lss_dt_reports: 27

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27 c82a7ffe3e4792c27b399f4fa0dd1a28ef7d3f05 In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded. The proceedings against the Respondent arose out of his failure to keep the client’s daughter/Complainant informed of matters concerning his High Court Suit of various matters in the client’s High Court Suit and his subsequent discharge from the matter. The client was at the material time facing criminal charges overseas and was detained, thus becoming uncontactable. It was later learnt that he subsequently suffered a stroke. A total of 12 charges were preferred against the Respondent at the onset of the proceedings. Each of the principal charges referenced section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Act whilst the alternative charges referenced section 83(2)(h) of the Act. The charges referencing the various breaches of the 2010 edition of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (‘PCR’) and the findings by the DT are summarized in the table below. Nature of Charge Findings of the DT 1st Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the directions made at the 25 January PTC. Charge made out as DT found that the Law Society had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent had made “no attempt” to inform his client of the directions made at the PTC. 2nd Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the directions made at the 8 February PTC. Charge made out, the DT took the same position as it did for the 1st charge. 3rd Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT found that the Respondent had served a copy of the Discharge Order on his client’s last known address in compliance with Order 64 Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. 4th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent failed to give client due notice of discharge by making no attempt to inform the client about the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 3rd charge. 5th charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent failed to allow client reasonable time to substitute a new solicitor, by making no attempt to inform the client about the Discharge Application and Discharge Order. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 3rd and 4th charge. 6th charge Breach of Rule 56 of PCR for making a false and misleading statement during his discharge application when he informed the Court that his client was estranged from his children and unable to find others to contact. Charge dismissed, DT found that Respondent’s statement to be an honest belief and the requisite mens rea to “knowingly” mislead or deceive the Court when he made the Representation was absent. 7th Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of his matter’s progress when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client about the directions given or Interlocutory Judgment (IJ) entered at the 28 February PTC. Charge dismissed, Law Society acknowledged that the Respondent would not be aware of any updates in the Suit after being discharged from the same. 8th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client about the directions given or IJ entered at the 28 February PTC. Charge dismissed, the DT takes the same position as it did for the 7th charge. 9th Charge Breach of Rule 53A of PCR for misleading the Complainant into believing that he was still acting for the client when he had obtained a discharge from so acting. Charge made out, the DT found that the response given by the Respondent evidence did not make it clear that he was no longer acting for the client but seemed to suggest he was still involved in the Suit, thereby still acting for the client. 10th Charge Breach of Rule 17 of PCR for failure to keep client reasonably informed of his matter’s progress when the Respondent made no attempt to inform client of discharge. Charge dismissed, Law Society was unable to provide that even though it was the Complainant who called him, the Respondent’s duty extended to contacting the client to inform him of the discharge. 11th Charge Breach of Rule 42(2)(a) of PCR for failure to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to client when the Respondent made no attempt to inform the client that the Respondent’s firm had been discharged as client’s solicitors. Charge dismissed, the DT took the same position as it did for the 10th charge. 12th Charge Breach of Rule 53A of PCR for misleading the Complainant into believing that the Respondent was still acting for client when he had already obtained a discharge from so acting. Charged dismissed, the WhatsApp messages and emails cannot be said to be misleading when the Complainant was aware before exchanging messages with the Respondent that the Respondent had discharged himself, and the last message stating that he “will revert” did not amount to any representation that the Respondent was still acting or not acting for the client in the Suit. In arriving at its determination, the DT noted that in relation to the 1st charge, the omission to inform the client of the directions made at the 25 January PTC was more of an error of judgment on the Respondent’s part as to whether other means of communicating with the client (such as via e-mails or third parties) are viable/permissible in view of his obligations to keep client information confidential. As for the 9th Charge, the DT accepted the Respondent’s submission that there was no intention to mislead the client as well as the Society’s submission that the conduct was not so serve as to constitute taking unfair advantage of the Complainant since the Respondent never gained any real benefit at all. For the foregoing reasons, the DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be reprimanded. The Council’s Decision Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the Act, the Council of the Society agreed with the determination of the DT and ordered the Respondent to be reprimanded.     2020-06-06T06:00:04+00:00 https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/ In the Matter of Yeo Kan Kiang Roy Advocate and Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jun-2020/ 1049

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