lss_dt_reports: 41

This data as json

_id	_item_id	title	content	pdf-link	pdf-content	timestamp	url	unique_id	_commit
41	e02b86b3be69f93346960ef6b5e60f712a139242	In the Matter of Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor These proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint made by Mr Chan Yee Huat (the Complainant) who was a client of the Respondent from 2013 to 2019. The Respondent was engaged to represent the Complainant in the following lawsuits involving various insurance companies: HC/S 324/2016, HC/S 325/2016 and HC/S 52/2017. The first two suits had their judgments entered into on 3 October 2017 and 10 October 2017 respectively. The defendants in both suits were ordered to pay certain costs and disbursements to the Complainant. However, the Complainant was made a bankrupt on 13 November 2017. At the Respondent’s request, a part of the judgement sums amounting to approximately $160,395.96 (the sum) was paid to the Respondent’s law firm. Between February to April 2020, the Complainant instructed the Respondent on numerous occasions to utilise the sum to pay various persons nominated by the Complainant. Despite the Respondent’s numerous instances of assurances via email, the Respondent did not make any payments to the nominated persons, nor did he inform and/or account to the Complainant as to how he had utilised the sum. Subsequently, the Respondent admitted to the Inquiry Committee that when he issued the emails he had already set off the sum against his legal fees and costs. However, no invoice was ever issued to the Complainant with respect to the sum or any part of it that was allegedly set off. In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Tan Kok Quan, SC and Mr Andrew Chan as DT member. Four charges (and their alternatives) were preferred against the Respondent: First Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or would shortly be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant in circumstances where he did not do so and/or had no intention to do so, in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR). First Alternative Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or would shortly be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant in circumstances where he did not do so and/or had no intention to do so, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR. Second Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had applied the sum received on behalf of the Complainant towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR. Second Alternative Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had applied the sum received on behalf of the Complainant towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR. Third Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent had failed to inform the Complainant of the basis on which your fees for his professional services would be charged and of the manner in which his fees and any disbursements in respect of, inter alia, H/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 were to be paid by the Complainant, thereby breaching Rule 17(3)(a) of the PCR. Third Alternative Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had withdrawn the sum from the client account in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where (a) no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of solicitor’s costs incurred was delivered to the Complainant; and (b) the Respondent had failed to notify the Complainant that the sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of his legal costs, thereby breaching Rule 17(3)(a) of the PCR. Fourth Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent had withdrawn the sum from the client account in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where (a) no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of solicitor’s costs incurred was delivered to the Complainant; and (b) the Respondent had failed to notify the Complainant that the sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of his legal costs, thereby breaching Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (the SAR). Fourth Alternative Charge For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had withdrawn the sum from the client account in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where (a) no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of solicitor’s costs incurred was delivered to the Complainant; and (b) the Respondent had failed to notify the Complainant that the sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of his legal costs, thereby breaching Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR. The DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the LPA that there is cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act and that the Respondent is to pay the Law Society’s costs of the proceeding in the sum of $10,000 and reasonable disbursements. Findings of the DT First Charge (and its Alternative) The DT found that the Respondent had not been honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had strung the Complainant along by falsely and deliberately concealing the truth from him over a period of one month as he had already set off the $160,000 against his legal fees and costs. The DT noted that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or shortly would be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant when the Respondent did not do so and/or had no intention of doing so. Thus, the DT determined that the Respondent was guilty of the First Charge (and its alternative) beyond a reasonable doubt. Second Charge (and its Alternative) In relation to the Second Charge, it was suggested that the Complainant was never told about the set-off prior to it being effected. The DT found that the Respondent had not been honest in his dealings with the Complainant when he applied the sum towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent and/or without first informing the Complainant of his intention to do so. Thus, the Second Charge (and its alternative) had been made out. Third Charge (and its Alternative) On the Third Charge, the Respondent failed to produce any evidence regarding the basis on which his professional legal fees would be charged. There had been no accounting provided by the Respondent during the investigation. Therefore, the DT found that the Respondent had failed to inform the Complainant of the basis on which his fees for professional services would be charged and of the manner in which his fees and any disbursements were to be paid by the Complainant. Hence, the Third Charge (and its alternative) was made out. Fourth Charge (and its Alternative) On the Fourth Charge, the Respondent had admitted that he had indeed used the Sum, which was the Complainant’s money and was paid into the client account, to pay his professional legal fees and costs, without issuing any bill of costs or written intimation to the Complainant. As stated by the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Lim Yee Kai [2001] 1 SLR(R) 30 at [17], where rules relating to accounts are breached, disciplinary action is warranted as such contravention of the rules amount to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of a solicitor’s professional duty. Thus, the Fourth Charge (and its alternative) was made out. In respect of the above Charges, the DT determined that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed, with the Respondent to be referred to the Court of Three Judges (C3J). The DT awarded costs amounting to $10,000 and disbursements (to be agreed, if not, taxed) to the Law Society. The Council adopted the DT’s findings. The C3J’s findings On 4 July 2024, the C3J found that the First Charge and the Third Charge had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In respect of the Second Charge, the C3J found that pursuant to section 6(4) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (the MVA), the Respondent was the beneficial owner of the Sum, and that accordingly, the Second Charge had not been made out. Consequently, with regards to the Fourth Charge, the C3J found that the Sum was not client’s money within the meaning of Rule 2 of the SAR and that accordingly, the Fourth Charge, which was premised on a breach of Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR, had not been made out. The C3J therefore acquitted the Respondent of the Second and Fourth Charges. In respect of the First and Third Charges, the C3J ordered the Respondent to be suspended for four (4) years commencing 4 July 2024, with costs in the sum of $12,000 (inclusive of disbursements) be paid to the Law Society of Singapore, and for the costs order of the DT to remain. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Oct_24_Full_DT_report_-_Nedumaran_Muthukrishnan.pdf	DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966 DT/10/2022 IN THE MATTER OF NEDUMARAN MUTHUKRISHNAN (FORMERLY OF N NEDUMARAN & CO) AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT (CHAPTER 161) REPORT OF DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL PRESIDENT: MR TAN KOK QUAN, SC ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR: MR ANDREW CHAN TEO YIHUI NEDUMARAN MUTHUKRISHNAN (FORMERLY OF N NEDUMARAN & CO) POINTER LLC 144 ROBINSON ROAD #18-01 ROBINSON SQUARE CEDAR SUITES SINGAPORE 068908 RESPONDENT-IN-PERSON Counsel for the Law Society of Singapore Dated this 18th day of September 2023 Background Facts 1. The Complainant is Mr Chan Yee Huat (the “Complainant”). During the period 2013 to 2019 he was a client of Mr Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (the “Respondent”). 2. The Respondent was called to the Bar on 25 May 1996 and at the material time was practising at the law firm of Messrs M Nedumaran & Co. However, the Respondent has not held a practising certificate since April 2020. 3. The Respondent was engaged to represent the Complainant as well as members of his family in various lawsuits involving various insurance companies in respect of health issues, traffic accidents and home accidents. The claims in which the Complainant was the plaintiff included HC/S 324/2016, HC/S 325/2016 and HC/S 52/2017. 4. Judgements (by consent) were entered for the Complainant in HC/S 324/2016 on 3 October 2017 and in HC/S 325/2016 on 10 October 2017. 5. The defendant in HC/S 324/2016 was ordered, inter alia, to pay to the Complainant: a. b. c. 6. $120,000 (inclusive of $20,000 as interim payment) being $100,000 in general damages and $20,000 in special damages; Costs and disbursements to be agreed or taxed; and The disbursements included $225.00 being the Public Trustee fees. The defendant in HC/S 325/2016 was ordered, inter alia, to pay to the Complainant: a. b. c. d. $660,000 (inclusive of $170,000 as interim payment), being $260,000 in general damages, and $400,000 in special damages; Costs at $55,000; Disbursements to be agreed or taxed; and The disbursements included $225.00 being the Public Trustee fees. 7. The Complainant was made a bankrupt on 13 November 2017 and Mdm Yvonne Hill was appointed his private trustee in bankruptcy (the “Private Trustee”). 8. At the Respondent’s request, a part of the judgement sums amounting to approximately $160,395.96 (the “$160k”) was paid to the Respondent’s law firm. 9. Between February to April 2020, the Complainant instructed the Respondent on numerous occasions to utilise the $160k to pay various persons nominated by the Complainant. 10. By way of emails between March and April 2020, the Respondent assured the Complainant or gave him the impression that the Respondent would be making the payments shortly or had already made the payments to the nominated persons from the $160k. 11. However, notwithstanding his assurances, the Respondent did not make any payments to the nominated persons. Neither did the Respondent inform and/or account to the Complainant as to how the Respondent utilised the $160k. 1 12. On 18 October 2021, the Respondent admitted to the Inquiry Committee that when he issued the emails he had already set off the $160k against his legal fees and costs. However, no invoice was ever issued to the Complainant in respect of the $160k or any part of it that was allegedly set off. The Charges dated 5 September 2022. 13. In the Statement of the Case (“SOC”) dated 3 June 2022, the Law Society formulated 4 Charges (and Alternative Charges) against the Respondent. Except for the 3rd Charge (and Alternative 3rd Charge), the 1st, 2nd and 4th Charges (and each of their Alternative Charges) were on 5 September 2022 amended, with the leave of this Tribunal. 14. The Charges which the Law Society proceeded against the Respondent at the hearing on 11 November 2022, 9 & 14 December 2022 were as follows: a. The Amended 1st Charge and Alternative Amended 1st Charge concerned the Respondent not being honest in his dealings with the Complainant in that he misled the Complainant into believing that he had posted or would shortly be posting and/or hand delivering cheques to pay the persons nominated by the Complainant, in breach of Rules 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (the “PCR”); b. The Amended 2nd Charge and Alternative Amended 2nd Charge also concerned the Respondent not being honest in his dealings with the Complainant in that he applied various sums received on behalf of the Complainant to his legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent and/or without first informing him, in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR; c. The 3rd Charge and Alternative 3rd Charge concerned the Respondent’s failure to inform the Complainant of the basis on which his professional fees would be charged and the manner in which his professional fees and disbursements would be paid in breach of Rule (17)(3)(a) of the PCR; d. The Amended 4th Charge and Alternative Amended 4th Charge concerned the Respondent’s failure to issue any bill of costs or written intimidation of the amount of legal costs incurred as well as for failing to notify the Complainant that he would be withdrawing client’s money from client’s account in satisfaction of his legal costs in breach of Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the Legal Profession (Solicitor’s Accounts) Rules (the “SAR”). The Defence 15. In his Amended Defence No.1 filed on 23 September 2022 the Respondent alleged that the Complainant was lying and abusing the due process of the law, including the disciplinary process. No or limited particulars were provided. He further denied (again without any particulars) all allegations in the SOC “as if the same were set forth seriatim and traversed separately”. 2 16. In his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) affirmed on 11 November 2022, the Respondent alleged that: a. The claims he was handling related to the Complainant, his wife and his brother; b. They related to multiple road and other accidents, illnesses, hospitalisations and medical leaves and ran into double digit millions of dollars; c. All claims were based on tens of insurance policies; d. There were hundreds of claims filed running into thousands of days of hospitalisations and medical leaves; e. He attended numerous hearings, CDRs, interlocutory applications regarding the numerous claims. f. As the Complainant was impecunious, he felt sorry for the Complainant and he took only what the Complainant could pay and when he could pay; g. From whatever the Complainant paid, he would partly apply for his fees and disbursements; h. When he did not have enough, he would request the Complainant to pay for the disbursements; i. The Complainant precisely knew the details of the monies paid to him or received by him from third parties like insurers and/or their lawyers; j. At all times the Complainant knew exactly what he paid and for what; and k. The Complainant always maintained proper report of figures. The Hearing 17. At the hearing, the Respondent cross-examined the Complainant extensively relating to the Complainant’s credibility which as the Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) pointed out to him was not the issue relating to the 4 Charges or their alternatives. Law Society’s Application to Amend the Charges 18. After the close of hearing on 14 December 2022, Counsel for the Law Society indicated that she was taking instructions and might be amending the SOC, in particular the Charges. On 26 January 2023, the DT heard Law Society’s application to amend the SOC and the Charges. The Law Society’s reasons for the amendments were that they related to 3 clarifications/admissions made by the Respondent during the hearing on 14 December 2022 concerning: 19. a. The Amended 1st Charge/Alternative Amended 1st Charge, the time frame within which the Respondent informed the Complainant that he had already posted and/or hand delivered cheques for the payment to the various payees nominated by the Complainant; b. The Amended 2nd Charge/Alternative Amended 2nd Charge, how and when the Respondent had set off the sum of $160,395.96 (the “Sum”) against his professional fees and costs; and c. The Amended 4th Charge/Alternative Amended 4th Charge, how the Respondent had set off the Sum against his professional fees and costs. The Respondent objected to the amendments on the grounds: a. That they were made very late as the information was available or within the knowledge of the Complainant/Law Society; b. No reasons were given for the lateness of the amendments; and c. In this case the credibility of witnesses is critical and the Complainant is a liar. 20. After hearing both Counsel and considering their submissions, the DT allowed the Law Society’s application to amend the SOC and Charges. We further gave leave to the Respondent to amend his Defence as a result of the Law Society’s amendments and allowed each party to file a further list of documents, if necessary. 21. The Respondent filed his Amended Defence on 16 February 2023 and a further pre-hearing conference (“PHC”) was held on 13 April 2023. At the PHC, Law Society confirmed that it has no further list of documents to file. On 22 March 2023, the Respondent wanted to file his list containing 1037 new items and 14 separate emails. It was not in the usual format and Counsel for the Law Society as well as the DT could not access any of these documents. On 27 March 2023, the DT directed the Respondent to file and serve his List of Documents (“LOD”) in the correct format. The Respondent was also directed to file and serve copies of his documents listed in his LOD in PDF format. The Respondent, thereafter, filed his LOD by way of a Google spreadsheet and copies of the documents listed in the LOD by way of a Google spreadsheet with links. There were 2626 links in the Respondent’s Google spreadsheet of 3 April 2023 and neither Counsel for the Law Society, nor the DT or its Secretariat could access any of the documents. 22. The DT then directed the Respondent to file and serve 3 sets of hard copies of his documents by 10 April 2023 failing which the DT would not be considering these documents. The Respondent did not comply with this direction and at the PHC on 27 April 2023, the DT informed him that his new documents were not admitted. 4 23. As a result of the Amended SOC and Charges, the Respondent applied to recall the Complainant for further cross-examination. When asked for the reasons for his application, the Respondent admitted that his whole defence to the Charges is that the Complainant is a liar and he wanted to recall the Complainant to cross-examine him and show that the Complainant cannot be believed and for that reason the Charges should be dismissed. In other words, the reason for recall is essentially to only further test the credibility of the Complainant and nothing more. 24. We dismissed the Respondent’s application to recall the Complainant as the Complainant in his affidavit affirmed on 15 April 2023, stated that he “has no knowledge of the reasons for and/or behind the Law Society’s various Amendments to the SOC and Charges over the course of DT10/2022” and credibility of the Complainant is not relevant to the 4 Amended Charges and their Alternative Amended Charges. The Complainant’s Bankruptcy 25. Although it was not raised by the Respondent, the DT asked Counsel for the Law Society and the Respondent to address the issue of whether the bankruptcy of the Complainant in any manner affects this proceeding and his capacity to give instructions/directions on the $160k. 26. Section 78 of the then applicable Bankruptcy Act (“BA”) sets out the description of a bankrupt's property divisible amongst creditors: 78. — (1) The property of the bankrupt divisible among his creditors (referred to in this Act as the bankrupt's estate) shall comprise — (a) (b) all such property as belongs to or is vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of his bankruptcy or is acquired by or devolves on him before his discharge; and the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit at the commencement of his bankruptcy or before his discharge. (2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to (a) (b) (c) (d) property held by the bankrupt on trust for any other person; such tools, books, vehicles and other items of equipment as are needed by the bankrupt for the bankrupt’s personal use in the bankrupt’s employment, business or vocation; such clothing, bedding, furniture, household equipment and provisions as are necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of the bankrupt and his family; and property of the bankrupt which is excluded under any other written law … 5 27. According to Section 2(1) of the BA, “property” of the bankrupt: “includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, whether present or future or vested contingent, arising out of or incidental to, property.” 28. The definition of "property” at Section 2(1) of the BA does not encompass choses in action in respect of personal injury to the bankrupt, as well as damages recovered as compensation thereto. 29. With respect to the former, this is provided for at Section 131 of the BA, which stipulates that a bankrupt is subject to certain disabilities whilst he is yet undischarged. These disabilities relate to his incompetency to maintain any legal action without previous sanction of the Official Assignee, save for an action for injury to his person. “Disabilities of bankrupt 131.---(1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge — (a) he shall be incompetent to maintain any action, other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to his person, without the previous sanction of the Official Assignee; and (b) he shall not leave, remain or reside outside Singapore without the previous permission of the Official Assignee.” [Emphasis Added] 30. The rationale behind the special carve out for personal injury actions was succinctly explained in the Court of Appeal case of Standard Chartered Bank v Loh Chong Yong Thomas [2010] 2 SLR 569 ("Thomas Low”). 31. In Thomas Low, the Court of Appeal recognised at [12] that Section 2(1) of the BA was in pari materia with the definition of "property" at s 436 of England's Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (UK) (the “lA"), and observed that cases over the years have not considered damages recovered pursuant a personal injury action to be "property" of a bankrupt. 32. The Court of Appeal cited with approval at [13] – [14] the decision of Hoffmann L.J. in Heath v. Tang [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1423, as follows: “The property which vests in the trustee includes ‘things in action’ [see section 436 [of the IA]. Despite the breadth of this definition, there are certain causes of action personal to the bankrupt which do not vest in his trustee. These include cases in which the damages are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his body, mind, or character, and without immediate reference to his rights of property:’ see Beckham v. Drake (1849) 2 H.L. Cas. 579, 604, per Erle J. and Wilson v. United Counties Bank Ltd. [1920] A.C. 102. … Section 436 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (UK)1 is not in truth a definition of the word ‘property.’ It only sets out what is included. 6 As will appear later from the cases that have been decided over many years, actions which relate to a bankrupt’s personal reputation or body have not been considered to be property and therefore they do not vest in anybody other than the bankrupt. They relate solely to his body, mind and character and any damages recovered are compensation for damage to his body, mind and character as opposed to other causes of action which have been considered to be a right of property. Thus causes of action to recover damages for pain and suffering have been held not to vest in the trustee…. [Emphasis Added] 33. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the $160K, being compensation or damages obtained pursuant to the Complainant’s personal injury lawsuits in HC/S 324/2015 and HC/S 325/2015 in respect of personal injuries suffered by the Complainant, are excluded from the property that is divisible amongst his creditors pursuant to Section 78 of the BA and the Complainant was always at liberty to utilise the monies at his sole discretion, including giving instructions and / or directions to the Respondent concerning the use of the same. The Charges against the Respondent 34. On 4 June 2022, the Law Society formulated 4 charges under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (“LPA”) and 4 Alternative Charges under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA. All 4 Charges and Alternative Charges concern the Respondent’s breach of various rules under the PCR and Legal Profession (Solicitor’s Accounts) Rules (the “SAR”) of the LPA. 35. On 5 September 2022 with the leave of the DT the 1st, 2nd and 4th Charges were amended. On 26 January 2023, the 3 amended Charges and Alternative Amended Charges and the 3rd Charge and Alternative 3rd Charge were as follows: 1st CHARGE You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) to wit, you were not honest in your dealings with your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”) in that between the period of 17 March 2020 and 24 17 April 2020, you had misled Your Client into believing that you had already or would shortly be posting posted and / or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by Your Client for the sum of S$144,800.00 (the “Sum”) which you had received on Your Client’s behalf pursuant to HC/S 324/2016 and H/C 325/2016 to persons whom Your Client had nominated and/or shortly intended to make payment of the Sum (or part thereof) to, in circumstances when you did not do so and/or had no intention to of doing do so, and as such, you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). 7 (Alternative Charge: 1st Charge) You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) to wit, you were not honest in your dealings with your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”) in that between the period of 17 March 2020 and 24 17 April 2020, you had misled Your Client into believing that you had already or would shortly be posting posted and / or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by Your Client for the sum of S$144,800.00 (the “Sum”) which you had received on Your Client’s behalf pursuant to HC/S 324/2016 and HC/S 325/2016 to persons whom Your Client had nominated and/or shortly intended to make payment of the Sum (or part thereof) to, in circumstances when you did not do so and/or had no intention to of doing do so, and as such, you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). 2nd CHARGE You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap161), to wit, you were not honest in your dealings with your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”), when you applied the sum of $144.800.00 S$160.395.96 (the “Sum”) received on behalf of Your Client pursuant to HC/S324/2016 and C/S325/2016 (the “High Court Suits”) towards the settlement of your professional legal fees and costs in, inter alia, HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 without obtaining Your Client’s prior consent and/or without first informing Your Client of your intention to utilise the Sum in such a manner, and in circumstances where Your Client was led to believe that you would be utilising the Sum to pay the persons whom Your Client had nominated had instructed you to utilise the Sum for the payment of persons nominated by Your Client, and as such you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). (Alternative Charge: 2nd Charge) You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap161), to wit, you were not honest in your dealings with your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”), when you applied the sum of $144,800.00 S$160,395.96 (the “Sum”) received on behalf of Your Client pursuant to HC/S324/2016 and HC/S325/2016 (the “High Court Suits”) towards the settlement of your professional legal fees and costs in, inter alia, HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 without obtaining Your Client’s prior consent and/or without first informing Your Client of your intention to utilise the Sum in such a manner, and 8 in circumstances where Your Client was led to believe that you would be utilise the Sum to pay the persons whom Your Client had -nominated had instructed you to utilise the Sum for the payment of persons nominated by Your Client, and as such you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). 3rd CHARGE You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 17(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap161), to wit, you failed to inform your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”), of the basis on which your fees for your professional services would be charged and of the manner in which your fees and any disbursements in respect of, inter alia, H/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 were to be paid by Your Client, and as such you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). (Alternative Charge: 3rd Charge) You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 17(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap161), to wit, you failed to inform your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”), of the basis on which your fees for your professional services would be charged and of the manner in which your fees and any disbursements in respect of, inter alia, H/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 were to be paid by Your Client, and as such you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). 4th CHARGE You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161), in that you withdrew the sum of S$144,800.00 S$160,395.96, being client’s money (the “Sum”), or a part thereof from the client account in satisfaction of your solicitor’s costs in, inter alia, HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 in circumstances where: (a) No bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of legal solicitor’s costs incurred by you in respect of HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 was delivered to your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”); and (b) You failed to notify Your Client that the Sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of your legal costs (or a part thereof) 9 and as such, you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). (Alternative Charge: 4th Charge) You, Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, are charged that you, as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, did act in breach of Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161), in that you withdrew the sum of S$144,800.00 S$160,395.96, being client’s money (the “Sum”), or a part-thereof from the client account in satisfaction of your solicitor’s costs, in inter alia, HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 in circumstances where: (a) No bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of legal solicitor’s costs incurred by you in respect of HC/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 was delivered to your client, Chan Yee Huat (“Your Client”); and (b) You failed to notify Your Client that the Sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of your legal costs (or a part thereof) and as such, you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161). The Respondent’s Amended Defence: 36. The Respondent’s defence, as can be gathered from his Amended Defence, AEIC, questions put to the Complainant and his replies to the DT when the DT sought clarification from him were: a. The Complainant, Mr Chan is a liar and cannot be believed; b. He is lying in his complaint dated 26 April 2021; c. The Respondent is entitled to set off the $160k against his professional legal fees and costs; and d. The Complainant was aware of the set off. 37. The Amended Defence and AEIC filed by the Respondent were bare allegations and denials without any particulars or contemporaneous documents adduced by the Respondent in support. 38. The relevant paragraphs of the Respondent’s Amended Defence are as follows: 10 a. “The Complainant (“Chan”) is lying and is abusing the due process of the law, including the disciplinary process.” b. “38 39The Respondent will also aver that the Law Society had confirmed at the PHC of 29.8.2022 that Chan is allegedly unaware of the exact amount in question. In this regard, it will be averred that, inter alia, Chan is being inconsistent or non-committal because he was/is at all material times lying.” c. “39. Further or in the alternative, as regards paragraph 13 of the SOC (Amendment No. 2). the Respondent will aver that Chan is a liar and is misleading the DT that the Respondent only handled a handful of cases to give the false impression that monies due to him (and his family) who have still not settled the full legal fee of the Respondent for handling the multitude of cases from 2012/2013 to 2019 and Chan (and his wife) disappeared in late 2019 without paying the Respondent his full legal fees and disbursements as pleaded at, inter alia, paragraph 34 herein above and Chan (and his wife) is/are fully aware of this at all material times.” d. 40. Further or in the alternative, as regards paragraph 13 of the SOC (Amendment No.2) the Respondent will aver that Chan (and his wife) were at all material times knew of and/or were aware of and/or had prior knowledge of and/or had consented to the set offs including those pleaded by the Law Society at paragraph 13 of the SOC (Amendment No.2) and that they also knew at all material times that they had not fully paid the Respondent all his legal fees and disbursements for all the work that he had done/incurred from 2012/2013 to 2019. e. 41. Further and/or in support of the Defence filed herein, the Respondent will refer to all his responses to the Law Society written and oral including those responses given by the Respondent at the Inquiry Committee hearing on 18 October 2022 and save as alleged herein the Respondent denies all allegations contained in the Case Statement as if the same were set forth seriatim and traversed separately. Legal Principles 39. A breach of Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA arises inter alia if the Respondent is guilty of a breach of any rule of conduct under the PCR which "amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor". 40. The standard of professionalism of an advocate and solicitor is an objective one, determined by the Court: see Law Society of Singapore v K Jayakumar Naidu [2012] 4 SLR 1232 at [43]. To determine whether an advocate and solicitor has complied with the relevant rules under the PCR, the solicitor's conduct will be assessed against what a reasonably competent advocate and solicitor would have done, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, the context of time and deadline pressures. 41. The key question is thus whether the standards applied and skills discharged by the advocate and solicitor in question are consistent with the legal profession's presumed responsibilities 11 and obligations to its clients: see Lie Hendri Rusli v Wong Tan & Molly Lim [2004] 4 SLR(R) 594 at [44]. 42. Ultimately, no single touchstone will be conclusive in determining the existence and extent of a solicitor's duty in any given matrix; the application of these overarching principles must be undergirded by pragmatism and reality. 43. Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA has been held to be a "catch-all provision" which can be invoked when the conduct does not fall within any of the other enumerated grounds in Section 83 of the LPA but is nevertheless considered unacceptable: see Ng Chee Sing v Law Society of Singapore [2000] 1 SLR(R) 466 (“Ng Chee Sing”) at [40]. 44. To make out a charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, it is sufficient to show that a solicitor is guilty of conduct which "brings discredit to a respondent as an advocate and solicitor or on the legal profession as a whole" (see The Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2019] SGDT 416 at [9]) or "render[s] him unfit to remain as a member of an honourable profession" (see Ng Chee Sing at [40]). 45. A practical test for whether such misconduct is made out is to ask "if reasonable people, on hearing about what [the respondent] has done, would have said without hesitation that as [an advocate and solicitor] he should not have done it”. This is an objective standard determined by the Court, and not based on the standard of peer judgment: Ng Chee Sing at [41]-[42]. The totality of the solicitor's conduct and the whole course of events must be taken into account in this analysis: see The Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2009] SGDT 6 at [19]. 46. A charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA is made out if the advocate and solicitor’s misconduct is “not sufficiently serious to be considered as ‘grossly improper’ but which may be described as ‘unbefitting’ an advocate and solicitor”: see The Law Society of Singapore v Sidambaram Uthayasurian [2009] SGDSC 1 at [28]. Accordingly, it follows that the standard of misconduct required to make out a charge under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA is less strict than the standard of “grossly improper conduct” required under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. The DT’s Findings Amended 1st Charge and Amended Alternative 1st Charge: 47. The Amended 1st Charge concerns improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA read with Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR, which requires that an Advocate and Solicitor must "be honest in all the legal practitioner's dealings with his or her client.” 48. The Amended 1st Alternative Charge concerns "misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or a member of an honourable profession under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA." 12 49. One of the guiding principles of rule 5 of the PCR requires that "the relationship between a legal practitioner and his or her client imports a duty to be honest in all dealings with the client.” In addition, and as stated by the learned author of Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: A Commentary: “The primary precepts which flow from the principle of honesty set out in rule 5(1)(a) of the PCR in the context of the lawyer and client relationship may be expressed as follows: (a) the solicitor must be honest in all his dealings with his client and maintain a relationship of trust and confidence which the client is entitled to expect and on which he relies (b) he is accountable to the client for any money or other property with which he has been entrusted or for which he has been made responsible (c) he must be scrupulously fair in the manner he charges his clients for his services." [Emphasis Added] 50. The following facts were undisputed/admitted by the Respondent: a. The Complainant was a client of the Respondent and that on behalf of his client, the Respondent received the sum of $58,393.13 in HC/S 324/2016 on or about 4 May 2018 and the sum of $102,002.83 in HC/S 325/2016 on or about 6 December 2016 amounting to a total of $160,395.96 (the $160k). b. The Complainant instructed the Respondent to make payment from the $160k to various persons he nominated, namely, his private trustee, various doctors and his previous solicitor (collectively the “payees”) by way of multiple emails to the Respondent from 3 February 2020 to17 April 2020. c. The Respondent represented to the Complainant by his multiple emails between 17 March 2020 to 17 April 2020 that he had posted or would shortly be posting or handdelivering cheques for payment to the payees. d. Despite the Respondent’s representation, he never posted or hand-delivered the cheques to the payees, nor made any payment to the payees in any other form. e. Between 2017 and 2019 (i.e., prior to sending the emails to the Complainant between March 2020 and April 2020), he had already set off the sum against his professional legal fees and costs. f. The Respondent misled/misrepresented to the Complainant when he sent the emails because the Respondent “just wanted to piss off” the Complainant. g. The Respondent further admitted that on hindsight his deliberate misleading of the Complainant was poor judgement on his part. h. During his cross-examination, the Respondent clarified that the $160k was professional legal fees and costs due and owing to him. 13 51. In fact, the Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had strung the Complainant along by falsely and deliberately concealing the truth from him over a period of one month as he on his own case had already set off the $160k against his legal fees and costs. In this connection, the Respondent accepts that he received the $160k and it is clear that he mispresented and misled the Complainant in flagrant breach of his duties to be honest in all his dealings with his client and to maintain a relationship of trust and confidence which the client was entitled to expect and on which he relied. 52. In the circumstances the DT finds the Respondent guilty of the Amended 1st Charge and the Amended 1st Alternative Charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant, and between 17 March 2020 and 17 April 2020, he misled the Complainant into believing that he had or shortly would be posting and/or handdelivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant when the Respondent did not do so and/or had no intention of doing so. Amended 2nd Charge and Amended Alternative 2nd Charge 53. The issue in these charges relate to whether the Respondent, when he applied the $160k towards the settlement of his legal fees and costs, obtained the Complainant’s prior consent and/or first informed the Complainant of his intention to utilise the $160k in such manner. 54. As stated above a solicitor’s duty of honesty extends to being accountable to his client for any money or other property with which he has been entrusted or for which he has been made responsible. 55. The Respondent admitted that prior to issuing the emails (referred to in the Amended 1st Charge and Amended 1st Alternative Charge) to the Complainant he had already set off the $160k against his professional legal fees and costs in the period 2017 to 2019. 56. The Respondent further made the bare allegation that the Complainant must have been aware of it as the Complainant was in the Respondent‘s office “every day”. The DT does not understand how the Complainant by being in the Respondent‘s office every day could actually know that the $160k was set off by the Respondent against his professional legal fees and costs. Further even if the Complainant somehow became aware of the set off, that did not or in any way lessen the Respondent’s duty of honesty to the client to expressly account for the set off of the $160k. 57. In any event, the Complainant denied any knowledge of the set off. Cross-Examination of the Complainant on 11 November 2022 at page 102: Q: And that---I now put it to you that that somebody, that is me, had obtained your consent before application of the 160,000. A: No, Sir Q: I put it to you that that somebody from whom that knowledge had gone to your and your wife, that is me, had informed you and your wife with regard to this. "Yes" or "No"? 14 A: No, Sir. … 58. 59. Q: ..I put it to you that no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount was delivered to you because you, at all material times, knew about it---knew about how the monies were applied. "Yes" or "No"? A: Can I clarity your question? Apply to what? Q: Applied, with respect to my $500,000-odd legal fees. A: No, Sir. That the Respondent had never informed the Complainant when he set off the $160k in 2017 to 2019 is further supported by the following: a. The Respondent has not adduced any contemporaneous documents to evidence the fact that he had informed the Complainant of the set off which he alleged was in the period 2017 to 2019. b. Neither has he alleged any prior oral conversation when he informed the Complainant of the set off. c. The fact that the Respondent sent the emails referred to in the Amended 1st Charge and Amended 1st Alternative Charge suggests that the Complainant was never informed of the intention to set-off. Accordingly, no consent could have been obtained to such set-off. Further the Respondent was dishonest when he failed to inform or to obtain the Complainant’s prior consent to set off the $160k for the following reasons: a. The Respondent concealed that he had set off an amount and only revealed it for the very first time before the Inquiry Committee in spite of the Complainant’s demand to know what had become of the monies received by him in his emails to the Respondent in February to April 2020. b. The Respondent did not produce any invoice or breakdown of his legal fees in respect of the set-off. 60. Also, the cross examination as a whole suggests that the Complainant was never told about the set-off prior to it being effected. This explains why much time was spent as whether the Complainant knew what the monies were used for. If the Respondent had informed the Complainant that the monies were to be set and had obtained the consent of the Complainant prior to set-off, the DT would have expected this point be raised in the defence and the AEIC. 61. In the circumstances, the DT finds the Respondent guilty of the Amended 2nd Charge and the Amended 2nd Alternative Charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Respondent was not honest in his dealings with his client, the Complainant, when he applied the $160k towards 15 the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant‘s prior consent and/or without first informing the Complainant of his intention to do so. The 3rd Charge and Alternative 3rd Charge 62. The 3rd Charge and the Alternative 3rd Charge concerns improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) or alternatively Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA read with Rule 17(3)(a) of the PCR, which requires that a solicitor informs his client of the basis on which his professional legal fees would be charged and the manner in which his fees and disbursements would be paid. 63. Rule 17 of the PCR states that: “A legal practitioner must act in the best interests of his or her client, and must charge the client fairly for work done”. 64. Further, and as stated by the learned author of Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: A Commentary at [17.023]: “...The client must be fully informed so that he is absolutely clear about the extent of his actual or potential liability for fees and expenses related to [the solicitor’s] retainer. The [solicitor] must be entirely transparent and clearly explain the basis of the fees, disbursements, and any other necessary and foreseeable payments... regarding the basis on which fees are charged... if a time-based rate (hourly rate) applies (as is a common practice), the client should be informed that the rate applies to all time spent in the conduct of the retainer (if this is the agreement), whether it concerns legal research, communications, correspondence, attendance at meetings or any other form of engagement. Such information is important to the client because it gives him a measure of control in deciding the type and extent of work he wants the legal practitioner to undertake. Indeed, this is consistent with the lawyer’s responsibility to evaluate with a client whether the consequence of a matter justifies the expense or the risk involved ...” [Emphasis Added] 65. In the case of Legis Point LLC v Tay Choon Ai [2008] 3 SLR 1269 at [69], the Court observed that: "The onus should be on law firms to make their fee arrangements clear and unambiguous, and it would be improper and unsatisfactory outcome if law firms could simply take undue advantage of ambiguities in their fee agreements by insisting on their interpretation of the fees at the close of the solicitor-client relationship." [Emphasis Added] 66. The Respondent has not produced any evidence regarding the basis on which his professional legal fees would be charged. Apart from one invoice which the Respondent said he issued in 2013, no further invoices were issued by the Respondent to the Complainant. In his evidence, the Respondent said he “only took what (the Complainant) can pay as and when he can pay”. 16 67. The Respondent's bare and bald defence and contention at the hearing (which was not pleaded in his Defence) was that a breakdown of the work he had done and time spent was previously given to the Complainant, and that "it is a breakdown that [the Respondent and the Complainant] actually [went] through together”. 68. The Complainant’s evidence is that he does not recall signing any Letter of Engagement and Warrant to Act with the Respondent. The Respondent has also completely failed to produce any such Letter of Engagement and Warrant to Act (which document would have set out the basis for his legal fees) in the course of these proceedings. 69. The Respondent has previously taken the position before the Inquiry Committee that “what the Complainant owed him was more than what [the Respondent] owed the Complainant”. The Respondent subsequently affirmed this position during his cross-examination. Notwithstanding this, the Respondent has at all material times been unable to adduce any breakdown to the Inquiry committee as well as the DT in the course of these proceedings to demonstrate the basis for his aforesaid statement / position: Cross-Examination Of the Respondent (on 14 December 2022 at page 177 of the transcripts): Q: Mr Nedumaran, you've taken the position before the Inquiry Committee on 18th October 2021 that what Mr Chan owes you in terms of legal fees is more than what you owed him, am I right? A: What Mr Chan owes is more than what I owed him, yes. Q: Yes, what Mr Chan owes you is more than what you owe him? A: Yes. Q: Yes, am I right? Yes. you also asked that the in---I mentioned this earlier, you were asked that the inquiry committee hearing on 18th October and in a post-hearing even on the same day to give an accounting to reconcile the legal fees that you claimed you set off against your legal fees---let me repeat that, sorry. You were asked to provide an accounting to reconcile the legal fees claimed and set off with the sums that you received from the---from Mr Chan, in particular, the sums in Suit 324 and 325. And just now you confirmed that you did not give this accounting, right? A: Yes. Q: Notwithstanding your belief that what the respondent---or rather, what Mr Chan owes you is more than what you owe him, you have yet to provide the committee or this Tribunal of any accounting to substantiate this averment, am I right? A: Yes. 70. The Respondent has not given any evidence as to the basis for his legal fee throughout the course of the proceedings. No accounting has also been provided by the Respondent todate. 71. In the circumstances the DT finds the Respondent guilty of the 3rd Charge and the 3rd Alternative Charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Respondent failed to inform the 17 Complainant of the basis on which his fees for professional services would be charged and of the manner in which his fees and any disbursements were to be paid by the Complainant. Amended 4th Charge and Amended Alternative 4th Charge 72. Pursuant to Section 83(2)(b) or Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA read with Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR, a solicitor must, before drawing any money from his client’s account any of his client’s money as properly required for or towards payment of the client’s costs, ensure that a bill of costs or other written intimidation of the amount of costs incurred has been delivered to the client and the client has been notified that money held for him will be applied towards or in satisfaction of the solicitor’s costs. 73. The raison d'être for the Solicitors Accounts Rules was emphasised in the case of Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2005] 4 SLR(R) 320 at [19]: "Solicitors have been conferred a unique statutory privilege by Parliament for the purpose of facilitating the efficient discharge of their professional duties. They are allowed to hold moneys belonging to clients and third parties. This right in turn entails serious responsibilities. The public must be confident that moneys held or maintained by solicitors will be adequately safeguarded and legitimately disbursed at any cost. To this end, detailed accounting rules, practices and conventions have been put in place through subsidiary legislation and practice directions. All practicing solicitors are ipso facto subject to the Solicitors' Accounts Rules and other relevant rules made pursuant to the LPA. The raison d'etre for these rules is clearly to protect the public against any unauthorised use of money maintained by solicitors and to instill in the public confidence that the legal profession is effectively regulated and policed. It is not enough that a solicitor conducts himself honestly in relation to the discharge of his professional duties. A solicitor also has to discharge his obligations and responsibilities competently and conscientiously. Observance of the relevant accounting rules, practices and conventions is a fundamental obligation that all solicitors must observe as a condition for their privilege to practise. We find an observation of Thomson CJ in In re A Solicitor (1962) 3 MC 323 at 323 apposite: The legal profession enjoys very great privileges. In return for these privileges they owe the public a duty and that duty involves not only an extremely high standard or probity but a way of conducting business, and particularly business in relation to financial matters, which is beyond suspicion. In particular it is required, and it is part of the price the profession must pay for its privileges, that separate accounts of solicitors money and clients' money should be kept." [Emphasis Added] 74. The following facts were undisputed and/or admitted by the Respondent during crossexamination on 14 December 2022: 18 75. a. The $160k was client’s money and paid into client’s account; b. The Respondent used the $160k to pay his professional legal fees and costs; and c. The Respondent did not issue any bill of costs or any written intimidation to the Complainant before withdrawing the $160k from his client’s account. In the circumstances, the DT finds the Respondent guilty of the Amended 4th Charge and the Alternative Amended 4th Charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Respondent has not complied with Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR in that he withdrew the sum of S$160,395.96, being client’s money, in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where: a. No bill of costs or other written intimation of solicitor’s costs was delivered to the Complainant; and b. The Complainant was not notified that the monetary sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of the Respondent’s legal costs. Whether Cause of Sufficient Gravity exist for disciplinary action. 76. The powers that this DT may exercise are set out under Section 83 and 93 of the LPA:Section 83 of the LPA “(2) Subject to subsection (7), such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor – …. (b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his or her professional duty or guilty of such a breach of any of the following as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor: (i) any usage or rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under section 71 or by the Council under the provisions of this Act; … (h) has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession;" [Emphasis Added] Section 93 of the LPA “(1) After hearing and investigating any matter referred to it, a Disciplinary Tribunal must record its and findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts shall determine that (a) no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be); 19 (b) while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be), the regulated legal practitioner should be (i) ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed; (ii) reprimanded; (iii) ordered to comply with one or more remedial measures; or (iv) subjected to the measure in sub-paragraph (iii) in addition to the measure in sub -paragraph (i) or (i); or (c) cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 or 83A (as the case may be)." 77. The DT may make the following findings under Sections 93(1)(a) – (c) of the LPA as set out as follows: a. No cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83; b. While no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under that section, the advocate and solicitor should be reprimanded, ordered to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed and/or ordered to comply with one or more remedial measures; or c. Cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83. 78. A finding of cause of sufficient gravity is only in instances of the “most serious cases”: see Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 SLR 390 at [24]. 79. Cause of sufficient gravity will be found if, on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the solicitor’s conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of sanctions: see Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another [2017] 4 SLR 1369 at [30]. 80. More recently, the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2021] 4 SLR 382 expounded on the principles relating to when cause for sufficient gravity exists at [31] – [34]: a. The Respondent could only be held to account for the specific misconduct charged for. To hold otherwise would be prejudicial to the respondent, since it is the charge that informs a lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings of the case that he or she has to meet. b. Where a charge does not contain an allegation of dishonest conduct, it is inappropriate to find cause for sufficient gravity on the basis of dishonesty. c. Only the most serious cases are heard by a Court of Three Judges; the fact that a lawyer’s conduct falls within one or more of the limbs of Section 83(2) of the LPA does not, without more, establish cause of sufficient gravity. 20 18th September 2023.	2024-10-11T07:00:15+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2024/	In the Matter of Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-oct-2024/	1646

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