fc_judgments_version: 2

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_id	_item	_version	_commit	tags	date	court	case-number	title	citation	url	counsel	timestamp	coram	html	_item_full_hash
2	2	1	1274	[ "Family Law \u2013 Maintenance \u2013 Child", "Family Law \u2013 Maintenance \u2013 Wife" ]	2023-12-19	Family Court	Maintenance Summons No 664 of 2022	WSN v WSO	[2023] SGFC 33	https://www.lawnet.sg:443/lawnet/web/lawnet/free-resources?p_p_id=freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_action=openContentPage&_freeresources_WAR_lawnet3baseportlet_docId=%2FJudgment%2F30779-SSP.xml	[ "Mohamed Hashim Bin Abdul Rasheed and Sofia Bennita d/o Mohamed Bakhash (A Mohamed Hashim) for the Mother", "Mohamed Fazal Bin Abdul Hamid (I.R.B Law LLP) for the Father." ]	2023-12-21T16:00:00Z[GMT]	Tan Zhi Xiang	<root><head><title>WSN v WSO</title></head><content><div class="contentsOfFile"> <h2 align="center" class="title"><span class="caseTitle"> WSN <em>v</em> WSO </span><br><span class="Citation offhyperlink"><a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30779-SSP.xml')">[2023] SGFC 33</a></span></h2><table id="info-table"><tbody><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Case Number</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Maintenance Summons No 664 of 2022</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Decision Date</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">19 December 2023</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Tribunal/Court</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body">Family Court</td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Coram</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Tan Zhi Xiang </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Counsel Name(s)</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> Mohamed Hashim Bin Abdul Rasheed and Sofia Bennita d/o Mohamed Bakhash (A Mohamed Hashim) for the Mother; Mohamed Fazal Bin Abdul Hamid (I.R.B Law LLP) for the Father. </td></tr><tr class="info-row"><td class="txt-label" style="padding: 4px 0px; white-space: nowrap" valign="top">Parties</td><td class="info-delim1" style="padding: 4px">:</td><td class="txt-body"> WSN — WSO </td></tr></tbody></table> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Maintenance</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Child</span></p> <p class="txt-body"><span style="font-style:italic">Family Law</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Maintenance</span> – <span style="font-style:italic">Wife</span></p> <p></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td width="80%"><p class="Judg-Hearing-Date">19 December 2023</p></td><td><p class="Judg-Date-Reserved"></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p> <p class="Judg-Author"> Magistrate Tan Zhi Xiang:</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Introduction</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_1"></a>1 This was the Mother’s application against the Father for maintenance for herself and their four children. I dismissed the application for the following reasons.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Maintenance for the Mother</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_2"></a>2 I first address the Mother’s application for spousal maintenance. The application was dismissed because her reasonable expenses did not exceed her income. The Mother’s estimated expenses were around $1,700 a month, or $1,300 a month taking into adjustments for joint household expenses.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_1" id="Ftn_1_1"><sup>[note: 1]</sup></a></span> It appeared from the Mother’s submissions<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_2" id="Ftn_2_1"><sup>[note: 2]</sup></a></span> that she wanted the Father to pay her expenses fully. This was despite the Mother’s own position that she was earning $1,000 a month.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_3" id="Ftn_3_1"><sup>[note: 3]</sup></a></span> It was also notable that the Mother’s declared expenses included $600 a month for allowance to parents, and $221 a month for holiday expenses.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_3"></a>3 It bears emphasis that as divorce proceedings were underway in the Syariah Court, any order that I could have made would have been interim in nature, to address the parties’ immediate financial needs without a full investigation of the parties’ respective financial positions, and that any order would have been intended to provide modest maintenance (often calculated on a conservative basis) to tide the parties over pending the final determination of the parties’ divorce: see <em>VVQ v VVR</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/26548-SSP.xml')">[2021] SGFC 97</a> at [21], citing <em>UEC v UEB</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/20614-SSP.xml')">[2017] SGFC 92</a> at [10] and <em>Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/[2012] 2 SLR 0506.xml')">[2012] 2 SLR 506</a> at [22]); see also an academic view at [11] below.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_4"></a>4 I did not think that the Mother could reasonably expect the Father to pay for the maintenance of her own parents. The sum of $221 a month for vacations was also rather high taking into account the interim nature of these proceedings. Considering these factors, the Mother’s declared salary was sufficient to cover her expenses, whether calculated on an actual or adjusted basis. Indeed, even during re-examination by her own counsel, the Mother accepted: “the salary I’m earning is only for my---e---enough for---for my personal expenses”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_4" id="Ftn_4_1"><sup>[note: 4]</sup></a></span> I came to this conclusion without even considering the Mother’s rental income and earning capacity, which was likely to be higher than her current income given her higher past salary.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_5"></a>5 The Mother’s application for maintenance for herself was therefore dismissed.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Maintenance for the children</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_6"></a>6 The Mother’s application for the children was dismissed because she had not shown that the Father had neglected to pay reasonable maintenance for the children.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_7"></a>7 As a preliminary point, I clarify that in coming to my decision, to give the Mother the maximum benefit of the doubt, I assumed that, save for the eldest child’s university fees, the Mother’s stated reasonable expenses of the children were reasonable. The children’s reasonable expenses were likely to be significantly lower given that for each of the four children, the Mother included $221 <em>per month per child</em> for “entertainment and holiday”, and $70 a month for “furniture and electronic”: <span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_5" id="Ftn_5_1"><sup>[note: 5]</sup></a></span> see [11] below.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The parties’ cases</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_8"></a>8 The Mother’s case was that the Father had neglected to pay for the children’s reasonable expenses. In particular, she pointed out that her employment by the Father was terminated, and that the Father had terminated the utilities account and the tenancy at one of their properties. The Mother also submitted strenuously that the Father was hiding his income and assets and could afford the maintenance she was seeking. The Father’s case was essentially that he had not failed to provide reasonable maintenance for the children.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">The law</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_9"></a>9 The law on the reasonableness of maintenance is set out in <em>UHA v UHB and another appeal</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/24410-SSP.xml')">[2020] 3 SLR 666</a> (“<em>UHA v UHB</em>”). Aside from the reasonableness of the nature of quantum of expenses, the Court also considers the reasonableness of communication of expenses. Thus, “to find neglect or refusal to provide maintenance, the alleged non-paying party must be aware or ought to have been aware of the child’s needs or expenses”: at [48]. The Court further added at [59] and [60]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">… The Mother has to communicate the child’s needs and expenses reasonably. The Father has to have an opportunity to provide reasonable maintenance before the matter is escalated to court. Regardless of how extensive court proceedings are, I do not think the request should be found only in an affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">I find that despite the Father’s requests, the Mother did not provide any information on the child’s expenses before commencing the maintenance application. …</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_10"></a>10 It is clear from the above that the child’s needs and expenses must be communicated <em>before</em> the application for maintenance is filed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_11"></a>11 Professor Leong Wai Kum has also written, in relation to maintenance for children (<em>Elements of Family Law in Singapore</em>, LexisNexis, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 2018 at paragraphs 12.111 and 12.113):</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">The author suggests that the maintenance of a wife during marriage should be appreciated as the provision of emergency financial help so that the goal in assessing her maintenance must be to ensure that her basic needs are met to the extent which the husband is able to meet them. The same must be true of maintenance of a child by her parent… The relationships… between the child and her parent… are continuing. Intervention by the court into such continuing relationships should be as minimally invasive as possible.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Such reported cases as there are demonstrate that the amounts ordered tend to be fairly modest. The courts use the law of maintenance to order the defendant to meet the child’s modest neds to the extent that she can…</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-2">Discussion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_12"></a>12 As alluded above, the overarching issue was whether the Father had neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for the children. This was the threshold issue that the Mother had to prove before the substance of her claims could be analysed. In my view, she had not crossed this threshold for two independent reasons. First, she had not proven that there was a shortfall between the Father’s contribution and the children’s expenses. Second, she had not shown that even if there was a shortfall, the Father was aware of the shortfall.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-3">Whether there was a shortfall between Father’s contribution and children’s reasonable expenses</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-4">(1) Lack of clarity in the Mother’s case</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_13"></a>13 In a case like this, the usual approach would be to first determine the children’s reasonable expenses, then apportion the expenses between parents in accordance with legal principles. The Father’s determined portion (which I assumed was 100% in my analysis here to give the Mother the maximum benefit of the doubt) will then be compared against what he has been providing <em>in fact</em> to determine if there was neglect. However, the Mother’s analysis appears to have stopped at the first step.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_14"></a>14 In particular, aside from the table at paragraph 14 of her written submissions (discussed at [19] below), the Mother had not set out her own calculations or even estimates, supported with evidence, of the Father’s <em>actual</em> contributions to the children’s expenses. All the Court had to work with were bits and pieces set out below. Thus, it was not possible to even begin calculating if there was a shortfall. I explain with reference to the Mother’s evidence at trial and submissions.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_15"></a>15 On the last day of trial, the Mother accepted the Father’s statement in his final affidavit R11 that “I have always paid for the children’s daily expenses, their school fees, and the family holiday”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_6" id="Ftn_6_1"><sup>[note: 6]</sup></a></span> Her evidence was that both parties contributed:<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_7" id="Ftn_7_1"><sup>[note: 7]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Yes, Ma’am. So sorry if I am being confusing, but I’m referring to my client’s latest affidavit.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Latest one, okay. R9, okay. Page 3, right?</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Page 3, that’s correct. Item 8, can you see? The column.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Uh, yes.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Yes. Under children’s expenses, just for the record.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Yes.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Yes. Thank you.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Yes.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q So, if I could repeat my question? Confronting you with this a---this---this evidence that my client have---</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Yes.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q he is able to provide.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Okay.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Are you denying that he pays for all these?</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A I’m not denying---</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q You’re not denying.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A he paying, yah.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Thank you.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A I’m also paying also.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q That’s fine. Yes. Yes.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A So, this is on top of what I’ve paid. Yah.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Both parties are paying, isn’t it?</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Yah, correct.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q That is a point. Thank you.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_16"></a>16 I digress briefly to clarify that while Father’s counsel referred to R9 instead of R11 according to the transcripts, the Mother was clearly looking at the correct affidavit, in light of her answers to counsel’s questions. The Father’s counsel also specified that he was referring to the Father’s “latest affidavit”, which was R11. The same reference in R9 relates to the completely different issue of the financial documents for a property, so there could not have been any misunderstanding.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_17"></a>17 The Mother also accepted that the Father had paid at least part of the children’s expenses. In particular, the Mother also accepted that she was not able to bear witness to all the expenses that the Father spent on the children, and that the Father paid for at least some of the children’s food.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_8" id="Ftn_8_1"><sup>[note: 8]</sup></a></span> The Mother also accepted that the Father passed the children money directly when asked.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_9" id="Ftn_9_1"><sup>[note: 9]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_18"></a>18 In re-examination, the Mother, when pushed by her counsel, hesitantly offered a figure of $300 to $400 as the sum that the Father would spend on the children monthly. However, in the same breath, the Mother quickly added that the Father also paid for the children’s clothing when asked, and purchased for the children tickets for a Taylor Swift concert which cost more than $1,000, and that he had also bought them tickets to a Blackpink concert.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_10" id="Ftn_10_1"><sup>[note: 10]</sup></a></span> The Father had also exhibited documentary proof that he had paid substantial sums for family holidays.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_11" id="Ftn_11_1"><sup>[note: 11]</sup></a></span> Clearly, the Father was not as stingy as the Mother sometimes sought to portray him.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_19"></a>19 More confusingly, there was also a table in the Mother’s submissions where she addressed the Father’s claims on his reasonable expenses on himself<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_12" id="Ftn_12_1"><sup>[note: 12]</sup></a></span> and the children.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_13" id="Ftn_13_1"><sup>[note: 13]</sup></a></span> Under the second column of the table, it was recorded that the Father claimed that he spent $3,400 per month on the children.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_14" id="Ftn_14_1"><sup>[note: 14]</sup></a></span> Under the third column of the same table, it was recorded that the Mother’s assessed “reasonable amount” was $2,004.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_15" id="Ftn_15_1"><sup>[note: 15]</sup></a></span> What is this “reasonable amount”? The Mother placed this table here in her submissions with virtually no explanation. Be that as it may, this appears to be amount that the Mother accepted that the Father had been paying a month. If so, why had the Mother not given the Father credit for these payments in her calculations at paragraphs 2 and 7 of her closing submissions? Does this also not contradict her figure of $300 to $400 a month which she mentioned at trial (see preceding paragraph)? In any event, I was unable to accept the revised figure of $2,004, because the Mother’s reasons for revising the Father’s figure downwards was not put to the Father in cross-examination at all.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_20"></a>20 In light of the above, I considered that there was:</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_20-p2_a"></a>(a) Lack of clarity as to the Mother’s position on extent of the Father’s contributions.</p> <p class="Judg-2"><a id="p1_20-p2_b"></a>(b) Lack of clarity as to the extent of the Father’s contributions.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_21"></a>21 Both were independently fatal to the Mother’s case, as the burden was squarely on her to show that the Father had failed to provide adequate maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_22"></a>22 In relation to (a), even if I had given the Mother the benefit of the doubt and accepted her position as what she had written in the letter of Court of 6 November 2023 (that the Father “was only paying the children’s meals and some expenses on an <em>ad hoc</em> basis),<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_16" id="Ftn_16_1"><sup>[note: 16]</sup></a></span> I was unable to find in her favour because even on the Mother’s own evidence, the Father went beyond contributing to basic necessities and provided for expensive non-essential spending such as holidays and concert tickets.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_23"></a>23 The lack of clarity in the sense of (b) above was more fundamental. Because of the various concessions made by the Mother that the Father had been contributing to the children’s maintenance (see [15] to [18] above), it was important that she set out her calculations on how much the Father had been actually paying, and the shortfall she had to top up. Without the numbers to back her claim, her assertion that the Father had not maintained the children adequately was nothing more than a bare assertion.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_24"></a>24 Instead, as highlighted above, the Mother’s analysis stopped at the first step: see [13] above. At paragraph 2 of her written submissions, the Mother had claimed almost fully for the children’s reasonable expenses, without giving credit to the Father for his contributions, save for his share of the rental proceeds of a property. Insofar as the Mother sought to argue that she did not take into account the Father’s contributions because they were <em>de minimis</em>, I rejected this argument for the reasons set out in the discussion above.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_25"></a>25 To be clear, it was not sufficient for the Mother to show that she had been paying part of the children’s expenses. She may had, like other loving parents, paid for expenses which went beyond what a Court would consider reasonable and necessary. It was also not sufficient for the Mother to show that her employment by the Father was terminated, or that the Father had terminated the utilities account or the tenancy at one of their properties. All these, if true, would count towards the Father’s contributions (or lack of) when the Syariah Court divides the matrimonial assets. But they did not by themselves show that there was a shortfall.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_26"></a>26 Thus, on this ground alone, I found that the Mother had not proven that the Father had not been contributing adequately to the children’s maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-4">(2) Failure to challenge the Father’s case</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_27"></a>27 In any event, compounding these difficulties in the Mother’s case was that almost the entirety of the Father’s cross-examination was spent on examining the Father’s assets and means, and whether parties had agreed to settle (an issue which I will address below). As a result, the Father’s evidence that he had been contributing to the children’s maintenance substantially ($3,400)<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_17" id="Ftn_17_1"><sup>[note: 17]</sup></a></span> was unchallenged in cross-examination. This is striking because the sum of $3,400 is close to the sum which the Mother claimed were the children’s reasonable expenses, a sum which was in any event significantly inflated; if necessary I would have found that the children’s reasonable expenses did not exceed $3,400: see [7] and [11] above.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_18" id="Ftn_18_1"><sup>[note: 18]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_28"></a>28 For completeness, I note that a brief part of the Father’s cross-examination was spent on the Father’s claims that he had been spending certain sums on the children ($1,000 on food and groceries, $200 for eating out and $1,150 for entertainment and outings).<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_19" id="Ftn_19_1"><sup>[note: 19]</sup></a></span> Counsel for the Mother was seeking to use this aspect of the Father’s evidence to justify the Mother’s list of expenses, <em>ie</em>, because the Father was spending these sums on the children on top of the Mother’s rental proceeds which she had been spending on the children, it could be argued that the Mother’s list of expenses for the children were not inflated. At no point in this line of cross-examination was the Father’s alleged spending on the children challenged. Indeed, it appears from counsel’s strategy that he accepted the Father’s claims that he had spent those sums on the children.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_29"></a>29 Further, the Mother, in her letter of 6 November 2023 filed (without leave) in response to the Father’s closing submissions, did not deny that the Father was not cross-examined on this issue, but instead tried to explain this inadequacy in her case by arguing that “the [Father] is well aware of the [Mother]’s case and his case was presented to the [Mother] … and the [Mother] extensively engaged the same”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_20" id="Ftn_20_1"><sup>[note: 20]</sup></a></span> This missed the point, which was that the Mother’s case that the Father did not contribute adequately to the children’s expenses was not put <em>to the Father</em>. And while the Mother cited case law stating that the rule in <em>Browne v Dunn</em> should not be applied rigidly, the issue of the extent to which the Father had been contributing to the children’s expenses was a key (if not, <em>the</em> key) issue in this case, and the failure of the Mother’s counsel to touch on it on cross-examination was a serious deficiency.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_30"></a>30 In particular, as stated above at [19], the Mother explained at paragraph 14 of her written submissions her reasons (for each particular expense) for not agreeing with the Father’s claim on how much he had been spending on the children. These reasons were not put to the Father in cross-examination, and hence the Father was not given a chance to rebut the Mother’s position. For example, the Mother disagreed with many of the Father’s declared expenses on the children because the statements tendered were dated 2020, “when the marriage is [sic] still good”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_21" id="Ftn_21_1"><sup>[note: 21]</sup></a></span> In my view, it did not necessarily follow that the Father would spend less on the children because his relationship with the Mother deteriorated. It was a point that should have been put to the Father during cross-examination. Thus, while the Father was aware of the Mother’s case <em>broadly</em>, he was not aware of the Mother’s case<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_22" id="Ftn_22_1"><sup>[note: 22]</sup></a></span> as to the <em>specific expenses</em> in his list of children’s expenses.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_31"></a>31 I also note that while the Mother had argued that the rule of <em>Browne v Dunn</em> should not be applied rigidly, she also submitted that the Father had failed to put specific questions to her in cross-examination.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_23" id="Ftn_23_1"><sup>[note: 23]</sup></a></span> She clearly accepted that important points of a party’s case must be put to the other party. I further note that she argued that it was not put to her that her declared expenses on the children were inflated.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_24" id="Ftn_24_1"><sup>[note: 24]</sup></a></span> In my view, this was misguided. I have expressed my view above that the declared expense of $221 a month per child for holidays was extravagant. In this case, it was not disputed that both parties had spent significant sums on overseas holidays, <em>ie</em>, there was no dispute of <em>fact</em>. The question whether such expenses amounted to reasonable expenses (and whether the Court should in principle order a parent to spend on non-essentials like holidays) is a question of law that could and should be addressed in submissions.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_32"></a>32 In light of the Mother’s failure to challenge the Father’s evidence on his spending on the children in cross-examination, it would be inequitable for this Court to reject the Father’s evidence for the reasons set out by the Mother.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_25" id="Ftn_25_1"><sup>[note: 25]</sup></a></span> This, along with the lack of clarify of the Mother’s case as to how much the Father had been spending on the children, made it impossible for this Court to find on a balance of probabilities that the Father had neglected to maintain the children.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-3">Whether the Father was aware of the children’s needs</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_33"></a>33 In any event, even if there was a shortfall, the Father did not neglect to maintain the children because the Father was not aware of the shortfall.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_34"></a>34 The law on the reasonableness of maintenance is set out above. Save for the eldest child’s private university fees, the Mother did not expressly communicate the children’s needs to the Father. She accepted during cross-examination that “You are right to say I never asked for more maintenance, yah”.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_26" id="Ftn_26_1"><sup>[note: 26]</sup></a></span> The Mother confirmed her answer in response to her counsel’s clarification in re-examination:<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_27" id="Ftn_27_1"><sup>[note: 27]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Alright. Alright. Alright. Okay. The follow up---a clarification to that when you say you decided to ask him, did you inform him of the amount you require?</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Uh, no, actually, no.</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">…</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">Q Okay. You---no, no, no, I---I am not---I can’t rephrase the question but I’m asking for clarification in answer to the question, right? Whether you’ve him to provide more maintenance. That was the question. Whether you did ask him to provide more maintenance. And you said that you’ve never asked for more maintenance. Right? Can you explain that? Can you clarify?</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A Okay. I did not ask him for more maintenance, but I did ask him to pay for the son---the son’s tuition fee, which is part of the maintenance, lah.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_35"></a>35 The Mother’s position is that the Father should have asked her whether she had enough money,<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_28" id="Ftn_28_1"><sup>[note: 28]</sup></a></span> and that in any event, she had asked the Father through this application.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_29" id="Ftn_29_1"><sup>[note: 29]</sup></a></span> This is plainly not the law.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_36"></a>36 <em>UHA v UHB</em> is instructive here because the Father here, like the father in <em>UHA v UHB</em>, had been paying some maintenance. He was not a parent who has disappeared from the children’s lives and left them to fend for themselves with their mother. He had made an effort to provide for the children, and if that was not enough, it was incumbent on the Mother to inform him before filing this application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_37"></a>37 It bears noting that in a letter of clarification from Mother’s counsel dated 19 October 2023, the Mother’s counsel did not point the Court to any instance when the Mother had communicated the children’s needs to the Father, save for the eldest child’s private university tuition. While I will address the merits of the Mother’s claim on the eldest child’s private university fees separately below, I will just observe here that it is not clear why the Mother felt able to raise the question of tuition fees but no other aspects of maintenance to the Father. In re-examination, the Mother sought to explain why she did not ask the Father for additional money for the children’s maintenance:<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_30" id="Ftn_30_1"><sup>[note: 30]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">A I have to justify what I am spending. I have to justify to get more money. It was a chore to ask him. Right?</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_38"></a>38 If it was a “chore” to ask the Father for more money, or if there was any other unspoken reason, why was the Mother able to expressly ask the Father to pay the eldest child’s private university tuition, but not for the children’s other expenses? This, in my view, highlights the fact that the Mother had not sufficiently explained why she had not sought maintenance from the Father before the application was filed.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_39"></a>39 Shortly before the decision of this matter was delivered, the Mother filed further submissions on 6 November 2023. A new argument in the letter was that <em>UHA v UHB</em> could be distinguished on its facts, and that the touchstone is whether the respondent in an application of maintenance must be aware or ought to have been aware of the child’s needs. The Mother submitted that because the Father had terminated her employment and the tenancy at one of their properties, the Father must have been aware that she needed more money for maintenance. I was prepared to accept the Mother’s submission that <em>UHA v UHB</em> does not require express communication in every case, and that a respondent’s awareness of the children’s needs can in principle be inferred from the circumstances. However, even if that were correct, I did not think that the circumstances were such that the Father was or ought to have been aware of any shortfall in the children’s maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_40"></a>40 The Mother did not dispute that the Father had been contributing to the children’s maintenance (see the discussion from [14] above). As such, it did not necessarily follow from the Mother’s allegations of the Father’s conduct (even if true) that the children were not being reasonably maintained by either or both parents. The Father could have assumed that what he had been providing, together with the Mother’s fair contributions, were largely sufficient. In any event, it was not put to the Father that he must or should have been aware that the children were in need of maintenance because of these reasons. Thus, I did not accept, even on the Mother’s reading of <em>UHA v UHB</em>, that the Father was or ought to have been aware (even if true) that there was a shortfall in the children’s maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_41"></a>41 For completeness, it was also significant that the Father had obliged when the children asked for money: [17] and [18] above. This showed that he was willing to pay extra if it was made known to him that the children required more money. This further cemented my view that Court intervention was not appropriate.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-3">Private University tuition fees</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_42"></a>42 I address this expense separately because it was undisputed that the Mother had informed the Father about this expense before the claim was filed. The Mother gave evidence that when she informed the Father about the eldest child’s private university tuition fees, the Father did not want to pay because he was of the view that the eldest child should have enrolled in ITE.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_31" id="Ftn_31_1"><sup>[note: 31]</sup></a></span> The quantum of fees can also be determined easily. Thus, the above discussion does not apply to this specific expense. I am hence prepared to consider this expense on its merits.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_43"></a>43 Nevertheless, I am of the view that the Father should not, at least at this juncture, be ordered to pay the eldest child’s fees. In <em>UYT v UYU and another appeal</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/24272-SSP.xml')">[2020] SGHCF 8</a> (“<em>UYT v UYU</em>”), the High Court, faced with a similar situation, remarked that the Court was placed in an unenviable position to compare and assess different courses. However, this was not even possible here as the Mother’s evidence<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_32" id="Ftn_32_1"><sup>[note: 32]</sup></a></span> only explained why she had enrolled the eldest child in a private university – she did not lead evidence as to why she had chosen to enrol the eldest child in a private university <em>instead of pursuing other more affordable options</em>. No attempt to weigh the different options was clear from the evidence. In my view, this was a necessary step to show that the decision to enrol the eldest child into a private university was reasonable. This was especially since the fees at the private university were not negligible – the Mother was claiming more than $23,000.<span class="FootnoteRef"><a href="#Ftn_33" id="Ftn_33_1"><sup>[note: 33]</sup></a></span></p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_44"></a>44 The fact that the Mother had decided to enrol the eldest child in a private university did not mean that the Father was automatically obliged to pay for the tuition fees. As the High Court held in <em>UYT v UYU</em> at [12]:</p> <p class="Judg-Quote-1">… s 69(5)(c) WC, which the court below relied upon, does not create a specific obligation on the parent to pay for the tertiary education of the child. Section 69(5)(c) is to be read with s 69(2) WC, and that is a provision for the duty of a parent to provide maintenance. Maintenance, as we know, does not mean maintaining fully or of an unreasonable amount. To say that a parent has a duty to maintain a child is not the same as saying he must pay for all the expenses of the child’s education.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_45"></a>45 Further, this expense did not become reasonable simply because the Father could afford it: see <em>WOS v WOT</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/30067-SSP.xml')">[2023] SGHCF 36</a> at [50]. It also bears emphasis that there was no Court order granting the Mother unilateral authority to make decisions on the eldest child, nor was there an order for the Father to pay for the eldest child’s general education expenses. Thus, given that the Mother had not adduced evidence as to why it was reasonable to enrol the eldest child in a private university as opposed to other more affordable options, I declined to order the Father to pay those fees.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_46"></a>46 For completeness, I also considered the possibility of ordering the Father to pay a reasonable amount for the eldest child’s tertiary education expenses. However, as I was not addressed on this point, nor was any evidence led on what would have been a reasonable amount, I did not make such an order.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-3">Agreement</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_47"></a>47 The Mother also raised a collateral issue on whether there was an agreement to settle the matter. In my view, this was not relevant save as to costs. The parties had not recorded an agreement through the offer-to-settle regime, nor had they recorded a consent order in Court. Insofar as the Mother sought to argue that parties had entered into a private agreement, this was a matter for contract law, for which this Court has no jurisdiction to apply. To be clear, this Court can take into account an agreement while making orders pursuant to s 69 of the Women’s Charter 1961, but as explained above, this was not possible because the threshold issue of neglect (which must be crossed before s 69 can be invoked) had not been crossed. There is also no order provision in the Women’s Charter 1961 that empowers a Family Court to directly enforce a private agreement on maintenance.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-3">Other issues</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_48"></a>48 I considered the possibility of setting out my views on both parties’ assets and means and the maintenance I would have ordered if I were wrong on the above issues.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_49"></a>49 However, I decided against that. First, doing so could result in inconsistent findings between this Court and the Syariah Court, which is hearing the divorce and the ancillary matters. It would also not have been right for this Court to serve as a forum to obtain ammunition for the Syariah Court proceedings. Thus, it would be appropriate to express my views on these issues only if absolutely necessary. Second, the Father had not had an opportunity to respond to the specific allegations on his assets and means in the Mother’s written submissions. If the proceedings were remitted back to me, I would prefer to grant the Father a right of reply.</p> <p class="Judg-Heading-1">Conclusion</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_50"></a>50 For the above reasons, I dismissed the application.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_51"></a>51 I stress again that in coming to this conclusion, I assumed that the Mother’s case on the children’s reasonable expenses were reasonable, and that the Father should be responsible for all of the children’s reasonable expenses. Both assumptions were made for the benefit of the Mother and were highly unlikely to hold true if a full analysis were carried out.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_52"></a>52 I fixed costs at $30,000 to be paid by the Mother to the Father. In fixing costs, I took into the account the number of trial dates, the offer-to-settle made by the Father, and the Father’s disruptive and discourteous conduct at trial, in contrast to the Mother whom I find to be an honest and earnest witness.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_53"></a>53 I also note that this was an extraordinary case which had taken too long to conclude considering the nature of the matter. The Mother had served requests for discovery and interrogatories totally more than 100 items right on the doorstop of trial, which necessitated a lengthy adjournment. A large proportion of time was also spent on cross-examination of the Father’s assets and means, an issue which had become moot. The Father’s difficult conduct had also contributed to the delay.</p> <p class="Judg-1"><a id="p1_54"></a>54 I also register my disapproval at the Mother’s filing of further submissions by way of letter on 6 November 2023 without leave. It is trite that such conduct is a discourtesy to the Court, and the Court is at liberty to disregard such submissions: <em>WJM v WNN</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/Judgment/29555-SSP.xml')">[2023] SGHCF 18</a> at [13] and <em>VEW v VEV</em> <a class="pagecontent" href="javascript:viewPageContent('/SLR/28897-SSP.xml')">[2022] 2 SLR 380</a> at [9]. I had only addressed the arguments in the letter to show the Mother that her case would fail even if I were to consider all her arguments. It should not be taken as encouragement for any counsel to do the same in the future.</p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_1_1" id="Ftn_1">[note: 1]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 9.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_2_1" id="Ftn_2">[note: 2]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 2.1.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_3_1" id="Ftn_3">[note: 3]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 6.1.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_4_1" id="Ftn_4">[note: 4]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, p 39.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_5_1" id="Ftn_5">[note: 5]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 7.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_6_1" id="Ftn_6">[note: 6]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit affirmed 19 June 2023 (R11) at p 3, Item 8.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_7_1" id="Ftn_7">[note: 7]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 11 July 2023, p 34.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_8_1" id="Ftn_8">[note: 8]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 11 July 2023, p 33.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_9_1" id="Ftn_9">[note: 9]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, p 27.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_10_1" id="Ftn_10">[note: 10]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 11 July 2023, pp 55 and 56.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_11_1" id="Ftn_11">[note: 11]</a></sup>Father’s affidavit affirmed 19 June 2023 (R11) at Tab B.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_12_1" id="Ftn_12">[note: 12]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 14 (starting from p 123).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_13_1" id="Ftn_13">[note: 13]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 14 (starting from p 130).</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_14_1" id="Ftn_14">[note: 14]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at p 136.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_15_1" id="Ftn_15">[note: 15]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at p 136.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_16_1" id="Ftn_16">[note: 16]</a></sup>Mother’s letter dated 6 November 2023 at paragraph 2.2.6.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_17_1" id="Ftn_17">[note: 17]</a></sup>Father’s AEIC (R1) dated 10 June 2022 at Tab C.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_18_1" id="Ftn_18">[note: 18]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 2.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_19_1" id="Ftn_19">[note: 19]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 12 April 2023, pp 76 to 79.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_20_1" id="Ftn_20">[note: 20]</a></sup>Mother’s letter dated 6 November 2023 at paragraph 2.4.14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_21_1" id="Ftn_21">[note: 21]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_22_1" id="Ftn_22">[note: 22]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_23_1" id="Ftn_23">[note: 23]</a></sup>Mother’s letter dated 6 November 2023 at paragraphs 2.4.4, 2.5.6 and 2.5.7.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_24_1" id="Ftn_24">[note: 24]</a></sup>Mother’s letter dated 6 November 2023 at paragraphs 2.4.4.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_25_1" id="Ftn_25">[note: 25]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 14.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_26_1" id="Ftn_26">[note: 26]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 21 June 2022, p 39.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_27_1" id="Ftn_27">[note: 27]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, pp 32 and 33.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_28_1" id="Ftn_28">[note: 28]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, p 34.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_29_1" id="Ftn_29">[note: 29]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, p 35.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_30_1" id="Ftn_30">[note: 30]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, p 32.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_31_1" id="Ftn_31">[note: 31]</a></sup>Certified Transcript, 2 August 2022, pp 33 and 34.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_32_1" id="Ftn_32">[note: 32]</a></sup>Mother’s AEIC (C1) at paragraph 28.</p><p class="Footnote"><sup><a href="#Ftn_33_1" id="Ftn_33">[note: 33]</a></sup>Mother’s written submissions at paragraph 2.1.3.</p></div></content></root>	84cdda9b2b67ff9f8e6b85c06384e97bcc831534

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