's fawyer on the Last Will. There was an
Implied Retainer.

(D)

The positions that the parties had taken previously, in respect
of some of the questions that arose before us

439.For completeness, we should also deal with one additional matter.
This is in respect of what was said to the MC, to AGC,

and to the

public, in relation to the Respondent’s involvement in the Last Will.

137

440.These issues were raised in both parties’ pleadings, and were
covered in some detail when the Respondent and Mr LHY took the
stand, Substantial submissions were also made to us on these points
by both parties. While they do not affect our conclusions, they relate

to positions taken by the Respondent and Mr LHY, at an earlier point
in time, on some of the key issues before us. In particular, they relate

to the Respondent's role in the Last Will. We will therefore set out our
views on these points.

(1) The MC
441,The MC raised a number of questions to the Executors concerning

the preparation of the Last Will?**. In a letter from the MC to the
Executors on 25 April 201778, the MC raised, inter alia, the following
queries:
(a)

Whether a lawyer advised Mr Lee on the Last Will and, if so,
who this lawyer was;

(b) | Thenature of the Respondent's involvement in the preparation
of the Last Will; and
(c)

For a copy of the contemporaneous attendance notes for the
execution of the Last Will, which the Executors had referred to

in their earlier letter of 28 Feb 2017 (see also paragraph 185(c)
above).

282 MC report on 38 Oxley Road (2 April 2018), Annex C, at para 9 (httes:/Awww.pmo.gov.sq/imedia/PMO/Newsroom/Files/Media-Release/MC Report 38 Oxley Road Annex C.odij.
283 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 443 ~ 446 at paras 6 — 8, Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister for Nationa!
Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.

138

The MC sent this letter, as a follow up, in response to certain points
that had been made by the Executors to the MC764.
442.The MC's letter also invited the Respondent to set out her position on
the questions raised.

initially responded to indicate that they would be
travelling, and that the earliest they would be able to reply (if at all)
was end June2®, However, on 14 June 2017, two weeks before the
end-June deadline, they released a public statement, taking issue
with the MC and its work. They also wrote to the MC later that day,

443.The

Executors

informing the MC that they had decided to “disengage”.
444, As such, the questions raised in the MC’s letter of 25 April 2017 were
never

answered.

The

Respondent

also

did

not

respond

to the

Committee directly to set out her position.
445. In the present proceedings, the Law Society pleaded in its Statement
of Case that “the Respondent was invited to set out her
position...There was no response from the Respondent to the

Committee's invitation’®”.
446. The Respondent denied this assertion in her Defence. She pleaded
that “tJhe Ministerial Committee had never written to the Respondent

for any clarification’”**. She also took a similar position in her Affidavit,
and suggested that she had never been involved in the MC work,
284 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 408, Letter from Mr LHY and Dr LWL to the MC dated 28 February 2017.
285 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 479 at para 11, Letter from Mr LHY and Dr LWL to Mr Lewrence Wong, Minister
for National Development, dated 12 May 2017.
286 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 506 at para 6, Letter from Mr LHY and Dr LWL to Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister
for National Development, dated 14 June 2017.

287 Statement of Case at para 34.
288 Defence at para 56.

139

either directly, or through Mr LHY and

Dr LWL.

She said in her

Affidavit that?8°:
(a)

“The Ministerial Committee never wrote to me to seek my
views or responses”.

(b)

“Yang and Ling...did not seek any input from me...”°°.

447.The Respondent's assertions are contrary to the contemporaneous
documentary evidence. They were also contradicted by her testimony
on the stand.
(a) Did the MC seek the Respondent's views?

448. The Respondent’s assertion that the MC “never wrote” to her “to seek
[her] views or responses’, conveys the untrue impression that the MC
had not sought the Respondent's views.

449. The language of the MC’s letter to the Executors on 25 April 2017
was as follows:

“In view of the questions which have been raised regarding Mrs [Lee
Suet Fern’s] involvement in the Last Will, the Committee would like
to invite her to set out her position,

and would also ask if she is

prepared to do so by way of a statutory declaration’?*"".
[Emphasis added.]

288 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 35.
289 Mr LHY took a similar position during cross-examination: see Transcript (4 July 2019), 105:27-31;
106:22-26; 113:19 - 114:4.
281 LSS BOD, Vol 4, p 452 at para 7, Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister for National Development,
to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.

140

450. During cross-examination, the Respondent admitted that she was
indeed told, around the time of the letter, that the MC had sought her

views?®? (see also paragraph 453 below).
451.The

Respondent

made

similar

untrue

statements,

in

her

correspondence with AGC:
(a)

| The Respondent’s letter to AGC on 19 November 2018? said
that “your assertion... that the Committee wrote to_me is
plainly wrong...Please let me have a copy of this letter of 25
April 2017 written to me by the Committee that you cite.”

(b)

Her letter to AGC on 3 December 2018

reiterated that “ft/he

Ministerial

_through_its

Committee...

had

never

lengthy

deliberations written to me to enquire about Mr Lee’s Will...”
{Emphasis added.]

452.The

Respondent's

evidence

on the stand was

evasive,

and

not

coherent. Her positions shifted repeatedly, and were not credible.

453. Initially, the Respondent refused to admit that she had even seen the

MC’s letter of 25 April 2017295. After Counsel for the Law Society
pointed her to the Committee’s express

invitation “fo set out her
position” (see paragraph 449 above), she admitted that she was told
about this request.

2% Transcript (4 July 2019), 28:26-31, 30:16-22.
28 1 SS BOD, Vol 1, p 788, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 19 November 2048.
294 1 SS BOD, Vol 1, p 795 at para 2, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 3 December 2018.
285 Transcript (4 July 2018), 26:19 — 27:12.

141

454. The Respondent also claimed that “a suggested response was also

conveyed’, [Emphasis added.] When asked about the particulars
of this

“suggested

response”,

and

how

it was

“conveyed”,

the

Respondent changed her position, and said that the “response” was

“essentially not to respond’?®” (see excerpt from the transcript at
Annex D).

455.In other words, it was not a case of the MC not having sought the
Respondent's views. Rather, it was the Respondent who decided not
to answer the MC’s questions.
456. The Respondent gave a number of reasons why she did not respond
to the MC:

(a)

The MC's request was voluntary”*®.

(b) | The MC did not write to her personally. She said that if they
had done so, she would have responded”,
(c)

The

MC

was

not “the correct forum”,

so it was

“not worth

bothering about’, had there been real grounds for complaint,

it would have gone to a Disciplinary Tribunal*,
(d)

The MC was a “witch hunt’, and “any response would just be

used against [her[’*"""".

286 Transcript (4 July 2019), 28:22-31.
297 Transcript (4 July 2019), 34:3-6.
288 Transcript (4 July 2019), 34:14, 35:20-22.
289 Transcript (4 July 2019), 34:14-19. See also Transcript (4 July 2019), 15:8-9.
309 Transcript (4 July 2019), 30:24-25, 31:6 - 32:4, 35:22-28.
301 Transcript (4 July 2019), 34:11 & 25, 36:1-3.

142

457. These reasons contradict each other. If the Respondent believed that
the MC was a “witch hunt’, as she claimed, why would she consider
responding, even if the MC wrote to her personally? In addition, the
MC had raised serious questions about the propriety of the
Respondent’s involvement in the Last Will (see paragraph 441
above). Even if a reply was “voluntary”, as a senior lawyer with more
than 30 years’ experience, why would the Respondent leave these
serious allegations unanswered as a matter of record, if they were

indeed untrue, and without merit?
458. There are inherent difficulties with the Respondent's evidence. Our
conclusion is that she had not wanted to answer the MC’s questions,
about her role in the Last Will.

(b) Did Mr LHY and Dr LWL seek views from the Respondent on
their representations to the MC?
459.The

contemporaneous

correspondence

also

shows

that

the

Respondent’s assertion, that Mr LHY and Dr LWL “did not seek any
input’ from her on their representations to the MC, is also untrue.

460.0On 16 December 2016°2, the MC wrote to Mr LHY and Dr LWL,
attaching a summary of Mr LHL’s responses to them. The summary,
which was attached, stated that there were “serious questions’
regarding “The circumstances leading to the execution of the Last
wiir?3,

302 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 359, Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister for National Development, to Mr

LHY and Dr LWL dated 16 Dec 2016.

208 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 364 — 362 at para 10, Letter from Mr Lawrence Wong,
Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 16 Dec 2016, Annex.

Minister for National

143

461.Two days later, on 18 December 2016°+, the Respondent emailed
Mr BL and Ms EK, to check if a doctor had been present, when Mr
Lee signed the Last Will. Ms EK replied to the Respondent the next
day,

on

19

December

2016,

enclosing

her

contemporaneous

Attendance Note, from the execution of the Last Will (ie. the EK

Attendance Note (see paragraphs 69 and 185(c) above))*.
462.MrLHY and Dr LWL’s subsequent response, to the MC, then referred

to certain parts of the EK Attendance Note®.

463.This sequence of events indicates that the Respondent had
approached Mr BL, and Ms EK, on Mr LHY/Dr LWL’s behalf, and
shared the EK Attendance Note, with Mr LHY/Dr LWL, to be used for
their response to the MC.

464.We note that the 18 and 19 December 2016 emails (see paragraph
461 above) were not in evidence at the time that the Respondent filed
her Affidavit, and asserted that Mr LHY and Dr LWL “did not seek any

input’ from her on their representations to the MC. These emails were
amongst the BL Documents, which the Respondent did not produce
(see paragraphs 182 - 193 above). They show that the Respondent
was involved in the Executors’ correspondence with the MC, and that
what she said in her Affidavit was not true.
465.When

asked

about

these

emails

during

cross-examination,

the

Respondent admitted that”:

304 LSS SBOD, p 18, email from the Respondent to Mr BL and Ms EK dated 18 Dec 2016, 11.14pm.
305 LSS SBOD, p 18, email from Ms EK to the Respondent and Mr BL dated 19 Dec 2016, 10.49am.
308 LSS BOD, Vol 4, p 420 at para 63, Letter from Mr LHY and Dr LWL to Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister
for National Development, dated 28 February 2017.

30? Transcript (4 July 2019), 9:3-17, 14:11-18, 22:22 - 23:11, 41:27-30, 43:18 - 44:5,

144

(a)

© MeLHY and Dr LWL had spoken with her about the MC’s letter
of 16 December 2016. In particular, they had asked her to
check with Mr BL if a doctor was present, when Mr Lee signed

the Last Will.
(b) | The Respondent thus emailed Mr BL and Ms EK, on Mr LHY

and Dr LWL's behalves, to check. As part of the resulting email
exchange, Ms EK had sent the Respondent a copy of her
contemporaneous EK Attendance Note from 17 December

2013.
(c)

The Respondent then passed the EK Attendance Note on to

Mr LHY and Dr LWL, which they then used for their response
to the MC.
466. These statements contradicted what the Respondent had said in her
Affidavit. Further, Mr LHY had said to the MC that Mr Lee instructed
the Respondent (see paragraphs 224 - 225 above). The Respondent

was obviously involved and knew about the responses being given
by the Executors.
467.The Respondent attempted to reconcile the material contradictions.
Her explanations were not credible. She prevaricated, and changed
her evidence on the issue, several times. She eventually suggested

that there had been “a smal! misunderstanding” because she had a
different concept of what giving ‘input’ entailed®°®. According to the
Respondent, she had said that the Executors did not seek “input”
from her, because they did not come to her “in any formal way”, and

she “didn’t have contro! over the process.

We found this to be

308 Transcript (4 July 2019), 52:11-16.
309 Transcript (4 July 2019), 46:24-30.

145

contrived. The Respondent said this to avoid admitting that she had

lied on Affidavit.
468. Taken as a whole, her evidence on this point, (as with several other

points), was quite unsatisfactory.2""°
469.Mr LHY's evidence on this issue was equally unsatisfactory, and also
contained various falsehoods.

470.During

cross-examination,

Mr

LHY

maintained

that

he

had

not

discussed with the Respondent how to respond to the MC’s letter of

16 December 20167'', This is inconsistent with the chronology of
events apparent from the BL Documents, and the Respondent's own
testimony, on cross-examination (see paragraph 465 above).
471.It is clear that both their evidence was largely untrue, and an attempt
to: (a) distance the Respondent from the version of events that Mr
LHY had put forward to the MC (see paragraphs 224 - 225 above),

responding to the MC’s questions (see
paragraphs 441 - 444 above). The Respondent was obviously
unwilling to answer questions that the MC had asked, on her
involvement with the Last Will.
and

(b) justify

her

not

(2) AGC
472.The Respondent exhibited a similar pattern of conduct, vis-a-vis
questions from AGC, about her involvement in the Last Will. Before
us, she denied that she had refused to answer AGC’s questions, and
blamed AGC.

319 Transcript (4 July 2019), 44:20 — 45:30.
311 Transcript (4 July 2019), 105:27-31; 106:22-26.

146

473.The Law Society’s Statement of Case referred to AGC’s queries,
regarding the Respondent's involvement in the Last Will. It averred
that “fffhe Respondent did not provide a substantive response” to
these queries.

474.The

Defence

explained why the Respondent

a

had not provided

substantive response, as follows®""?:
“The

Respondent

had

repeatedly

indicated

that

she

would

provide substantive responses to the AG’s questions in due
course... The AG instead opted to refer the complaint against
the Respondent to the Law Society on 4 December 2018, before

receiving her substantive responses.”
[Emphasis added.]
475.The

implication,

from

her

Defence,

is that

the

Respondent

had

repeatedly confirmed her intention to provide substantive responses,
but that AGC referred the matter to Law Society nevertheless.

476. She took a similar position in her Affidavit, and claimed that AGC had
unilaterally referred the matter to the Law Society, even though she
had “unequivocally stated”, and even “reiterated” her “commitment to

providing a substantive response’*'s.
477.The evidence before us, however, shows that AGC

had proceeded

with the referral, because the Respondent refused to confirm that she
would respond substantively, to AGC’s questions.

312 Defence at para 62,
313 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at paras 38 - 40.

147

478.On 30 October 2018, AGC wrote to the Respondent, inviting her to

respond to some questions about her involvement in the Last Will
“fhJetore [AGC] decides on the appropriate course of action to be

taken (if any)""*""*. AGC initially requested a written response by 13
November 20183""5, This was subsequently extended to 20 November
201898.

479.The

Respondent then replied to AGC

indicating, inter alia. “/ am

travelling and ...expect to let you have my response by 14 December

2018,""3'7,
480.On

28 November 2018, AGC

informed the Respondent that if she

intended to respond substantively to their questions, they were
“prepared to consider [her] request for an extension of time’. As such,
AGC asked her to confirm that she would respond substantively to
their questions by 14 December 2018 (the date which the
Respondent had requested)*""®. The Respondent was asked to
provide her confirmation by 30 November 2018.
481. On 3 December 2018, three days after the 30 November deadline,
the Respondent wrote to AGC, questioning the basis for AGC’s

decision to review her involvement in preparing the Last Will5!*, She
contended that the evidence cited by AGC “does not show any prima
facie case at all’. Her letter made

no mention of AGC’s offer of an

34 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 775 at para 8, Letter from the AGC to the Respondent dated 30 Oct 2018.
315 LSS BOD, Val 1, p 775 at para 8, Letter from the AGC to the Respondent dated 30 Oct 2018.
316 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 785 at para 5, Letter from the AGC to the Respondent dated 13 Nov 2018.

317 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 788, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 19 Nov 2078; LSS BOD, Vol
1, p 792 at para 6, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 26 Nov 2018.
318 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 793 — 794 at para 4 and §, Letter from the AGC to the Respondent dated 28 Nov

2018.
318 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 795 — 796, Letter from the Respondent to the AGC dated 3 Dec 2018.

148

extension,

and

did

not

confirm

that

she

intended

to

respond

subsequently, either by 14 December 2018, or at all.

482. It was in these circumstances that AGC wrote to the Respondent on
4 December 2018, informing her of their intention to proceed. AGC
reiterated that they had been prepared to agree to the Respondeni’s
request for an extension of time, had she required the time to respond

to their queries. However, given the Respondent's refusal to provide
the confirmation sought, AGC would proceed accordingly*°. AGC
referred the matter to the Law Society that same day.
483.Given the above facts, it is untrue for the Respondent to have said
that AGC

proceeded,

despite her indicating “repeatedly” that she

would provide a substantive response.
484.The Respondeni’s statement that she intended to substantively
respond (See paragraphs 474 - 476 above), was contradicted by her
testimony on the stand. During cross-examination, she admitted that

she “hadn't decided at that time’, whether or not to respond to AGC’s
queries, and had simply been “asking for more time to think about
if'32),

485. In our view, the Respondent's claims in her Defence and Affidavit are
untrue.

(3)__

Public Statements

486.In her Defence, the Respondent suggested that she need not have
responded

to these

queries

about

her

involvement,

because

her

husband, Mr LHY, had already “made public statements as early as
320 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 797 at para 2 — 4, Letter from the AGC to the Respondent dated 4 Dec 2018.
321 Transcript (3 July 2019), 11:5-22, 12:20-27, 13:1-14.

143

June 2017 to the effect that the Respondent had not drafted [the Last

Will] and was not Mr Lee’s lawyer’?
487. Mr LHY's Facebook posts were largely concentrated over two periods.
First, in June and July 2017 (see also paragraph 493 above); and
second, in April 2019, around the time that the Respondent filed her

Defence in these proceedings.
488. These posts gave the impression that Ms KKL had prepared the Last

Will for Mr Lee, and that the Respondent had played no role in it.
489. None of these posts mentioned the Respondent's involvement in the
Last Will. There was no reference, inter alia, to the Respondent
having sent Mr Lee the draft Last Will, of her role in briefing Mr BL, of

her retaining the original of the executed Last Will, of Ms KKL being
overseas, or of Ms KKL having been excluded from the preparation
of the Last Will.
490. Instead, Mr LHY said, in the Facebook posts, that Ms KKL was the

lawyer of the Last Will. The assertions that he made included the
following:

(a)
(b)

“The will was drafted by Kwa Kim Li of Lee & Lee.”*
| “[Ms KKL] has been lying"" because she “denied involvement

in the events that led to [the Last Willf’.=24

822 Defence at para §7.
32 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 515, Mr LH'Y’s Facebook post dated 16 June 2017, 1.05am.

324 L§S BOD, Vol 2, p 1340, Mr LHY’s Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Dr LWL’s Facebook
post dated 30 April 2019.

150

(c)

“The final will was subsequently given to Lee Kuan

Yew's

lawyer, Kwa Kim Li, for safe-keeping.”>*
(d)

“Lee Kuan Yew’s final will was simply Lee Kuan Yew’s first will

of 20 August 2011 re-executed on his instructions.""
(e)

17 December 2013

“The will my father signed on Tuesday

reflected [his] prior discussions with his lawyer KKL.” 327

(f)

“if was exactly what he wanted.”*26

491.Mr LHY admitted in cross-examination that aspects of these posts

“could be misleading’ and “inaccurate’®®. These assertions are in
fact untrue,

and

dishonest,

for the

set out earlier (see

reasons

paragraphs 34 — 37, 253 — 258, and 412 - 422).
492. Mr LHY also mentioned some parts from the BL Documents, in his
:
posts, and omitted others.
493.In

a Facebook

post

on

17

June

2017,

Mr

LHY

referred

to the

“contemporaneous file note by the two lawyers who witnessed the

wilf’33°, He quoted the part from the EK Attendance Note which stated
that ""LKY read through every line of the will and was comfortable to
sign and initial at every page, which he did in our presence” (see
paragraph 69 above). He left out the part about Mr Lee asking who
228 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 532, Mr LHY's Facebook post dated 17 June 2017.
328 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 532, Mr LHY's Facebook post dated 17 June 2017.

327 LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 1340,.Mr LHY’s Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Or LWL's Facebook
post dated 30 April 2019.

328 LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 1340, Mr LHY's Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Dr LWL’s Facebook
post dated 30 Apri! 2019.
328 Transcript (5 July 2019), 40:24, 22:20 - 24:23,

339 Respondent's Exhibit R1, Mr LHY's Facebook post dated 17 June 2017 at 1.46pm.

152

drafted the Last Will. He said that Ms KKL had drafted the Last Will,
and that the Respondent had not drafted it; and he said that Ms KKL

was lying. When he said this, he knew that Ms KKL had not drafted
the Last Will, and it was the Respondent who had prepared it (see
paragraphs 324 — 328 above).

494. The letters which Mr LHY and Dr LWL wrote to the MC**"", (which
were also in evidence before us), referred to how Mr Lee read the
Last Will carefully, and was lucid. Again, nothing was said about Mr
Lee having asked who drafted the Last Will, or the answers that he
was given. Thus, to the MC and to the public, Mr LHY made selective
reference to the documents, which were misleading.

495.The MC made a request®*? for the EK Attendance Note, after the
in their
Note
EK Attendance
to the
referred
Executors
correspondence with the MC. This request was not acceded to.
During cross-examination, Mr LHY said that the EK Attendance Note
was not “relevant” to the MC's work.**3 This was surprising, since he
had drawn the MC's attention to the EK Attendance Note to begin
with, referring to parts which he wanted to refer to.

496. Mr LHY’s explanations for the untruths in his posts were not credible.
He gave the same

reason

that he had cited in the context of his

correspondence with the MC (see paragraph 232 - 233 above) —
namely, that he had not written these posts “with the level of care

which a legal affidavit requires”***. But in fact, this was not a case of

3311 SS BOD, Vol 1, p 420 at para 63, Letter from Mr LHY and Dr LWL to Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister

for National Development, dated 28 Feb 2017; LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 511 at para 25, Letter from Mr LHY
and Dr LWL to Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister for National Development, 14 June 2017.

*2 LS§S

BOD,

Vol 1, p 445

at para 6(e),

Letter from Mr Lawrence

Wong,

Minister for National

Development, to Mr LHY and Dr LWL dated 25 April 2017.

333 Transcript (4 July 2019), 112:31 ~ 113:7.
34 Transcript (5 July 2049), 19:13-14, 24:6-9, 20-24, 39:4-7.
152

carelessness. Mr LHY knew the true facts. He admitted that some of
his statements were inaccurate.

497.We have concluded (earlier) that there was an Implied Retainer. (see
Section VIIN(C) above). We will now deal with the question of whether
the Respondent was in breach of her professional duties.
IX.

Breach of Duties / Misconduct

498. We

will consider the Charges against the Respondent in the following

order:

(a)

First, the primary and alternative first Charges (Charges 1 and
1A), which charge the Respondent with breaches of Rule 25
amounting

of the PCR,

to grossly improper,

or alternatively

improper, conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

(b)

Second,

the

primary

and

alternative

second

Charges

2 and 2A), which charge the Respondent with
breaches of Rule 46 of the PCR, amounting to grossly
improper, or alternatively improper, conduct under section
83(2)(b) of the LPA.
(Charges

Finally, the further alternative first and second Charges
(Charges 1B and 2B), which charge the Respondent with
misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor, under
section 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

As mentioned

above (see paragraph

7 above), the further

alternative Charges®* are based on the same conduct, but
premised

on

section

83(2)(h)

of the

LPA,

(“misconduct

335 Statement of Case at paras 47 (further alternative first Charge) and 50 (further altemative second
Charge).
153

an advocate

unbefitting

and

solicitor’), and

do not require

proof of a retainer between the Respondent and Mr Lee.
499.

Rules 25 and 46 of the PCR respectively state as follows:
“Conflict of Interest
25.

During the course of a retainer, an advocate and solicitor shall

advance the client's interest unaffected by —
(a)

any interest of the advocate and solicitor;

(b) _ any

interest of any other person; or

Gift by will or inter vivos from client

46.

Where aclient intends to make a significant gift by will or inter

vivos, or in any other manner, to —

(d)

any member of the family of the advocate and solicitor;

the advocate and solicitor shail not act for the client and shall
advise the client to be independently advised in respect of the
gift.”

500.For the reasons set out below, we find that the primary first and
second Charges against the Respondent (Charges 1 and 2) have
been made out beyond a reasonable doubt. We also find that the
alternative, and/or further alternative first and second Charges

154

(Charges 1A and 2A and/or 1B and 2B) are also made out beyond
reasonable doubt.

(A)

Preliminary point

501.Before turning to consider each of these groups of Charges, we first
deal with a preliminary issue that the Respondent raised, in respect
of all the Charges.

502. The Respondent submitted in her Closing Submissions, that all the
Charges should fail, because there was no “conflict of interest’. She
cited two reasons:

(a)

First, she was unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the
conflict, because she did not know that the Last Will increased

Mr LHY’s share (from the Penultimate Will)**, and
(b)

Second,

Mr Lee was fully aware of, and had accepted the

Respondent's involvement, in the Last Will*”.
503.We will deal with each of these points in turn.

(1) Was the Respondent aware of the conflict of interest?
504. The Respondent contended that a conflict of interest could only arise
if: (a) the Last Will conferred a further advantage on Mr LHY (beyond
what Mr Lee had bequeathed to Mr LHY previously under the
Penultimate Will), and (b) she, as the putative fiduciary, knew that the

Last Will had this effect.

388 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 185.
337 Respondent's Closing Submissions (16 August 2019) at para 206.

455

505.The Respondent said that the latter requirement
Specifically, she said that at the material time:

(a)

was

not

met.

She was not aware that the Last Will increased Mr LHY’s
share, in Mr Lee’s estate; and

(by

Instead,

she thought that the

Last Will reduced

Mr

LHY's

share, in Mr Lee’s estate.

506.As such, she said that no conflict of interest arose on the facts.
507.We are unable to agree with this. There was a clear conflict of interest,
regardless of whether the Respondent knew that the Last Will
increased, decreased, or maintained, Mr LHY’s share. (As to whether

the Respondent knew about the Penultimate Will, see paragraphs
513 - 515 below).
508.Mr Lee's Last Will gave a significant (one-third) share of the Estate to
the Respondent's husband, Mr LHY. The Respondent put herself in
a position of conflict, by assuming the role of Mr Lee’s lawyer, in
respect of this substantia! gift to her husband. As Mr Lee's lawyer, the
Respondent owed him a duty of singular loyalty; she was required to ,
put Mr Lee’s interests, above those of anyone else. Her concurrent
personal interests, as Mr LHY’s wife, were in conflict with that duty.

509. The Court of Three Judges has said in Tan Phuay Khiang?**:
“It is established law that an advocate and solicitor owes a duty of
unflinching loyalty to his client... This obligation is derived from the
fiduciary nature of the solicitor-client relationship, which requires a

solicitor to place his client’s interests above those of his own as
well as those of third parties. In fact, the obligations of a fiduciary
338 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR (R) 477 at [62].

156

go beyond the avoidance of actual conflicts of interest, and extend
to proscribe perceived or ostensible conflicts as well. While

onerous in its requirements, the duty of unflinching loyalty is an
essential cornerstone of the solicitor-client relationship as it
ensures that a client may confidently expect to receive impartial
and frank advice and in turn repose complete trust in a solicitor to
safeguard his interests.”
[Emphasis added.]

510. Instead of avoiding the conflict, the Respondent actively precipitated
its occurrence. Mr LHY cut out Mr Lee's usual lawyer, Ms KKL, and

the Respondent

then

assumed

Ms

KKL’s

role, in making

all the

arrangements regarding the Last Will (see Section VIII(B)(2) above).

511.This conflict was aggravated by Mr LHY’s close involvement in the
preparation and execution of the Last Will. He acted together with the
Respondent, to ensure that the Last Will was executed urgently,
overnight, within a matter of 16 hours, from the time the draft Last Will

was sent to Mr Lee by the Respondent®**. Together, they rushed the
execution of the Last Will through. Mr Lee was not advised on any of
the implications of the Last Will (see paragraphs 353 — 354 and 437
above).

512.We will also address the underlying question which arose from the
Respondent's submission: Did the Respondent and Mr LHY know
about the Penultimate Will, when the Last Will was signed?

513. The Respondent and Mr LHY's position was that they only learnt that
Mr Lee had given Dr LWL

after he passed away.

an extra share, in the Penultimate Will,

,

338 See paragraph 607 of this Decision.

157

514.The Law Society challenged this position, and argued that the
Respondent and Mr LHY had actually been aware of the contents of
Mr Lee’s Penultimate Will, and knew,

inter alia, that the Last Will

would give Mr LHY a /arger share.

Counsel for the Law Society

referred us to a number of documents, which suggest that by 16
December

2013,

the

Respondent

and

Mr

LHY

knew

about the

Penultimate Will:

(a)

Ms KKL’s correspondence with Mr Lee's children suggests
that Mr Lee had spoken to them, about his intention to divide
his Estate unequally, through the Penultimate Will.

In an email from Ms KKL to Dr LWL on 3 June 2015"", Ms
KKL told Dr LWL that each time Mr Lee instructed her to divide
the estate unequally,

Mr Lee said that he would “ta/k fo the

children”. Ms KKL said that she recalled Dr LWL telling her
that Mr Lee had spoken to her (Dr LWL).
[Emphasis added.]

In a note from Ms KKL to Mr LHL, Dr LWL and Mr LHY on 4

June 20152,

Ms KKL said that Mr Lee had asked her to

prepare the Third and Penultimate Wilis which divided the
Estate

unequally,

and

told

her that “he

would

talk fo the

children to inform them why he wanted to divide the Estate

unequally’.
[Emphasis added.]
340 Transcript (4 July 2019), 67:18-28; LSS Skeletal Submissions (5 October 2019} at para 43,
341 RBOD, p 51, email from Ms KKL to Dr LWL dated 3 June 2015, 8.39am.
342 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 257, note fram Ms KKL to Mr LHL, Dr LWL and Mr LHY dated 4 June 2015.

158

(b)

Mr BL’s Affidavit also said that the Respondent had told him,
on 16 December 2013, that the Last Will was “going back fo

[Mr Lee’s] previous will with the Demolition Clause”. This
shows that the Respondent knew that the Penultimate Will
had removed the Demofition Clause, and the significance of

the

Last Will

challenged

in reinstating
this

aspect

of

it. The

Respondent's

Mr

account

BL’s

Counsel
in

cross-

examination.
(ce)

In an email from Dr LWL to Ms Ho Ching on 28 July 2014, Dr
LWL shared her view about what transpired on the evening of

16 December 2013. She told Ms Ho Ching that®**:
(i)

“So one day, | called Kim Li. She said Papa had
discussed w her giving me more than Loong n Yang and
gave her the reasons Pa told me and she had amended
the will as instructed...Kim Li said Pa had thought
through carefully and called her fo his office several
times to discuss it. Nor do | remember doing anything
that would make Pa so angry w me.”

(ii}

“I said to kim Li, “papa did not tell me he changed the

will back to 3 equal parts.” Kim Li was surprised, and we
both wondered whether Yang pulled a fast one.”
(iii)

“By now, Pa was already v forgetful.”

343 Mr BL's AEIC (1 July 2018) at para 10. It is undisputed that Mr Lee never mentioned reinstating the
Demolition Clause in any of his discussions with the Respondent and/or Mr LHY (see paragraph 538 of
this Decision).
34 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 238, Email from Dr LWL to Ms Ho Ching dated 28 July 2014 at 11.06am.

159

(iv)

“fit is Pa’s decision, | am ok with it. But! hv a sense that
Yang played me out...! was very upset that Yang did it
to me.”

[Emphasis added.]
(Dr LWL has subsequently changed her position)*®.

515. There are facts which seem fo suggest that the Respondent, and Mr
LHY, knew about the contents of the Penultimate Will, including the
fact that Mr LHY would get a smaller share under the Penultimate
Will, as compared with the Last Will. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has
decided to refrain from making a finding on this issue, because while
the evidence is suggestive (that the Respondent and Mr LHY knew
the above about the Penultimate Will), it is nevertheless not
conclusive.

(2) Did Mr Lee waive the conflict of interest?
516. The Respondent also said that there was no conflict, because Mr Lee
was fully aware that the Respondent was Mr LHY’s wife, and had

nevertheless accepted the Respondent's involvement in the Last Will.
517.1n our view, this argument is based on a misapprehension of Rules
25 and 46 of the PCR. The alleged breaches under Rules 25 and 46
of the PCR do not stem from the Respondent's failure to disclose her
potential conflict of interest, as Mr LHY’s wife. That is the subject of
a different rule, Rule 26 of the PCR, which provides:
“Disclosure of Interest

MB RBOD, p 53, Facebook post by Dr LWL dated 15 June 2017, 9.16am.
160

in any case where the advocate and solicifor or any member

26.

of his family... has an interest in any matter entrusted to him by a
client, the advocate and solicitor shall (a)

— make a full and frank disclosure of such interest fo the client;

or
(b}

if, on the grounds of confidentiality or for any other reason, the
advocate

and solicitor is unable

to make

such

disclosure,

decline to represent or withdraw from representing thaf client.”
518. Rules 25 and 46 of the PCR stipulate additional duties that a solicitor
must comply with, over and above the duty of disclosure mentioned
in Rule 26 of the PCR. In situations where the Rules 25 and 46 of the
PCR apply, the solicitor cannot argue that the client was aware of the
conflict of interest.

,

519. Rule 46 of the PCR is clear: It states that a solicitor: (1) cannot act in

respect of a gift that his client intends to make to him, or his family
members; and (2) must advise his client to get independent advice in
respect of the gift.
is confirmed in case law, which explains that the foundation of
Rule 46 of the PGR is based on a solicitors presumed influence over

520. This

his client. See Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James
[2013] 3 SLR 221 (“James Wan”) at [9]:
“When

a client intends to make

a gift to an advocate and solicitor,

there is an ethical duty on him to remove,

as far as he can, any

vestiges of influence (or the appearance thereof) he might have over

his client by virtue of their relationship. In the words of Dixon J in the
High Court of Australia in Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 at
135:

161

* .when [a solicitor] takes [from his client] a substantial gift of
property, it is incumbent upon him to show that it cannot be

ascribed to the inequality between them which must arise from
his special position...
The removal of any vestiges of influence is, in essence, what r 46 of
the Rules mandates...When an advocate and solicitor fails to comply
with r 46 of the Rules, disciplinary action is taken against him because
he is taken to have misused his influence over his client, and thus to
have put himself in a position where his personal interests conflict
with his duty to act in the interests of his client.”
[Emphasis added.]

521. In such cases, a client's purported waiver is irrelevant, precisely
because of the influence that a solicitor is presumed to exercise, over
his client. The solicitor can only remove these vestiges of influence,

by complying with both aspects of Rule 46 of the POR.

522.In our view, the correct position is that set out in the Law Society’s
Guidance Note (see paragraph 575 below) — the prohibition in Rule
46 of the PCR against acting in respect of the gift is an absolute
prohibition.

523. The

obligations under Rules 25 and 46 of the PCR clearly applied to

the Respondent, and the facts before us.

(8)

The Primary and Alternative First Charges — Rule 25, PCR

524. The key elements of the primary and alternative first Charges*“*
(Charges 1 and 1A) are as follows —
348 Statement of Case at paras 46 (primary first Charge) and 46 (altemative first Charge).
162

(a)

The Respondent prepared and arranged for the execution of

the Last Will, for her client, Mr Lee®47;
(b)

| The Respondent breached Rule 25(a) and/or Rule 25(b) of the
PCR

because

she

failed

to

advance

Mr

Lee's

interests,

unaffected by her own, and/or Mr LHY's interests*8,

(c)

In doing the above, the Respondent’s conduct amounted to
grossly improper conduct, (or improper conduct/practice),

under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA™®.
525.For the reasons set out above (see Section VIII(C) above), we find

that the first of these elements is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Our findings on the second element are set out below. As regards the
third element, as both the primary and alternative first and second
Charges require determination of this issue*°, we will consider them
together, at paragraphs 5871 - 592 below.

247 Statement of Case at para 45 and 46 — primary and alternative first Charges: “That you, Mrs Lee
Suet Fern... during the course of your retainer for your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew...preparfed] and

arrangfed] for the execution of your client's will where a one-third share in your client's estate was to be
given to your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang"". [Emphasis added,}

348 Statement of Case at para 45 and 46 — primary and alternative first Charge: “That you, Mrs Lee Suet
Fern... breached Rule 25(a) and/or Rule 25(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules...
in that you failed fo advance your client's interests unaffected by your interest and/or the interests of
your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang’. [Emphasis added.)
348 Statement of Case at para 45 — primary first Charge: ""...such act amounting to grossly improper
conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal

Profession Act’. [Emphasis added.]

.

360 Statement of Case at para 48 -— primary second Charge: “...such act amounting to grossly improper
conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal
Profession Act’. [Emphasis added.]
Statement of Case at paras 46 and 49 — alternative first and second Charges: ""...such act amounting

fo improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the

Legal Profession Act’. [Emphasis added.]

163

(1) Did the Respondent compromise Mr Lee’s interests?

526. Rule 25 of the PCR encapsulates a lawyer's paramount duty of loyalty
to his client. As the Court of Three Judges stated in Law Society of
Singapore v Uthayasurian Sidambaram [2009] 4 SLR(R) 674 at [53]:
“Most importantly, a solicitor must remember that his
unwaveringly and
paramount duty is to conscientiously,
faithfully advance the interests of his clients and avoid all actual
and/or potential conflict of interests.”
[Emphasis added.]

527.As Mr Lee's lawyer, the Respondent owed him a duty of singular
loyalty. As a fiduciary, she was required to place Mr Lee’s interests
above anyone else’s — be it her own interests, or those of third parties
(including Mr LHY).
528.The

specific

duties

which

a solicitor

owes

his/her

client,

when

preparing a will are well-established. These were set out by the Court
in Low Ah Cheow v Ng Hock Guan [2009] 3 SLR(R) 1079 (“Low Ah
Cheow’) , as follows (see [72] — [74]):
(a)

The preparation of a
responsibilities, which

will involves serious professional
solicitors must uncompromisingly

observe and discharge. It is wrong to regard the preparation

of a will as “no more than a routine exercise in form filling’.
(b)

A.will is one of the most important legal documents which an
individual can execute. There ought to be no reom for even
the slightest doubt (or the slightest possibility of a mistake) on
the part of a solicitor in both understanding the testator's

164

intention and expressing that intention in the will to be drawn
up.
(i) | Understanding the testator’s intention and wishes —
Before

preparing

a will, the solicitor ought to have a

thorough discussion with the testator on all the possible

legal issues and potential complications that might arise
in the implementation of the terms of the will. The
solicitor ought to painstakingly and accurately document
his discussions with and his instructions from the testator.

(ii)

Ensuring

the will accurately

expresses

the testator's

wishes—
The solicitor should also confirm with the testator, prior
to the execution of the will, that the contents of the will

as drafted accurately express the testator’s intention.
Half measures or the cutting of corners in the discharge

of these serious professional responsibilities will not do.
[Emphasis added.]

529. The Court of Appeal also said in Low Ah Cheow*®"":
‘T]he solicitor concerned [in the preparation of a will] should

also conscientiously

seek to avoid

being

in any situation

where a potential conflict of interest may appear to exist.

351 Low Ah Cheow v Ng Hock Guan [2009] 3 SLR(R) 1079 at [74].

165

In particular, exceptional restraint and care are called for if the
solicitor concerned has a pre-existing relationship and/or past
dealings with the sole beneficiary under a will, and all the more

so if the will has been prepared urgently and executed in
unusual circumstances with that sole beneficiary's active
involvement. When such a case occurs, the solicitor involved

must

be

scrutinised

prepared
and,

to

his

have

perhaps,

even

conduct_microscopically
his

motives

called_into

[Emphasis added.]

530. Similarly in Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline (Chee Ping
-Chian Alexander) [2010] 4 SLR 373 (“Muriel Chee’), the Court of
Appeal said at [60] that “[iJn every case, the solicitor should be
cautious about taking instructions from any person who is to be
named as a beneficiary in the will’.
531. The evidence shows that the Respondent acted quite contrary to the
duties set out above. She abused

her position to further Mr LHY’s

wishes that the Last Will be executed hurriedly (see paragraphs 30 —
52 and 346 - 365 above). The Respondent's conduct in taking
instructions from Mr LHY on the arrangements relating to and arising
from the execution of the Last Will is, in the Tribunals view, an
aggravating factor which increases the egregiousness of her conduct.
The Courts have stressed that solicitors should be wary of taking
instructions solely from a beneficiary to a will. The Respondent
testified

that

she

followed

Mr

LHY’s

directions

as

she

was

an

“obedient wife’. But her statement, that she was an “obedient wife”

shows her mindset on 16 and 17 December 2013: that she focused
primarily on what her husband wanted dene, though her duties were

owed to Mr Lee. She worked together with Mr LHY, with a singular
purpose, of getting Mr Lee to execute the Last Will quickly. The

166

following

an

is

from

excerpt

the

cross-examination

of

the

Respondent®:
“Tan CM:

The first communication you had with Bemard Lui
was at eight---before 8.11. Correct?

Respondent:

/t was probably soon after my 7.08 email.

Tan CM:

Soon after your 7.08 email, you communicated with
Bernard?

Respondent:

The sequence

of events,

Sirs, is that | sent that

email out, | think, probably as | was leaving the
office on my Blackberry. Yang called me-—! think |
was in the car, and he scoided me for taking so [ong

to

deal

with

it.

Simply

put,

| was

busy and
preoccupied and | forgot, and he then asked me if
| could have somebody on standby because Papa
was

anxious,

and we identified Berard,

and he

asked me to (indistinct) Bernard up. He would talk
to

Bernard

directly

and

he

would

arrange

for

Bernard to have the will, and then he also asked
me to let Lin Hoe know that Bernard was available
for the execution. He asked me fo do that because

| knew Bernard’s number straightaway at hand.
When | got back home and reached home at 8.12,
| proceeded to email Lin Hoe to get it out of the way.
Yang was---must have been in the airport lounge
calling and dealing with it. | hadn't yet completed
my packing.

362 Transcript (3 July 2019), 40:4-27.

167

Tan CM:

Mrs Lee, you told us that you communicated with

Bernard Lui soon after 7.08pm.
Respondent:

That’s right. After Yang spoke to me and scolded

me.
Tan CM:

Why would you do this even without finding out if
Kwa Kim Li would be able to assist?

Respondent:

lt was---

Tan CM:

Why would
7.08pm?

Respondent:

Because |’m an obedient wife and Yang told me to

you

call

Bernard

Lui

soon

after

do so.”

[Emphasis added.]

532.On the facts, the Respondent failed to discharge the duties set out by
the Court of Appeal in Low Ah Cheow and Muriel Chee.
a. Understanding Mr Lee’s intention and wishes

533, Based on our findings above, the Respondent only spoke once to Mr
Lee about the Last Will (see paragraph 225 above). Mr Lee had told
her “to revert to his first wil from 2017”. Thereafter, aside from one
email from Mr Lee (see paragraph 41 above), all the other instructions

which she received, on the Last Will, came from Mr LHY.

283 See paragraph 531 of this Decision.

168

534.On her evidence, there was no discussion between the Respondent
and Mr Lee, about his intentions or reasons for wanting to reinstate
the First Will, or the wider legal implications of doing so. This fell far
short of the professional duties that the law imposed on her. As the
lawyer preparing Mr Lee's Last Will, the Respondent should have had
“a thorough discussion” with Mr Lee, “on al the possible legal issues
and potential complications” that could arise, if he reverted to the First

Will.
535.Such thorough discussions would have to be handled with utmost
care. In this matter, that would entail the Respondent checking about
previous Wills. The Respondent should have found out about the
Penultimate Will (if, as she says, she did not know about it), and Mr
Lee’s intentions,

on what changes

he had wanted to make

to the

Penultimate Will. Mr Lee had discussed that with Ms KKL, just a few
days earlier the changes he had wanted. Even if she did not know
specifically the terms of the Penultimate Will, she knew that Mr Lee

had made other Wills, superseding the First Will"". It was her duty to
have them checked, and to see what was Mr Lee's latest valid will.

She also had a duty to advise him carefully on the differences
between the First Will (which she says he wanted to revert to), and
whatever was his last valid Will.

536.For example, Mr Lee had discussed the Demolition Clause, and the
terms on which Dr LWL was allowed to stay in 38 Oxley, on various

occasions, with Ms KKL, when preparing his earlier Wills**°. He had
ultimately landed in favour of the positions articulated in his Fifth and
Penultimate Wills. According to Ms KKL, Mr Lee did so because he
wanted to leave it to Mr LHL to handle the “hit and the heat”, and
38 Transcript (3 July 2019), 81:32 — 82:1.
368 Mr Lee never mentioned reinstating the Demolition Clause in any of his discussions with the
Respondent and/or Mr LHY (see paragraph 538 of this Decision). On the Respondent and Mr LHY’s
evidence, Mr Lee’s instructions had been confined to going back to the First Will.

169

removed

the

Demolition

Clause,

altogether,

from

his

Fifth

and

Penultimate Wills?°°,
537.There were also two versions of the Demolition Clause (see
paragraph 19(b) above and Annex A). In the first version (from Mr
Lee's First Will), demolition of 38 Oxley was subject to Dr LWL’s right
to stay there. This was the version in the draft that the Respondent
sent to Mr Lee. However, this version of the Demolition Clause had

been superseded by a second version (from Mr Lee’s Second Will).
This later version of the Demolition Clause was also used in Mr Lee's

Third and Fourth Will. In the Fifth and Sixth (or Penultimate) Wills, the
Demolition Clause was removed completely. Thus, the Respondent
should have checked with Mr Lee: did he want the Demolition Clause
reinserted, when he had removed them from his immediately
preceding two Wills?
538.The Respondent did not do this. She did not tell Mr Lee that the
Demolition Clause (which had been removed in the Penultimate Will)
had been reinserted in the draft Last Will that she sent to Mr Lee. The

Respondent's testimony*®’ was as follows:
“Advocate:

..[S]o on 16th December 2013, you never had a chance
to speak to or advise Mr Lee Kuan Yew, right, about this

decision to include any demolition clause in the final will
Respondent:

—/ think Papa was his own best lawyer. He knew what he
wanted.

Advocate:

Okay. So there was no conversation at all?

358 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 257 — 259, note from Ms KKL te Mr LHL, Dr LWL and Mr LHY dated 4 June 2015.

887 Transcript (4 July 2019), 98:13-18.

170

Respondent:

There was no conversation at ail.”
[Emphasis added]

had also removed Dr LWL’s right to stay at 38 Oxley
altogether in his Second, Third and Fourth Wills, before deciding to
confer her with only a conditional right in his Fifth and Penultimate

539.Mr

Lee

Wills.
540. The question of Dr LWL's rights (if any) to stay at 38 Oxley was an
issue on which Mr Lee seems to have focussed considerable thought

and attention in deciding on his Wills*°*. Apart from Mr Lee's First Will,
none of his five subsequent wills give Dr LWL an unfettered right to
stay at 38 Oxley, the Second, Third, and Fourth Wills did not give Dr
LWL any right to stay at 38 Oxley, whilst the Fifth and Penuitimate
Wills subjected this right to Mr LHL’s consent.

541.Mr Lee had also emphasised to Ms KKL the importance of requiring
Mr LHL’s consent in this respect. When Mr Lee reinstated Dr LWL’s
right to stay at 38 Oxley in the Fifth Will, he instructed Ms KKL, more
than once, to ensure that this should be made subject to Mr LHL’s

consent®®,
542. The Penultimate Will also contained a gift-over clause (as did all Mr

Lee’s wills, apart from the Last Will (see paragraph 21 above))*®.
543. The Last Will departed from the considered positions that Mr Lee had
settled on with Ms KKL on the changes to be made to his Penultimate
358 RBOD, p 51, email from Ms KKL to Dr LWL dated 3 June 2015, 8.39am; LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 257 at
para 1, note from Ms KKL to Mr LHL, Dr LWL, Mr LHY dated 4 June 2015.
359 1SS BOD, Vol 1, p 145, email from Mr Lee to Ms KKL dated 1 Oct 2072, 4.12pm; LSS BOD, Vol 1,
2 144, email from Mr Lee to Ms KKL dated 1 Oct 2012, 11.32pm.

38 LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 289, Penultimate Will executed by Mr Lee dated 2 November 2012,

171

Will. As Mr Lee's lawyer, the Respondent owed him a duty to find out
what Mr Lee's true wishes were, take him through the Penultimate
Will, and remind him of his discussions with Ms KKL a few days
earlier. It was only with the benefit of such a discussion that Mr Lee
(and the Respondent) could have been certain that the best (or even
an accurate) way of giving effect to his wishes was to rescind the
Penultimate Will, and reinstate the First Will (with all its attendant
changes).
544. The

Respondent

made

no effort to ascertain, discuss, or draw Mr

Lee's attention to the changes between the Penultimate Will and the
First Will. She did not try to obtain a copy of the Penultimate Will from

Ms KKL, either for Mr Lee’s or her own reference®*"". Any solicitor who
proceeded thus would have acted contrary to the requirements set
out by the Court of Appeal in Low Ah Cheow (see paragraph 528
above). The Respondent, being in conflict, fell foul of the additional
observations made by the Court of Appeal in Low Ah Cheow and
Muriel Chee (paragraphs 529 — 530 above). As the Court of Appeal
said in Low Ah Cheow, the Respondent's motives, in sending a draft
to Mr Lee which completely superseded the Penultimate Will and in
rushing the execution of the Last Will, are in serious question.

545. Had Mr Lee’s wish been solely to ensure an equal division of shares,
there were various other options he could have used, rather than
reinstating the First Will — he could have executed a codicil to the
Penultimate Will (which is what he had agreed with Ms KKL), or

reinstated one of his other previous Wills, which similarly divided his
Estate into equal shares.

36 Transcriptpt (3 July 2019), 29:25 — 30:29.
172

b,

Ensuring

Mr

Lee’s

wishes

were

fully

and

accurately

doubt

that

the

were

(see

expressed in the Last Will

546.We found it established beyond reasonable
Respondent failed in this duty as well.
547.She did not fully ascertain
paragraphs 533 - 545 above).

what

Mr

Lee’s

:
wishes

548.Even if Mr Lee's intention was to go back to the First Will, that was
also not done.

549.She told Mr Lee that the draft Last Will that she sent to him was the
First Will, when it was not (see paragraphs 34 — 35 above). She did
not draw his attention to the differences between the draft Last Will

and the First Will.
550. In particular, two substantive parts of the First Will were missing from
the draft that the Respondent gave Mr Lee — (a) the gift-over clause,
and (b) provision for Mr LHL to pay for the upkeep of 38 Oxley, whilst
Dr LWL occupied the property.

551.On her evidence, she simply forwarded to Mr Lee, what Mr LHY sent
to her, assuming

it to be the First Will, as Mr LHY

told her, and

representing it to Mr Lee as such*®2. The Respondent contended that
she did not open the draft, before she sent it on to Mr Lee. For the

reasons set out above (see paragraphs 318 — 321 above), we did not
find these statements credibie.

552. However, had this indeed been the case (as the Respondent stated),
it would have compounded her misconduct even further. Itis a breach
of the most basic duties for a lawyer to have:
362 The Respondent's AEIC (17 June 2019) at para 16.
173

(a)

Used a draft will sent to her by a beneficiary, whom she was
closely related to; and

(b)

Sent

on

the

draft,

from

the

beneficiary,

to

her

client,

representing its contents to be in order, without even having
opened the document to read it.
553.As Mr Lee’s lawyer, it was a serious breach of the Respondent's
duties to have misrepresented the Last Will as being identical to the

First Will.
554. The Last Will also omitted changes which Mr Lee wanted to make. It
failed to include the provision on the two carpets that Mr Lee had
instructed Ms KKL to make, just a few days earlier (see paragraphs
28 and 29 above).The Respondent’s omission to include this in the
Last Will underscored her failure to discuss the Last Will with Mr Lee
and ensure that its contents reflected Mr Lee’s wishes.

555. The Respondent's disregard for Mr Lee’s interests is also apparent
from her conduct after sending him the draft Last Will. She made no
effort to discuss the draft Last Will with Mr Lee, or at least confirm

that the draft Last Will accurately and comprehensively reflected his
wishes (see paragraph 544 above). On her own evidence, she did
not know if Mr Lee even read the draft Last Will which she sent,

because she did not speak with him after that®®?.
556.All of this was a gross breach of the Respondent's duties. As the
Court of Three Judges

has stated in Law Society of Singapore

v

Vardan Vasantha Lakshmi [2007] 1 SLR(R) 240 at [47]:

363 Transcript (3 July 2019), 89:7-9.

174

“Lawyers

have

a

duty

generally

(and

always)

to

give

their

respective clients a thorough explanation of all relevant documents

set in their appropriate contexts. This is the minimum standard of
professionalism which we would expect.”
[Emphasis added.]
557.In

their

testimony,

the

Respondent

and

Mr

LHY

repeatedly

emphasised that Mr Lee read through the Last Will before it was
executed. They contended that the Last Will must therefore have
reflected Mr Lee’s wishes.

558. This reasoning is contradicted, by the Respondent's own testimony.
The Respondent’s evidence is that even though she had worked on

the First Will in 2011, she herself would not have realised, from a
plain reading of the draft Last Will in’2013, that it was the wrong

version*,
‘Tan CM:

Would it be fair to say that if you did open, you will know
that this is not the correct draft because you were
involved in a wee bit of tidying, resulting in version 3 that
resulted in the fast will?

Respondent:

No. | wouldn't have known.

Tan CM:

You wouldn't have known?

Respondent:

{ wouldn't have known,

Tan CM:

So would it be fair to say that when

Mr Lee

reads

whatever draft of will it would be for him, he, foo, would

364 Transcript (3 July 2019), 74:9 — 75:9.

475

not have known of the differences with the first will if it
had not been placed before him?
Respondent:

{ don’t know. But | had sent the will to the author. And!
wouldn't have had the temerity of doing that if | had
thought that it wasn’t the will. This was sent to the author
Kim Li. tt was forwarded.

Tan CM:

You see, your evidence is that if you had opened,

you

would not have noticed the difference. Correct?
Respondent:

Yes. Sir.

Tan CM:

That must be because the wee bit of tidying that you did
was in August 2011. That will be more than 2 years ago?

Respondent:

| had—-yes, | had no reason to think that it was anything

other than the will. And, yes, | don’t have perfect memory
to remember a document | may have _go---looked at
briefly 2 years ago.

Tan CM:

By the same token, it would not be fair to expect that Mr

Lee would remember _or_would have noticed the
differences between the first and the last will because it
was_something

that he signed some

2 years

and

4

months ago. Would that be a fair statement?

Respondent:

| think that that’s probably the case, although you have
to recognise, Papa can be a very perspicacious man and
that he may well have the wills with him. And | did not.

Tan CM:

You don’t know that fora fact, am | correct?
176

Respondent:

No, | don’.

Tan CM:

Yes.

Respondent:

Neither do you.”
[Emphasis added.]

559.The Respondent's comments that she would not have known the
differences between the different variations of the First Will based on
memory alone, apply with more force to Mr Lee. By December 2013,
Mr Lee had signed five other Wills since the First Will. Mr Lee was 90

years old at the time, was very frail and had been in poor health®®. It
is not possible to assume that Mr Lee would have identified and
appreciated the specific changes that the Last Will made to either the
First Will,

or the

Penultimate

Will,

based

on

memory

alone,

and

without a lawyer explaining the differences and implications to him.
560. The problems are compounded by the fact that the Respondent had
made false representations to Mr Lee about the contents of the Last
Will. It is grossly remiss for her to have allowed Mr Lee to sign the
Last Will, based on her false representations to him.
561. Thus, it is no answer to say that Mr Lee read through the Last Will.

He was given a document and given false assurances about it. He
365 See paragraphs 27 and 59 of this Decision above.

See also email from Dr LWL to Ms Ho Ching dated 16 Dec 2013, 5.21pm, sent the day before the Last
Will was signed — Dr LWL said that Mr Lee had “been doing very well’ because he had “no admission

to SGH for more than a month"", but that she thought that “aging has caught up w his brain alsa’. (LSS

BOD, Vol 1, p 172)

Dr LWL also subsequently recounted Mr Lee's health at the time, in the following terms: ""By now, Pa
was already v forgetful’ (see email from Dr LWL to Ms Ho Ching dated 28 July 2014, 11.08am (LSS

BOD, Vol 1, p 238).

177

He read it, and signed it. But was he

trusted the Respondent®*,

aware that this Will was very different from what he had discussed

with Ms KKL just four days earlier®®”? Did he remember, for example,
that four days earlier, he had not wanted to include the Demolition
Clause? Did he, for example, remember that the Penultimate Will did
not have the Demolition Clause?

562. The Respondent also said that Mr Lee’s interests were not adversely
affected, because the Last Will simply effected his undisputed wish

to divide the Estate equally amongst his three children®®®, She also
said that the only basis on which the first Charge (Charges 1, 1A, and
1B) could be sustained was if Mr LHY “got some advantage that he
was not entitled to because of [the Respondent's] intervention’.
563. This submission overlooks the several ways in which the Respondent
failed to protect Mr Lee’s interests, set out above.

564.Mr LHY's contentions in his Affidavit were also to similar effect®°. He
referred to the differences between the First and Last Will as being

“minor discrepancies”

and “some occasional differences in legal

words’. There were in fact substantive differences between the two

Wills (see paragraphs 34, 548 - 550 and Annex B).
565.This

was

a

dismissive

complete disregard

approach.

Mr LHY

It shows,

and the Respondent

unfortunately,

the

had for Mr Lee's

wishes, and the Respondent's disregard for discharging her duties
honestly and faithfully. The Respondent:

388 Transcript (3 Jul 2019), 30:30-32.
387 See paragraph 29 of this Decision.

388 Respondent’s Skeletal Submissions for No Case to Answer (2 July 2019) at paras 54 — 56.
369 Mr LHY’s AEIC (11 June 2018) at paras 87 — 89.

178

(a)

Did not have a proper discussion with Mr Lee to ascertain his

wishes;
(b)

Did not take the required steps to herself ensure that Mr Lee's
wishes were properly reflected; and

(c)

Primarily focussed on ensuring that her husband’s and her
desire to get a will executed by Mr Lee quickly — which
contained terms which had not been discussed with Mr Lee,
and on which he was not advised.

566.We find it established beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent
breached Rule 25(a) and (b) of the PCR. The objective facts show
that she fell grossly short of her professional duties as Mr Lee’s
lawyer.
567.As a fiduciary, who was beholden to protect Mr Lee’s interests above

all else, it was unacceptable for the Respondent to have abused her
position as Mr Lee’s lawyer and prioritised her husband’s wishes.
(C)

The Primary and Alternative

Second

Charges:

Rule 46 of the

PCR
568.The key elements of the primary and alternative second Charges
(Charges 2 and 2A) are as follows:
(a)

The Respondent breached Rule 46 of the PCR by:
(i)

Acting in respect of a significant gift that her client, Mr
Lee, intended to give to Mr LHY, the Respondent's

husband?”°: and/or
370 Statement of Case at paras 48 and 49 — primary and alternative second Charges: “That you, Mrs
Lee Suet Fem... during the course of your retainer for your client, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, breached Rule
179

(b)

legal

Failed to advise Mr Lee to seek independent
advice®”’; and

(ii)

In doing the above, the Respondent’s conduct amounted to
grossly improper conduct (or improper conduct/practice)

under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA®”.
569. Rule 46 of the PCR expressly provides, inter alfa, that “where a client
intends to make a significant gift by wilf’ to “any member of the family
of the advocate and solicitor’, the advocate and solicitor “shail not act

for the client and shall advise the client to be independently advised
in respect of the gift’. It stipulates “two distinct obligations’, which are
“cumulative and not alternative” — a lawyer must both refuse to act for
in

respect

independently

advised

the

client

of

the

(see

gift,

James

and

advise

Wan*,

the

client

at [9] and

to

be

[22)).

{Emphasis added.]

570.In this regard, we note that the charges against the Respondent
framed both limbs of Rule 46 of the PCR conjunctively (see
paragraph 568(a) above). For the reasons set out below, we find that
the Respondent breached both these limbs, as the charges set out.
However, for completeness, we point out that for the reasons set out
46...by acting in respect of a significant gift (a one-third share in your client's estate)
intended to give by will fo your husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang”. [Emphasis added.]

that your clfent

371 Statement of Case at paras 48 and 49 — primary and alternative second Charges: “That you, Mrs
Lee Suet Fern... breached Rule 46 of the Legal Professional (Professional Conduct) Rules ...{by] failing
to advise your client to be independently advised in respect of this significant gift’. [Emphasis added]
272 Statement of Case at para 48 — primary second Charge: “... such act amounting fo grossly improper

conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal
Profession Act”. [Emphasis added.]

Statement of Case at para 49 — alternative second Charge: “... such act amounting fo improper conduct
or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act’.

[Emphasis added.)

373 | aw Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James [2013] 3 SLR 221.

180

above (see paragraph 569 above), a breach of Rule 46 of the PCR
would be made out as long as either of these limbs are proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
(1)Acting in respect of a significant gift to Mr LHY

571.For the reasons set out above (see Section Vill above), we find that
this limb of Rule 46 of the PCR

has

been

established

beyond

a

reasonable coubt.

572.The assets which Mr Lee intended to bequeath to Mr LHY through
the Last Will were a “significant giff’, within the meaning of Rule 46 of
the PCR. This was a gift that was both significant in absolute terms,
and also significant in proportion (one-third) of Mr Lee’s estate (see

James Wan, at [10)).

573. The Respondent's decision to act for Mr Lee, despite knowing of the
significant gift that her husband Mr LHY stood to receive, is in breach
of Rule 46. As the Court of Appeal pointed out in James Wan at [20],
a ""clear instance of so acting is when the advocate and solicitor draws

up an instrument by which a disposal of the client’s property is
effected, such as a will”. [Emphasis added.]
574. The Court in James Wan has noted that in England and in New South
Wales, the equivalent provisions to Rule 46 of the PCR do not apply
when the client is closely related to the solicitor. However, the Court
points out that Rule 46 of the PCR in Singapore does not have any
exception. The obligations imposed by Rule 46 of the PCR apply
regardless of any familial relationship between the solicitor and his
client. The Court also made reference to the Law Society’s Ethics
Committee’s Guidance Note of 4 December 2007, where the Ethics

Committee made clear that the obligations apply even in relation to a

182

solicitor’s own parents. The Respondent was in breach of Rule 46 of
the PCR.

575. The Guidance Note from the Law Society’s Ethics Committee (which
was cited by the Court in James Wan) states that®”:
“A solicitor is absolutely prohibited under rule 46 PCR from acting for
his parents in preparing any instrument (including a will) under which
he (or his family members or colleagues) would receive a significant
gift, whether as a beneficiary of his parents’ will or estate or otherwise.
In light of potential issues of conflict of interest and sensitivities
involved, the solicitor should avoid acting for his parents even when
they have not intimated any intention to make a gift. Naturally, once

such intention was intimated, the solicitor must advise his parents to
seek independent advice concerning the gift and cannot act for them.”
[Emphasis added.]
(2)Failing to advise Mr Lee to get independent legal advice

576. The Respondent also breached the second requirement in Rule 46
of the PCR — to advise Mr Lee to seek independent advice.

577.The nature of this duty has been set out by the Court of Three Judges

in James Wan*?>.
(a)

Asolicitor's obligation to advise his client to seek independent
advice arises even if the intended gift is wholly unrelated to
the matter in which the advocate and solicitor is acting for the

client - a fortiori where he is acting for the client in respect of
the gift itself. The

dispassionate

counsel

of an

uninvolved

374 Law Society Ethics Committee, Guidance Note (4 December 2007).

375 | aw Saciety of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James [2013] 3 SLR 221 at [12]-[18].
182

party is needed, to establish that his client's judgement has
not been clouded by influence, arising from their solicitor-client
relationship.

(b)

An advocate and solicitor does not fulfil his obligation merely
by telling his client “You

should

seek

independent_advice”

without more.
He should explain to his client the reason why independent
advice is required, viz, to ensure that the client’s decision to

make a gift to him, (or parties close to him), is free exercise of
independent will, given the presumption that the decision is
influenced by the solicitor-client relationship. He should
explain that, even if the client does not perceive any influence,
such influence may nevertheless exist. He should also

repeatedly if necessary,
emphasise,
receiving independent advice.

{d)

the

importance

of

The advocate and solicitor, should ask his client to nominate
an independent advocate and solicitor, who can advise the
client on the matter (the “advising advocate and solicitor’). He
should then ensure that the advising advocate and solicitor,
has no connections or involvement, which would in any way
compromise independence.

He should advise his client to obtain written confirmation from
the advising advocate and solicitor, to the effect that a full
explanation of the nature of the transaction, and its practical

implications, has been furnished.
Should
whatever

the client decline to seek
reason,

he should

independent_advice

for

insist_with some force that his

client do so, and _reiterate the importance of receiving that

183

independent advice. In the absence of such advice,
advocate and solicitor should decline to accept the gift.

the

{Emphasis added.]

578. It is not in dispute that the Respondent failed to do any of these things.
She

did

not

advise

Mr

Lee

to seek

independent

counsel.

She

breached the second aspect of her duty under Rule 46 of the PCR.
579. In fact, the Respondent did the opposite of what Rule 46 of the PCR
required her to do.
580. The Respondent acquiesced in cutting out Mr Lee from getting advice
from his usual lawyer, Ms KKL.
(D)

Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA: Grossly improper conduct

581.The final question is whether her conduct was “grossly improper’
under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA.

582. The test for what amounts to “grossly improper’ conduct, within the
meaning of section 83(2) of the LPA was also discussed by Menon
CJ in Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2019] SGHC
92 (“Peter Ezekiel’):

""37 The principles relating to s 83(2)(b) of the LPA can be briefly
stated. Whether a particular conduct is “grossly improper’ within
the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the LPA depends on whether the
conduct is dishonourable to the solicitor concerned as a man and

dishonourable in his profession (Re Marshall David; Law Society
of Singapore v Marshall David Saul [1971-1973] SLR(R) 554 at
[23]; Law Society of Singapore v Rasif David [2008] 2 SLR(R)
955 at [23]). Itis well established that deceit is not necessary for

184

a finding of grossly improper conduct. Indeed, s 83(2)(b) of the
LPA makes it clear that the requirement is for either
fraudulent or grossly improper conduct to be shown (Re Han
Ngiap Juan[1993] 1SLR(R)135; Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law
Society of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R)
398 (""Lim Kiap Khee”) at [19]). Whilst simple negligence or want
of skill would not necessarily constitute grossly improper conduct,
it has also been noted that there are degrees of negligence, and
that the gravity of a negligent act must be viewed in the context
of the matter, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case (Lim Kiap Khee at (19]). Grossly improper conduct will also
be found where a solicitor prefers his own interests to that of his
client (Law Society of Singapore v Khushvinder Singh
Chopra [1998] 3 SLR(R) 490 (“Khushvinder Singh Chopra’) at
[49]; Law Society of Singapore v Ng Chee Sing [2000] 1 SLR(R)

466 (“Ng Chee Sing”) at [36]).”
583. It would be “grossly improper’, for an advocate and solicitor to act in
a manner opposed to a client’s interests: Law Society v Heng Guan
Hong Geoffrey [1999] 3 SLR(R) 966 (“Geoffrey Heng’) at [24].
“Grossly improper conduct”, is also likely to arise, where a solicitor

puts his interest, above his clients’ interests®”*: Khushvinder Singh
Chopra at [49]; and Ng Chee Sing at [36].

584.Conduct may be “gross/y improper’ even without any dishonesty,
fraud or deceit: Re Han Ngiap Juan at [27] and [34]; and Law Society
of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee [2018] 5 SLR 1261 (""Wong Sin Yee"")
at [23].

585. In Peter Ezekiel, the Court of Three Judges characterised the type of
conflict of interest which has arisen in these proceedings as cases
where ‘it would be impossible, save possibly in exceptional
circumstances, to avoid the conclusion that the client had operated
378 Law Society v Khushvinder Singh Chopra [1998] 3 SLR(R) 490; Law Society of Singapore v Ng
Chee Sing [2000] 1 SLR(R) 466.
185

under the undue influence of the solicitor in ... making the substantial
gift’.
586.Based on these principles, we find the Respondent was guilty of
grossly improper conduct, beyond any reasonable doubt.

587. This is not a case of sheer incompetence, inadvertent negligence, or
even reckless indifference. The Respondent, as Mr Lee’s lawyer,
deliberately failed to discharge the duties that she was supposed to
perform. Her breaches are egregious.
in totality, the Respondent’s conduct was quite dishonest.
Mr LHY’s and her conduct, demonstrated a calculated attempt to:

588. Considered

(a)

Ensure that Mr Lee executed the Last Will as quickly as
possible, without due regard for Mr Lee’s wishes, and

(b) — Hide their wrongdoing in having done so.
589. The Respondent and Mr LHY knew that it was important to Mr Lee to
have a lawyer prepare and arrange for the execution of the Last Will.
Despite this: (a) they cut out Mr Lee’s usual lawyer, Ms KKL, and
replaced her with the Respondent, who was in a serious conflict of
interest; and (b) instead of advising Mr Lee to seek independent
counsel, as she was required to, the Respondent acquiesced in Mr
LHY’s representation to Mr Lee, that it was best to proceed without
Ms

KKL;

and

actively

ensured

that the

execution

could

proceed

without Ms KKL.

590.Having removed Ms KKL from the picture, the Respondent
compounded her wrongdoing by misleading Mr Lee on the contents
of the Last Will. She and Mr LHY also rushed the signing of the Last
Will by Mr Lee. It contained terms which had not been discussed with

186

Mr Lee (see paragraphs 536 — 538 above). Mr Lee signed the Last
Will under false assurances.
591.The Respondent's conduct clearly lacked the integrity, probity and
trustworthiness required of an advocate and solicitor. What she did
was

dishonourable,

both to herself, as a person,

and to the legal

profession. It was “grossly improper conduct’ under section 83(2)(b)
of the LPA.

592.Having procured the Last Will through these improper means,

she

and Mr LHY then fabricated a series of lies and inaccuracies, to
perpetuate the falsehood that Ms KKL had been involved in the Last
Will, and hide their own role in getting Mr Lee to sign the Last Will
and their wrongdoings (see paragraphs 439 - 496 above).
(E)

The Further Alternative First & Second Charges

593. The further alternative Charges (Charges 1B and 2B) brought under

section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, are also established beyond reasonable
doubt.
594. Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA is broader than section 83(2)(b)

of the

LPA. It applies when a solicitor's conduct does not fall within any of
the other subsections of section 83(2) of the LPA,
considered unacceptable”:

but is “nonetheless

Wong Sin Yee, [24]; Ng Chee Sing, [40].

Unlike “grossly improper conduct’ under section 83(2)(b) of the LPA,
“conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(h)
of the LPA, is not confined to misconduct in a solicitor's professional

capacity;

it also

includes

misconduct

in

his

personal

capacity:

Geoffrey Heng, at [25]; Khushvinder Singh Chopra, at [36].
595.Menon

CJ

has summarised,

in Peter Ezekie/ at [38], the test for

unbefitting conduct under section 83(2)(h) of the LPA as follows:

187

As for s 83(2)(h) of the LPA, this provision is broader
38
than s 83(2)(b). The standard of unbefitting conduct will be met
if a solicitor is shown to have been guilty of such conduct as
would render him unfit to remain as a member of an honourable

profession (Law Society of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee [2018] 5
SLR 1261 (“Wong Sin Yee"") at [24]). The relevant test is to
consider_whether_reasonable people, on_hearing what the
solicitor had done, would have said without hesitation that as a

solicitor he should not have done it (Ng Chee Sing at [41]; Wong
Sin Yee at [24]).”
{Emphasis added.]

596. It is sufficient if the solicitor’s conduct brings him into discredit as a
lawyer, or brings the legal profession as a whole into disrepute: Wong
Sin Yee, at [24].

597.Even if the Respondent had not been Mr Lee's lawyer, what she did
to Mr Lee was dishonest and dishonourable. She:

(a)

Misled him, and procured his execution of the Last Will on the
basis of misrepresentations;

(b)

Denied him the benefit of proper legal advice, on the contents
of his Last Will; and

(c)

Participated in ensuring that the Last Will was signed quickly,
without Mr Lee getting proper legal advice.

598.This

conduct

unquestionably

falis within

the

rubric

of “conduct

unbefitting an advocate and solicitor’.

188

xX,

Cause of sufficient gravity under section 93 of the LPA

599.Having

found

that

the

first

and

second

Charges

against

the

Respondent were established beyond reasonable doubt, the final
question to address is whether there is “cause of sufficient gravity’
under section 93 of the LPA.
600. The

existence of misconduct under section 83(2) of the LPA, does

not ipso facto constitute “cause of sufficient gravity’. The function of
a Disciplinary Tribunal uncer section 93 of the LPA, is to serve as a

“filter': Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel
[2010] 3 SLR 390 (“Jasmine Gowriman/’) at [28]. It is open to the
Tribunal to find that the conduct, technically, falls within one or more

limbs of section 83(2) of the LPA, but take the view that the case is
nevertheless not of “sufficient gravity’, to merit a reference to the
Court of Three Judges in Jasmine Gowrimani, at [39].
601. Cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action arises if, (and only
if), the Tribunal is of the view that “there is (potential or prima facie)
merit in the complaint”, which would result in a finding of “due cause’,
by the Court of Three Judges (see Jasmine Gowrimani, at [34] and
[37]). In other words, the misconduct must be ""sufficiently serious to
warrant the imposition of sanctions under s 83(1) of the LPA” (see
Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2017] SGHC

1471 at [30]).
602.The sentencing principles set out in Law Society of Singapore v
Nor’ain bte Abu Bakar [2008] 1 SLR(R) 753 at [92] are instructive —
(a)

""Where a solicitor has acted dishonestly,
that he be struck off the roll of solicitors.

the court will order

189

(b)

If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is
shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity,
probity and trustworthiness, he will nonetheless be struck off
the roll of solicitors, as opposed to merely being suspended, if

his lapse is such as to indicate that he lacks the qualities of
_character and trustworthiness which are necessary attributes
of a person

entrusted

the

with

responsibilities

of a legal

practitioner.
A further consideration to be borne in mind when deciding on
the appropriate penalty is the public dimension of disciplinary
sentencing, which is the equivalent of public denunciation by
the court in the process of punishing an offender for the
offence he has committed. This process serves to preserve

public confidence in the legal profession as an integral part of
the legal system.”
[Emphasis added.]

603. The misconduct that the Respondent is guilty of represents a serious

departure from the most basic and fundamental standards expected
of an advocate and solicitor — complete honesty and fidelity to his/her
client.

Respondent

The

acted

with

dishonesty,

deceit,

and

in

leave such egregious and
dishonest conduct unsanctioned would bring disrepute upon the
profession. We accordingly determine, pursuant to section 93(1)(c)
of the LPA, that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists
disregard

of her legal obligations.

To

under section 83 of the LPA.

Xl.

Conclusion

604. The main facts in this matter are not in much dispute.

190

605.In summary:

(a)

Ms KKL was responsible for drafting Mr Lee’s First to Sixth
Wills, from 2011 to 201297"", She was his lawyer. She took care
of all the arrangements, for drafting the Wills, and kept the

originals®”8.

(b)

As of 13 December 2013, Mr Lee had discussed and agreed
with

Ms

KKL

that he would

execute

a codicil,

making

two

specific changes to his Sixth (or Penultimate) Will®”®.
The Sixth (or Penultimate) Will, inter alia:
(i)

Did not contain any Demolition Clause38o;

(ii)

Provided for Dr LWL to stay at 38 Oxley subject to Mr
LHL’s consent®*""; and

(iii)

Contained a gift-over clause (which all Mr Lee’s

previous Wills also contained)***.
As of 13 December 2013, Mr Lee had not wanted to change
these aspects of the Penultimate Will, or any other provision
in that Will. He had agreed to make only the two changes,
referred to at (b) above*®*.

377 See paragraph 12 of this Decision.
378 See paragraphs 15 and 256 of this Decision.
379 See paragraphs 28 and 29 of this Decision.
380 See paragraph 23 of this Decision.
381 See paragraph 23 of this Decision.
382 See paragraph 21 of this Decision.
383 See paragraph 29 of this Decision.

191

(d)

A few days later, Mr LHY and the Respondent settled the Last
Will with Mr Lee on 16 and 17 December 2013, whilst Ms KKL

was away.

Mr LHY and the Respondent arranged for Mr

Lee to revoke the Penultimate Will in its entirety (instead of
executing

a codicil to the Penultimate Will, as Mr Lee

had

instructed Ms KKL three or four days earlier), and arranged for
Mr Lee to execute a new Will (namely, the Last Will).
(e)

The Respondent sent the draft of the Last Will to Mr Lee (via

her email of 7.08pm on 16 December 2013) 58. She and Mr
LHY arranged for Mr Lee to sign the Last Will urgently,

16

hours later, before lunch the next day*®.
(f)

Mr Lee signed the Last Will without legal advice from his usual
lawyer, Ms KKL*?.

The Respondent and Mr LHY knew that Ms KKL was away*®2.
Mr LHY told Mr Lee that he should not wait for Ms KKL to settle

the new Will®°, The Respondent was on that email. They
persuaded Mr Lee to sign the draft Last Will, without Ms KKL.
Mr LHY told Mr Lee that the Respondent's firm, Stanford Law,

could handle the matter®®°,

384 See paragraph 31 of this Decision.
385 See paragraph 30 of this Decision.
388 See paragraphs 346 - 365 of this Decision.
387 See paragraph 437 of this Decision.
388 See paragraphs 31 and 288 of this Decision.
388 See paragraph 39 of this Decision.

380 See paragraph 39 of this Decision.

192

Mr LHY removed Ms KKL from the email correspondence
(after the Respondent's initial email of 7.08pm), even before

Mr Lee agreed to use another lawyer for the Last Will?**. Ms
KKL was then cut out of the discussions”.
(g)

Mr LHY and the Respondent made all the arrangements for

the execution of the Last Will°. They took steps to have
Respondent's law firm, Stamford Law,
engross and witness the Last Will for Mr Lee, hurriedly®™*.
lawyers

(h)

from

the

| Mr Lee was 90 at that time, very frail and in poor health®®. He
had been hospitalised in the preceding weeks. Mr Lee
agreed to sign the Last Will, because he trusted the
Respondent (whorn he had instructed®*’, and whom he was

told prepared the Last Will®°), and believed that what she told
him was true°°,

not advised by any other lawyer

Hé was

before he signed the Last Will*°.
(i)

The Respondent misled Mr Lee on the terms of the Last Will.
She told him that the draft Last Will was the same as the First

381 See paragraph 39 of this Decision.
382 See paragraphs 39, 324-327 and 414-416 of this Decision.
393 See paragraphs 40-68 and 367-407 of this Decision.
394 See paragraphs 40-52, 363-365 and 370 of this Decision.
39% See paragraphs 27, 59 and 559 of this Decision.

*

39 See paragraph 27 of this Decision.
397 See paragraphs 224-249 of this Decision.

228 See paragraphs 200-222 of this Decision.
39 See paragraphs 268-269, 273 and 342 of this Decision.

400 See paragraphs 437 and 578 of this Decision.

- 193

Will executed by Mr Lee in 20114"". That was untrue*?, This
is notin dispute*®?. Such misleading is in breach of a solicitor’s
duties**,
G)

The Respondent did not advise Mr Lee on the differences
between the draft Last Will that she gave him, and Mr Lee's

Sixth (or Penultimate) Will*°5. He was not advised that the draft
Last Will:

(i)

Inserted a Demolition Clause (which was

not in the

Penultimate Will)4°° - even though three days earlier,
Mr Lee was not going to have such a clause; and

(ii)

Made other changes to the Penultimate Will (beyond

the equalisation

of shares)*°? - none of which was

discussed with Mr Lee.

(k)

The

Respondent

did

not

alert

Mr

Lee

to any

of these

changes“. Nor did she find out what Mr Lee had agreed with
Ms KKL*°, or confirm with Mr Lee that he indeed wanted to
make these changes to the Penultimate Will*, or check if

401 See paragraphs 32-33 of this Decision.
402 See paragraphs 34-35 and 549-550 of this Decision. See also Annex B.
403 See paragraph 35 of this Decision.
404 See paragraphs 549-553, 656 and 560 of this Decision.

405 See paragraphs 36, 535, 544 and 545 of this Decision.
408 See paragraphs 35 and 536 - 538 of this Decision.
407 See paragraphs 35 and 539 - 542 of this Decision; See also Annex C.
408 See paragraphs 555-556 of this Decision.
49 See paragraphs 535 and 643 of this Decision; See also Transcript (3 July 2019), 88:14 — 89:3.
410 See paragraphs 533-844 of this Decision.

194

there were any other changes that he wanted to make*""”, This
is

in

direct

contravention

of the

legal

requirements

on

solicitors*""?.
(I)

evidence why Mr Lee suddenly decided to
completely disregard what he had agreed with Ms KKL, on
these matters, just three or four days earlier*'?, revoke his
Penultimate Will (in its entirety), and sign a new Will*""*. There
is also no evidence as to why the First Will was chosen, when

There

is no

it had been superseded five times, by five other Wills’®. The
Respondent and Mr LHY say that Mr Lee decided this himself.
We only have their word for this — and, in this case, on many
aspects where there was other evidence, it was clear that both

of them were lying, and had acted dishonestly*’®. Mr Lee’s
conduct in respect of the Last Will is quite different from the
care he seems to have exercised just a few days earlier, when

he was discussing with Ms KKL on amending his Penultimate

Will4""7, The circumstances raise serious questions, including
on the Respondent's and Mr LHY’s motives*""®.
(m)

The Respondent managed every aspect of the process, from
sending

the

draft

Last Will to

Mr

Lee

at 7.08pm,

on

16

December 2013, and advising him.on it, to its execution by Mr

411 See paragraphs 554 and 555 of this Decision.
42 See paragraphs 556 and 565-567 of this Deciston.

4% See paragraphs 29 and 37 of this Decision.
4% See paragraphs 351-354 and 543 of this Decision.

415 See paragraphs 19-20, 533-534 and 545 of this Decision.
418 See paragraph 612 of this Decision.
417 See paragraphs 28-29, 350-351, 358 and 543 of this Decision.

#8 See paragraphs 544, 565, 587-591 and 597 of this Decision.

195

Lee at 11.40am, on 17 December 20134"". She organised
lawyers from her firm to engross the Last Will (which was in

the same terms as the draft), told them to get everything done
quickly, and made the arrangements for execution of the Last

Will by Mr Lee*?°, Mr LHY was also actively involved in the
process “21. The Respondent's conduct was in direct
contravention of the Rules governing solicitors’ conduct*”?.
Rule 46 of the PCR expressly prohibits a solicitor from
preparing a will when a family member of the lawyer is going

to get a significant gift under the will3. The Respondent would
have known this and other rules, but disregarded them“.
(n)

The Respondent knew that just before he signed the Last Will,

Mr Lee had asked (twice), and was told, that she was the

primary lawyer who drafted it#?5, She did not object to this*#°.
Yet she told this Tribunal that there was no reason for Mr Lee
to have considered her to be his lawyer for the Last Will*??.
When

she said this, she did not know that Mr BL’s evidence

on this matter, contradicting her, was going to be presented*?®.

419 See paragraphs 40-68 and 387-407 of this Decision.
420 See paragraphs 38-52, 363-365, 370, 380-384 and 389-394 of this Decision.

421 See, for example, paragraphs 39, 44-46, 56-88, 279(b) and (c), 324-325, 385-388 and 511 of this
Decision.
42 See paragraphs 499-500, 526-532, 566-567, 570-573 and 576-580 of this Decision.
423 See paragraphs 569 and 574-575 of this Decision.
424 See paragraph 605(p) of this Decision.
428 See paragraphs 200-208 of this Decision.

#28 See paragraphs 201 and 209 of this Decision.
42? See paragraphs 187(b) and 211-215 of this Decision.

4% See paragraph 213 of this Decision.

196

(0)

After the

Last Will was

signed,

the

Respondent

kept

an

original of the Last Will in her office safe“. (Ms KKL had kept
the originals of the First to Sixth Wills#°.) The only other
original of the Last Will was kept by Mr Lee*"".

(Pp)

As a senior lawyer of 37 years’ standing, the Respondent
would have known her duties:

(i)

She should not mislead Mr Lee on the contents of the

draft Last Will. However, she did mislead him**.
Rule 25(a) and (b) of the PCR requires that she take
Mr Lee carefully through the terms of the draft Last

Will, She did not do that**. After her initial (wrong)

advice on what the draft Last Will was, she did not
speak with Mr Lee again**. Instead, she focussed on
getting

the

Last Will

executed

quickly,

with

undue

haste**5.
(ili)

She would have known of the LPA, and in particular,
Rules 25 and 46 of the PCR.

(Iv)

Therefore, she would have known (pursuant to Rules
25 and 46 of the PCR) that she should advise Mr Lee
to get independent legal advice.

428 See paragraphs 68, 253-258 and 395-401 of this Decision.
430 See paragraphs 15 and 256 of this Decision.
431 See paragraph 68 of this Decision.
482 See paragraphs 35, 549-553 and 560 of this Decision.
483 See paragraphs 36-37, 437 and 533-567 of this Decision.
4% See paragraphs 533-544, 554-555 and 565 of this Decision.
435 See paragraphs 531 and 565 of this Decision.

197

Instead,

she

did the opposite,

husband,

Mr

LHY,

in excluding

and went
Ms

KKL,

along with

her

Lee’s

usual

Mr

lawyer, from the process“.
606.On these facts, there can be no doubt that the Respondent was

in

serious breach of her professional duties.*7
607. The facts expose an unsavoury tale. The Respondent and Mr LHY,
on 16 December 2013, persuaded their aged father-in-law/father, Mr

Lee (then a 90-year-old man in poor health, who had recently been
hospitalised for several weeks, with serious medical conditions), to
sign a new Will without his usual lawyer (Ms KKL), to advise him.
They cut off that lawyer (Ms KKL) from communications with Mr Lee
on the Last Will, and rushed through the execution of the Last Will, in
her absence. The Respondent took over as the lawyer to prepare the
Last Will and advise Mr Lee, and misled Mr Lee on the terms of the
Last Will that he was going to sign. Mr Lee was persuaded into

signing the Last Will within 16 hours — the Respondent sent a draft of
the Last Will at 7.08pm on 16 December 2013 and it was signed at

11.10am on 17 December 2013. The Will that Mr Lee signed was
very different from both the Penultimate Will, and the proposed
Codicil (that Mr Lee had discussed and agreed with Ms KKL, on 13
December 2013, four days before he signed the Last Will prepared
by the Respondent). The Respondent gave the briefest of advice to
Mr Lee, and did not alert Mr Lee to all the differences between what

Mr Lee had earlier wanted and what the Last Will actually provided
for.

438 See paragraphs 324-331, 412-416, 510-511, 531 and 578-680 of this Decision.
437 See paragraphs 544, 551-556, 560-567, 586-592, 597 and 603 of this Decision.

198

608.As

stated

earlier, the Last Will increased

Mr

LHY’s

share

in the

Estate*®®, The Respondent, in explaining aspects of her conduct (with
regards to the haste with which the Last Will was done), said that she
was acting as an “obedient wife"" (see paragraph 531).
609. Mr Lee, who was very frail and in poor health, was misled by the very
people whom

he trusted: his son, Mr LHY, and daughter-in-law, the

Respondent.

610.Mr LHY and the Respondent tried to explain away their conduct, the
contemporaneous documentary evidence and other surrounding
Their
previous statements.
and even their own
evidence,
explanations ranged from the improbable, to the patently contrived,
to the downright dishonest.
611. They tried to suppress their central role in what happened by:
(a)

Lying about what happened; and

(b)

Trying to suppress evidence on what happened

from being

revealed.

612. The lies stretched from 2013, both in public and in private forums,
until and through the current disciplinary proceedings. We have
earlier gone through the facts and set them out. To summarise:
(a)

| The Respondent and Mr LHY said that the Respondent did
not draft the Last Will. This is untrue. She prepared the draft

Last Will and she advised Mr Lee on it#?°.

4% Mr Lee had discussed with Ms KKL on equalising the shares of ail three children. See paragraph 29
of this Decision.
4% See paragraphs 267-302 of this Decision.

199

(b)

lied to the public

Mr LHY

about

Last Will was

how the

drafted“, He admitted to us that some of his statements were
inaccurate “1. He said his public statements could be
inaccurate because they are not sworn statements, and thus

he may not look at them carefully4#?. The Respondent adopted,
in her Defence, what Mr LHY had said publicly (which was

untrue)4“, That was dishonest.

(c)

The Respondent and Mr LHY said in these proceedings that
after introducing Mr BL to Ms WLH and Mr LHY, the

Respondent had no further role in the Last Will**. This is
untrue.

The

directions,

Respondent
in charge

was

intimately

of what was

involved,

happening,

giving

until Mr Lee

signed the Last Will and even thereafter“®. The Respondent's
and Mr LHY’s untruths came to light when Mr BL’s evidence

was produced*4”. They did not know that Mr BL’s evidence
would be produced before us“*®.

(d)

The Respondent said that Mr Lee had no reason to consider
the Respondent as his lawyer, for the Last Will*. This is
untrue. Mr Lee specifically asked, twice, who drafted his Last
Will. He was told, both times, that the Respondent had drafted

440 See paragraphs 488-493 of this Decision.
44) See paragraph 491 of this Decision.
44 See paragraphs 233 and 496 of this Decision.
443 See paragraph 486 of this Decision.

44 See paragraphs 488-491 of this Decision.
445 See paragraph 265(d) of this Decision.
446 See paragraphs 367-407 of this Decision.
447 See paragraphs 187(a) and 367-394 of this Decision.

48 See paragraphs 213 and 266 of this Decision.
448 See paragraph 214 of this Decision.

200

the Last Will°. On the second time that Mr Lee asked, he was
told that the Respondent and Ms KKL had drafted the Last

Will4*'. (Mr BL’s reference to Ms KKL was inaccurate.)
Again, Mr BL’s evidence exposed the untruths.
The Respondent and Mr LHY said that Ms KKL was Mr Lee’s

lawyer and had drafted the Last Will. This was said to us on

oath*53, and Mr LHY had said this to the public as well***. This
is untrue. Ms KKL had no role in drafting the Last Will#°°, She
was cut out of communications on the Last Will by Mr LHY*®°
(except for one initial email which Ms KKL had said she did

not receive)**”.

f)

Mr LHY compounded his dishonesty by accusing Ms KKL of
lying, in public 468 , when Ms KKL said that she had not drafted
the Last Will48°. This was quite cynical conduct. He knew that
Ms KKL was telling the truth, and that he and the Respondent

were not being truthful*®°.

450 See paragraphs 202-204 and 215 of this Decision,
451 See paragraphs 204 and 208 of this Decision.

452 See paragraphs 210 and 409-422 of this Decision.
483 See paragraph 409 of this Decision.

484 See paragraphs 488-490 and 493 of this Decision.
485 See paragraphs 412-417 of this Decision.
458 See paragraphs 39 and 324-328 of this Decision.
487 See paragraph 417 of this Decision.
488 See paragraph 490(b) of this Decision.
489 See paragraph 434 of this Decision.

460 See paragraphs 409-416 of this Decision.

201

(9)

The Respondent and Mr LHY said that Mr LHY found the draft

Last Will and sent it to the Respondent**"". This is untrue®.

(h)

The Respondent and Mr LHY said that Mr Lee did not instruct

the Respondent on the Last Will**. This is untrue“. Mr LHY
had

admitted,

in writing,

that

Mr

Lee

had

instructed

the

Respondent on the Last Will*°. The Respondent adopted Mr
LHY’s account in her correspondence to AGC*®,

(i)

The Respondent kept the original of the Last Will in her office

safe*®’. Ms KKL, who was Mr Lee’s lawyer for the First to Fifth
Wills kept the originals of these Wills*°. The Respondent gave
untruthful reasons why she kept the original of the Last Will.

0)

The Respondent said that the Executors never asked for any
‘input’ from her on their correspondence with the MC, in

relation to her role in the Last Will‘. This is untrue. She also
gave untruthful answers to us‘’'. The untruths were exposed
when Mr BL gave evidence*”.

481 See paragraph 303 of this Decision.
462 See paragraphs 305-322 of this Decision.
483 See paragraph 228 of this Decision.
484 See paragraphs 224-249 of this Decision.
485 See paragraphs 225-227 of this Decision.
485 See paragraphs 226 and 241-246 of this Decision.
48? See paragraph 68 of this Decision.
488 See paragraphs 15 and 256 of this Decision.

489 See paragraphs 398-401 of this Decision.
470 See paragraphs 446-448 of this Decision.
471 See paragraphs 459-468 of this Decision.

472 See paragraph 187(c) of this Decision.

202

(Kk)

The Respondent made untrue statements to AGC*”; and lied
to us about what she had said to AGC*“. The untruths are in
writing.

613.The

Respondent

and

Mr

LHY

also

sought

to suppress

relevant

evidence from coming to the Tribunal*”®.
614. The Respondent suppressed the BL Documents, which would have

exposed her untruths*’®, As a solicitor of 37 years’ standing, it was
inexcusable for her to have not disclosed the BL Documents:
(a)

She was under a legal duty to disclose them.

She was in

breach of that fegal duty;

(b)

She also falsely stated that she had disclosed all relevant
documents, when she was deliberately holding back the BL

Documents*”?; and
(c)

She knew her husband, Mr LHY, was selectively relying on
parts of these documents (namely, the EK Attendance Notes)
in public, whilst suppressing other parts which were damaging

to her’”8,
615.Mr LHY, as one of the Executors of the Estate, caused the Estate to

make an application OS 639, to prevent the Law Society from relying
473 See paragraph 451 of this Decision.
474 See paragraphs 472-485 of this Decision.
475 See paragraphs 85-89 and 122-147, 184-195 and 423-434 of this Decision.
476 See paragraph 184-195 of this Decision.
47 See paragraph 193 of this Decision.

478 See paragraphs 194-195 and 493-495 of this Decision.

203

on various documents, including the previous Wills of Mr Lee*”*. That
application was rejected*?.
616.Thereafter, and despite the High Court's ruling in OS 639, the
Respondent tried to prevent this Tribunal from obtaining various
documents, including the previous Wills of Mr Lee***. These attempts
were quite unmeritorious. She then complained that she had been

unfairly treated because these documents were produced*®,
617.In essence, an elaborate edifice of lies was presented, both on oath
(through Mr LHY and the Respondent’s Affidavits, and on the witness
stand), and through their public and other statements, (which were
referred to/relied upon during the Disciplinary Proceedings). The
Affidavits were contrived to present a false picture. Several of the lies
were quite blatant.
618.The Respondent was a deceitful witness, who tailored her evidence
to portray herself as an innocent victim who had been maligned. This
was a fagade. She lied to the AGC and she lied to us. Before us, she
lied or became evasive whenever she thought that it was to her
benefit to lie or evade.

619. Mr LHY’s conduct was equally deceitful. He lied to the public, he lied
to the MC, and he lied to us. He tried to hide how he and his wife had
misled his own father, Mr Lee, on the Last Will. He had no qualms
about making up evidence as he went along. We found him to be

cynical about telling the truth.

479 See paragraphs 85-86 and 143 of this Decision.
480 See paragraphs 89 and 144 of this Decision.
484 See paragraphs 139-147 of this Decision.

482 See paragraph 154 of this Decision.
204

620.Under these circumstances, we find that all Charges against the
Respondent have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and we
determine, pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the LPA, that cause of
sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the
LPA.

205

Dated this Siday of February 2020

—

oe

Sarit Singh Gill SC, President

Yee Kee Shian Leon, Member

206

ANNEX A
-

207

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ANNEX B

211

Annex B

Detailed comparison between the Last Will! and First Will (signed in August 2011)
éscriptioniof: Clauses
Dr LWL’s right to live
at 38 Oxley free of rent
Mr LHL to pay for
maintenance and
upkeep so long as Dr

astaWal pe

Proviso to Clause

es

4a (whereby 38

i

Oxley is bequeathed to Mr LHL) ~

Ha

Hirsts Will 220A ugust 201,
Proviso to Clause 4a (which

bequeathed 38 Oxley to Mr LHL) —

Dr LWL is allowed to live in 38
Oxley “for so long as she desires"",

(1) Dr LWL is allowed to live in 38

(No provision that Dr LWL can live

Oxley “for so long as she desires
[free af rent”.

LWL stays at 38 Oxley

rent-free or that Mr LHL will pay
for the maintenance and upkeep of
38 Oxley.

Division of shares

Clause 6 — Equal Shares

Clause 6 — Equal Shares

Gift-Over Clause

No Gift ~ Over Clause

Clause 7 — Gift - Over Clause

Demolition Clause

Clause 7 - Demolition Clause with
condition that demolition is to be
postponed after Mr Lee’s death
until Dr LWL moves out of 38

Clause 8 — Demolition Clause with
condition that demolition is to be
postponed after Mr Lee’s death
until Dr LWL moves out of 38
Oxley

amongst Mr Lee’s

(2) Mr LHL “shail pay for the

maintenance and upkeep of 38 Oxley
Road when {Dr LWL] is in
occupation thereof”.

children

(including Dr LWL’s
right to live in 38 Oxley)

Oxley

1 The Last Will was essentially based on the draft that the Respondent had sent to Mr Lee and referred to as the

“original agreed Will” in the Respondent's email dated 16 December 2013 at 7.08pm (LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 174).
212

ANNEX C

213

Annex C

Detailed comparison between the Last Will? and the Sixth Will

D

Te

Dr LWL’s right to live at
38 Oxley free of rent
Mr LHL to pay for
maintenance and upkeep
so long as Dr LWL stays
at 38 Oxley

AAS
Proviso to Clause 4a (whereby 38
Oxley is bequeathed to Mr LHL) —

Dr LWL is allowed to live in 38
Oxley “for so long as she desires”.

'Tdentical to the Fifth Will
Proviso to Clause 4a (which

bequeathed 38 Oxley to Mr LHL)

INo provision that LWL can live
rent-free or that LHL will pay for
the maintenance and upkeep of 38
Oxley.

qd)

Dr LWL “may continue to

reside at 38 Oxley Road subject
always to Hsien Loong’s consent”.
This right “shall not be construed
as [Mr Lee] giving [LWL] a life

interest in 38 Oxley Road”.
()

No provision stating that Mr

LHL is to pay for the maintenance
and upkeep of 38 Oxley (cf. First

Will.
Division of shares

Clause 6 — Equal Shares

amongst Mr Lee’s

children

Clause 6 —
a) Mr LHL: 2 shares
b) Dr LWL: 3 shares

c) Mr LHY: 2 shares
Gift-Over Clause

No Gift— Over Clause

Clause 7 — Gift— Over Clause

Demolition Clause

Clause 7 — Demolition Clause with
condition that demolition is to be

No Demolition Clause

(including Dr LWL’s
right to live in 38 Oxley)

postponed after Mr Lee’s death

until Dr LWL moves out of 38
Oxley

? The Last Will was essentially based on the draft that the Respondent had sent to Mr Lee and referred to as the
“original agreed Will” in the Respondent’s email dated 16 December 2013 at 7.08pm (LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 174).

214

ANNEX D

215

Annex D

This Annex D

sets out the full transcript dealing with the Respondent’s cross-examination on her

involvement with the response to the MC where the Respondent also claimed that “a suggested
response was also conveyed”. However, when asked about the particulars of this “suggested

response” and how it was “conveyed”, the Respondent changed her position, and said that the
“response” was “essentially not to respond”.

4 July 2019, LSF, XX, 26:15 — 36:3
15

Q

Evin assnmineyemi are sight thar it’s a shortcut, in my-view it’s a quantum leap

16

to support you bur assuming i's a shortcut, tte estate’ was given. anotter

W

oppartunity to comect whatever inaccuracies there were thal may have been

18

present in their 28th Febroary letter—2017 February letter witen the comoritiee

19

sought further clarification at page 953, Alrigit? Please quiclty go through

20

this Jette. That's a letter dated 25¢h April 2017 to Mr Lee Hsien and Dr Lee

a

Wei Ling from Mr Lawrence Wong. Have you seen this letter before?

BDA

‘Yes,

23)

Q) —

woA

Wontld that be ar the material time?
Fim not sure, I don’t think so but E saw it after the AGC wrote fo me.

25°

Q

it yourevidenre thm before the AGC wrote to you, you did not see this letter?

6

A

My evidence isJ ean’ remember because I didn't have any close involvement

27

With the ministesial committee. They had nor writtén to m2 anelT had a career

Psy

and travel to deal with.

Bw

Q

Would it be highly probable given that this letfer concems issues felating to you

30
uM

‘that it would have beéa shown to you by your husband Me Lee Heirs Yanu at
around the tinse they received this letter?

320A

Not necessarily bec—

216

we

g

‘Would irbé highly probable?

A

Tdon'rinow, 1fT""m around, it my have beén probable. And if Twas travelling
aad out of town, no,

SSeS

BROEBERS

ON

arb

Q —

sityyour evidesice that you were not aeked to assist in the reply to the ministerial
committe?
on queries afising from this letter dated 25th of April 2017?

A

Wthis was Hesh, they would have come tome. Bot this had been goitig on for

Q
A
Q

years and they—they were fed up and they fust dealt with it,
just want 2 simpte answer.
Theat they asked this—
Were you asked or were you nor asked? You can say yes. no or “T can't
semember™.

A
Q

[can'tremember,
Now let’s look ar the atlezations or clarifieations that the ministerial'comimittee:
sought, arising from the 28th ofFebruary 2017 fetter'frena the estate.

TanCM:

Your Hénqur, L would like you to plésse tam to 955,

President,

‘Yes, we are there,

Q

Focusing on paragraph (d):
[Reads] “Your Letter”""—aiso—-""states that “Mr Lee gave isstmctions
to Mis Lee
Suet Fern for the Final Will to be engmssed”. It forther states tat ‘on the vasis,
of Mr Lee's express instruction to revert 10 his first will, from 201)...Mrs Lee

BERRY

‘Suet Fem obtained what she understood
to ba the final version of the first will.
without realising thata gift over clause
had been added to rhe execttted version’.

Buller paint (1):
:
[Reads] “Could you clarify if Mrs Lee Suet Fem was involved in the preparition
of the Last Will? If so, @) Whos was the namve af Mis Lee Suet Fem's

weebeey
Bye
Bee

involvement? (ii) Did anyone assist Mrs Lee Suel Fem in the préparation
of the
Last Will? If so, who assisted ber, and what was the asmire and estent of that
person's involvement.
‘Wher did Mrs
Lee Snet Fem obtiin what she understoadfo be the final version.
of the first will?
‘What bappened
oa the evening of 16. December 2013, and the next moming
‘when the Last Wilt ors siemed?

217

awa

wie

Who took
Air Lee's instruétions on the Last Will, and. prepared
thie findl
document
fot Mr Lee to engross?
Dida trwyer or any other person grovide legal advice to Mr Lee, and explain
the provisioas of the Last Will to liim, before ine signed it? If so, who
was this
taweyer?
Did Mrs Lee Suet Fem. ot anyone...confirm with Mr Lee that the version she

ean

obtained was the comet version af the first will, which he intended to engross?

10
uw
2
B
8
15
16

‘Were the differences between the [ast

and Mr Lee's peomitimate will-of 2

‘November 2016 explained to hini’—and—""If
so, by whom?
‘President:

Should
it bé 2012? I think they got the—

‘TanCM:

Yes, should 62012. It’s an error,
I beli¢ve.

Q

[Reads} “Your Letter also states that you have. ‘contemporancors notes of the

cXecuticn of the Final Will showing that Mr Lee caréfilly
read the document
and was filly aware of what he was signing’.
~ Can you please provide...a copy 6f the centemporansous
notes of the
execution
of the Final Will?

7

. Mr Lee Hsien Loong’s letter also srates that Mr No Joo Ehin...was preseat

18
9
20
a
2

at the reading of the Last Will on 12 April 2015. and read the Last Will to Mr

B

involvément in the Last Will, the Conunittee woold like to invite her to set out

4

her position, and wonld also ack if she is prepared to do so by way of a statutory

5

declaration”

26
27
28
29
30
31

‘Let mie stast swith this fast paragraphs that I just read. There was a request
from

Lee's family.
= Cond you...explain why Mc NIK was present and read the-Last Will ta the
family, if be had no connect with the matter?
. In view of the questions that have been saised regarding Mrs LSF's

the nulnisterial commimtes throvgh the estate for you to explain your position.
‘Was this reqnest camveyed to you?
‘Yes. anda suggested response was also conveyed.

Aad whes was it conveyed?
Edon‘timow. Must have been around the ime.

218

of read 2 Copy of this letter?

might have and Lmightot, Basically, you fave to realise that they werc'imly
set uparihis point, This—
‘Who
fs “they""?

>

au bw te
Sen

‘So itwould
be camect to say that at-arnund that time yar would-have received

Lingand Yang. They basically said this comuittee was of Loong’s subordinate,
was set up to look at options. And they were asked optionally whether they
would like to conrribure, and it soon by this time had-become's witch-iumt. And

they dido’t think this was the right forum. And {believe
that they were thinking,
at that tines, P'm—T'n not exactly sure when—
Mrs Lee—
A

—thay
they wanted to disengage—
‘Mss Lee, please stop there: Your counsel tas objected to me asking ""you
questions
of what the estafe’s thinking was at that time But you séém to
‘voluuteér a [ot of information on what you thonght wefe the estate's intention

Did you have—
Tapoingise—
‘Let me fisish—
— just now they were gruhpy—
—let me Anish

Did you lave extessive diseussions with the estate on this

munner?
Theard extensive grumbies,

‘Did you have extensive discussions with the estate
on this matter?
‘What do you mean, Sir, “on this matter“?
On these letters that are being sent ta the estate by the ministerial commuittes.
‘Because you seem to be able ac offer a lot of views on wharthe estate dIt about
this whole issue.
A

Tknow that they were grumpy aud wnhappy. That's different
from dealing with
the substance af the leéters going back and forth and I've now realised it’s
voluminous.
Ditl you have extensive discussions on this issue with the estate?

“Issue”

nuganing the queries from the ministerial committee.

219

Hf your—I—I need to undemtaid- your question. Are you refining to the
respanses
ar how fed up they wert?

Predident:

[think the quéstion is a very simple question, Can you repeat
the question?

Q

Did you have extensive discussions on this issne With the estate? The “issue”

manning
the queties by the ministerial commitier.
A
Q

Hearing gripes is different
from discussion. Why do I sense that you had preat

A

difficultyin answering this simple question?
No. I don't, Tjust dida’s want you to misunderstand that we were sifting down.

Thearda lot of gripes from: them on this issue.

and inpimting annyers and discussing answers because thar was not what was
happening. J didn't want you to walk away with the misimdersinnding
about
hn.
Alcight, can we focus en your position instead of the estate’s position, becatse

T qvill be able to ast: Mr Lee Hsien Yang what thé estate's position has been
when he tikes che stand. Let's look at paragraph 7 of this letter at page 957:
[Reads} “la view of the questions whitir have been raised regarding Mis Lee
Suet Femn’s involvement in the Last Will, the Committee would like to invite

her to set out her position and woutd also ask if she és prepared to do so by way
ofa starotory declaration.”
Your evidence 1s that this was—this request was conveyed to0-you. Yes?
A

Yes.

And you chose 201 t0 sespond?

A

‘The estate sugpested thar if was gor worth bothering about —let.me hear—hear

sme‘out —and [went along because they pointed out that this was about Oxley.
And
if yon toolsat paragragh 3 at 953, it was dont in avery:
[Reads] “I would appreciate it if you cold let us know if-you wish to

respetub.,.”
And—and funiber—

- oO

a whee
COR

A

‘Mas Lee, please dant side-track. Mrs Leé—
No, no, a6.

No. no. Mrs Lee—

220

And—
—pasa3 doesn’ conten yon, it cuncems the éstaté Para 7 conrems
you. It

mw
Ae Re

concems your professional integrity
and smnding as a senior member of this

10

4
»
B
M
15

Indeed, Sir_

‘Why did you choose
nat ta respond?
I dida’t believe that this was the correct forum
or Tribunal to deal with issues.
like this.
Did you thinks a that time hat you will be sefened to the Disciplinary Tritmeal
ofthe Law Society?

»

10
u
a
13
4
45
16
7
18
19

profession Sc let's look at para 7.

J did feel at thartime that] was a victins because I'm Yang's wife.
‘That's not my question. You said thar that ninisteriat committee was not the
fon What ottier fornm were you thinking of?

A

TTom net sure. sny thinkingaf that time because so omeh water has gant
off—gane nader the bridge, so be.patient, I ditin’t think that it would be here

because there was no evidence of my wrongdoing
as a lawyer, But did
1 feel
victimised because Fn Yang's wife? Yes, I did and Ido.
‘You have not answered my question.

E
‘You said that the ministerial
committee was aot the fomm Did yon think
at
that time that you Were—yous
matter will be referred yo the Law Sociery?

Tavnot sure my recollection
now because so wtivch has happened. But, wo, I
didn’t think so because I didn’t consider that there was—that J had dane

anyrhiag impropes
ta Iielp my imisband
find a witness for his Ether winn knows
exactly
what le wants. And. in fact, had Kim Li been aroun I woulda rhisve

16

had any idvotversent-at all. So I ditin’t think it was an isque, probablyI didar

2
28
»
30
31

that time. So
I was surprised when the AGC mised it so many years after.
Twill come to the AGC Inter. Let's not side-track You say that the MC was
not—the ministerial conmmittee was oot the proper-forcum. What did you think

was the proper forum to address theee queries or Ganification by the ministerial
committee?

221

YW

Hook it if anybody hhad serious gronnds for complain, reai eronnds, whether it

was Papa, fallowing 2013, the estate, any benéficiaries or ¢ves Papa's Inwvyer,
Kins Lt, that diey would Lave complained to the DT. ButI dido'rbetieve
that

Bole

toe

A

there were any real grounds.
Q

Mes Lee, unlike the allegations that we see in the annex at page 861 of this

wa

vunifle, which goes to your professional
standing as a lawyer, the queries tbat
the ministerial committee

were asking did nor make any allegation or

wm

wrongdoing against you. AmIcomect?
A

‘T£-you took at the whole series of correspondence—

10

Q

Please stick to—

il

A,

No, no.

12

Q

13

A

‘No, Pim not sure that—I-—i doa’t know well ¢nomgl. But I do thin yon can

Q

recognise I fet that thee was a.vwitch-imat
Canyon please look at page 955, scb-pusgraph (4) through fo para 7, Is there

Nono—

ao

15

anything here to suggest’ that ‘the ministerial committer bad come to a
conclusion
that you had misconducted yourself in ary way?

16
17
12

A

A caiclusion may not yet had been reached, trot it was clear that they
were—there was perhaps some entrapment going on.

19
20

Q — Canyou please answer my question
and I will go to your entrapment theory, Is |

a

there anything in pages 955 to 957, indeedis there anything in this entire letter

22

that suggests that the MC, the ministerial committee, had come to a conctnsion

that you-had misconducted youself?

B

4

A,

Nota copelusion.

President.

Can we take a 10-minute break?

a)

TanCM:

Thank you, Sir

n

President:

And we wil! comimic
until 5 o'clock, okay.

28

‘Wimess:

Till 1.007

29

President.

‘Yea. Thank you.

(Adjourned at 11.302)

30

(Resumed at 1142m)

3

2

President:

¥es. Yes, MrTan.

222

bow

ee

{Contersing)
Q

President:

Q

wa

A

oo

We left off at paragtaph 7 of the ministerial committee's letter—
Yer.

= —at957. You stidthat—

Sony, 06 957:

President:

Page 957.

Q

§.

A

Fvegone to the wrang page.

Q

‘You said that this was- brongbt to your attention and there was a suggested
response.

The suggested response came from the estate, specifically
Mr Lee

Hsien Yang?
A

I think so.

Q

And what was this suggested response?

A

Ithinkhe
felt rustated. He'said, “Ef they wanted to ask you, then Jet them write

fo you""
Q

And was this suggested sesponse commyed 19 anyone?

A

T think be smst have discussed is with the lawyers for thie estate I assume.

7

mean, when you say conveyed to anyone, are you asking ifI conveyed it? No,
T don’t think so.
Q

Alright. Let me be more precise ia amy question. This request
came from the

eepeyy
2s
eI

BY &

ministerial committee. You said there was a suggested response. Was—
A

‘Well. ot so omch—

Q

Let me finish

A

-No.no. I—

Q = Let me finish, Was—
a

When you—when
vou said—

Q
A

Late finis,
Obzy, TWletyou finish,

Q

Let nue start again You said-the request came from the ministerial committee

and thal there-was a suggested response. My qqidstion to you is: Was this
suggetted response conveyed
to the miniererisl committee?

223

A

Think Fiave bed unclear, Mr Tan. There wasn’t—itif
if I suggested

ew

response,
you and I meaning, there
was a draft. no. In fact, Léhink
the position
‘When you icll—sugpested
response to this was loaking at paragrapit 13, it said:
“Your provision of any response
is purely voluntary.”

Bora

ao

And it wasa't even addressed to me.

So, I—I—I just don't want you to

ausunderstand whenf say suggested responses was esseatially not to respond.

Q—

Afcight. i's an optional responce.

A

“Yes, it’s am optinnal ant—

Q. — Terelstes to matters which concems your professional
imeprity aad you did not
see it fil to respond? Is that your positian?
A

No, J-itis not asmner if] did not see it GL Lifes that this was a witch boot

Q

And that was the season why you didn’t think you dred to respond?

A

Thar there was 2ot—it was not going to be heipitd to the Commirtes 1o—weil,
tome. And since the Coumitice had said itwas just voluntary, it was—if they
needed
of wanted to raise anything. they could just have asked me. They could
have written. They wrote to one of my colleagues. they could have written to

me.

Q — Soisyour—
A

‘Had they written to me, then.
I would bave looked ata response.

‘President

‘You see, Mrs Lee, Tryant to very—the
Tribunal wants to be very
Ahir to-you, alright? Bot what the Tribunal is grappling with is

that these are'very serious allégations being owdlé against
you, a

ery senior meinber of the Bat and a promitent sénior meniber
of the Bar at that Didotyou want to answer these allegations?
‘Witness:

Sic, Iwas very upset. I felt very victimised.

‘President:

But the way to overcome that upset surely must be that you
would want fo ansiver the allegations in writing so thal you
mow. rhere 15 some documentary evidence available thar at the
iirst opportnnizy you had, you answered the allegations? That's
Whar the DT is grappling with.

224

Oo mw
om

wie

Witness.

16
ul
Q
B
14
LB
16
v7
18
19
26
a
34

TT hear you, Sir, and ihe sense was that any tesponse would
just be used against
me. That was the sense. ‘You—you have no.

idea how victimised| felt over this.

Bresidear.

Well Mr Tan, cary on.

TanChe

Yes.

Q

‘Well, we fatow for a fact that you didn’t respond and nor was the reason for

‘your nor responding conveyed to the ministerial cammittee.

A

Isthata question?

Q

Do you accept that
to be a fact?

A

I think thar—

Q — Fmanot asking2 question I'm asking while we fmow that you dida’s respond

ant the'reason—it's apt “white”. We now that you didn’t respond
ner was the
reason for you not responding conveyed to the ministerial commities. Is thata
correct statement of fact?
A

Wsayesairlno, Yes, in the sense that a specific “She's not responding to your
vohuntary cequest” was uot in. but I think subsequently the estate: chose to
disengage and tied to explain the reasons for their disengagement
with the
sainistenal committee

And it is broadly there, withont the specific of this

sequest irom me,

Q

Mer Lee, please. My question is not directed ot ibe estate, My questionis in
respect of what you did first You didn't respond, agree?

A

TF did not respond to s—a request which was voluntary.

3 Q = Fes Second, the reason why you did nol respond was nol comveyed fo the
ministerial conmuities.
4
Da you agree?
25 President:
The committee fefter’said if was voluntaryso that—
6 Witness:
Yes.
” TanCh:
—it dido’t invite a response on that question
28 ‘Witness:
That's not the answer bun, aever mind, Tthink it’s clear. Nor did the estate
give
6 Q
the ministerial committee any reason why they chose nor to respond
on your
30
1
behalf, agree?
woe

‘A

Tdisagtee because think the estate felrthat they hadi responded nat necessarity

amy behalf,
but in respett of the issues stounding
thé will many times over
already.

225

ANNEX E

226

Annex E

This Annex E presents a table showing the list of assertions made by Mr LHY in his Facebook
posts suggesting that Ms KKL was the lawyer of the Last Will, and the findings of fact by the

Tribunal (based on Mr LHY’s cross-examination).
SING
lL.

NaS

ei

Sea

posts

Fae

“The will was drafted by Kwa Kim Li of
Lee & Lee”

the preparation and the execution of the Last
Will*. In fact, the Respondent had prepared the

Last Will.
Mr LHY admitted during cross-examination that
“We realise that this could be misinterpreted to

mean Kwa Kim Li had drafted the 2013 will...*
2.

“{Ms KKL] has been lying” because she | Ms KKL was excluded from and had no role in

“denied involvement in the events that led | the preparation and the execution of the Last

to [the Last Willy” ®

Will’. The Respondent had prepared the Last
Will.

Mr LHY later admitted that he used the word
“involved” loosely: “Kwa Kim Li was involved in
events — or my sister is saying that Kwa Kim Li
was involved in events that led to the 2013 will”,

and that “J consider that all the discussions my
father had with her were events that led to this
will *
3.

“{The] final will was subsequently given | There were two originals of the Last Will. The
to Lee Kuan Yew's lawyer, Kwa Kim Li,
Respondent kept one original of the Last Will in
for safe-keeping’””
her office safe. On Mr Lee’s instructions, the

+ LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 515, Mr LHY""s Facebook post dated 16 June 2017, 1.05am.

‘LSSBOD Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent, Mr Lee and Ms WLH dated 16 December 2013,
7.31pm,
5 Transcript (5 Tuly 2019), 26:21 - 26:27.

§L$8 BOD, Vol 2, p 1340, Mr LHY’s Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Dr LWL’s Facebook post dated 30
April 2019.
7 LSSBOD Vol 1, p 177, email from Mr LHY to the Respondent, Mr Lee and Ms WLH dated 16 December 2013,
7.31pm.

® Transcript (5 July 2019), 29:15 — 29:30,

° LSS BOD, Vol 1, p 532, Mr LHY’s Facebook post dated 17 June 2017 as referred to at “LHL-2” of the Statutory
Declaration of Mr LHL dated 25 August 2017.
227

other original w:

not receive any originals of the Last Will for
safe-keeping.
Mr LHY admitted during cross-examination that
“I believe I got— I accept that this is wrong.”

[4

“Lee Kuan Yew’s final will was simply
Lee Kuan Yew’s first will of 20 August

2011 ve-executed on his instructions’""'

There were material differences between Mr
Lee’s First Will and Mr Lee’s Last Will in
relation to: (a) Dr LWL’s right to live rent-free;
(b) that Mr LHL will pay for the maintenance
and upkeep of 38 Oxley; and (c) the gift-over

clause (which was not in the Last Will).
“The will my father signed on Tuesday 17
December 2013 reflected {his} prior

discussions with his lawyer KKL”?

The discussions that Ms KL had with Mr Lee
related to the preparation of a Codicil to the Sixth
Will for the purposes of: (a) equalising the shares
given to his children; and (b) bequeathing two
carpets to Mr LHY.

Based on the wording of the Last Will, there
were a number of changes to the Sixth Will

which were not the subject of the prior
discussions between Mr Lee and Ms KKL,

“Tt was exactly what he wanted""

The Last Will is materially different from the
First Will and the Sixth Will.

'© Transcript (5 July 2019), 23:9— 24:1.
‘TESS BOD, Vol 1, p 532, Mr LH¥’s Facebook post dated 17 June 2017 as referred to at “LHL-2” of the Statutory
Declaration of Mr LHL dated 25 August 2017.
""LSS BOD, Vol 2, p 1340, Mr LHY's Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Dr LWL’s Facebook post dated
30 April 2019.
“LSS BOD, Vol Z, p 1340, Mr LHY’s Facebook post dated 30 April 2019 sharing Dr LWL’s Facebook post dated
30 April 2019.
228

",2020-02-06T04:00:03+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2020/,In the Matter of Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern) (Respondent) Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2020/,1049
29,b110f287567359a75e1296fe90e8698be0b0373a,"In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor

Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act), the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.


The disciplinary proceedings arose from information referred by the Court of Appeal hearing a dispute between the beneficiaries of an estate. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal expressed concern with the professional conduct of the Respondent, namely that there was potential conflict of interest as between the Respondent’s client and other siblings and that the Respondent failed to advise each of the siblings to seek independent legal advice.

The Respondent pleaded guilty to four amended charges and therefore the DT was obliged to determine whether a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal

The DT found no deliberate or wilful blindness on the part of the Respondent in his conduct of the estate matter. Accordingly, the DT determined that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action against the Respondent under section 83 of the Act, he should be reprimanded or ordered to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed. Further, the DT ordered that the Respondent bear the Society’s costs of the proceedings which is to be taxed if not agreed.

The Council’s Decision

The Council accepted the findings of the DT and accordingly reprimanded the Respondent.


",,,2019-12-07T01:00:02+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/,"In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/",1049
30,13d833b0586c12f43f2afef6a556f16932925cb7,"In the Matter of Ismail Bin Atan, an Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Ismail Bin Atan, an Advocate and Solicitor

Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act, the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Legal Profession Act (the Act).

On 18 November 2014 the Respondent was charged for outraging the modesty of his former employee pursuant to section 354(1) of the Penal Code. On 26 June 2015 the charge was compounded as the victim agreed to an offer by the Respondent to compound upon payment of $3000 and a letter of apology. Subsequently the Attorney-General referred information pursuant to section 85(3) of the LPA and the Council commenced disciplinary proceedings.

Three charges were preferred against the Respondent. The 1st charge set out the allegations relating to the outrage of modesty which was grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161). The 2nd and 3rd charges were premised on the same facts save that the 2nd charge referenced a breach of Rule 53A of Professional Conduct Rules whilst the 3rd charge referenced conduct unbecoming of an advocate and solicitor as a member of an honorable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act.

Findings by the DT

In his defence, the Respondent denied that he intended to outrage the modesty of his former employee. He alleged that he had made the offer to compound and provided the letter of apology on the advice of his counsel.

The victim gave evidence and the DT found that she had provided a clear and detailed account of what had transpired and that her evidence was corroborated by several factors, including the Respondent’s letter of apology where he apologised for the unwarranted physical contact imposed on her without her consent.

The DT determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists against the Respondent under section 83 of the Act.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors on 26 July 2017.


",,,2019-12-07T01:00:02+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/,"In the Matter of Ismail Bin Atan, an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/",1049
31,10ff6cd26c6f7bd0d07231439b544bf2548756ae,"In the Matter of Ong Cheong Wei, Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Ong Cheong Wei, Advocate and Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined pursuant section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that cause of sufficient gravity exists under section 83(2)(a) for disciplinary action.

The Respondent was prosecuted on four charges for willfully making false entries in his income tax returns for the Years of Assessment 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2009. He pleaded guilty to two charges and the remaining two charges were taken into account and sentenced to eight weeks’ imprisonment and ordered to pay penalty of $118,341.78, being three times the amount of tax evaded. Council then referred his conduct to the Chairman, Inquiry Panel. The Inquiry Committee recommended that there should be a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal and Council applied to the Chief Justice pursuant section 89 of the Act to convene a DT.

The Respondent was charged that making false entries in his Income Tax returns for Years of Assessment 2007 and 2008, with intent to evade tax in breach section 96(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134) implied a defect of character making him unfit for the profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act. The Respondent admitted to the charge.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal

The DT noted from Law Society of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee [2003] SGHC 197 and Law Society of Singapore vs Tham Yu Xian Rick [1999] SGHC 213 that not every criminal conviction implies a defect of character rendering the advocate and solicitor unfit for the profession. The DT noted that there was no known case in Singapore where an advocate and solicitor had been convicted under the same offence as the Respondent and where disciplinary action was taken against the errant solicitor. The closest reported case was Law Society of Singapore vs Lim Chor Pee [1988] SGDSC 1 where the respondent in the matter was convicted for making an incorrect return without reasonable excuse which offence did not involve dishonesty. The respondent in that case was not found guilty of misconduct by the Court of Three Judges.

The DT took the view that a tax evasion offence is a serious offence which implies a defect of character rendering the Respondent unfit for the profession and that it is an act of dishonesty. Referring to [107] in Chng Ghim Huat v PP [2000] SGHC, the DT shared the same view with the presiding Judge in the matter that a conviction for any other reason is equally a fraud on the State and an act of dishonesty. Taking the cue from several authorities from Australia and New Zealand, the DT noted that the respondents in these cases were said to be dishonest and unfit for the profession.

In examining the Respondent’s mitigation plea, DT took the view that an acrimonious divorce does not quite explain the filing of false tax returns and in fact the Respondent had admitted to filing false returns since 2002 which was well before the start of his divorce proceedings in 2008. Even if he was coerced by his ex-wife to file the false returns as stated in his mitigation plea, such conduct is inexcusable as he either condoned the dishonesty initiated by the wife or worse still, continued with it.

The DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act and made no order as to costs.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors on 9 November 2017.


",,,2019-12-07T01:00:02+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/,"In the Matter of Ong Cheong Wei, Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/",1049
32,ccb6c97ede2fc70cd1a40514a5330d11d10f11c7,"In the matter of Ong Pang Meng, an Advocate and Solicitor","In the matter of Ong Pang Meng, an Advocate and Solicitor

The disciplinary proceedings arose from a complaint as to how the Respondent had dealt with an interim payment of $20,000 received from insurers on behalf of the complainant, his client, for the client’s injury claim and the Respondent’s breach of his of duty of care and diligence to his client.

The Law Society preferred five charges for grossly improper conduct pursuant to section 83(2)(b), of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) for:

Requesting the complainant to transfer a sum of $20,000 into a joint account maintained by the Respondent and his wife and upon the receipt of the said sum, being client’s money as defined in the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Account) Rules, failing to transfer without delay the said sum into a client account in a breach of Rule 3(1) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (PCR);

Failing to maintain a reasonable level of communication with his client, the complainant, despite the client’s multiple attempts to contact him directly and indirectly in breach of Rule 17 of the PCR;

Failing to provide a statement of account to his client for a sum of $5,000, being client’s money, which he retained since on or about 6 May 2011 despite your client’s requests for a statement of account or return thereof in breach of Rule 19 of the PCR;

Without authority, instructions and/or consent, accepting a counter-proposal of $6,000 offered by the Plaintiff in respect of a matter in which his client was the Defendant;

Failing to explain in a clear manner the counter-proposal of $6,000 offered by the Plaintiff in respect a matter in which his client was the Defendant in breach of Rule 21 of the PCR.

Several alternative charges were also preferred.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT)

On the 1st Charge, the DT was of the view that it is clear that Rule 3 of the Solicitors’ Account Rules read with Rule 9 of the said Rules requires client’s money to be deposited into a client account without delay unless the exceptions in Rule 9 apply and none of the exceptions were applicable in this case. The DT therefore found the Respondent in breach of Rule 3(1) of the said Rule and that the 1st and 1st alternative charge were made out.

On the 2nd Charge the DT was of the view that that the failure to maintain a reasonable level of communication with a client could also constitute a failure to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of his matters under Rule 17 of the PCR. The DT also noted that there was a case of a breach of Rule 20(a) for failure to promptly respond to client’s telephone calls without good and sufficient reasons. Having examined the various correspondences between the parties, the DT was not convinced that the Respondent had communicated with the Complainant as to the counter-proposal when it was evident that he was ignorant or lacked knowledge of this. In any event, there were no telephone memos, files notes or records were offered by the Respondent and in their absence, the DT drew an adverse inference and found the 2nd charge, its alternative and further alternative made out.

On the 3rd Charge, the DT noted the admission by the Respondent that he failed to render a statement of account for the $5,000 retained as alleged fees even when the Complainant asked for a breakdown as to the said amount. The Respondent should have rendered a bill or a statement of account following requests made by the Complainant but admitted he did not and he was effectively in breach of Rule 19 of the Rules. In relation to the alternative charge concerning Rule 35(a) of the Rules, the DT referred found that there was no agreed fees and accordingly found the 3rd Charge, its alternative and further alternative made out.

As for the 4th Charge and its alternative are in substance the same, the DT elected to deal with the principal charge and its further alternative only. As the issue as to whether the counter-proposal by the Plaintiff was accepted without instructions, authority or consent of the Complainant, the DT noted that the evidence has been considered in the course of its deliberation on the 2nd Charge and consequently found the 4th Charge and its further alternative made out.

Finally, on the 5th Charge, the DT noted that it goes without saying that the Respondent had acted without the instructions, authority or consent of the Complainant in accepting the Plaintiff’s counter-proposal. In this regard, it must follow that the Respondent had failed to explain in a clear manner as to the counter-proposal. The DT took the view that the 5th Charge constituted a separate and distinct charge relating to a specific rule under the PCR, namely Rule 21. Accordingly, the DT found the 5th Charge and its alternative made out.

At the conclusion of the proceedings the DT determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be suspended for a period of three months.


",,,2019-12-07T01:00:02+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/,"In the matter of Ong Pang Meng, an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/",1049
33,d9a0732d0e1f9e352aa7b0fcaede1bee51c0fa09,"In the Matter of Ryan Lin Longcai, an Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Ryan Lin Longcai, an Advocate and Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined under section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act against the Respondent, a penalty in the range of $15,000 to $20,000 should be imposed.

The Complainants alleged that the Respondent had disclosed confidential information pertaining to the Respondent’s clients while using the WhatsApp mobile application.

Fourteen charges detailing the various disclosures and pursuant to section 83(2)(h) of the Act were preferred against the Respondent. The Respondent admitted to the charges at the onset of the proceedings.

Findings by the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT)

The DT found that the Respondent had breached the Rules on confidentiality but there was no evidence that the any of the clients had suffered any loss or damage as a result. Further, the DT acknowledged that the disclosures were related to personal communications between the Respondent and the 1st Complainant. In the DT’s view the Respondent was a foolish young man who in the pursuit of the 1st Complainant, forgot his duty to keep matters relating to his professional engagement confidential. His naiveté that these disclosures would not come back to haunt him when he ended his relationship with the 1st Complainant, attested to his youth and foolishness. However, this did not excuse the Respondent from what he had done.

The DT noted that whilst there were no cases in Singapore involving a breach of confidentiality which reached the DT stage, the DT was guided by several cases from the Commonwealth jurisdictions which suggested that the imposition of a fine was an appropriate form of punishment.

The DT determined that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists pursuant to section 93(1)(b) for disciplinary action, a fine in the range of $15,000 to $20,000 should be imposed on the Respondent.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and imposed a penalty of $15,000 on the Respondent.
",,,2019-12-07T01:00:02+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/,"In the Matter of Ryan Lin Longcai, an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports-dec-2019/",1049
34,c327e322e7a2bf1b7255a63f997e89f28f1dc5e4,"In the Matter of Lee Terk Yang (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Lee Terk Yang (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor

The Disciplinary Tribunal has determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.


The disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint that the Respondent had engaged in sexual intercourse with the client in the course of representing her in her divorce proceedings.

The Charge

“You Lee Terk Yang, are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) in that you had a close personal relationship with a client between December 2013 and March 2014 and/or did engage in sexual intercourse with the client between 28 and 29 January 2014, when you were the solicitor having conduct of negotiations in respect of ancillary matters in divorce proceedings instituted in the High Court by the client.”

Findings by the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”)

The DT agrees with the approach taken by the Respondent that the admitted conduct whilst “grossly improper” by itself cannot automatically give rise to the determination that “cause of sufficient gravity” exists under section 83. Such determination is only arrived at by way of meticulous fact based enquiry along with a scrutiny of all applicable mitigation factors. In terms of precedent, the DT notes that the decision in Dennis Singham looms large in these proceedings and regardless of whether actual prejudice is caused, the solicitor-client relationship should not be compromised by indiscretions of this nature when it occupies the highest position of trust and confidence, even though the Respondent has not taken any step in the substantial part of the proceedings, and has taken steps subsequently to transfer the file to another firm.

In making the determination that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 93(1)(c) of the Act, the DT was mindful that the Respondent had engaged in a personal and sexual relationship which was not a one off and there is a conflict between his and his client’s interest. Further such conduct tarnished his own reputation as an advocate and solicitor as well as the profession as a whole. These factors elevated the present case of gross misconduct to one of cause of sufficient gravity’.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be suspended for a period of three months.
",,,2018-02-07T04:00:40+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/,"In the Matter of Lee Terk Yang (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/",1049
35,bc6fe88667e3c9089b18a6ec87d3ee0f263bac26,"In the Matter of Joseph Chen Kok Siang, an Advocate and Solicitor.","In the Matter of Joseph Chen Kok Siang, an Advocate and Solicitor.

The Disciplinary Tribunal determined under section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act that, whilst no cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded.

The Respondent rendered an invoice to his client for $35,000 for professional fees contrary to the agreed fees of $8,000 without first informing his client of any change in circumstances, in breach of sections 111 and 112(3) of the Legal Profession Act read with Rule 35 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”)

The DT observed how this case illustrates the importance of having clear fee arrangements, which reflect the course of litigation and the consequent work done. As a principle, in setting out agreed or capped fees in their engagement, solicitors should:

Clearly identify the stage of work such agreed/capped fees apply to;

Set out the agreed/capped fees at each stage so that the effect of any unexpected event does not impact on the fees to be charged beyond that stage;

Clearly identify the circumstances in which the agreed/capped fee arrangement can be changed and the process for change and notification; and

Use clear, simple and unambiguous language in communicating with the client, particularly in matters involving fees.

Nonetheless, the DT observed that the costs of $35,000 levied by the Respondent commensurate with the work done and is not excessive

The Council’s Decision

Council accepted and adopted the findings and recommendation of the DT and accordingly reprimanded the Respondent. Costs was fixed at $5,000 plus reasonable disbursements to be paid by the Respondent to the Law Society.
",,,2018-02-07T04:00:40+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/,"In the Matter of Joseph Chen Kok Siang, an Advocate and Solicitor._https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/",1049
36,c28a7212c1c01db97de07cbb9257a549b92fdc25,"In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor

Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act, the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.

The disciplinary proceedings arose from information referred by the Court of Appeal hearing a dispute between the beneficiaries of an estate. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal expressed concern with the professional conduct of the Respondent, namely that there was potential conflict of interest as between the Respondent’s client and other siblings and that the Respondent failed to advise each of the siblings to seek independent legal advice.

The Respondent pleaded guilty to four amended charges and therefore the DT was obliged to determine whether a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal

The DT found no deliberate or wilful blindness on the part of the Respondent in his conduct of the estate matter. Accordingly, the DT determined that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action against the Respondent under section 83 of the LPA, he should be reprimanded or ordered to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed. Further, the DT ordered that the Respondent bear the Society’s costs of the proceedings which is to be taxed if not agreed.

The Council’s Decision

The Council accepted the findings of the DT and accordingly reprimanded the Respondent.
",,,2018-02-07T04:00:40+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/,"In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2018/",1049
37,423c14b6e561e123a8fa1b0e9fd49f5e50501c99,"In the Matter of Thirumuthy Ayernaar Pambayan (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Thirumuthy Ayernaar Pambayan (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor

Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act’) the Disciplinary Tribunal (‘DT’) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action against the Respondent under section 83 of the Act.


The Respondent’s client complained that the Respondent had entered into a prohibited borrowing transaction with him.

The Charges

The Society tendered the following charges against the Respondent:

1st Charge

“You, Thirumurthy Ayernaar Pambayan, an advocate and solicitor are charged that on or about 26 January 2012, you did enter into a prohibited borrowing transaction by virtue of which the sum of $3,000 was borrowed by you from your client, one Chandran s/o Eruthi Yanathan, and such conduct by you amounts to a breach of Rule 33(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council of the Law Society (the “Council”) under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act, as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161)”

2nd Charge

“You, Thirumurthy Ayernaar Pambayan, an advocate and solicitor are charged that on or about 26 June 2012, you did enter into a prohibited borrowing transaction by virtue of which the sum of $8,000 was borrowed by you from your client, one Chandran s/o Eruthi Yanathan, and such conduct by you amounts to a breach of Rule 33(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council of the Law Society (“the Council”) under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act, as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161)”

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”)

The DT accepted that only two loans of $3,000 and $8,000 were obtained from the complainant. The DT accepted that the complainant was carrying on a business as an unlicensed moneylender.

The DT considered the decision of the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Yap Bock Heng Christopher [2014] SGHC 188 where the Court noted that breach of Rules 33(a) and (34(a) of the PCR “is one that will be viewed extremely seriously by this court. The rationale for prohibiting solicitors from borrowing from their clients (except where the clients have obtained independent legal advice) should be apparent. A client is vulnerable vis-a-vis his solicitor because the latter enjoys a position of influence over the client and the client may find it difficult to deny a loan simply because of the trust and confidence he has reposed in the solicitor. … Whilst a solicitor who borrows from his client who is not independently advised may not be considered dishonest in the usual sense, he is certainly taking advantage of his position to obtain a benefit for himself in breach of his duty of fidelity.”

The Council’s Decision

Council accepted and adopted the findings of the DT and proceeded to apply for the Respondent to show cause before the Court of Three Judges pursuant to section 98 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be suspended for a period of two months noting that:

“A term of suspension was warranted despite the absence of aggravating factors in order to send a consistent and strong message to the profession that a breach of the rule against prohibited borrowing transactions was viewed seriously by the court, and that a solicitor should under no circumstances borrow from his client unless any of the prescribed exceptions apply. Balancing the need for general deterrence with the particular facts and circumstances of this case – in particular the lack of aggravating factors and the fact that the

Respondent was remorseful, a relatively short term of suspension of two months was appropriate.”
",,,2018-01-07T04:00:19+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/,"In the Matter of Thirumuthy Ayernaar Pambayan (the “Respondent”), Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/",1049
38,2c783b067248df472f340c33e3d74a7282a83480,"In the Matter of Krishna Morthy S V (the “Respondent”), an Advocate and Solicitor","In the Matter of Krishna Morthy S V (the “Respondent”), an Advocate and Solicitor

The disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint from a client that the Respondent permitted his employee, one Ebrahim Marican Batcha Sahib (“Ebrahim”) to misappropriate an amount of $108,000, which payment was for completion of the purchase of a HDB flat.

The Charges

The DT found the Respondent guilty of the following charges:

3rd Charge

“You, Krishna Morthy S V, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.161), by breaching Rule 8(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct),Rules, being a rule of conduct made by the Council under section 71 of the Legal Profession Act, in that from 1 July 2008 to November 2010, you surrendered the management and control of Frontier Law Corporation, a law firm of which you were at all material times the sole director, to one Mr Mohd Sadique bin Ibrahim Marican, and one Mr Anand Kumar s/o Toofani Beldar, including but not limited to the surrender of control over the said law firm’s banking accounts, and by so doing, failed to exercise any or any reasonable supervision over the employees and/or staff of Frontier Law Corporation, to wit, you had admitted to the Inquiry Committee of the Law Society of Singapore, by way of your solicitor’s letter dated 4 November 2014 that the said Mohd Sadique and Anand Kumar whilst employed as “legal assistants” of the law firm, were, in fact, the “controlling partners” of Frontier Law Corporation since its inception on 1 July 2008 till November 2010 when they left the firm and that the said Mohd Sadique and Anand Kumar “were running the firm at that time as any files which came to the firm was controlled by them and all profits and monies taken by them”.

4th Charge

“You, Krishna Morthy S V, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties within section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.161), by breaching Rule 8(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct), being a rule of conduct made by Council under section 71 of the Legal Profession Act in that from November 2010 to date, you surrendered the control and management of Frontier Law Corporation, a law firm of which you were at all material times the sole director, to one Mr Ebrahim Marican Batcha Sahib, including but not limited to the surrender of control over the said law firm’s banking accounts, and by so doing, failed to exercise any or any reasonable supervision over the employees and/or staff of Frontier Law Corporation, to wit, you had admitted to the Inquiry Committee of the Law Society of Singapore, by way of your solicitor’s letter dated 4 November 2014 that the said Ebrahim, together with Mohd Sadique and Anand Kumar was a “controlling partner” of the Frontier Law Corporation, and, that the said Mohd Sadique and Anand Kumar left the firm in late November 2010 “leaving Ebrahim as office manager, in charge of everything”, which includes the said Ebrahim taking possession of the ATM cards in respect of the firm’s account thereby facilitating the said Ebrahim’s misappropriation of the sum of $108,000 that was deposited with the firm by the Complainant.

5th Charge

“You, Krishna Morthy S V, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties within section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.161), by breaching Rule 5(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property (Conveyancing) Rules 2011, being a rule regulating the receipt, holding and distribution of conveyancing money made by the Minister under section 73D of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Cap. 61), in that you failed to ensure that, on or about 19 April 2013, the sum of $108,000 paid by one Lim Yeok Chong to facilitate the purchase and completion of a property at Block 444 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 10 #02-1609, was not to be paid into the office account of Frontier Law Corporation, a law firm of which you were at all material times the sole director.”

Additional Alternative 5th Charge

“You, Krishna Morthy S V, are charged that you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties within section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap.161), by breaching Rule 3(1) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules, being a rule regulating the keeping of accounts by solicitors made by Council under section 72 of the Legal Profession Act, in that you failed to ensure that on or about 19 April 2013, the sum of $108,000 paid by one Lim Yeok Chong to facilitate the purchase and completion of a property at Block 444 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 10 #02-1609, was not to be paid into the office account of Frontier Law Corporation, a law firm of which you were at all material times the sole director.”

The Law Society’s Case

The complainant was a client of Frontier Law Corporation (“FLC”) and the Respondent, the sole director of FLC. In effect, the Respondent was not the proprietor of FLC, but actually employed by one Mohd Sadique bin Ibrahim Marican (“Sadique”) and one Anand Kumar s/o Toofani Beldar (“Anand”) to manage FLC in 2009. The Respondent was paid a sum of $7,500 per month by them. The manager of FLC was Ebrahim Marican Batcha Sahib (‘Ebrahim’), who was not an advocate and solicitor. Both Sadique and Anand subsequently left FLC and the Respondent left the control and management of FLC entirely to Ebrahim.

In February 2013, the complainant instructed FLC to act in the purchase of a property and signed a Warrant to Act. On the face of it, the Respondent was the signatory to the Warrant to Act. However, the complainant never met the Respondent at all although the Respondent appeared in court for the complainant to successfully obtain specific performance against the vendor. In fact, by this time, the Respondent had ceased to practice at FLC and was acting as “instructed counsel’ in another law practice. The Respondent very much left matters at FLC under Ebrahim’s care.

On 19 April 2013, the complainant paid the sum of $108,000 to FLC ostensibly to “facilitate completion of the property”. FLC acknowledged receipt of the moneys but failed to complete the purchase. Subsequently investigations revealed that the monies had been withdrawn from FLC through a series of ATM and cheque withdrawals. These withdrawals were traced to Ebrahim.

Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”)

Before dealing with each specific charge, the DT made a general observation regarding the duty of an Advocate and Solicitor in relation to his duty to supervise his practice.

Rule 8(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (2010 Ed) (the “PCR”) provides:

“8(1) An advocate and solicitor shall exercise proper supervision over his employees and other staff.”

The Tribunal accepted the cases of Law Society of Singapore v Tan Chwee Wan Allan [2007] 4 SLR(R) 669 and Law Society of Singapore v Zulkifli Bin Mohd Amin & Anor [2011] 2 SLR 620 in which the court stated that the responsibility to supervise is “unyielding” (Allan Tan at page 430) “and in the court stated that a solicitor is “not to abdicate such responsibility … by delegating … without any adequate system or periodic checks”. (Zulkifli at page 38)

A solicitor can delegate his work to his employee and mere delegation is not, ipso facto, breach of Rule 8(1) of the PCR. However, that does not absolve the solicitor from his overall responsibility to ensure there is proper supervision of what goes on in the practice. A particular act performed by an employee in a law firm must be viewed in the totality of the circumstances for one to decide if the solicitor in allowing that act has been negligent in allowing it. In most instances the test lies not in the act itself (unless the act is obviously illegal, improper or in breach of the rules), but in whether or not there is in place a system to ensure that the solicitor knows about it.

DT’s Findings on the Charges

The 3rd charge accused the Respondent of surrendering the management and control of FLC to Sadique and Anand from July 2008 to November 2010. The DT found the 3rd Charge proved. The DT found that the two Letters amounted to a confession by the Respondent that he had surrendered the management and control of the practice to Sadique and Anand during this period. It was wrong for the Respondent not to have any control at all over the files brought into the firm, including those brought in by Sadique and Anand. The Respondent owed an obligation to all clients of FLC.

The 4th Charge accused the Respondent of not exercising control and management of FLC by allowing Ebrahim from November 2010 to have full rein of the management of FLC. The DT found this charged proved. Despite knowing that Sadique and Anand were disbarred, he took no steps to acquaint himself with the running of FLC, and to take over the reins of management. In cross-examination the he admitted that he did not supervise Ebrahim and was in breach of the Rules. The Tribunal found that the failure of the Respondent to supervise the Ebrahim was complete. The lack of control enable Ebrahim to embezzle money deposited by the complainant. The lack of management of the practice was egregious and systematic and such complete failure started in July 2008 and continued right up to 2010.

The 5th Charge accused the Respondent of not ensuring that the complainant’s $108,000 would not be deposited into the office account. This payment into the office account is a breach of Rule 3(1) of Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules and Rule 5(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property (Conveyancing) Rules 2011. These are strict liability offences and the DT found the charge proved. The Respondent’s failure to ensure that the $108,000 was not paid into FLC’s office account took place in the context of a complete lack of supervision by the Respondent and resulted in its theft of the money by Ebrahim.

Accordingly, the DT determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act’) that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action against Krishna Morthy S V under section 83 of the Act.

The Council’s Decision

Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.

The Court of Three Judges

The Respondent was subsequently ordered to be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors by the Court of Three Judges.
",,,2018-01-07T04:00:19+00:00,https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/,"In the Matter of Krishna Morthy S V (the “Respondent”), an Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/",1049