fc_judgments_version: 18

This data as json

_id	_item	_version	_commit	tags	date	court	case-number	title	citation	url	counsel	timestamp	coram	html	_item_full_hash
18	17	1	1284	[ "Family Law \u2013 Child \u2013 Maintenance of child", "Family Law \u2013 Custody \u2013 Care and control" ]	2024-02-07	Family Court	Maintenance Summons No 1661 of 2023	WUG v WUH	[2024] SGFC 11	https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F31032-SSP.xml	[ "Lim Fang-Yu Mathea (PKWA Law Practice LLC) for the Complainant", "Respondent-in-person" ]	2024-02-14T16:00:00Z[GMT]	Marcus Ho	<root><head><title>WUG v WUH</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WUG <em>v</em> WUH </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/31032-SSP.xml')">[2024] SGFC 11</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Maintenance Summons No 1661 of 2023</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">07 February 2024</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Marcus Ho </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Lim Fang-Yu Mathea (PKWA Law Practice LLC) for the Complainant; Respondent-in-person </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WUG — WUH </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Child</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Maintenance of child</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Custody</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Care and control</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">7 February 2024</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> District Judge Marcus Ho:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 The Complainant Mother and the Respondent Father had entered into a consent order on all ancillary matters, which included an order for joint custody to the parties, sole care and control to the Complainant, and various maintenance obligations on the Respondent’s part, including the payment of their children’s childcare and school fees.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 In July 2023, the Complainant filed an enforcement application, claiming 3 months’ worth of preschool fees for C3 that the Respondent had refused to pay. After hearing the parties, I granted the Complainant’s application and ordered the Respondent to pay the full arrears of $4,547.43 claimed. The Respondent has since appealed. I now set out my full grounds of decision.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Background </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 The Complainant and the Respondent were married in October 2011. There are 3 children to the marriage, who were respectively 10, 8 and 4 years old at the time of the application. I refer to them in descending order of age as C1, C2 and C3 respectively (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Children”).</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 The Complainant and the Respondent attended mediation under the Family Dispute Resolution Division of the Family Justice Courts (“FDR Mediation”), where parties reached a global resolution of all ancillary matters. This was recorded as part of the interim judgment entered on 14 May 2019 (the “Consent Order”). Both parties were represented by counsel at the time.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 The Consent Order provided that parties were to have joint custody of the Children, with sole care and control to the Complainant. The orders relating to the Children’s maintenance were set out at Clause 3(f) of the Consent Order, which reads as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_5-p2_a"></a>(a) The [Respondent] shall pay $3,000.00, being $1,000.00 for each child, as monthly maintenance for the Children with effect from the last day of May 2019 and thereafter on the last day of each month into the [Complainant’s] designated bank account.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_5-p2_b"></a>(b) In addition, the [Respondent] shall pay for the following expenses incurred by the Children directly to the third party or on a reimbursement basis to the [Complainant]:</p> <p class="Judg-3"><a id="p1_5-p2_b-p3_i"></a>(i) Childcare/student Care/school fees and all education expenses including school allowance, school bus, ad hoc school expenses, school uniform, stationeries, textbooks, tuition and enrichment classes and school trips;</p> <p class="Judg-3"><a id="p1_5-p2_b-p3_ii"></a>(ii) Medical and dental expenses; and</p> <p class="Judg-3"><a id="p1_5-p2_b-p3_iii"></a>(iii) Insurance premiums for existing insurance policies.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_5-p2_c"></a>(c) Provided that the [Complainant] moves into rented accommodation to stay with the Children, the [Respondent] shall pay an additional $1,000.00 per month towards the [Complainant’s] rental for accommodation pending the completion of the transfer/sale of the Matrimonial Home. The [Complainant] shall provide the tenancy agreement as proof of rental.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 At the time that the Consent Order was granted in May 2019, C3 was just under one year old. After the Complainant moved out of the matrimonial flat and into a rented apartment in Bedok North, she enrolled C2 and C3 into Sparkletots, with C2 in Kindergarten and C3 in infant care. C1 was already in primary school by then. This Sparkletots centre was situated at the ground floor of the block next to the Complainant’s apartment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 Sometime in January 2022, the Complainant enrolled C3 into MindChamps Performing Arts International Preschool @Changi Business Park Pte Ltd (“MindChamps”), in anticipation of the Complainant’s move to her current residence at Bedok South. By this time, C2 had progressed to primary school. The preschool fees at MindChamps were about $1,600.00 per month<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span>. These fees were deducted from C3’s Child Development Account (“CDA”) until the balance therein was insufficient to pay for any further fees. When this happened, the Complainant asked the Respondent to top up C3’s CDA for the purposes of paying C3’s fees at MindChamps. The Respondent refused to do so. The Complainant therefore took a loan from her parents to make payment of the outstanding fees of $4,547.43, being the fees owed to MindChamps for December 2022, January 2023 and February 2023. This is the amount that the Complainant claimed as the arrears she sought to enforce in this application.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The applicable legal principles</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 The Complainant’s enforcement application was made under Section 71 of the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353) (the “Charter”). Section 71 of the Charter sets out the court’s powers to make various orders in the event that a person fails to make one or more payments required to be made under a maintenance order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 While Section 71 of the Charter itself does not provide for any statutory exceptions or mitigating circumstances under which the arrears claimed should not be enforced, it is well established that the quintessential characteristic of enforcement proceedings is the opportunity for the respondent to “show cause” why the maintenance in arrears should not be enforced in full or in part: <em>Lai Ching Kin v Ng Chin Chye</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/7316-M.xml')">[2001] SGDC 228</a> (“<em>Lai Ching Kin”</em>) at [10].</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 Whether a respondent has “shown cause” or not is ultimately a fact-sensitive exercise. The touchstone of the inquiry is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be inequitable to make an enforcement order or if doing so would lead to injustice: <em>VUJ v VUK</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26500-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGFC 87</a> at [20]-[22].</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Complainant’s case</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 The Complainant claimed that the Respondent was obliged to pay her the sum of $4,547.43, being C3’s MindChamps fees for November 2022, December 2022 and January 2023, in accordance with his obligations under Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order. The Complainant argues that the express terms of the order made the Respondent responsible for these preschool fees, without exception or restriction, and that the Respondent should therefore be held accountable as such.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">The Respondent’s case</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 In short, the Respondent refused to pay for C3’s fees at MindChamps because he had not consented to it. To his mind, there was no need for C3 to be enrolled into a preschool as expensive as MindChamps. C3, like C2, was previously enrolled at Sparkletots at Bedok North. The Respondent did not feel that children of C3’s age needed to attend “good schools”, and that money spent on a “good school” was not worth it, given C3’s young age<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span>. The Respondent was of the view that C3 should have remained in Sparkletots.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 The Respondent accordingly proposed that C3 be transferred back to Sparkletots, in which case he would pay for C3’s Sparkletots fees<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span>. Alternatively, if the Complainant wanted C3 to continue attending MindCamps, the Respondent said that he would contribute $750.00 per month, being what he estimated would be the cost of C3’s fees for his age group at Sparkletots<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span>. At the hearing on 30 October 2023, the Respondent clarified that his offer was to pay $750.00 per month for C3’s fees for the year 2022, and a reduced monthly amount of $150.00 for the fees in year 2023, being what he felt was the appropriate fee for the year given C3’s progression into Kindergarten 1<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">My decision</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">On a plain reading of the order, is the Respondent required to pay for C3’s school fees?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 As provided in Section 71 of the Charter, the court’s power to make an enforcement order is triggered when a person “fails to make one or more payments required to be made under a maintenance order”. The first inquiry is therefore whether or not the Respondent was <em>required</em> to make the payment of $4,547.43 under the terms of the Consent Order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 To determine whether or not a payment is <em>required to be made under a maintenance order</em>, the starting point must be to examine the plain language of the Consent Order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 At the outset, I note that the Respondent does not dispute that this clause could apply to C3’s preschool fees <em>generally</em><span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span>: the Respondent only disputes the Complainant’s <em>choice</em> of preschool, and would have had no qualms paying for C3’s preschool fees pursuant to this clause, if C3 had continued in Sparkletots instead. Indeed, Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order requires the Respondent to either pay directly or reimburse the Complainant for the Children’s “Childcare/student Care/school fees and all education expenses including school allowance, school bus, ad hoc school expenses, school uniform, stationeries, textbooks, tuition and enrichment classes and school trips”<em>.</em> From the inclusive and permissive language used, I infer that this intended to encompass all of the Children’s education-related expenses until the Children completed formal schooling. Even though this clause does not specifically state that “nursery”, or “kindergarten”, or “preschool” fees would be included, I find that the definition of “childcare” or “school” in this clause would be wide enough to encompass preschool fees. In any event, it was not disputed that this clause could apply to C3’s preschool fees:</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 Notwithstanding this, the Respondent does not believe that he is required to pay for C3’s preschool fees <em>at MindChamps</em>, primarily because the Complainant had enrolled C3 into MindChamps without his consent. The logical conclusion of the Respondent’s argument is this: if the Respondent was not <em>required</em> to make this payment under a maintenance order, then there are effectively no arrears to enforce.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 In <em>VCL v VCM</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/23785-SSP.xml')">[2019] SGFC 122</a> (“VCL v VCM”) (at [31]), the court held the view that where there was no express order stipulating that the paying party’s consent had to be obtained before he paid for certain expenses provided for in the maintenance order, “it would be untenable to adopt the position that there be consent – and express consent at that – on an intended course of action undertaken by a child, before a payer of maintenance pays anything”. The danger of adopting this position is that it “would create a perverse incentive for payers of maintenance to refuse blithely their consent on major decisions in a child’s life, in order to avoid paying the necessary and attendant expenses.”</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 On the facts, I find that there was no requirement for the Complainant to first obtain the Respondent’s consent before C3’s preschool fees at MindChamps could be payable. The wording of Clause 3(f)(b) of the Consent Order is clear and unambiguous. There is no express proviso stating that the Respondent’s obligation to pay for any of these specified expenses would be subject to the Complainant first seeking and obtaining the Respondent’s agreement.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 The agreement on the terms of the Consent Order was reached at FDR Mediation, where both parties were represented and had the benefit of legal advice. If there was any intention for the Respondent’s consent to have been sought first as a precondition before any of the expenses stipulated in Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order were incurred, this should have been expressly worded into the order.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 Similarly, if there was any intention for C3 to be enrolled only into Sparkletots or another preschool in a similar, if not the same, cost bracket, this should also have been stipulated in the order. In this regard, I note that Clause 3(f)(b)(iii) of the Consent Order (which relates to the payment of the Children’s insurance premiums) expressly caveats that the Respondent would be responsible only for the premiums of <em>existing</em> insurance policies. This suggests that parties <em>were</em> aware of and <em>did</em> apply their minds to the option of inserting restrictions and limits into the wording of the clauses. To my mind, the inference that arises is that parties were therefore contented <em>not</em> to place any such restrictions on the other expenses listed, including that of the Children’s education expenses.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 I therefore find, without difficulty, that on the plain reading of Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order, the Respondent was indeed required to pay for C3’s preschool fees.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Does the order for joint custody imply that the Complainant was required to obtain the Respondent’s consent before enrolling C3 into MindChamps? </p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 The Respondent nevertheless argued that because he was granted joint custody of the Children, he has a “50% stake in the decision-making process of the children.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span> As such, the Complainant should not have enrolled C3 into MindChamps without his consent, even if the express terms of Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order did not specifically provide for this.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 However, on the facts of this case, I find that the order for joint custody does not stretch so far as to require the Respondent’s consent to C3’s enrolment into a preschool, and at least not to the extent where it would nullify his obligations under Clause 3(f)(b) of the Consent Order. I elaborate as follows.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 The Court of Appeal in <em>CX v CY (minor: custody and access)</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2005] 3 SLR(R) 0690.xml')">[2005] 3 SLR(R) 690</a> (“<em>CX v CY</em>”) at [31] described “custody” as the package of residual rights that remains after the grant of a “care and control” order. A “care and control” concerns the day-to-day decision-making of a child and dictates which parent shall be the daily caregiver of the child and with whom the child shall live. In contrast, residual “custody” concerns the long-term decision-making for the welfare of the child.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 The concepts of “custody” and “care and control” were more recently summarised in <em>VJM v VJL and another appeal</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26170-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGHCF 16</a> (“<em>VJM v VJL</em>”) at [18] as follows:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Our law adopts the legal constructs of ‘custody’, ‘care and control’ and ‘access’, which are used to support families in which the child’s parents have separated. As ‘custody’ refers to the decision-making authority and responsibility in major aspects of the child’s life, ‘custody’ is not directly dependent on having physical time with the child. In contrast, ‘care and control’ involves physical time with the child, caregiving, and the residence of the child with the parent as well as that parent’s decision-making responsibility over day-to-day matters.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 In <em>CX v CY</em>, the Court of Appeal broadly observed (at [35]) that matters pertaining to religion, education and major healthcare issues were examples of the type of decisions that would generally be covered by a “custody” order. However, in my reading, one must be careful not to construe the Court of Appeal’s observations as a pronouncement that <em>every</em> decision relating to these issues must be made jointly (where a joint custody order is granted). Rather, the key inquiry is whether, to use the Court of Appeal’s words, the matter “would be considered [an] important and longer-term [decision] concerning the upbringing and welfare of a child.”</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 Parents routinely make a wide range of education-related decisions throughout their children’s lives. Some decisions will invariably be more significant and of greater consequence than others. Where an order for joint custody is granted, which is now the norm, it could be counter-productive to a child’s welfare if every education-related decision had to be made jointly. This is especially so where parties do not readily see eye-to-eye (which is not unusual between separated parents), or where an access parent who has minimal or irregular contact with the children is effectively given a veto on matters that would affect the children’s – and consequently the primary caregiver’s – day-to-day lives.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 As such, it is natural that in a situation where a joint custody order is made with an order for sole care and control to a parent, that the care and control parent is trusted with the freedom to make various decisions, without the need to obtain the other parent’s consent. This is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s views at paragraph 30 of <em>CX v CY</em>, which left room for some education-related decisions to be made by the care and control parent (rather than necessarily jointly between parents with custodial rights), depending on the importance of this decision to the child’s education:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">In other words, a “custody order” only gives the parent the residual right to decide on long-term matters affecting the child’s welfare. For instance, the right to decide on the type of education resides with the parent(s) with custody as it concerns the more important and long-term aspects of a child’s upbringing. The right to decide the particular school may also reside with the custodian(s) <b>depending on the importance of this decision to the child’s education</b>.” [emphasis added in bold]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 In the present case, there was no dispute as to the <em>type</em> of education that C3 should receive at his age: both parties were agreed that C3 should be sent to a formal preschool, rather than other alternative forms of education such as homeschooling. Rather, the dispute at hand here was of the <em>choice</em> of preschool.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 In my view, given the level of importance of choosing a child’s <em>preschool</em>, relative to the importance of choosing other institutions that the child may stand to be enrolled for in the future (for instance, for the child’s primary, secondary and tertiary education), this could conceivably be a decision left to be made by the parent with care and control. Unlike primary school education, which is mandatory for Singapore citizens under Section 3(1) of the Compulsory Education Act 2000, preschool education is completely optional. There are no formal examinations at preschool level, and how “well” a child “performs” at their preschool has no formal bearing on the child’s subsequent entry into his or her primary school. The selection of preschool, to put bluntly, is a decision of limited long-term academic impact on a child, relative to every other institution the child may subsequently be enrolled into.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 Furthermore, many parents, even in functional marriages, regard preschool as a form of childcare; a place to mind one’s children while they work. As such, besides choosing a preschool for reasons such as the types of activities offered, the teacher-to-child ratio, and the use of a bilingual curriculum, many parents also prioritise other practical factors such as proximity to their residence and their place(s) of work, and whether or not a preschool offers a full-day programme. These are factors that relate to the management of a child’s caregiving arrangements and day-to-day affairs, which fall within the scope of a care and control parent’s responsibilities as defined in <em>VJM v VJL</em>. This supports my view that once the decision to send C3 to preschool has been made by the parties, the <em>choice</em> of preschool could reasonably be left to the Complainant, being the care and control parent, to decide.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 All things considered, I did not find the difference between preschools – in this case between Sparkletots and MindChamps, to be so significant and important to C3’s welfare as to fetter the Complainant’s prerogative as the care and control parent to decide where C3 should be enrolled.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 Having said this, I would caveat that my views as above should not be taken by the Complainant as a <em>carte blanche</em> to incur expenses in an uninhibited manner, or with disregard to the Respondent’s views. It remains open to the court hearing an enforcement application to decide that it would be unjust to enforce an expense that the Respondent was not at least consulted on, especially if the expense is a significant one.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 As referenced above, the court in <em>VCL v VCM</em> found that the payor’s consent was not a prerequisite to his obligation to pay for the necessary expenses where there was no express order to this effect. However, the court was also of the view that the payor should not be made to blindly pay for new or additional expenses he had not been informed of. To this end, the court highlighted the importance of <em>both parents</em> consulting and cooperating with each other, particularly on expected milestones (at [34]):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Particularly where expected milestones such as primary school registration, graduation etcetera are concerned, an access parent should exercise initiative and broach the topic for discussion, and not always expect the care and control parent to approach him/her to consult him or her first. This is because the access parent is in no less a position than the care and control parent, to know when such major life events will be arising, and has an equal right to start the consultation process.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 Furthermore, a complainant’s <em>right</em> to incur various expenses is tempered by the expectation that such expenses must be reasonably incurred, or the complainant may find difficulty in enforcing the full sum claimed as arrears. To illustrate, a complainant may choose to spend an astronomical amount on expensive, branded stationery her children, and indeed she could be entitled to do so. However, the complainant’s expenditure may not necessarily be endorsed by the court should she seek to enforce the full cost of her luxurious spend.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 Ultimately, even where the arrears may be established and unarguable, a respondent will be given the opportunity during enforcement proceedings to show good cause why the arrears should not be enforced. In my view, the more <em>unreasonable</em> the expense incurred by a complainant, and the more <em>unreasonably</em> a complainant has conducted herself, the easier it may be for the respondent to show good cause for refusing to pay these arrears. At this juncture, I reiterate that the court will not compel a respondent to make payment where it would be inequitable for him to do so. In this vein, I proceed to examine if the Respondent in this case has shown good cause why the arrears of $4,547.43 should not be enforced.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Is there nevertheless any good cause why the arrears should not be enforced?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 To restate the court’s observations in <em>Lai Ching Kin</em> (at [10]), enforcement proceedings provide the respondent with an opportunity to “show reason” why the maintenance in arrears should not be enforced in full or in part. At the heart of this process is the desire to prevent injustice by ensuring that the maintenance orders are not “blindly enforced in the face of legitimate reasons for the failure of husbands and fathers to make payment.”</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 This being the Respondent’s opportunity to show cause, the burden of proof logically rests on him. In the present case, the Respondent’s chief argument is that C3 should have remained in Sparkletots, and not enrolled into MindChamps. The corollary of this is that the Complainant had therefore acted unreasonably in enrolling C3 into MindChamps.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 Having considered the evidence and submissions, I find that the Respondent failed to sufficiently prove that the Complainant had acted so unreasonably, or that C3’s enrolment into MindChamps was so unreasonable, that it would be considered “good reason” for the Respondent to refuse payment.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 <em>Firstly</em>, I accepted that the Complainant had legitimate reasons for enrolling C3 into MindChamps.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 The Complainant’s reasons were, in summary, as follows. Although C3 (together with C2) used to attend Sparkletots near their previous residence at Bedok North, this was only a temporary arrangement and a function of where the Complainant was living at the time.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> After C2 graduated, the Complainant was informed by Sparkletots that C3 had to be placed on a waiting list if he were to continue there because of the quota on the number of students progressing to the next level.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span> When the Complainant was about to move out of her rented apartment and into her current residence in Bedok South, she placed C3 on the waiting list of various schools which were more conveniently located for her, including a Sparkletots and a My First Skool. However, as only MindChamps was able to enrol C3 immediately, the Complainant proceeded to enrol him there so to avoid disrupting his education<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span>. In any case, having observed C2’s struggles in keeping up with the curriculum in primary school after graduating from Sparkletots, the Complainant felt that MindChamps would better prepare C3 for primary school than Sparkletots would. <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span>Additionally, the Complainant’s change in residence meant a different route to her workplace, such that a switch to MindChamps (which was located along the way to her workplace) would save her about 15-20 minutes of travel time each way<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 The Respondent did not rebut the Complainant’s evidence at trial, nor did he offer any compelling reason to doubt the veracity of the Complainant’s evidence and her reasons. On the face of the evidence, I found the Complainant’s reasons to have been legitimate and mostly motivated by C3’s welfare, if not a function of the change in her living arrangements. There was no basis for me to find that this enrolment was done for an untoward parallel purpose, such as inflating the Respondent’s financial outlay. If the Complainant’s intention was simply to take advantage of the Respondent’s agreement to pay for the Children’s expenses pursuant to Clause 3(f)(b), the Complainant could have signed C3 up to a more expensive preschool or incurred a host of other expenses in the name of the Children’s “education” to claim the same from the Respondent. This was not the situation here.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 I also found that the Respondent’s objection to C3’s enrolment into MindChamps was premised less on C3’s interests, but more on his reluctance to pay the sums sought. The Respondent never offered any reasons as to why C3’s enrolment into MindChamps would be <em>contrary</em> to C3’s welfare. The Respondent in fact acknowledges that MindChamps is a good preschool, but simply posits that “children at his age… do not need to attend good schools” and that “money spent on a good school at that age is not worth it.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> The Respondent did not ask for C3 to be removed from MindChamps, nor has he taken out any application to that effect. It therefore appears to me that in terms of C3’s welfare and interests, the Respondent does not actually have any objections to C3’s enrolment into MindChamps. In my view, this diluted the strength of the Respondent’s reasons for refusing to consent to C3’s enrolment, and fortified the reasonableness of the Complainant’s decision.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 <em>Secondly</em>, I find that the Complainant, on account of the Respondent’s conduct and acquiescence, had reason to believe that she could decide on C3’s preschool.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 It does not escape me that the decision to enrol C3 into Sparkletots was one that was effectively made unilaterally by the Complainant in the first place. The Complainant had enrolled C2 and C3 into a Sparkletots centre that operated from the block next to her rented apartment at Bedok North, ostensibly choosing to do so out of convenience more than anything else as she needed somewhere nearby that had both infant care and childcare services. In the Respondent’s own words, “[the Complainant] moved out of her mum’s house so [C3] had to go somewhere and. I don’t know whose idea it was, but end up Sparkletots, I accepted it, you know.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> Prior to this, C1 and C2 attended preschool at the Kindergarten at the Church of Holy Trinity in Tampines<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span>, which was the church that the parties attended as a family. There was no evidence that the Respondent demanded that C3 similarly be enrolled in this church kindergarten, and by all accounts the Respondent was happy for C2 and C3 to be enrolled into Sparkletots and had no issues with the Complainant’s choice. In my view, this state of affairs gave the Complainant good reason to believe that the Respondent would have no issues with C3 unilaterally deciding on C3’s enrolment into MindChamps, given that he never raised any issue with her choosing to enrol C2 and C3 into Sparkletots previously.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 In the same vein, the Respondent never actually raised any objection to C3’s enrolment into MindChamps until he was asked by the Complainant to make monetary top-ups into C3’s CDA sometime in September 2022. By this time, C3 had already been enrolled in MindChamps for 9 months or so, having started in MindChamps in January 2022. The Respondent continued to have access to C3 throughout this period, and would have known of C3’s new enrolment if not through his conversations with C3, then from the very fact that C3 would show up for his weekday access with the Respondent in a MindChamps uniform<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> instead of a Sparkletots one.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 In <em>VCL v VCM</em>, the court espoused the importance of <em>both</em> parents communicating meaningfully, and emphasised the responsibility of the access parent to proactively communicate his or her views. I find the court’s observations to be apposite to the present situation, and I quote the salient portions in full for the benefit of the parties (at [33] and [35]):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">33 All too often, the care and control parent is blamed – rightly or wrongly – for failing to inform the access parent of events and happenings in a child’s life. However, <b>where joint or no custody orders are concerned, it is clear to me that the responsibility for consulting and cooperation falls equally on both parents</b>. Of course as a matter of practical realities, the care and control parent would usually be the one keeping tabs of, and being the first to know of a child’s significant life events or milestones. <b>But being involved in a child’s life such that the joint custody order is meaningful and its purpose achieved, means that both parents are to be proactive, not just the care and control parent</b>. It cannot be the job of the latter to ensure that the access parent has perfect information on the major events of a child’s life – the access parent has to be responsible for seeking such information too. In fact, one may suggest that precisely because the access parent does not live with the child, it behoves him or her to actively engage the child or care and control parent on developments and updates in the child’s life.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1"> <em>…</em> </p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">35 In my view, <b>generally, once there has been communication to the access parent of an impending life event or milestone or decision to be taken, the burden is then on the access parent to respond to those communications and offer his or her views and input</b>. There is no need for the care and control parent to invite the access parent to proffer views – it is the entitlement of the latter and <b>he or she should exercise that right without need for solicitation.</b></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">[emphasis added in bold]</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 The Respondent does not dispute that the Complainant had asked him about enrolling C3 into MindChamps sometime in late 2021, before C3 was formally enrolled in January 2022. If the Respondent held strong objections to C3’s enrolment in MindChamps, he should have communicated this to the Complainant at the earliest possible juncture. The Respondent however chose to remain silent in a situation that warranted a clear and constructive response. The Respondent’s position was, in his own words, that “at no point did I give my agreement… which to me, means I disagree.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> This, to me, is unsatisfactory. It does not behove him to sit on his hands when consulted about sending C3 to MindChamps, only to be up in arms when he is asked to make payment, especially where he would have been aware of his maintenance obligations.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 I therefore find in the circumstances that the Respondent had tacitly acquiesced to the Complainant enrolling C3 into MindChamps, and that in this context, the Complainant had not acted unreasonably in doing so.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 <em>Thirdly</em>, and relatedly, I find that the Respondent was not so proactive and communicative in discussing C3’s options in November 2022 (the month of the first MindChamps bill claimed as part of the Complainant’s arrears), that it would in the circumstances render it unreasonable for the Complainant to have continued with C3’s enrolment into MindChamps thereafter.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 While the Respondent objected to C3’s enrolment into MindChamps once he was asked to pay for it, he never proposed any concrete, reasonable alternative, bearing in mind the reasons for switching C3’s preschool as explained by the Complainant. There is no evidence of any attempt by the Respondent to engage or address the Complainant on her concerns and reasons for the switch, apart from him making the sweeping statement (via text messages sent on 12 November 2022) that the quality of preschool education “makes no difference to [C3’s] development.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span> When the Complainant expressly told him that she had already given him her reasons for enrolling C3 into this school, and that he therefore “cannot just say that it’s just all the same”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span>, the Respondent’s reply was brief and without elaboration: “U may feel that his new school is good but i don’t agree. I didn’t agree to mindchamps and u went ahead anyway”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 The Respondent’s bottom line appeared to be as communicated in his text message to the Complainant: “if u make decision urself, u have to deal with the consequences.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span> The Respondent seemed most concerned about the limits of his liability, rather than with trying to do what he felt was truly best for C3, telling the Complainant “U always just spend my money like its free”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span>, and “since u made the decision urself, u have to pay for it.”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 On the evidence, I find that the Respondent did not leave the Complainant with any options to consider besides re-enrolling C3 into Sparkletots or continuing with MindChamps with limited monetary contribution from him. The Respondent’s only other suggestion was for the Complainant to withdraw C1 and C2 from their after-school student care (which he had been paying for), which would save the Respondent an additional $500.00 per month which he could then divert toward C3’s MindChamp fees<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span>. This struck me as a facetious suggestion given that the Complainant was not able to make alternative childcare arrangements for C1 and C2, and given that Clause 3(f)(b)(i) of the Consent Order had expressly contemplated the need for student care services. It appeared to me that the Respondent simply did not want to increase his financial outlay. Further, despite the Respondent’s professed willingness to contribute $750.00 per month towards C3’s preschool fees, I note that the Respondent never voluntarily made any such payment to the Complainant at all, which, in my view, diminished the sincerity of the Respondent’s offer<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span>. In this context, and given the Complainant’s reasons for withdrawing C3 from Sparkletots which were not rebutted by the Respondent, it cannot be said that the Complainant had acted unreasonably in continuing with C3’s enrolment in MindChamps from November 2022 onwards.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_55"></a>55 <em>Lastly</em>, I did not find the cost of C3’s fees at MindChamps to be so exorbitant as to be unreasonable.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_56"></a>56 It was not disputed that at or around the time the Consent Order was granted, C3 was enrolled into infant care at Sparkletots. This cost around $2,000.00 per month<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span>, which is about $400.00 more than C3’s average monthly fees at MindChamps. It is Respondent’s evidence that he paid this, without more, even though he felt, in his own words, that “it was quite a lot of money”<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span>.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_57"></a>57 With this in mind, I find it reasonable for the Complainant to have chosen to enrol C3 into a school that cost less than an amount that she knew the Respondent had previously paid. While I find that the sum of about $1,600.00 per month is objectively high, given that the Respondent had previously paid for a higher fee without issue, I do not find it unreasonable for the Complainant to have considered this to be beyond the scope of what the Respondent could pay, or what he may reasonably be expected to pay.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_58"></a>58 I note that C3’s preschool fees for January 2022 to October 2022 had been paid for using C3’s CDA monies<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span>, even though this was supposed to have been paid for by the Respondent. The Respondent had ostensibly benefitted from at least 9 months’ worth of non-payment, which even at the monthly fee of $750.00 he was willing to pay, would have amounted to $6,750.00 in savings and is exceeds the arrears claimed by the Complainant.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_59"></a>59 All things considered, I therefore did not find that the Complainant had acted unreasonably in enrolling C3 into MindChamps, and thereafter in continuing with C3’s education in MindChamps past November 2022. Consequently, I do not find any good cause why the arrears of $4,547.43 should not be enforced.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">My orders</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_60"></a>60 Having established the Respondent’s obligation to pay for the arrears, and given the Respondent’s candid admission that he has the ability to pay the amount of $4,547.43 in full<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span>, I so ordered that the Respondent pay to the Complainant the full sum of $4,547.43 by 15 November 2023.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_61"></a>61 As costs follow the event, I also ordered costs fixed at $1,000.00 (all-in, including disbursements) payable by the Respondent to the Complainant, also by 15 November 2023. I made this order in consideration of the costs incurred by the Complainant in these proceedings including the costs of attendance at a half-day contested trial.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_62"></a>62 For completeness, while the Complainant additionally sought an order for a banker’s guarantee, I declined to make such an order. I found that there was no need for it in the circumstances and noted that the Respondent had, to his credit, been faithfully making payment on the other aspects of the Consent Order that were not in dispute. As this was not appealed against, I do not elaborate any further on this.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_63"></a>63 It is unfortunate that much of the present dispute arose from a difference in parties' understanding as to the scope and application of the order for joint custody, which led to their inability to reach a consensus on how to deal with the payment of three months’ worth of preschool fees.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_64"></a>64 In delivering my oral judgment, I conveyed to the parties that an order for joint custody is more than just a veto that either party holds, but represents a commitment made by both parties to work proactively and collaboratively towards the interests of the Children. I hope that with better clarity on each party’s obligations as parents and as partners in this joint-parenting endeavour, and with a more charitable view of each other’s choices, further dispute can be avoided.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Notes of Evidence for hearing on 30 October 2023 (“NE”), p 25</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>Respondent’s Affidavit dated 19 September 2023 (“RAEIC”), [6.1]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>RAEIC, [6.2.1]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>RAEIC, [6.2.2]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>NE, p 30-31</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>NE, p 28</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>NE, p 39</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Complainant’s Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“CAEIC”), [12], [14]; NE, p 14</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>NE, p 13</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>CAEIC, [14]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>CAEIC, [12]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>NE, p 14</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>RAEIC, [6.1]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>NE, p 35</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>NE, p 11</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>RAEIC, [6.1]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>NE, p 33</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 24</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 26</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 28</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 25</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup><em>ibid</em></p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 24</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>CAEIC, p 25</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>NE, p 32</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>NE, p 35</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>NE, p 34</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>CAEIC, [10]</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>NE, p 29</p></div></content></root>	a4b490bacd756c4c322547d0ba8f91e35ad7ef2d

Links from other tables

11 rows from item_version in fc_judgments_changed