lss_dt_reports: 40

This data as json

_id	_item_id	title	content	pdf-link	pdf-content	timestamp	url	unique_id	_commit
40	f722e6cb2861a341a3e5f7755ea48b5b62e45e8e	In the Matter of Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Mr Seto Wan Tarng (the Complainant). The Respondent was admitted to the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore on 8 July 1992 and was, at all material times, a partner of M/s K. Krishna & Partners (the Firm). The Complainant had sustained personal injuries in a motor accident while driving his taxi. He sent his taxi for repairs at ComfortDelGro’s authorised car repairer, who referred him to the Firm regarding his personal injury claim. The Complainant signed the Firm’s Warrant to Act on 17 May 2019, and received the Firm’s letter dated 30 May 2019 confirming their appointment to act and enquiring as to his medical condition. The Respondent then received a specialist medical report on the Complainant’s injuries around 28 August 2019, but did not seek the Complainant’s instructions on it nor advise the Complainant on the quantum of damages claimable in respect of his injuries. Without seeking the Complainant’s instructions or keeping him informed, between 26 September 2019 and 17 December 2019, the Respondent proceeded to exchange letters with NTUC Income (the insurers for the tortfeasor) (NTUC) to settle the Complainant’s claim, including counter-proposals by the Respondent. Copies of these correspondences were not provided to the Complainant by the Respondent or the Firm. Throughout the entire duration of the Respondent’s handling of the claim: the Respondent did not personally speak with the Complainant at any time; all dealings were between the Respondent’s paralegal, Mr Veknesh Mohanathass (Veknesh) or other staff and the Complainant; none of the Firm’s emails to NTUC, or NTUC’s emails to the Firm, were furnished to the Complainant; there was no email communication between the Firm and the Complainant; and no reasonable advice was given to the Complainant regarding his personal injury claim, party-and-party costs and solicitor-and-client costs. On 17 December 2019, Veknesh telephoned the Complainant to discuss NTUC’s counter-offer of 17 December 2019, during which the Complainant was informed that NTUC had initially offered compensation of $2,000; the Complainant informed Veknesh that he was unhappy with the figure of $2,000 and wanted a sum of at least $3,000; Veknesh explained that it was unlikely that NTUC would increase their offer such that the Complainant would receive more than $3,000; and at the end of the discussion, the Complainant agreed to accept a sum of $2,800. On 18 December 2019, there was another telephone conversation between Veknesh and the Complainant, during which Veknesh informed the Complainant about NTUC’s counter-offer of 18 December 2019. On 2 January 2020, the Firm sent a letter to the Complainant, enclosing NTUC’s discharge voucher dated 17 December 2019 for the amount of $5,783.49 in settlement of the Complainant’s claims. The Complainant signed the discharge voucher and the matter was eventually concluded on around 28 January 2020 when the Complainant collected a cheque of $3,500 from the Firm after paying $700 in cash. The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Lok Vi Ming SC and Ms Disa Sim Jek Sok as DT member. One amended charge was proceeded against the Respondent (the Amended Charge): Amended Charge For breach of Rules 5(2)(b), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(h) and 17(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in that the Respondent: issued the Firm’s 26 September 2019 letter to NTUC, rejected their counter-offer of 25 November 2019, and issued the Firm’s further counter-offer of 2 December 2019 to them, without the Complainant’s instructions; failed to keep the Complainant informed of the matters in (a) above and did not supply copies of any correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC throughout the entire duration of his handling of the claim; and failed to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant on his personal injury claim, his right to recover party-party costs from the tortfeasor, and his liability to pay solicitor-client costs to the Firm; amounting to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA). Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions The DT concluded that this is not a case where only reprimand or a censure is appropriate. It is the very core of a legal practitioner’s duty to give proper guidance and advice to a client, especially so where the client may lack certain sophistication and general understanding of the law such as in this case. It was therefore incumbent on the Respondent to give a full breakdown of what the Claimant would be getting in NTUC’s various offers and a proper explanation on the various types of costs he should pay. However, the DT notes that due consideration should be placed on the fact that the Respondent had pleaded guilty to the Amended Charge on the first day of the hearing on 6 June 2022. The Respondent had also since returned the sum of $700 which was charged as solicitor-and-client costs to the Complainant. The DT placed great weight on this gesture as the gravamen of the complaint was that the Complainant felt aggrieved that he had to pay the Firm $700 from the damages for his personal injury claim, despite the manner in which the Respondent had handled his matter. Nevertheless, the DT noted that the Complainant’s dissatisfaction would also have been mitigated or completely avoided if the Respondent kept him informed of the various offers exchanged between NTUC and the Firm, and supplied him copies of the correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC. He would then at least have had the opportunity to raise queries or objections regarding NTUC’s various offers and would have been aware of the party-and-party costs of $2,283.49 claimed by the Firm instead of only finding out when he received NTUC’s discharge voucher on 2 January 2020. Therefore, the DT was of the view that the issue of the $700 payment falls squarely within the four corners of the Respondent’s failures as reflected in the Amended Charge. The DT determined that while there exists no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA and recommended the sum of $3,500 which the DT considers sufficient and appropriate for the misconduct committed. The DT also ordered the Respondent to pay costs of $4,000 (all-in). Council accepted the findings of the DT and imposed a financial penalty of $2,500 on the Respondent. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Oct_24_Full_DT_report_-_Krishnamoorthi_so_Kolanthaveloo.pdf	DT/24/2021 IN THE MATTER OF KRISHNAMOORTHI S/O KOLANTHAVELOO (AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966 REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Coram President: Mr Lok Vi Ming, S.C. Advocate & Solicitor: Ms Disa Sim Jek Sok Solicitors for the Law Society: Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Daniel John Ms Cara Satapornvanit Mr Ragbir Singh s/o Ram Singh Bajwa GOODWINS LAW CORPORATION 143 Cecil Street #03-02 GB Building Singapore 069542 BAJWA & CO 3 Shenton Way #08-02 Shenton House Singapore 068805 Dated this 3rd day of January 2023 2 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Mr Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (the “Respondent”) was admitted to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore on 8 July 1992 and was, at all material times, a partner of M/s K. Krishna & Partners (the “Firm”). 2. These proceedings arose out of a complaint made by way of a letter dated 26 November 2020 against the Respondent by Mr Seto Wan Tarng (the “Complainant”), a taxi driver who has been working with ComfortDelGro since 2002. II. CHARGES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 3. On 11 November 2021, this Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) was appointed. In the Statement of Case filed by the Law Society against the Respondent dated 21 October 2021, the original charges preferred were as follows: a. The first main charge was that the Respondent had breached rules 5(2)(b), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(i), 17(2)(c), 17(4), 26(2) and/or 39(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”) in that sometime between 26 September 2019 and 2 December 2019, during the course of the Firm’s retainer in acting for the Complainant in his personal injury matter, the Respondent had: i. issued the Firm’s 26 September 2019 letter to NTUC Income Insurance Cooperative Limited (“NTUC”), rejected their counter-offer of 25 November 3 2019, and issued the Firm’s further counter-offer of 2 December 2019 to them, without the Complainant’s instructions; and/or ii. failed to keep the Complainant informed of the matters in (i) above; and/or iii. failed to explain to the Complainant that in any event, he is personally responsible for paying his own solicitor-and-client costs in full, and that NTUC may not pay the full amount of such costs even if he was successful in his claim, and such conduct amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (“LPA”). b. The first alternative charge was that the same conduct as in the first main charge also amounted to improper practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA (i.e., misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession). c. The second main charge was that the Respondent had breached rules 5(2)(b), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(j), 17(2)(c), 17(4), 22(1)(a), 22(2), 22(3)(a) and/or 22(3)(b) of the PCR in that sometime on 17 December 2019, during the course of the Firm’s retainer in acting for the Complainant in his personal injury matter, the Respondent had: 4 i. obtained the Complainant’s instructions to settle the Complainant’s personal injury claim with NTUC at $2,800 in damages whilst failing to inform the Complainant that NTUC had already made its 17 December offer comprising $3,000 in damages and $2,283.49 for costs and disbursements; and/or ii. rejected NTUC’s 17 December offer of $3,000 in damages with the intention of getting NTUC to make a higher offer of damages with the intention that any amounts in excess of $2,800 would be charged to the Complainant as the Firm’s solicitor-and-client costs, and such conduct amount to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. d. The second alternative charge was that the same conduct as in the second main charge also amounted to improper practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA (i.e., misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession). e. The third main charge was that the Respondent had breached rules 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(i), 5(2)(j), 17(2)(c), 17(4), 22(1)(a), 26(2) and/or 39(2)(g) of the PCR in that sometime on 18 December 2019, during the course of the Firm’s retainer in acting for the Complainant in his personal injury matter, the Respondent had led the Complainant to believe that NTUC had offered to settle the Complainant’s personal injury claim at $3,500, from which the Complainant had to pay the Firm 5 $700 in legal fees, whilst deliberately omitting to inform him that NTUC’s settlement offer included an additional sum of $2,283.49 for costs and disbursements which would be paid to the Firm directly, and by such deliberate omission, the Respondent induced the Complainant into instructing the Firm to accept NTUC’s settlement offer and/or agreeing to pay the Firm $700 in legal fees, and such conduct amount to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. f. The third alternative charge was that the same conduct as in the third main charge also amounted to improper practice as an advocate and solicitor with the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA (i.e., misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession). 4. The matter was initially fixed for hearing from 6 June 2022 to 8 June 2022. However, prior to and on the first day of the hearing, the parties engaged in extensive discussions, leading eventually to the Law Society proceeding only on one amended charge (the “Amended Charge”) which is as follows: “AMENDED CHARGE You, Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo, an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore, are charged that sometime between 26th September 2019 and 28th January 2020, while practicing law under the law firm of K Krishna & Partners (the “Firm”), during the course of the Firm’s retainer in acting for the Complainant in his personal injury claim breached Rules 5(2)(b), 6 5(2)(e), 5(2)(h) and 17(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that you had: a. issued the Firm’s 26th September 2019 letter to NTUC, rejected their counteroffer of 25 November 2019, and issued the Firm’s further counter-offer of 2 December 2019 to them, without the Complainant’s instructions; b. failed to keep the Complainant informed of the matters in (a) above and did not supply copies of any correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC throughout the entire duration of your handling of the claim; and c. failed to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant on his personal injury claim, his right to recover party-party costs from the tortfeasor, and his liability to pay solicitor-client costs to the Firm; and such breaches amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966.” 5. The Amended Charge and the Statement of Facts were read to the Respondent subsequently in the afternoon of the first day of the hearing, 6 June 2022, and he pleaded guilty. We therefore found the Respondent liable for the matters raised in the Amended Charge. 7 6. The hearing was then adjourned for parties to tender written submissions on sentencing and the parties reconvened at a subsequent hearing on 17 August 2022 where the Law Society and the Respondent made further oral submissions on sentencing. III. BACKGROUND FACTS (i) The Statement of Facts (as reproduced from the version which was read to and agreed to by the Respondent on 6 June 2022) 7. The Respondent is an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore of 29 years’ standing, and was at all material times a practising advocate and solicitor and a partner in the Firm (as defined above). 8. The Respondent’s main area of work is personal injury and accident claims. 9. The Complainant who was at all material times a taxi driver with ComfortDelGro. On 26 April 2019, the Complainant sustained personal injuries in a chain collision accident while he was driving his taxi. 10. The Complainant sent his taxi for repairs to ComfortDelGro’s authorised car repairer, Chunni Motor Work Pte Ltd. The latter referred him to the Firm regarding his personal injury claim. 11. The Complainant signed the Firm’s Warrant to Act on 17 May 2019. 8 12. The Respondent subsequently received the Firm’s letter dated 30 May 2019 confirming their appointment to act and enquiring as to his medical condition. 13. Though the Respondent received Dr. Steven Ang’s specialist medical report around 28 August 2019, he did not seek the Complainant’s instructions on it nor advise the Complainant on the quantum of damages claimable in respect of his injuries. 14. The Respondent did not give the Complainant any reasonable legal advice regarding the expected damages he could get for his injuries, the legal costs he could recover from the tortfeasor’s insurer, or the legal costs he was expected to pay the Firm for handling the matter. 15. Without seeking the Complainant’s instructions, on or around 26 September 2019, the Respondent wrote a letter to NTUC (the insurers for the tortfeasor) quantifying the Complainant’s claim seeking the following:- General Damages $ 7,000.00 Special Damages (including three days’ lost earnings) $ 345.50 Others (inclusive of medical report and search fees) $ 582.49 Contribution towards legal costs (i.e., P&P Costs) $ 2,500.00 TOTAL 16. $10,427.99 Neither the Respondent nor the Firm supplied a copy of the above letter and enclosures to the Complainant. 9 17. On or around 2 December 2019, the Respondent received NTUC’s counter-offer dated 25 November 2019, in which they proposed to settle the Complainant’s claim at a sum of $4,007.49 comprising $2,000 for damages and $2,007.49 for costs and disbursements. Neither the Respondent nor the Firm supplied a copy of this letter to the Complainant. 18. Without consulting the Complainant nor keeping him informed of the action taken, the Respondent rejected NTUC Income’s offer, and on 2 December 2019, counter-proposed the following:- 19. a. General Damages $ 4,000.00 b. Medical report fees $ 321.00 c. GIA/LTA Fee $ 36.49 d. Costs (inclusive of GST) $ 1,926.00 TOTAL $6,283.49 By their without prejudice response email of 17 December 2019 (of 9:03am) NTUC counter-offered the following:- a. Damages $ 3,000.00 b. Costs and disbursements $ 2,283.49 TOTAL $5,283.49 Neither the Respondent nor the Firm supplied a copy of this email to the Complainant. 20. The Respondent concluded the matter on around 28 January 2020. 10 21. Throughout the entire duration of the Respondent’s handling of the claim:- a. the Respondent did not personally speak with the Complainant at any time; all dealings were between the Respondent’s paralegal, Mr. Veknesh Mohanathass (“Veknesh”) or other staff and the Complainant; b. none of the Firm’s emails to NTUC, or NTUC’s emails to the Firm, were furnished to the Complainant; c. there was no email communication between the Firm and the Complainant; and d. no reasonable advice was given to the Complainant regarding his personal injury claim, party-and-party costs and solicitor-and-client costs. 22. The claim was eventually concluded with the Complainant’s consent, but he was aggrieved by the matters stated above and lodged a complaint with the Law Society of Singapore. (ii) 23. Other relevant facts Aside from the Statement of Facts, both the Law Society and the Respondent referred to other pertinent facts in their respective submissions on sentencing which we find ought to be highlighted as well. 11 24. Following NTUC’s counter-offer of $5,283.49 (comprising $3,000 for damages and $2,283.49 for costs and disbursements) on 17 December 2019, Veknesh replied NTUC on the same date to counter-propose $3,600 for damages. 25. On 17 December 2019, Veknesh telephoned the Complainant to discuss NTUC’s counter-offer of $5,283.49. There is disagreement as to whether this telephone conversation took place before or after Veknesh replied to NTUC to counter-propose $3,600 for damages. However, while the Complainant and Veknesh had different accounts of this telephone conversation, both the Law Society and the Respondent described the contents of this conversation to include the following: a. the Complainant was informed that NTUC had initially offered compensation of $2,000;1 b. the Complainant informed Veknesh that he was unhappy with the figure of $2,000 and wanted a sum of at least $3,000;2 c. Veknesh explained that it was unlikely that NTUC would increase their offer such that the Complainant would receive more than $3,000;3 and d. at the end of the discussion, the Complainant agreed to accept a sum of $2,800.4 1 Paragraph 11 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Seto Wan Tarng dated 6 January 2022; Paragraph 11.a. of the Defence dated 2 December 2021. 2 Paragraph 11 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Seto Wan Tarng dated 6 January 2022; Paragraph 11.b. of the Defence dated 2 December 2021. 3 Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Seto Wan Tarng dated 6 January 2022; Paragraph 9 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Veknesh Mohanathass dated 19 January 2022. 4 Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Seto Wan Tarng dated 6 January 2022; Paragraph 12 of the Defence dated 2 December 2021; Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Veknesh Mohanathass dated 19 January 2022. 12 26. Following this, NTUC replied on 17 December 2019 to make a subsequent counter-offer of $5,783.49 (comprising $3,500 for damages and $2,283.49 for costs and disbursements). There was yet another telephone conversation between Veknesh and the Complainant subsequently on 18 December 2019 where Veknesh informed the Complainant about NTUC’s latest counter-offer. However, on one hand, Veknesh’s version of this conversation was that he informed the Complainant that NTUC had offered $3,500 and proposed that the Complainant contribute $700 as legal costs payable to the Firm to which the Complainant agreed.5 On the other hand, the Complainant’s recalls Veknesh informing him that NTUC had agreed to pay him $2,800 but that NTUC would issue a cheque for $3,500 and he would have to pay $700 in cash in exchange for this cheque.6 27. On 2 January 2020, the Firm sent a letter to the Complainant, enclosing NTUC’s discharge voucher dated 17 December 2019 for the amount of $5,783.49 in settlement of the Complainant’s claims. The Complainant signed the discharge voucher and the matter was eventually concluded on around 28 January 2020 when the Complainant collected cheque of $3,500 from the Firm after paying $700 in cash. IV. LAW SOCIETY’S SUBMISSIONS ON SENTENCING 28. The Law Society recommended that a fine of $10,000 be imposed on the Respondent. In support of this recommendation, the Law Society submitted, inter alia, that: 5 Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Veknesh Mohanathass dated 19 January 2022. 6 Paragraph 13 of the Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief of Seto Wan Tarng dated 6 January 2022. 13 a. The Complainant was entitled to expect that (1) the Respondent would gather information from him on his claim (the injuries he suffered, expenses he incurred in treatment, etc.), (2) advise him on the prospects of success of his claim, (3) advise him on the expected general and special damages he might recover, (4) advise him on the party-and-party costs he may recover and that such costs belongs to him, (5) advise him on the solicitor-and-client costs the Firm was entitled to charge him and that this amount had to be approved by the Public Trustee, and (6) advise him that the settlement sum would be paid by NTUC to the Public Trustee who would then in turn pay the Firm’s solicitor-and-client costs and return the balance to the Complainant. Instead, the Respondent did none of these acts.7 b. The Respondent never discussed any aspects of the pre-action letter of demand dated 26 September 2019 which was sent to NTUC with the Complainant (i.e., the first letter of demand sent to NTUC). Instead, the Respondent, inter alia, chose to pitch the Complainant’s injury at the upper level of a “minor whiplash injury and soft tissue damage classified as Grade 1 whiplash injury” as found in the Guideline for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, and claim partyand-party costs of $2,500 in the matter. The latter meant that his claim for solicitorand-client costs would be even higher.8 c. The Respondent should have realised that the Complainant’s medical report which he had relied on to quantify the Complainant’s injuries was issued by a general practitioner and not an orthopaedic specialist, and should have advised the 7 Paragraph 15 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 8 Paragraph 20 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 14 Complainant to see an orthopaedic specialist or to submit to an examination by NTUC’s specialist (which NTUC offered in their letter dated 2 October 2019).9 d. The Respondent was careless about what damages the Complainant was entitled to and arbitrarily brought down his quantification of general damages from $7,000 to $4,000 in the Firm’s letter dated 2 December 2019 without any discussion with or explanation to the Complainant.10 e. The Respondent provided no explanation to neither Veknesh nor the Complainant as to why the general damages of $3,000 offered by NTUC was fair and instead there was simply some unprincipled haggling between Veknesh and the Complainant leading to the Complainant agreeing to accept a net sum of $2,800 for his claim. The Respondent was therefore reckless in his actions of getting Veknesh to persuade the Complainant to accept NTUC’s counter-offer of 17 December 2019.11 29. The Law Society referred us to two cases: (1) The Law Society of Singapore v Sham Chee Keat [2018] SGDT 5 (“Sham”) where the respondent had misunderstood the outcome of a pre-trial conference and acted carelessly and caused the client to affirm statements in his affidavit that were inaccurate or false, resulting in a penalty ordered of $5,000;12 and (2) The Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margret Paglar [2020] SGDT 4 (“Constance”) where the Law Society submitted that, in the absence of aggravating factors, where a legal practitioner is charged and found liable for breach of 9 Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 10 Paragraph 28.a. of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 11 Paragraphs 34 and 37 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 12 Paragraph 47 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 15 rule 5(2) of the PCR, a monetary penalty was appropriate and that a penalty of $6,000 in that case was appropriate.13 30. The Law Society’s view here was that the Respondent’s conduct was more serious than that of the charges proceeded against the lawyers in Sham and Constance14 and therefore a penalty of $10,000 would be appropriate. V. THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS ON SENTENCING AND MITIGATION PLEA 31. Conversely, the Respondent submitted that only a reprimand or a censure should be imposed for the Amended Charge. The Respondent raised the following arguments in mitigation: a. The Respondent accepts that he should have been more circumspect and prudent and should have engaged with the Complainant at every stage. Instead, drawing on his experience in dealing with cases involving taxi drivers, the Respondent had thought that taxi drivers preferred not to get involved at the early stages of such matters given their daily work routine and would find it disruptive to attend the lawyer’s office or receive calls at the early stages of negotiations. Thus, he had proceeded to engage with NTUC until a reasonable offer had been received, and had the interest of the Complainant at the forefront.15 13 Paragraphs 46 and 49 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 14 Paragraph 52 of the Law Society’s Sentencing Submissions dated 12 July 2022. 15 Paragraphs 16 and 19 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 16 b. The Respondent also took the position that if he had engaged the Complainant at the early stages of the negotiations, the Complainant would have in all likelihood told him to negotiate further. Moreover, from his experience, some offers are ridiculously low and do not merit any consideration nor reference to the client.16 c. While the Respondent did not supply copies of the correspondence between the Firm and NTUC, he had, through Veknesh, updated the Complainant by phone on 17 December 2019 and 18 December 2019.17 d. The Respondent, through Veknesh, had discussed the Complainant’s medical report with him and did advise the Complainant as to the damages which he could reasonably expect during the call on 17 December 2019. On the 18 December 2019 phone call, the Respondent had also, through Veknesh, advised the Complainant that NTUC’s final offer of $3,500 was reasonable. Thus, while the Respondent accepts that he had “failed to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant” as per the Amended Charge, it was not the case where he gave no advice at all.18 e. While the Respondent concedes that he should have explained to the Complainant the difference between party-and-party costs and solicitor-and-client costs, the Complainant should have reasonably deduced from NTUC’s discharge voucher for $5,783.49 that NTUC was paying $2,283.49 as costs and disbursements in addition to the agreed damages of $3,500.19 16 Paragraph 21 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 17 Paragraph 34 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 18 Paragraphs 27 to 30 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 19 Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 17 32. The Respondent also relied on the case of Constance and highlighted the similarities in Constance and this case, namely that:20 33. a. both cases involved the solicitors acting in motor accident cases; b. both involved negotiations with insurers; c. both involved a reduction of charges prior to pleading guilty; d. both involved a breach of the PCR; and e. both were for improper conduct and not grossly improper conduct. The Respondent drew our attention to the fact that while the Law Society had submitted for a fine of $6,000 in Constance, the tribunal in that case only ordered a penalty of $2,500.21 34. The Respondent also highlighted his lack of antecedents and unblemished record of 30 years, and his service in the Law Society’s Non-Injury Motor Accident / Personal Injury Motor Accident sub-committee in mitigation.22 35. In addition to the submissions mentioned above, the Respondent also submitted at the hearing on 17 August 2022 that the Law Society had raised new assertions of fact that 20 Paragraph 39 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 21 Paragraph 41 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 22 Paragraph 47 of the Respondent’s Sentencing Submissions and Mitigation Plea dated 12 July 2022. 18 the Respondent did not agree to. Particularly, the Respondent took issue with the Law Society’s submission at paragraph 28(c) above that the Respondent did not advise the Complainant to see an orthopaedic specialist or submit to an examination by NTUC’s specialist, and that this submission was neither raised in the complaint nor the subject of the complaint or Amended Charge. 36. Finally, at the hearing before us on 17 August 2022, the Respondent indicated that he was willing to make amends with the Complainant by returning the sum of $700 which was charged as solicitor-and-client costs. We understand that this $700 has been returned by way of cheque to the Complainant on 13 September 2022. VI. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL 37. Section 93 of the LPA provides as follows: “93.— (1) After hearing and investigating any matter referred to it, a Disciplinary Tribunal must record its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts shall determine that — (a) no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be); (b) while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be), the regulated legal practitioner should be — (i) ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed; 19 (ii) reprimanded; (iii) ordered to comply with one or more remedial measures; or (iv) subjected to the measure in sub‑paragraph (iii) in addition to the measure in sub‑paragraph (i) or (ii); or (c) cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be).” 38. We agree with the Respondent that the case of Constance bears several similarities with this case. Notably, the Court of Three Judges held in Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2021] 4 SLR 382 at [31] that: “31 It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent could only be held to account for the specific misconduct that she had been charged for. To hold otherwise would be prejudicial to the respondent, since it is the charge that informs a lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings of the case that he or she has to meet and impacts the decision he or she makes as to how to respond to the disciplinary proceedings… The court did not dispute the point made that the Disciplinary Committee was not at liberty to consider the allegation which had been omitted from the amended charge…” 39. As such, as it was in Constance, our decision on sentence must only be limited to the Amended Charge to which the Respondent had pleaded guilty. In this regard, we agree with the Respondent that the Law Society’s submission at paragraph 28(c) above that the Respondent should had advised the Complainant to see an orthopaedic specialist or to 20 submit to an examination by NTUC’s specialist, was a new assertion of fact which was not borne out in the Amended Charge, Statement of Facts or complaint. 40. That said, this is certainly not a case where only reprimand or a censure is appropriate. It is the very core of a legal practitioner’s duty to give proper guidance and advice to a client. This is especially so where the client may lack certain sophistication and general understanding of the law such as in this case. It was therefore incumbent on the Respondent to give a full breakdown of what the Claimant would be getting in NTUC’s various offers and a proper explanation on the various types of costs he should pay. 41. Legal practitioners also have a basic duty to keep clients informed of the progress of their matter and to provide the client with copies of correspondence sent by the legal practitioner on the client’s behalf. This is so that the client will be aware of what is happening in the matter and have an opportunity to raise any queries or objections. This was not done by the Respondent. 42. We also agree with the Law Society that based on the Amended Charge and Statement of Facts, the present case is in our view more severe than in Sham (where a penalty of $5,000 was ordered) and Constance (where a penalty of $2,500 was ordered). 43. First, the Amended Charge (to which the Respondent pleaded guilty and has been found liable for) concerned a breach of the following rules of the PCR: 21 a. rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR: the legal practitioner must when advising the client, inform the client of all information known to the legal practitioner that may reasonably affect the interest of the client; b. rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR: the legal practitioner must keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the client’s matter; c. rule 5(2)(h) of the PCR: the legal practitioner must provide timely advice to the client; and d. tule 17(2)(c) of the PCR: the legal practitioner must explain clearly and properly to his or her client a proposal of amicable resolution, or any other offer or position taken by any other party, which affects the client. 44. In contrast, the respondent in Sham was found to have breached only rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR (i.e., failure to act with reasonable diligence and competence) and the amended charge in Constance concerned a breach of only rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR (i.e., failure to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the matter). 45. Secondly, in Constance, the gravamen of the amended charge was that after the respondent was instructed by the client to accept the tortfeasor’s insurer’s offer, the respondent proceeded to negotiate further to obtain a higher party-and-party costs without informing the client. In Sham, the respondent was found liable of failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence when she caused the client to include an inaccurate and false statement in her client’s affidavit. 22 46. Here, the Amended Charge pertains to the Respondent’s act of negotiating with NTUC without the Complainant’s instructions, failure to keep the Complainant informed of the initial negotiation, failure to supply any correspondence to the Complainant, and failure to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant. The scope of the Amended Charge is therefore much wider than both the amended charge in Constance and the charge in Sham. 47. However, we do note that unlike in Sham where the respondent did not plead guilty and the matter proceeded for hearing, the Respondent in this case had pleaded guilty to the Amended Charge on the first day of the hearing, 6 June 2022. Due consideration and weight should be placed on this fact. We have also taken into consideration the Respondent’s submissions on costs (as detailed below) in mitigation. 48. More crucially, the Respondent has since returned the sum of $700 which was charged as solicitor-and-client costs to the Complainant. We place great weight on this gesture as in our view, the gravamen of the complaint was that the Complainant felt aggrieved that he had to pay $700 out of the damages for his personal injury claim to the Firm despite the manner in which the Respondent had handled his matter. This is evident in the Complainant’s handwritten complaint dated 26 November 2020 where he states: “I complaint (sic): a) Lawyer K. Krishnamoorthi did not provide the best interest of his client – The personal injury claim payout is $3,500 but told his client is $2,000 then ask me to settle at $2,800. 23 b) Lawyer K. Krishnamoorthi is dishonest, cheat and greedy – He tried to get a bigger amount for his legal fee from the personnal (sic) injury claim payout of his client. c) Overcharge of legal fee – He already claim his legal fee from NTUC Income Co-operative Limited and still ask his client to pay legal fee.” [Emphasis added] 49. In essence, the Complainant felt wronged that the Respondent had required him to pay $700 in cash (i.e., the Respondent had “tried to get a bigger amount for his legal fee” and “already [claimed] his legal fee from [NTUC] and still [asked] [the Complainant] to pay legal fee”), even though (1) he had informed Veknesh that he wanted at least $3,000 in damages but was advised to “settle at $2,800”; (2) NTUC had in fact offered $3,500 in general damages; and (3) the Firm was already pocketing $2,283.49 in costs (i.e., the “legal fee from NTUC Income Co-operative Limited”). 50. We would also add that we are cognisant of the Tribunal’s duty to hear and investigate the complainant and charges as has been held by the High Court in Law Society of Singapore v Yeo Khirn Hai Alvin and another matter [2020] 4 SLR 858 at [59] – [77]. However, while the Amended Charge may not capture the full extent of the Respondent’s transgression, the Amended Charge did not take away the gravamen of the complaint nor was it outside the scope of the complaint. 51. As mentioned above, the gravamen of the complaint centres around the $700 which the Complainant had to pay out of the damages for his personal injury claim. The Complainant’s complaint that he was advised to “settle at $2,800” despite the offer from 24 NTUC being $3,500 and the “overcharge of legal fee” was a consequence of the Respondent’s failure to “to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant on his personal injury claim, his right to recover party-party costs from the tortfeasor, and his liability to pay solicitor-client costs to the Firm” as reflected in the Amended Charge. 52. The Complainant’s dissatisfaction would also have been mitigated or even completely avoided had the Respondent kept him informed of the various offers exchanged between NTUC and the Firm and if copies of the correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC were supplied to him. He would then at least have had the opportunity to raise queries or objections regarding NTUC’s various offers and would have been aware of the party-and-party costs of $2,283.49 which was being claimed by the Firm instead of only finding out when he received NTUC’s discharge voucher on 2 January 2020. Therefore, in our view, the issue of this $700 payment falls squarely within the four corners of the Respondent’s failures as reflected in the Amended Charge. 53. In light of the above and having regard to the submissions made by the Law Society and the Respondent, the Tribunal determines that while there exists no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $3,500 pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA which we consider sufficient and appropriate for the misconduct committed. 25 VII. COSTS 54. Having made a determination under section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the Tribunal is permitted under section 93(2) of the LPA to make an order for payment of costs. 55. The Law Society submitted that the Respondent should pay costs of $6,014.08. This being the $5,000 honorarium which the Law Society pays to prosecuting counsel and $1,014.08 for tax and disbursements. However, bearing in mind the fact that the Respondent had pleaded guilty, and hearing did not proceed, counsel for the Law Society left the issue of costs to our discretion. 56. The Respondent submitted that costs should be fixed at $4,000 (all in) as was ordered in the case of Constance, bearing in mind the similarities of this case with Constance, namely that the Law Society had amended the original charges to drop any allegation of dishonesty, and that the Respondent had pleaded guilty after the charges were amended. 57. Having heard the parties in relation to costs, the Tribunal orders that the Respondent pay costs to the Law Society of $4,000 (all in). 26 58. We thank counsel for the Law Society and the Respondent for their spirited and suceinct arguments and assistance. Dated this3rd day of January 2023 ( Mr Lok Vi Ming,,S.C. (President) Disa Sim Jek Sok (Member)	2024-10-11T07:00:15+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2024/	In the Matter of Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2024/	1653

Links from other tables

2 rows from _item in lss_dt_reports_version